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ABSTRACT 
This thesis reports on my attempts to 're-align' the purpose, behaviour and 
underlying culture of a large military organisation through heuristic, self-
reflective enquiry - to 'find its future' - with and through its people. I use the word 
re-align with great care as I recognised that change would have been too 
ambitious and would (probably have) result(ed) in failure. Whilst I cannot claim 
total success, I have made new and valuable discoveries in knowledge elicitation 
and methods of integrating the views of a large number of people to 'build and 
reinforce consensus around initiatives for change'. 
In the process of completing this research I developed a novel approach to 
strategic planning/policy making that advances the ends, ways and means 
construct of decision-making into a purer and more refined approach. One that 
anchors these elements firmly to the organisation and its environment 
simultaneously through a knowledge management system, enabling the strengths 
and weaknesses within the organisation to be drawn into sharp focus - an effects-
based planning approach. I have also fused together the more systematic and 
disciplined approaches embodied within a knowledge management system with 
existing and more creative scenario planning/future focussed methods. Thus 
allowing organisations to undertake 'self-constructed' audits that have an 
immediate interest or are situated well into their future, doubling its value as a 
planning device. 
As I report, the methods have been presented at the highest levels of Defence, 
attracting interest from the Australian Minister of Defence. The New Zealand 
Defence Force, Naval Warfare Development Command of the United States Navy 
and Australia's Chief of Air Force have also expressed an interest in the potential 
of an effects-based orientation to planning and policy-making. 
iii 
Whether the concepts and underpinning ideas become established, leading to the 
discovery of a post-modem military is uncertain. What is clear is that there is a 
definite move away from a pre-occupation with the means, or the things that are 
done, towards a more comprehensive understanding of what are we trying to 
make happen as a guiding principle. This is certainly of value within military 
'organisations and has potential for others involved in complex problem-solving in 
social settings. 
A heuristic, self-reflective approach has enriched this search for focussed and 
'change-finding' knowledge, allowing a more purposeful, complete and forthright 
account of the involvement of others. 
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GLOSSARY 
This glossary is a compilation of military and civil terminology drawn from a 
range of government, military (and necessarily not of a restricted nature) and open 
source locations. There are many terms that the reader will have encountered 
before, but it has been necessary to assign a slightly different meaning to align 
more completely with the focus and product of this thesis. Many may cause 
confusion on initial reading. This is to be expected, as the true meaning will only 
become clear after having read the entire thesis and understanding the contexts in 
which these terms are used. Many are also 'nested' within others to give a more 
complex expression. 
As this work has proven to have wide applicability outside of the military the 
reader should also remain open-minded about how these terms may have 
relevance in the commercial or private sector. 
In a departure from convention I have omitted the sources of these definitions. 
Although most are freely available from United States military web pages. Where 
a new term is introduced that the reader may not be familiar with, or one that has 
a specific meaning within this thesis, it will be contained within single quotations 
in its first appearance and presented as normal text from then on. 
Active Adaptation 
ADFP 
is the meta-learning state of ideal seeking, purposeful behaviour. It is 
synonymous with Kohlberg's 3.2 level of moral development. Changing, 
as an anticipatory response to stimuli not yet readily discernable. 
stands for Australian Defence Force Publication. It is usually combined -
with a number to indicate the specific publication, for example ADFP 25 
Psychological Operations. 
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Campaign Planning 
integrates both deliberate and immediate planning processes and seeks to 
orchestrate and sequence the ways for tactical means to achieve strategic 
ends. 
Capability 
is defined within the military as the combination of force structure and 
preparedness. More commonly taken to refer to the capacity of the 
military to conduct a particular type, or form of military activity. 
Capability is expressed with~n the three elements, or domains, of physical, 
moral and intellectual: the means to fight, the will to fight and the 
knowledge to fight. 
Capacities 
are the descriptors that bring additional information to the 'means', they 
are simple, action oriented phrases that bundle together in various 
configurations to enable means to be undertaken. The expressions used _ 
should have a competency orientation (see competencies). Whilst it could 
be reasonably expected that a capability secures the ability to undertake a 
means - a quality of being able, a capacity is more expressive of the state 
of possibility that attaches to various parts of the organisation. A simple 
example could be: capable of improvement, but not in the possession of 
the necessary capacity. 
Clandestine Operations 
accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence and other similar activities 
sponsored or conducted in such a way as to assume secrecy or 
concealment. They differ from covert operations in which emphasis is 
placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. 
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Competencies 
are used interchangeably with capacities. In the formal domain of training 
it is the specification of knowledge and skill and the application of that 
knowledge and skill to the standard of performance required in the 
employment. I use the term here in a broader sense. 
Components of Capability 
are: the Physical, the Moral and the Intellectual. 
• The Physical component- is expressed through six inter-linked 
elements of: people, organisation, support and facilities, 
training, equipm.ent and doctrine. These are coupled in 
different ways through Battlespace Operating Systems (BOS) 
to generate military power. The mechanisms through which 
these abstract interelationships occur has not been fully 
explained within the doctrine. 
• The Moral component - combines all those individual, 
organisational and institutional aspects that ensures there is a 
morally sound, appropriate and defensible basis upon which 
action (of any type) is authorised. It governs and shapes the 
behaviour that is linked to a common purpose. 
• The Intellectual component - combines professional mastery 
and innovative concepts. It is an expression of individual and 
team competence and striving for advancement through a 
concept-led approach. 
Covert Operations 
are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of, or permit 
plausible denial by, the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations 
in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor 
rather than on concealment of the operation. 
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Doctrine 
Effects 
is the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions 
in support of national objectives. Doctrine guides the development of 
tactics, techniques and procedures that allow soldiers and units to 
cooperatively channel their activities to the outcome being sought. 
is an extension of the Clausewitzian approach to policy/politik in that it is 
necessary to 'impose our will' upon our opponent in order to secure 
success. Effects are, therefore, the (sometimes) behavioural expressions 
that indicate the directions of these changes in will. They can be coercive 
or seductive. They are the outcomes that we are endeavouring to bring 
about as a result of our actions. From an Effects-Based Operations (EBO) 
purist's perspective the effects should not be derived from a consideration 
of what actions can produce them. They must offer a solution, or change 
in the strategic conditions, that deliver the desired end-state. 
Effects-Based Operations 
or EBO is an approach to the planning and sequencing of actions to 
achieve objectives. I believe it is the next Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA). Its use is informed by a thorough understanding of, Effects-Based 
Strategy, which forms the strategy/policy issues which occupy the 
problem space at a national or international level. EBO is gaining interest 
and a following throughout, at least, Western military planning. It has a 
critical point of origin for all analysis that demands an expression of 
"What is it that we want to have happen?" It lifts military planning out of 
the delivery of destruction-based (causing heat and blast) effects that have 
only a military consequence. The effect within EBO can be an expression 
of the physical, psychological, environmental, political, social, industrial, 
technical and/or economic. It allows for a more complete expression of the 
use of national power and a whole of government approach. 
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Effectiveness 
has been variously described as the extent to which the area/item of 
interest is accomplishing its purpose. Whilst it is a simple concept, it is 
used in a multitude of contexts, but remains both a quantitative (albeit 
subjectively derived) and qualitative measure of fitness for purpose. Its 
meaning within this thesis will be dealt with at length in Chapter 4, 
aligning principally with the degree to which the area of interest fulfils its 
raison d'etre. 
Efficiency 
although not dealt with in detail within this thesis, efficiency is a 
necessary partner to effectiveness and reflects the relative costs (not only 
in dollar terms) of undertaking an action. 
Elite Conventional Operations 
Ends 
are those activities which, while requiring selected personnel, technology, 
training, and strategic direction, are conceived and planned from within 
the current universal military expectations for the conduct of operations. 
At their most sophisticated, these operations are strategically projected, 
high risk, short notice and politically sensitive. To maximise their chances 
of success, and in an effort to concentrate scarce resources, they are 
regarded as beyond the range and capabilities of conventional units. The 
fact that an adversary may expect these operations make them 
conventional, their need for specialist personnel and skills make them 
elite. 
are similar to objectives, they are what we are in pursuit of, but within this 
thesis they have been combined with another word - states - to produce 
end-states: an expressive account of a changed (and ideally more 
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favourable) condition that results from undertaking a series of actions. 
This element will be fully explained in Chapter Four. 
End-state 
is the set of desired conditions which will achieve the strategic objectives. 
This definition is somewhat incomplete and almost a reversal of reality, 
the objectives could also be considered to be the embodiment of the end-
state. Within this thesis the definition has been broadened to accommodate 
. the fullest expression of conditional and contextual ingredients that 
provide an unambiguous account of the state arrived at following the 
successful deployment of an orchestrated series of actions. End-state 
describes the commander's desired outcome for the operation or the state 
that the commander wishes to exist when the operation is complete. It 
defines the success criteria for the operation and may include descriptions 
of status and locations of actors. 
Environmental Textures 
describe the existence of interdependencies between various elements 
around and within an organisation that create their own dynamic cause-
effect behaviour. 
Force Structure 
is the term used to describe a grouping of physical capabilities into a 
particular arrangement that aligns against a specific task or allows training 
to be undertaken. 
HUM INT 
human intelligence is the specific information derived from the 
intelligence collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources 
and collectors, and where the human being is the primary collection 
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instrument. It is the only method that can capture information on the mood 
of a people or society - critical for the success of psychological operations. 
Government Strategic Guidance 
Government provides direction and guidance to the Chief of the Defence 
Force, which would include: 
a statement of the required national end-state; 
a definition of national interests which require a military response; 
a statement of the circumstances in which the Australian Defence 
Force (ADF) may be committed; 
constraints and limitations within which operations are to be 
conducted; 
the extent to which national resources would be devoted to the 
ADF; 
the legal basis for deployment; and 
a statement to allow the framing of National Policy (NATPOL) 
and subsequent Rules Of Engagement (ROE). 
Campaigns and operations are planned and directed at the operational 
level to achieve. strategic objectives. It is the level that links military 
strategic objectives and all tactical activity in the theatre. Operational 
planning cannot be accomplished in isolation from the strategic level; the 
two processes are inextricably linked. Ideally, operational and strategic 
level planning will be initiated at the same time with each process 
informing the other. 
The link between the strategic and tactical levels must provide the ways of 
using the tactical means to achieve the required strategic/national ends. 
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are the actions that can be undertaken that make a contribution towards the 
achievement of the desired effects. They are context-free and aid planning 
in a future-focussed manner; when a context is encountered then specific 
adjustments are undertaken to tailor the response using micro-alignments 
in the organisation, which are themselves informed by deeper levels of 
analysis. This element will be fully explained in Chapter Four. 
Military Creativity 
requires the constructive application of military expertise, broad 
educational influences, imagination, experimentation and critical analysis 
to produce novel solutions to unique problems which are timely, relevant 
and attuned to a commander's needs and intent. 
Mission 
is a clear concise statement of the task and its purpose. When used in a 
military context as a mission statement it must have a verb leading to 
afford an action-orientation and contain the phrase in order to as a prefix 
to the purpose. 
National Interests 
are the general and continuing ends for which a State acts. 
National Military Strategy 
is the art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain 
national objectives in peace and war. 
National Security Strategy 
is the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the 
instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and 
informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. 
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National Strategy 
is the art and science of developing and using the political, economic and 
psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during 
peace and war to secure national objectives. 
Non-Government Organisation 
is a transnational organisation of private citizens that maintain a 
consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations. Non-governmental organisations (NGO) may be professional 
associations, foundations, mpltinational businesses or simply groups with 
a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities such as 
development and relief. 
Operational Art 
In seeking to structure campaigns and major operations in pursuit of 
strategic objectives, theatre commanders should design their plans around 
a number of building blocks, which help them to conceptualise how 
operations will unfold. Their skill at this stage forms the essence of 
operational art. The key elements of operational art are listed below: 
Operational Objectives. These are the objectives that need to be 
achieved in the campaign to reach the military strategic end-state. 
Correct assessment of operational objectives is crucial to success at 
the operational level. 
End-state. Will be identified at the national and military levels as 
follows: 
The national end-state is the set of desired conditions, 
incorporating the elements of national power that will 
achieve the national objectives. 
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Glossary 
The military strategic end-state is the set of desired 
conditions beyond which the use of military force is no 
longer required to achieve national objectives. 
are conducted in such a manner that detection by a potentially hostile unit 
or force is either desired or is not a factor to be considered in the conduct 
of assigned missions. 
Passive Mal-adaptation 
offers a contrast to active adaptation. It describes a condition whereby 
subsystems seek to disengage in the interests of their own survival and 
benefit at the cost of the larger systems of which they are part (Crombie, 
1972, p.ll9). 
Peace Building 
is a set of strategies which aim to ensure that disputes, armed conflicts and 
other major crises do not arise in the first place, or if they do arise that 
they do not subsequently recur. 
Peace Enforcement 
is the coercive use of civil and military sanctions and collective security 
actions, by legitimate, international intervention forces, to assist 
diplomatic efforts to restore peace between belligerents, who may not 
consent to that intervention. 
Peacekeeping 
is a non-coercive instrument of diplomacy, where a legitimate, 
international civil and/or military coalition is employed with the consent 
of the belligerent parties, in an impartial, noncombatant manner, to 
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implement conflict resolution arrangements or assist humanitarian aid 
operations. 
Peacemaking 
is diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement 
through such peaceful means as those foreseen under Chapter 6 of the UN 
Charter. 
Preparedness 
is the degree of readiness to undertake operations against an assigned 
notice to move, expressed in .units of time. 
Preventive diplomacy 
is action to prevent disputes from developing between parties, to prevent 
existing disputes from escalating into conflict and to limit the expansion of 
conflicts when they occur. 
Psychological Action 
is the use of psychological media and supporting activities in peace and 
war designed to reduce the enemy's potential or actual prestige and 
influence in potentially hostile or neutral countries and to increase friendly 
influence and attitudes in these countries. 
Psychological Operations 
are planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, 
friendly or neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behaviour 
affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They 
include strategic psychological activities, consolidation psychological 
operations and battlefield psychological activities. 
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Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 
is a term used to describe the catastrophic changes that occur at key 
periods in technological development. The paradigm changes that result 
are massive, affect all participants and force considerable re-analysis of all 
existing doctrine. It is generally accepted that there have been nine RMA: 
• Gunpowder Revolution. 
• Infantry Revolution, whereby cavalry were defeated by foot 
soldiers. 
• Fortress Revolution. 
• Artillery Revolution, in which cannon fire could defeat stone 
fortifications, and later deliver exploding shells. 
• Napoleonic Revolution in logistics and administration. 
• Revolution in Sail and Shot, in which naval vessels were 
transformed into sail-powered gunnery platforms. 
• Land Warfare Revolution in firepower, transportation and 
communication. 
• Naval revolutions of steam, iron and submarine. 
• Nuclear Revolution. 
It is evident from this progression that the ability to wage war has undergone a 
gradual increase in sophistication and ability to strike with greater accuracy over 
greater distances. The RMA that I propose involves a massing of political, social, 
economic, psychological, technical and judicial effects to bring 'outcome 
precision' to planning, rather than the bluntness of violence and offensive action 
to coerce which is the stuff of all the revolutions above. 
Special Forces 
are specially selected military personnel, trained in a broad range of basic 
and specialised skills, who are organised, equipped and trained to conduct 
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special operations. Special forces can be employed to achieve strategic, 
operational or tactical level objectives across the operational continuum. 
Special Forces Group 
is a brigade strength organisation compnsmg the Special Air Service 
Regiment in Perth; 1st Commando Regiment with a headquarters in 
Sydney and sub-units in Watsonia and Williamstown in Melbourne, and 
Mosman in Sydney; 4th Battalion (Commando) in Sydney and a Special 
Forces Training Centre based in Singleton in New South Wales. 
Special Operations 
are those measures and activities conducted by specially trained, organised 
and equipped forces to achieve military, political, economic or 
psychological objectives by means outside the scope of conventional 
forces. These operations may be conducted during peacetime, conflict and 
war, independently or in c.onjunction with conventional forces. 
Strategic 
is used in many contexts. Within this thesis it refers to the application of 
measures to achieve political (diplomatic) ends. The strategic level of 
conflict is that level of war that is concerned with the art and science of 
employing national power. 
Strategic Concept (NATO) 
is the course of action accepted as a result of the estimate of the strategic 
situation. It is a statement of what is to be done expressed in broad terms 
sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, 
economic, psychological and other measures that stem from it. 
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Strategy 
is the art and science of developing and using political, economic, 
psychological and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to 
afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the 
probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the 
chances of defeat. See also military strategy and national strategy. 
Unconventional Warfare 
exploits military, political, economic or psychological vulnerabilities of an 
enemy. Special Forces impl~ment it by providing support and direction to 
indigenous resistance forces where appropriate, or by unilateral offensive 
operations. The conduct of unconventional warfare involves the 
application of guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, escape and evasion; 
and psychological operations is a general term used to describe operations 
conducted for military, political or economic purposes within an area 
occupied by the enemy and making use of the local inhabitants and 
resources. 
Unconventional Operations 
are those activities conducted by a military force in support of national 
policy which are outside contemporary military practices- an environment 
commonly termed the conventional. They may build upon, reapply or 
overturn accepted military fundamentals. This may involve reinventing 
techniques or methods long discarded or leaping beyond the bounds of 
established military activity. The strength of unconventional operations 
lie in their psychological nature, which may produce subtle influence, 
surprise and or shock. They aim to deter, disorientate, dislocate, or 
paralyse an adversary's will, and or support our nation's will. Their 
execution requires judgement and timing due to often-limited windows of 
opportunity. 
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Glossary 
are the means-effects pairs that result from a thorough and comprehensive 
effects-based analysis of a situation, problem or area of strategic concern. 
In the research reported in this thesis there were 306 pairs, or ways, each 
with their own unique, numerically expressed profile of political exposure, 
immediacy, totality and capability to undertake. These ways eventually 
read like a military mission statement that always contains the linking 
phrase - in order to: "undertake X in order to bring about Y". The 
development of these ideas is fully explained in Chapter Four. 
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Preliminary Comments 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter One - Introduction 
Before beginning I must alert the reader to the three different writing styles that I 
use. 
Firstly,there is pragmatism and a military preciseness that allows the expression 
of concepts dominated by a functionalist perspective. Things are as they are stated 
and understood to be. The ideas expressed are rich in fact and doctrine. Concepts 
are grounded in definition. There is no ambiguity. This style allows me to 
describe and "structure [an] organisational reality in a way that makes controlled 
performance possible" (Hassard & Pym, 1990, p. 16). My aim is not to confront 
the reader with objectivity but to bring depth to the story and draw in theories in 
use. I use arguments based on a pragmatic approach to set up thoughts and 
opinions that I later reinforce, remain neutral towards or strike down - a discourse 
with boundaries that I assist in the formation of, but simultaneously demand that 
these beliefs remain boundaryless and free-ranging. This pragmatic style also 
builds cohesion: ideas fit with those around them, relationships are ordered and 
knowledge is tightly bound to practice. This is the world and our understanding of 
it as we have constructed it. 
Secondly, I use a heuristic style that primarily celebrates doubt and my own 
uncertainty and incompleteness. I am honest and open in my accounts of engaging 
with the subject, I seek the mystery and uncertainty that comes with learning. Its 
presence is not uncomfortable, it is vital, it is what makes me worthy. Mezirow's 
disorientating dilemmas is an apt description of the state that allows meaning to 
be made (Mezirow, 1990a). I objectify the new perspective through words that 
remain clumsy and inadequate when viewed in the third person. It is impossible to 
communicate the richness of personal experience. Interpretation, even into words 
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dulls the moment and leaves one with a somehow colourless duplicate that can 
never retain the qualities of the original. This heuristic style combines an 
interpretivist and radical humanist perspective, recognising that I "am attempting 
to understand and explain the social world primarily from the point of view of the 
actors directly involved in the social process" (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 227). It 
invokes Kantianism and a search for intuition and involvement of the mind and 
human values. The radical humanist approach allows me to study "the self-laid 
traps that interpretive theory shows us that humans are so adept at constructing 
.... a world which they often experience as confining, and most.importantly, with 
finding ways in which humans can exercise control over their own constructions 
that allow them to express and deve~op their nature as human beings" (Hassard & 
Pym, 1990, p. 20). It is a radical change that originates from within, from a 
cooperative inquiry (Reason, 1999, p. 207) of (almost like-minded) individuals 
who at least share a common curiosity that can bind their early efforts. 
Finally, I use reflection as an aid to my own contemplation of personal growth 
and task progress. My work and focus on the problem needs to be balanced with 
(and moderated by) a recognition that I am bringing the information to the surface 
and exposing it to the attention of others for their own consideration. I am also in 
the problem space. It makes me pause, holding my gaze on the phenomenon of 
me being interdependent with the object of my interest (Willis, 1999, p. 25). The 
insights are personal and are juxtapositions to the main text. They are attempts to 
understand my position at a particular point, to keep myself within the topic yet 
aware of what this means, it is non-"adherence to the model [that] requires writers 
to silence their own voices and to view themselves as contaminants" (Richardson, 
1994, p. 517). These "narratives of the self seek to [maintain] coherence [of me 
in the story and to] make a point without tedious documentation" (Richardson, 
1994, p. 521). Although this speaks of a need to know oneself the caution comes 
from Nietszche: 
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We knowers are unknown to ourselves and for a good reason: how 
can we ever hope to find what we have never looked for? There is 
a sound adage that runs: "Where a man's treasure lies, there lies his 
heart." Our treasure lies in the beehives of our knowledge. We are 
perpetually on our way thither, being by nature winged insects and 
honey gatherers of the mind. The only thing that lies close to our 
heart is the desire to bring something home to the hive. As for the 
rest of life - so called "experience" who among us is serious 
enough for that? Or has time enough? 
(Nietzsche, 1956, p. 149) 
This action research does not qualify as spiritual practice (Reason, 2000) when 
viewed solely in terms of its aims. At the level of an organisation though, it is an 
inquiry "worthy of our attention" as practitioners, and therefore, can be considered 
as "everyday spirituality" (Reason,' 2000, p.1) for this researcher when these 
writing styles and content are blended together. 
Overview of the Chapter 
In this chapter I provide both the organisational and psychological origins of the 
research. I provide insights into the things that needed to be done for their own 
sake as part of broad human endeavour and enterprise. I describe my own role and 
motivation for simultaneously recognising the need and voluntarily stepping 
forward as an actor in what was to become the beginnings of a larger and swifter 
current of change. 
Later, I will discuss in detail the heuristic guidance I received through the writings 
of Moustakas and his recognition that "when I persist in a disciplined and devoted 
way I ultimately deepen my knowledge of the phenomenon. In the heuristic 
process, I am personally involved. I am searching for qualities, conditions, and 
relationships that underlie a fundamental question, issue, or concern" (Moustakas, 
1990, p. 11). It is a process of discovery, rather than verification and 
corroboration, "the result of the quest is a narrative portrayal of the experience" 
(Tesch, 1990, p. 35). 
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This guidance came to me slowly and (only) when I was in need of it, reinforcing 
the benefits of this (self-directed) educational method as one in which learning 
takes place through discoveries and experiences that result from investigations 
made by the student. It became a celebration of a series of Mezirow's 
"disorientating dilemmas" 
(1990, p. 13) of the self-
reflective kind wherein 
"reflection serves a purpose, 
and purposes serve as 
organising principles that give 
coherence and order to 
activities" (1991, p. 13). 
Without this reflection, 
ordering within the mind may 
become distorted or delayed, 
the "incubation ... in which the 
researcher retreats from the 
intense, concentrated focus on 
the question .... [is a vital stage 
to secure deeper understanding 
and] enables the inner tacit 
dimension to reach its full 
possibilities" (Moustakas, 
1990, p. 28). 
I confess that the beginnings of 
this work were characterised by 
disorder, confusion and 
bewilderment; but offer that 
this condition lies at the heart 
Throughout the thesis I will present my 
thoughts and reflections in text boxes like 
this one. The reader may discover that I 
express a point of view that is in direct 
conflict with the main body. At others I may 
support or express ambivalence. At all times 
though my aim is to provide a voice, a 
dialogue that goes beyond the extraction of 
meaning from the main text by the reader. "I 
should [also] warn my readers that [these 
chapters] must be read without haste, and 
that I am ignorant of the art of making 
myself clear to those who do not wish to 
concentrate" (Rousseau, 1762, p. 91). 
Furthermore, my writing style makes use of 
bracketed additional text to introduce twin 
(and often opposing) thoughts. Sometimes I 
may even change the tense, enticing the 
reader to think of the subject in the past, 
present and sometimes future at the same 
time. I make no apology for this, recognising 
it as a necessary component of interweaving 
(more than one) self with the subject. It is an 
acceptable authorial style to insert material 
in square brackets within quoted text to show 
material by a person other than the author, 
why not a second (possibly contradictory) 
voice by the same author. This allows 
juxtaposition of self with self. It is a critical 
additional heuristic voice, as suggested by 
Reason (1988, p. 80) " ... to make meaning 
manifest through expression requires the use 
of a creative medium through which the 
meaning can take form . . . . not a conceptual 
grid which divides up experience, it is rather 
the creation of an empty space". 
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of heuristic enquiry. It is a vital precursor state, a catalyst from which curiosity 
begins, an intense "critical interest and area of search" that engages the self with 
the topic (Moustakas, 1990, p. 27), eventually bringing order and understanding. 
It is a story with two parts. One part tells of the discovery and development of a 
powerful new way of thinking and evaluating the performance of an(y) 
organisation, an objectively dominated field of enquiry that is process-focused 
and retains an appropriate fixation on "what are we trying to make happen 
through our actions". It is an attempt to build consensus, but not universality. It 
maintains difference, using this to accommodate diversity, but does not attempt 
total agreement as "actual consensus on at least some paradigmatic cases by a 
particular community is a better starting place than the fruitless alternative of 
seeking consensus about some a priori abstract principles" (Rest, Narvaez, 
Bebeau & Thoma, 1999, p. 27). 
The other part is an autobiographical account of my role as the principal agent; 
rich in critical reflection and self-dialogue to fully expose my place in the 
research topic, in order to "derive a body of scientific knowledge .... that is 
guided by a conception that knowledge grows out of direct human experience and 
can be discovered and explicated initially through self-enquiry" (Moustakas, 
1990, p. 17). It is research that honestly records consensus and conflict, thereby 
recognising the value and importance of dissent within a community of activists. 
Within this community of activists it fosters moral consciousness, communicative 
action and discourse (Habermas, 1990; Hersh, Paolitto & Reimer, 1979; Duska & 
Whelan, 1977; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1990), ensuring that the grounds 
for dissent and consent are respected and ethically pure. It must encourage 
transformative and emancipatory learning, using the notion of disorientating 
dilemmas as vital triggers (Mezirow, 1990b) to enable one's mind to wander 
someplace new. Finally, it fuses the communities of/for change with planning 
methods that seek to align with the nature of the contextual environment (Emery 
& Trist, 1965), specifically the (foundational work of) identification (of) causal 
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textures within environments and the subsequent need to democratise the (social) 
planning process to secure success. It highlights the value of dialectical discourse 
and critical hermeneutics within an inquiry dominated by people, culture and a 
design purpose (Jenlink, 2001). 
In this chapter I will also lay out the structure of the thesis, linking the major 
phases of the research using an adaptation of the rich picture form, combined with 
the seven-stage Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), (Checkland, 1972, 1980 and 
1981; Checkland & Scholes, 1990). 
As mentioned, the thesis reports t~o parallel but interwoven research projects 
conducted over the five-year period of 1997-2001. The first part of the research 
seeks to (objectively) answer the question "To what extent can knowledge 
management systems build and reinforce consensus around initiatives for 
change?" This question will be unpacked in a later section to reveal the five 
subsidiary (subjectively orientated) questions that progressively demanded my 
attention in order to achieve wholeness, balance and the vital component of 
critical reflection, later to advance into reflexion, a dynamic response inspired by 
personal discoveries of oneself. 
These five subsidiary questions form the autobiographical account of my own 
reflective observations as the research project steadily expanded to include 
different groups, exhibiting various cultural and ideological perspectives, in 
different organisational contexts, seeking different outcomes. 
The research is, therefore, highly qualitative; capturing much of the diversity 
embodied within the different groups and their environments. A characteristic that 
has enriched my own responses and reflections resulting from interaction with 
these groups; and one which shaped the knowledge management system in ways 
that could not have occurred had a purely technical, rationalist approach been 
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pursued throughout; an approach that would have been discourteous to the (vital) 
role that people played in this research. 
It is a deeply personal story of my own 'honey gathering' (referring back to the 
initial quotation from Nietzsche within this chapter) against a background of 
purposeful, professional practice to bring about a transformation within an 
organisation. It is a story I had to tell for "what makes the story worth telling is its 
presumably out of the ordinary or unique character" (VanMaanen, 1988, p. 102). 
The uniqueness is not its content, nor the role of the researcher; it is the 
juxtaposition of these two that provides the character and depth. We can never 
separate ourselves from what interes~s us; in order to understand we must explore 
our curiosity which itself governs the patterns of our enquiry. As observed by 
Perry, "[we] social scientists should not be surprised to find [ourselves] as 
participants in all [our] observations of human behaviour .... [and] embedded also 
in the midst of our working concepts" (Perry, 1988, p. 143). 
The difficulty of keeping these two research projects simultaneously anchored to 
each other and separate has proven to be somewhat problematic. In a later section 
within this chapter, dealing with reflective practice, I will draw a complex 
analogy using the Heisenberg uncertainty principle within physics of knowing 
both velocity and location at the same time using ·one of Escher's drawings. I use 
this to highlight the dilemma for myself as both a researcher and (simultaneously) 
a reflective practitioner interacting with a research topic. 
At times the dominance of one, as my observations of the group and subsequent 
self-reflection was to uncover, built the foundations for failure. Being overly 
attentive to the needs of the group and their requirement for structure and order 
delayed the productive effort. Pressuring for more focussed, and quicker, analysis 
and discussion, a desire for ambiguity, led to breakdowns in group cohesion and 
purpose. 
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These two sources of failure are reported as positive outcomes. Firstly, for the 
ability to deepen and enrich my autobiographical account and quality of learning. 
And secondly, for the accelerated development and refinement of the database- a 
device which has proven to possess considerable originality of function and 
illustrates many complex relationships that convey powerful messages of 
criticality and dependency for decision-makers. It is this capacity to convey new 
insights into thinkers dominated by traditional perspectives that has fuelled my 
own creative enthusiasm for a knowledge management system to shape 
organisational change. 
As the sole facilitator of many diverse groups there were many occasions of 
(what I perceived as) negative behaviour. Disagreement and resistance to move 
forward were common. This was overcome through an adjustment to the 
vocabulary contained within the database text and its manipulation by the group 
in ways that accommodated (built consensus around) their own wishes and 
concerns. What I came to see as a seductive process governed by the participants 
themselves who were motivated by 'ideal seeking' or self organisation and an 
unconscious acknowledgement that "new strategic direction can only emerge; it 
cannot be planned .... And the processes through which emergence occur are ones 
of political interaction and group learning" (Stacey, 1996, p. 331) became a 
powerful force to align opinion. 
Indeed "the most distinctive attribute of the human ... [is the] capacity to be ideal-
seeking and to alter goals and objectives in the service of ideals that he can never 
reach" (Trist, 1978, p. 533). This amounted to the preservation of a 
communicative action orientation (Habermas, 1990) and minimisation of a purely 
technical rationality. To this end the research provided a fertile plain on which to 
bring forth an emergent theory of group interaction, an interaction that was self-
limited by the boundaries of the knowledge management system and its 
(in)capacity to accommodate the fullness of individual expression. This paradox 
was something I was never fully able to reconcile to myself. The broader the 
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boundaries became, the more those inside filled the space. A form of 
emancipation created through (a self and group-driven) expanding schema. 
The research focus was positioned over national security; principally the role and 
purpose of a military organisation - Special Forces. A unique institution certainly 
in defence areas, but one that also exhibits many other unusual behavioural 
phenomena. My role as a planning officer within Headquarters Special Operations 
provided the focus for the research effort. It legitimised the need for the futures 
study to be undertaken and provided me with an opportunity to record and report 
on a practitioner's experiences. 
A practitioner who was an active participant; a developer of a knowledge 
management system; a group facilitator and a builder of expressive languages and 
vocabularies to provide for productive discourse. One who was also able to 
'disconnect' and become distanced from the research/organisational context to 
evaluate and reflect on my own (and others') learning, insights, emotional states 
and roles in the progress of the study. In particular, the potential for my own 
prejudices to pollute the purity of the participative (van Beinum, 1997) and 'ideal-
seeking' environment that I sought to foster. 
My Research Role - An Overview 
In the beginning I gave myself a task to 'find the future' for the organisation. It 
had a past and a present, which provided valuable reference points. Its future, 
however, was uncertain, indeterminate and fluid. It would be a product of what it 
tried to make of itself and what external actors and actions would conspire to 
allow it to be and demand that it become. My role was to bring these together, to 
synthesise a method, and elicit knowledge, to alert significant others to the 
proposed reforms and above all maintain balance and composure in approach, 
progress and effort. "Do what you can, where you are with what you have" was 
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my subconscious companion. "Bring as many as you can along with you" was my 
governing consideration. 
In endeavouring to act as a reflective practitioner (Schon, 1993), I provisionally 
researched my use of the knowledge management systems using journals (Clegg 
& Green, 1995; Clegg, 1996; Ballantyne & Packer, 1995), writing papers and 
exploring the use of heuristic inquiry (Moustakas, 1990; Tesch, 1990) and 
reflective phenomenology (Moustakas, 1994; Tesch, 1990). I have kept accounts 
of all group meetings, taken note of reactions and collected qualitative data and 
feedback. These have been referred to frequently to secure a continuing 
understanding and appreciation of the enormity of the undertaking. Although I 
seek consensus, it is not at any cost. There must be an enduring recognition that 
individuals are at the core of this work. Where the blurring between individual 
(and therefore possessing different views) and the subconsciously shared ideas of 
a mass occurred was the point of fascination. 
Published military doctrine was my only stationary aid throughout the research. 
Whilst it contained the architecture of national security planning, it left the 
relationships betweyn major items (the strategies) and the effectiveness of 
undertaking an action (the tactics) unresolved. The highest levels of strategy have 
been thoroughly described elsewhere in official publications dealing with national 
security, as have the numerous elements that comprise tactics, but the two have 
not been fused together, allowing an alignment of organisational fitness for 
purpose with the contextual environment. This is the task I set for myself - to 
build and reinforce consensus through communities of professional practitioners 
applying themselves to action research; creating the authority of a shared idea, 
whilst remembering that "an idea is a point of departure and no more. As soon as 
you elaborate it, it becomes transformed by thought" (Picasso, 1946), raising 
more questions. So this journey will never be complete(d). It is the bringing 
together of a stable group to explore possibilities, for others to ultimately 
determine the worth of. 
10 
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The Research Approach 
What does it mean to build and reinforce consensus around initiatives for change? 
Given the right conditions and employing a suitable process, which may itself 
have to be constructed by the participants, it should be possible to mobilise the 
creative talents of selected individuals to craft a unifying vision of what is 
possible within an organisation and its operating environment. This is in stark 
contrast to the individually experienced memories of the past that I believe 
characterise those who do not actively engage in 'building desirable futures'. 
The thesis is about creating the conditions and building the processes for 
collaborative, action-oriented organisational transformation within an elite 
Australian military organisation - The Special Forces Group. It is my assertion 
that knowledge management systems can assist in creating these conditions and 
building the processes. 
Creativity is a large part of the knowledge management system I devised. It was 
not assembled out of existing hardware, it is not manifested within information 
systems, computers, the 'communities' within the internet or the tacit-explicit 
debate that often dominates the field of knowledge management. These are 
quantitative orientations that are "prescriptive and formulaic" (Edwards, Braganza 
& Lambert, 2000, p. 29). They are the aids, processes, procedures and devices 
that were employed by the participants to secure progress. 
It was not about how much knowledge the organisation has in its possession 
(whatever that might mean), a preoccupation with knowledge capital, but how to 
share that knowledge, requiring a "delicate marriage of technology with a keen 
sense of cultural or behavioral awareness. It involves creating an environment that 
supports learning, fosters social cohesion, openness and interconnectivity" 
(Ruddy, 2000 pp. 37), and to what use can that knowledge that emerges be put 
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that can advance the organisation (world?) - a qualitative orientation. "What do 
we know"? "What can we know"? "What does this mean for us and others"? 
Qualitative research methods have an entirely appropriate obsession with the 
richness and diversity of social phenomena and will preserve the significance of 
every grain of sand within a field of enquiry to avoid ( over)simplification. This 
richness and diversity is often lost with quantification and the transfer of textual 
language into a numerical representation - an often de-individualising coding 
I 
exercise. This difficulty of dealing with a national security context, with its 
diplomatic complexities and causal relationships that spiral off into many areas 
combined with the role and purpose of an instrument of national power (possibly 
in need of a new post-modem understanding of its purpose) was to raise its head 
frequently, becoming a problem of isolating a suitable method(ology), informed 
by the availability of specific information, within which to proceed. 
My first task was to assign appropriate methods to each part of the puzzle. Is it 
better to let the area under investigation be subjected to a proven methodology? 
One that is informed by a clear understanding of that particular, problem space and 
has set processes and procedures to be adhered to in pursuit 'Of a solution or 
answer, with the researcher remaining at a distance. Or is it more appropriate (and 
a more honest account of the phenomenon) whereby "the researcher must move 
beyond any confined or constricted attention to the data itself and permit an 
inward life on the question to grow, in such a way that a comprehensive 
expression of the essences of the phenomenon investigated is realized[?]" 
(Moustakas, 1990, p. 32). 
Given the fluid nature of the topic and the extent of method/vocabulary 
construction required to win participation, combined with the difficulty of 
securing precise terms and expressions from others, I elect to be guided from 
within. The purpose and goal of the research will dictate the approach(es), I will 
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work with the subject, not upon it (Reason & Heron, 1995; Heron & Reason, 
1977). 
The Research Purpose 
The purpose of the research is to locate a set of future operating characteristics for 
an Australian military organisation in order to secure its rightful position as an 
instrument of national policy. Its focus is to develop a set of sufficiently robust 
analytical tools to order thought and provoke novel solutions, forcing a (brief) 
departure from conservatism. The ability of the information to overcome dogma 
will then rightfully become the con~em of executive decision-makers and leaders 
within the organisation. 
Futures thinking and futures studies remain a valuable and important endeavor, 
the "scenarios [that result] are the most powerful vehicles ... for challenging our 
mental models about the world" (Schwartz, 1991, p. xv) allowing the 
contemplation of (complex) events that are often outside our capacity to generate 
spontaneously. If executed with thoroughness and discipline, they can link the 
most perplexing set of strategic dilemmas with a coherent grouping of capabilities 
and responses - what has generally become known as a characteristic or attribute 
of active adaptiveness (Emery, 1977a)- and what I shall call organisational poise. 
Without a sufficiently rich and comprehensive understanding of what may 
eventuate in the future, one is simply left struggling with one surprise after 
another. 
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The Research Questions 
Although I began with the simple question of: 
To what extent can knowledge management systems build and 
reinforce consensus around initiatives for change?" 
which was related primarily to the notion of organisational change and the role of 
individuals and groups, it quickly became evident that my own personal quest to 
reach an answer and the frequent and detailed interaction with others was a source 
of distortion. This distortion continually presented me with a hybrid that was 
somehow disfigured through my presence, approach, questioning and ultimately 
filtered by my own world-views. 
To overcome this personally sourced bias I developed four subsidiary questions 
that firstly forced critical reflection and secondly demanded confession within the 
thesis to secure the warrant of honesty. These questions were: 
To what extent did my adaptation of the Field Anomaly Relaxation 
(FAR) method assist in building and reinforcing consensus around 
initiatives for change?" 
and also: 
To what extent did the Effects-Based Planner assist in building and 
reinforcing consensus around initiatives for change?" 
Having addressed the limitations resulting from what could be an overly 
technicist style of information exploration in the use of these two models, I was 
then concerned by the possibility that my imposition of these two models, within 
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the style of meetings, may lead to an unethical corruption of the purity of intent 
within the group. I had to then ask: 
"How was my involvement in the creation and use of these 
knowledge management systems beneficial or detrimental to the 
achievement of consensus?" 
combined with: 
"Could my biases, assumptions and prejudices inteifere with the 
employment of knowledge management systems?" 
Only then would I possess the warrants for honest, purposeful endeavor in action 
research. 
A non-obtrusiveness observer orientation is unlikely to expose the full range of 
subtleties and nuances that are present - an entanglement and confrontation with 
the subject must be achieved if the researcher is to achieve the necessary depth of 
enquiry. Moreover, the "situation talks back and the practitioners reframe the 
situation once again. The situation comes to be understood through the attempt to 
change it, and changed through the attempt to understand it" (Heiskanen & 
Newman, n.d. p. 123) offering "fleeting awarenesses, but whose nature is largely 
unknown" (Moustakas, 1990, p. 13). 
For me there was no single event, more a growing concern that a deeper, more 
penetrating analysis would offer insights that a superficial investigation would 
cause to remain hidden. The statements that follow embody many of my own 
perceptions are indicative of the general theme of concerns circulating within 
military and strategic planners over the period of this project. 
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Structure of the Thesis 
In Chapter Two, I lay out the architecture and framework of the national security 
strategy and national military strategy. These will serve as backdrops when I later 
address the issues of 'organisational fitness for purpose'. I familiarise the reader 
with the subtleties and nuances that pervade an organisation of this nature and its 
purpose within defence and national security. I describe how it became evident to 
me that a disciplined, systematic approach to futures thinking was vital to 
establishing a solid foundation for change, redefinition and realignment and one 
that would win support and ownership. My aim is to alert the reader to the appeal 
of a 'post-modem' military, a military that is sensitive to the changes in the 
operational and contextual environments. I will delay any detailed consideration 
of how this may be achieved to later chapters. 
In Chapter Three, I provide a comprehensive explanation of the use of Field 
Anomaly Relaxation - the method used to achieve a comprehensive, albeit 
abstracted view, of the world beyond the immediate planning and defence 
procurement horizons- a period extending from five years out to 25. This chapter 
also includes the use of twenty rich narratives that contained the 'stories' of future 
change. The interest that these scenarios, along with the methodology employed, 
attracted within the circle of more unorthodox thinkers at Australian Defence 
Force Headquarters was considerable and was the source of much lively debate. 
The rigor and thoroughness used to construct the scenarios will be discussed 
along with the confidence and legitimacy that flowed from the approach into the 
database application, the topic of the next chapter. 
Chapter Four contains a detailed explanation of effects-based planning and 
operations - a new and novel approach (and reversal) to thinking about strategic 
planning. This chapter is about the knowledge management database, my primary 
engine for change. Discussions will cover its growth into a functioning model, the 
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personal insights and dynamic problem-solving that was characteristic of its 
development and the gradual population of the data - the expressive language -
and its adjustment/refinement to capture or bridge across the full continuum of 
operational contexts. I also discuss its maturation into a true and comprehensive 
effects-based strategic, operational and tactical planning tool that maintains its 
architecture and functionality regardless of the scope or scale of issue being 
addressed. 
The progressive exposure of this application to various audiences, its contents and 
the visualisation methods used to present organisational effectiveness and 
decision-aid information will be highlighted. Indeed, the opportunity to personally 
brief the Minister of Defence, Deputy Secretary Strategy and Deputy Chief of 
Army on separate occasions was a career highlight and one that I found 
immensely satisfying. Later developments springing from these briefings will be 
discussed in the final sections of the thesis as I draw the research to its conclusion 
and offer a way forward. 
Also in Chapter Four I will discuss the discovery of similar, but trailing, work 
being undertaken in the United States by other military and civilian personnel 
confronted with an identical need to transform their approach towards national 
security. Although the communication and sharing of ideas that resulted from this 
discovery played no role in the continuing development of my own knowledge 
management application, the ability to exchange thoughts and gain confidence 
within my conclusions was vital. It was important for this thesis, recognising that 
this was possibly the beginning of a paradigm shift in thinking and planning was 
of immense value, bringing great personal satisfaction. It was the interaction with 
these individuals that gave rise to the notion of remarkable people as a vital 
ingredient in the birth of a movement for change. This chapter was where ideals 
and idealists collided. 
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In Chapter Five, titled 'Those Who Chose To See', I describe those who came to 
believe in the approach to solving problems set out in Chapters Three and Four. I 
set out the context in which they were exposed to the methods and their reactions, 
comments and conclusions. The empirical data derived from this analysis will be 
used to inform my creative synthesis in Chapter Seven. 
In Chapter Six, titled 'And Those Who Didn't', I will provide a counterpoint to the 
previous chapter, offering a contrasting set of empirical arguments gained from 
the reactions of these 'non-believers'. My position throughout this exchange, as in 
Chapter Five should be viewed as neutral. I endeavoured to avoid a judgmentalist 
approach and hope that this has carri.ed through into my personal account of these 
episodes. 
Chapter Seven contains my assertions and is a synthesis of opposites. I say this 
because I harbored a temptation to over-generalise and stereotype those who 
participated in the research, despite my promises to the contrary. My experience 
has been one of success in many instances and failure at others. There were very 
few occasions that situated themselves between these two extremes. To attribute 
this to others and make claims against their perspectives, schema or mental 
models would be unfair, unproductive and unnecessary and in breach of the 
subsidiary research questions focussed on my own involvement and behaviour. 
I did not wish to deceive, only design with what was there. I reflect on my 
approaches, I rejoice in the diversity. I complete what Carl Jung refers to as 'the 
hero's journey'. Understanding and knowledge will be equal (Jung, 1958, p. 52). 
Significance of the Research 
What we need are shared visions of the future, not individually 
experienced memories of the past. 
The author in 1999, during an early planning workshop 
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Many planners within defence are undertaking long-term studies using futures 
thinking. Scenario planning, popularised by Wack (1984; 1985a; 1985b) and 
practically in the work at Royal Dutch Shell during the 1970s, is probably the 
most notable and referenced success story. Whether the Shell futures team got it 
right or whether conditions and events conspired to deliver an outcome to them 
that spontaneously coincided with their futures thinking derived recommendations 
will never be known. The fact remains that futures thinking is a vital element of 
strategic planning and contains many pitfalls and problems that cannot be handled 
using traditional planning processes. 
Defence is now recognising the worth of the (Art of the) Long View (Shwartz, 
1991). Scenario planning in particular is enjoying more frequent use at senior 
levels of defence strategic thinking. Indeed, there is now an organisation within 
Defence called Strategic Planning and Futures Studies where unorthodox and 
novel thinking is encouraged, to both inform decision-making and give an 
expanded view of possibilities. It allows the value-laden consideration and 
presentation of a complete set of desirable, undesirable and neutral outcomes from 
the interaction of many drivers. 
These drivers can then be thought of as decisive points from which events can be 
coaxed into certain patterns that actively bring about desired outcomes or 
passively discourage the realisation of undesired outcomes, particularly where 
political sensitivity levels may be high. These drivers can also be considered as 
indicators for the transition points of change, providing for an anticipatory 
response from decision-makers that prevent getting 'caught short'. 
In 1998, two research analysts visited from the New Zealand Ministry of Defence 
Capability Development Branch. They, unknown to me, had been engaged in a 
Special Forces capability review themselves and were in the early formative 
stages of constructing a methodology to move forward. Having been advised of 
my work they had traveled to Sydney for detailed discussions. This event and the 
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value of these discussions highlighted to me the value of my work. Their second 
visit in 1999, to review the functionality of the database, provided further 
reinforcement of the merit and value of the research approach. 
The culminating moment occurred in late 1999, whilst on a visit to Canberra 
where several key functions within the database were employed by the highest 
level strategic planning division within the Australian Defence Force to aid 
completion of the White Paper for 2000. A later event was to eclipse this and will 
be discussed in detail later in this thesis, as it occurred at a critical point in the 
development of the application, and also coincided with a key stage in the 
strategic discussions occurring in Canberra. 
The foundation knowledge on which much of my approach has been based can be 
found in the combined works of Checkland (1972); Checkland and Scholes 
(1990); Emery (1977a); Emery and Emery (1997); Emery and Trist (1965). These 
authors have defined the changing nature of contextual environments for 
organisations, promoted the use of an active adaptive orientation to planning and 
"fostered a collaborative, participative-democratic methodology" (McWhinney, 
1992, p. 28). One that combines pluralism and free will, whereby "the objective 
world . . . is the shared consensus among the perceptions and feelings of a 
population . . . it is constructed through the interaction among individuals" 
(McWhinney, 1992, p. 35). 
Only through the principle of democratisation can organisational design cope with 
turbulent social fields, developing and nurturing ideal-seeking individuals 
(Emery, 1993b, p. 221). These combine to make purposeful human action 
effective, exciting, satisfying, rewarding and most of all (usually) successful, (at 
least more frequently than other methods that do not contain these characteristics). 
Although not purely ethnographic, my role as a research instrument is guided by 
VanMaanen (1983, 1988). 
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In my attempts to use a soft-systems methodology, embodying rich pictures, I 
have been shaped by these authors and led willingly in a direction towards a 
systems-based methodology for real-world problem solving (Checkland, 1972) 
that secures emancipatory and transformative learning as part of the learning and 
change that results (Mezirow, 1990a and 1990b). Checkland's model has had a 
profound influence upon my methods, as it allows 'what is' and 'what could be' to 
exist simultaneously (Steps 1, 2 and 4 in Figure 1). What I have discovered to be a 
vital characteristic in any consensus building program. 
······ 
............ ··""sy~tems thinking 
about real world 
Figure 1. Checkland's conventional seven stages SSM model. 
This allows the accommodation of a large number of ideas (as will become 
evident in Chapter Four), making progress towards consensus of ideas. The 
consensus of actions from these shared ideas occurs as a result of Step 5 and the 
formation of the list of feasible and desirable changes (actions) at Step 6. 
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Rich Picture 
Rich pictures are receiving recognition and respect as a powetful form of 
imagery, a form that can blend the factual with the feel of a situation. They are 
valuable devices for allowing more complete expression of events and 
relationships. They stir emotions and interpretations that can be superior to 
written text. They convey meaning beyond the metaphorical; they encourage 
deeper and more personal levels of analysis. They encourage a qualitative analysis 
and expression of ideas, "they require the drawing [of] pictures as well as taking 
notes and writing prose" (Checkland & Scholes, 1990, p. 45). Where 
disassociation in research is often fostered to promote rigor, they celebrate 
involvement and demand subjectivity. The researcher is part of the picture, the 
central character as well as the drawer. There is no escaping this engagement. 
My rich picture in Figure 2 is a characterisation of the problem I was faced with. 
Although it does not align totally with the original characteristic(s) of SSM, it was 
valuable to me as an aid to understanding the problem I was faced with. I have 
deliberately omitted the presence and influence of individuals; my problem is 
about groups, opinions, their ability to see the whole picture and my (in)ability to 
bring the whole picture into view. I have already said that my aim was to build 
and reinforce consensus and that a knowledge management system may 
contribute to this. The implication was that there was dissent, not consen(t)sus and 
that this could be overcome. The origins of this dissent were not my primary 
concern, it was not my wish to be drawn into countering an existing effect. 
I knew there would be a difference of opinion. The planes within the diagram can 
explain this. For groups occupying a single plane it is reasonable to expect that 
their view of the whole vertical arrangement will be obstructed. Therefore their 
capacity to accommodate a broader set of issues will be eroded. Dissent is already 
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being set up. I (once) also adopted a point of view based on a narrow plane of 
vision. 
Figure 2. Rich picture of my research. 
My primary concern relates to people and information. People occupy various 
positions within organisations and these positions offer various pieces of 
information for consumption, and conceal others. They operate on the surfaces. 
Rarely is the entire scene available to a single individual. The lines that link the 
various elements also point to information flows and relationships. My role was to 
secure a methodology for bringing the people and the information together, fusing 
them into a single (and hopefully) well functioning conglomerate that fosters 
shared understanding and knowledge. The layered elements associated with life in 
an organisation would need to be broken down and substituted with a series of 
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accepted statements that could be conveyed from top to bottom to inform purpose. 
My diagram indicates the difficulty of bring this information into a single 
channel. Moving vertically changes the perspective, the links that are discemable, 
the degree of 'fit', and the ability of various levels to see what is above or below. 
Exposure of elements to the observer is always incomplete. To gain a wider view 
the individual must be brought out of the layered framework and be allowed to 
scan vertically up and down into areas that would remain hidden. They must be 
allowed to discuss issues with those above and below, in ways that do not 
constitute policy and regulation. The language and culture that applies on each of 
the surfaces must be viewed and experienced if any hope of understanding and 
collaboration is to be achieved. 
The central argument that requires this dislocation is that everything is done in 
order to contribute to something else, to make something happen, which builds 
and grows vertically until it arrives at the top to bring about something which 
represents 'the ultimate purpose'. In a national security context, the reality for 
practitioners is that they are quite inwardly focused on their bit of the world and 
cannot see what the ultimate purpose may be when expressed in meaningful 
terms. I am not suggesting that people are ignorant, but at many times throughout 
this research it proved difficult for practitioners to form the statements that would 
normally originate at the highest levels of planning. Thes€ statements are what 
inform all effort below. 
Without clouding these thoughts here the next section, containing three of 
Escher's drawings, also has some relevance. To a figure in Escher's landscape, the 
inability of the figure to see the neighboring twisted architecture results in an 
individual believing that everything is in order from where they see it. It is only 
when the observer can see that the hallways and arches are impossibly linked that 
an overall confusion is introduced about which way is up and which view 
provides the overall reference point. 
24 
Chaprer One - Introduclion 
Thoughts on Self Reflection 
In hi s sketches, which are both beautiful and bizarre, Escher was able to capture 
simultaneously reality and unreality (Figure 3) ... 
Figure 3. Belvedere. 
what something was, what it was transitioning into and what it had become 
(Figure 4) ... 
Figure 4. Day and night. 
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These mind-torturing images embody some key aspects of self-reflection. How is 
it possible to apprehend a thought, sight or some other sensory stimuli that is not 
stable, and arrive at a reasonable understanding of it within a factual framework 
that is fluid and ever-changing? The self-mage in the mirrored sphere held at 
arm's length as Escher himself draws his reflection of himself drawing his own 
reflected image (Figure 5) is a moment frozen in time that can be deconstructed to 
pose a psychological conundrum - If I should pause to observe and contemplate 
myself I have changed the reality of the moment, and I am not looking at myself 
in the context of what I was doing, I am now considering myself in a paused state 
of not doing what I was doing moments earlier, but now doing an inwardly 
probing analysis of personal thoughts that had an external stimuli. The images and 
electro-chemical states within the brain that the mind preserves is like the fading 
Figure 5. Hand with reflecting sphere. 
optical illusion seen when one stares 
at a bold pattern then quickly looks 
away. The more one moves the eyes 
to see the detail, the more the image 
evades discovery until it IS lost from 
the memory. Heisenberg's problem 
of velocity and location, the 
physical manifestation of this 
paradox, has much wider 
application, possessing deep 
implications for those who seek to 
practice self-reflection. 
To apprehend the moment in order to judge oneself, thereby to reflect 
meaningfully, is to gain a distorted view. The velocity/location dilemma is 
transferred immediately from the physical world to the psychological. I am no 
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longer who I just was, I am now not a practitioner, I am an observer, of myself 
But the observations I am part of (now) are not the events that formed the 
inspiration to look, the desire for deeper understanding. The observations are now 
vacant and lacking in any meaning or context. They are a suspension of 
experience that dilutes the purity and excitement of the moment before, the one in 
which the mind raced with eager anticipation towards an unknown goal that 
entertained a brief fascination. Moustakas (1967, p. 1) declares that "[this rich] 
experience is only real when it is being lived; as soon as it is talked about or 
defined, the living moment is lost. 
Efforts to communicate the real self [even to oneself!] inevitably distort its reality 
and violate the integral nature of life". In going to these places where the self is 
fully exposed, something of the self must be left behind, but it is not left intact. It 
is fractured, broken and the edges of what stayed and what was taken briefly away 
can never be realigned. The subconscious is as precious as fine china. Its most 
intricate forms are elusive, protective of itself. 
Whilst I remain uncertain how to deal with this, it remains a concern worthy of a 
reflective practitioner's attention and contemplation if one is to improve the ability 
to ultimately become reflexive - what should be the ultimate purpose of personal 
reflection. 
The poem below from Moffitt (1971, in Moustakas, 1990, p. 12) provides a vivid 
account of the elusiveness of (the) pure( est) immersion into an experience. 
To look at any thing 
If you would know that thing, 
You must look at it long: 
To look at this green and say 
"I have seen spring in these 
Woods," will not do -you must 
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Be the thing you see: 
You must be the dark snakes of 
Stems and ferny plumes of leaves, 
You must enter in 
To the small silences between 
The leaves, 
You must take your time 
And touch the very place 
They issue from 
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Further guidance in how this can be achieved within a natural (uncontrived) state 
of human thought is offered in Roads (1987, p. 1). He questions "How can we 
write of unseen realities, hint of unheard concepts, or even demonstrate the 
practicality of inner truths, without disturbing the slumbering Self within?" and 
answers with his call to "Let go and fall into the river ... trust that I will guide you 
with care and love into a new stream of consciousness. Can you trust me enough 
to let go of the known and swim in an unknown current?" (Roads, 1987, p. 26). 
These thoughts remind me of a similar thought expressed by Christopher 
Colombus (circa 1472) when he stated that "man cannot hope to discover new 
oceans until he has courage to lose sight of the shore". 
There have been many times that I have been without a shore to provide comfort 
and a navigational reference. It has been a deliberate and conscious act to locate a 
new stream of consciousness. I expect it may be some time before I glimpse a 
shore. 
This human condition of willing acceptance and deep immersion into a subject 
that has called its attention to you is not restricted to deeply personal subjects. It 
can be a fruitful form of enquiry under any situation. Salk (1983, p. 7) recalled 
that "later, when I became a scientist, I would picture myself as a virus, or as a 
cancer cell. I would also imagine myself as an immune system engaged in 
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combating a virus or cancer cell", realising that what he called an 'inverted 
perspective' was capable of producing views and understanding that would be 
denied when one did not become the object of interest and look outward. This 
(need for) disembodiment seems to introduce a paradox into the human condition 
- experience intensely on a personal level, but remain open and 'unselflike' to gain 
maximum reception of (what may be) conflicting signals and disorientating 
dilemmas. 
I will delay declaring my thoughts here. There is a quote at the end of this chapter 
that expresses the problem that I am now within. There is a need for a ubiquitous 
participative democracy of purposeful social (inter)action to overcome this. 
Morgan (1986, p. 176) has expressed this as (a style of) leadership, wherein the 
"democratic leader's influence is far more subtle and symbolic [fostering a co-
operative inquiry?]. He or she spends time listening, summarising, integrating and 
guiding what is being said . . . summoning images, ideas and values". These are 
actions that draw practitioners together. 
An Initial Dialogue with the Self 
In this section I present an early dialogue in which I sought to understand the 
meaning of conflict and how my career as a professional career officer within the 
nation's defence force and maturing years and outlook had altered my view on 
what it was to be an instrument of national policy. 
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Time for Some Resolutionary Thinking: The 21st Century, a Time 
Without Conflict? 
We aeronauts of the spirit! All those brave birds [that] fly out into 
the distance, into the furthest distance- it is certain! Somewhere 
or other they will be unable to go on and will perch down on a 
mast or bare cliff-face - and they will be even thankful for this 
miserable accommodation! But who could venture to infer from 
that, that there was not an immense open space before them, that 
they had flown as far as one could fly! 
Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 16 
Hollingdale trans. 1969 
Nietzsche's words echo with the need for some to continue the journey that others 
have begun. We can only go so far. Every person's journey is, therefore, to some 
extent, never complete(d), it is (only) a part of a greater journey. Others must 
continue, for the way ahead is open and waiting for the brave birds that must 
continue, over and beyond the horizon that block our view. 
History records periods of colonisation, invasion, domination over one culture by 
another and forced relocations as being the major macro-determinants of social 
structure at the level of the nation-state. These nation-states of the world, their 
different languages, customs, cultures, religions, systems of government; indeed, 
almost every facet of life that distinguishes one group from another has likely 
been the product of some form of conflict and its resolution into a position of 
balance. This is changing. The major disturbances are passed, I believe we are 
entering a new period. 
We now find ourselves at an interesting threshold wherein what was once conflict 
between nations, is now conflict within nations. Micro-determinants within 
nations are creating fracture lines that are threatening the internal balance, the 
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diversity is beginning to coalesce into tightly-bonded community groups, each 
with needs that bring them into conflict with their neighbours. Horowitz (1985) 
provides a comprehensive account of how ethnic alliances fuel conflict, also 
dramatically simplified by Huntington (1996, p. 125) "Peoples and countries with 
different cultures are coming apart" from the result of forces within. 
Does this represent a new form of conflict, or are we simply moving (returning?) 
conflict to a different scale? Are we destined to make many horrible decisions as 
we learn our way forwards? Will a new vocabulary develop to allow us to express 
the strangeness of it in ways that are abstracted and make it somehow 'not 
something I have to concern myself ,with' (the term 'ethnic cleansing' provides a 
vivid example, neatly employing two existing words to describe a new form of 
orchestrated and systematic murder. The victim is somehow 'different' and 
membership of this 'different from us' cultural group provides a partial 
explanation for these atrocities). 
Is this a collision of opposing values and one that could realistically have no end? 
Must we then re-examine our own values to isolate the source of the conflict, 
hopefully allowing a solution to emerge that is about change and modification 
within the self? 
This section aims to address these questions, but in a novel way. I contend that 
we must look to resolutionary thinking (I have borrowed this term from 
McWhinney (1992, p. 119) who explains that "resolutionary thinking has been 
mostly the province of those who felt themselves powerful enough to make 
changes in the affairs of man". I believe that this power has been now dispersed 
to the masses and a collective voice is (now) able to bring about difference. 
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A Need to Look Further Ahead 
Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a distinct 
conception of what poets called inspiration? If not, I will describe 
it. - If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one, one 
would hardly be able to set aside that idea that one is merely 
incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely medium of overwhelming 
forces. The concept of revelation, in the sense that something 
suddenly, with unspeakable certainty and· subtlety, becomes 
visible, audible, something that shakes and overturns one to the 
depths, simply describes the fact. One hears, one does not seek; 
one takes, one does not ask who gives; a thought flashes up like 
lightning, with necessity, unfalteringly formed - I have never had 
any choice. 
Nietzsche, Hollingdale trans. 1979 
Ecce Homo p.102 
I am writing this section in the closing days of the 2oth century. A century 
in which man simultaneously advanced the powers of destruction and 
creativity at a rate more rapid than ever before. From a Newtonian 
perspective which viewed the world as a clockwork, deterministic system, 
the giant century gear is about to grind forward one notch, the second 
wheel continues to spin blindinglyfast, advancing the minutes, hours and 
days. The years seem to blend together with troubling events becoming 
inherited by those who have had no involvement in their beginnings, they 
simply become the custodians of a problem, carrying forward a 
taxonomy of superficial understandings in order to hand on - a 'Balkan 
stalemate' that exists on many levels in many nations with generations of 
participants (passive conspirators?). 
So, as we hesitate on the brink of this new age, with many of the world's 
inhabitants enjoying wealth, prosperity, security and opportunity; but 
with the great majority still poor, hungry and affected by regional 
conflict (over one-thousand million human beings - a fifth of the world's 
population - live in absolute poverty), should we take a moment to 
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consider our 'work? In doing so we must consider whether our 
worldview is consistent with our inner values, for it is here that a great 
potential for change lies. 
The Beginnings of Observance and Self-Reflection 
The first requirement for the growth of the individual self is that 
the person remains in touch with his own perceptions. No matter 
how different one's experience is from that of others, he must trust 
in the validity of his own senses if he is to evolve as a unique being 
.... he will be open to new levels of learning, to new pathways of 
relatedness to others, and to a genuine respect for all life. 
(Moustakas, 1967, p. 13) 
As I look around and take in the world I see great happiness, a time of 
gift giving and the reunion of families andfriendships; a time when the 
youngest are brought together with the oldest. For a few brief days 
bridges are built across differences and we find reason to hold others 
close once again. 
I also see a world that has failed to halt war in many places. The fighting 
in Chechnya is renewed - a strange clash of cultures and ideologies 
contained within a single nation state. Indonesia continues to fragment 
with over 100 deaths in Ambon in the days surrounding Christmas. 
Kashmir continues to be fought over by India and Pakistan, with artillery 
exchanges occurring across one of the most remote and barren 
landscapes on Earth. 
Solutions will be found to all these conflicts, why must it take so long, 
why do so many have to suffer and die- on all sides? How can the next 
generation of leaders in these places receive any education and sense of 
normality when gunfire has more place in their memories than laughter 
and play? 
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I see continuing environmental damage and disregard for the 
importance of diversity, a diversity that preserves a fragile ecological 
balance. 
The kaleidoscope of images bound up in these events holds promise that 
the world can heal itself, but only if a conscious effort is made to avoid 
the downward spiral into conflict. If we can see no other avenue, then we 
have failed to learn a fundamental lesson; a lesson that must begin with 
the individual. From each individual communities must be formed. 
A Further Dialogue with the Self 
The following semi-fictional conversation is based upon an actual self-reflective 
dialogue spanning about five years concerning my impressions of conflict and 
the pursuit of peace. It represents a compilation of thoughts and ideas that grow 
and alter the direction of discovery and can, therefore, be considered to be a 
heuristic inquiry (Moustakas, 1990). To clearly signal the fictive nature of the 
dialogue, I have used the names Ixion, Friedrich Nietszche and Jean-Paul Sartre. 
These participants from mythology and philosophy take on roles and conflicting 
views to enrich the story: 
Ixion - in Greek mythology, the first man to murder one of his kinspeople. The 
violent act of killing his father-in-law to avoid paying him promised bridal gifts 
embodies the· ultimate in materialistic motivations. I use his voice to provide 
expressions of selfishness, cruelty, and greed. 
Nietszche - to provide a point of departure from rationalism, his fundamental 
contention was that traditional values (represented primarily by Christianity) had 
lost their power in the lives of individuals, what he called passive nihilism; the 
masses, whom he termed the herd or mob, conform to tradition, whereas his ideal 
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'superman' (Zarathustra) is secure, independent, and highly individualistic - an 
iconoclast. 
Sartre- He believed that the true, purest expression of (a creative) mankind was 
in the self-determination made available to every individual and that the 
acceptance of inescapable personal responsibility for their own decisions, unaided 
by morality, religious faith or society was what defined us as beings and was, 
therefore, the necessary condition for authentic human existence. He began to 
favour Marxism as a movement representing the revolt of the masses against the 
imposition of authority. 
Concerning a Re-Orientation of Thought and Action 
Nietszche: "So Guy, you say you have been thinking about this subject 
for many years. We are now at the end of the 2oth century, a new century 
is only days away. Are we to expect the emergence of a new 'man'? Andre 
Reszler, when director of the Centre for European Culture, described 
earlier attempts to forecast the coming of a new type of human being, 
one that could lead us into the next great period of mankind (cited in 
Tof.fler, 1980, p. 390). Tell us what it is that you hope for". 
Guy: ''I look foremost to safety for my family. I pray for my children that 
they are able to grow old with their own children in a world that respects 
each individual's right to a simple life, free from the persecution of others. 
I will be old when they marry, older still when their own children take on 
the individual beauty, creativity and innocence that will define them and 
become the source of attraction that will draw others towards them. My 
last thoughts as I leave them to continue their lives will be a deep love for 
them and the dreams they carry, a hope that their efforts will be 
rewarded, I hope also that they may find quiet, peaceful moments to 
think fondly of their mother and I and that we were part of their lives". 
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Ixion: "Those are simple needs, ones that can be gained by isolating ones 
self from society. If that is all you and others like you seek then I urge you 
to move away from the towns and cities, let the rest of the world go on 
without you. There is a brutality to the world that we must harden 
ourselves against. Only the strong can survive. This is the way it must 
be". 
Sartre: ''I agree with some of what Ixion says. The strong amongst us do 
have a very important role and yes the world can be a harsh place, but is 
not a Darwinian process wherein the weak must die. It is the strong who 
bind individuals together with a common purpose, but this common 
purpose may be for good or evil. What about the need to be both strong to 
provide the necessary leadership and yet live peacefully alongside 
others? If we are to survive then we need to actively involve ourselves in 
the building of communities, but many times this is complicated by the 
need to openly disagree with the authorities or those who hold power - an 
unusual (unachievable?) mix of Hobbesian compliance coupled with 
Marxist revolt. This seems to be a dilemma that we cannot escape from". 
Nietzsche: "Jean-Paul, you always were a Marxist, and I am glad you 
have introduced the topic of class struggle into our conversation. People 
may have been fooled by your existentialist beginnings, but your 
statements on group revolutionary activity and rebellion against 
authority are at the heart of what you have just called 'community 
building'- there can be no purely isolated human being with individual 
experiences, we are all shaped by those persons and events around us; as 
identified by Heiskanen and Newman (n.d, p. 122), when expanding the 
work of Schon's reflective-practitioner "Through their transactions with 
a situation where the practitioners shape it and make themselves part of 
it" they become agents within the body of their own enquiry. Moreover, 
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you have always advocated conflict and the collision and interaction of 
wills, its presence is an essential ingredient in your philosophies. The 
very origin of (revolutionary) change is the existence of profound 
disagreement (McWhinney, 1992, p. 62) and is the natural order of 
things (King, 1981, pp.13-22). A community is a gathering of individuals 
who exist at the edge of disintegration, at that narrow boundary between 
fragile stability and chaos. They oscillate between disagreement, 
cooperation and sometimes collaboration - but only when an external 
threat mobilises a collective frame of reference that unifies their values 
and efforts for a brief moment. Smith (1977, p. 446) states that 
"Whatever the form of the political systems, the differing sectional values 
within a plural society are a profound source of instability". Agreement is 
a fragile condition wherein activists have suppressed their concerns 
momentarily in the absence of any stimuli. 
Guy: "You are both right. We need to .find a new democratism, on many 
different levels, one that can bind together (religious) diversity 
(Huntington, 1996, p. 193). Jean-Paul made a central theme of his work 
that people must rely on their creative powers, rather than the imposition 
of authority. Others have recognised that "the principles of democracy-
such as the equality of human beings - cannot deny the immense 
variability of human experience and human attributes" (Diamond, 1995, 
p. 2). So democracy can certainly provide a forum for dialogue, but it 
alone is not enough. A 'new', deeper, democratism is necessary- because 
"the high ideals that characterise democracy are not readily transferable 
into practice" (Diamond, 1995, p. 3). 
"An interesting examination of 'participative democracy' can be found in 
van Beinum (1990) in Trist, Emery and Murray (1997, pp. 570-588). The 
article contains references to the holocaust - the darkest event in modern 
history - and "how it overtook man's imagination to conceive evil. So the 
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practical part must come from within, deep within us somewhere I 
believe are the answers. The core of our being conceals the good, the right 
thing to do; it needs to be exposed in order that we may cast aside our 
superficial layers that we use to mask our identity". 
Ixion: "You talk as ifthere were some kind of moral orguidingforce at 
work. It doesn't know right from wrong. If my behaviours are consistent 
with my moral position then I am doing what I believe to be right, what I 
know to be right. If someone else is harmed because of it, then so be it. 
What am I to do, change my beliefs so that my moral outlook conforms to 
what somebody else expects of me? What you are really talking about 
here is moral conservatism, or ethics for the masses". 
Nietszche: "People may say they have ethics that guide their behaviour, 
but they have deluded themselves. I created my superman (Zarathustra) 
to counter this myth, he will provide the salvation - "the Superman feels 
deeply, but his passions are rationally controlled. Concentrating on the 
real world, rather than on the rewards of the next world promised by 
religion, the superman affirms life, including the suffering and pain that 
accompany human existence" (Microsoft Encarta, 1996) he is the voice of 
the 'will to power', the realisation that I am that which must overcome 
itself again and again. Many people look to a religion for guidance, for 
spiritual direction. Our gods have failed us, we must demolish their 
ancient habits of mind". 
Satre: "We have always recognised that there is a vertical progression of 
ideals or goals that we seek, and the satisfaction of the ingredients at 
each level allow us to pursue those at the next level. Your earlier 
comments of your family Guy seem to me to be firmly anchored to the 
lowest set, where physiological and security concerns are the primary 
focus". 
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Guy: "Yes, although many philosophers have known this, it was 
Abraham Maslow, a founder of humanistic psychology, who developed 
and popularised a hierarchical model of human motivation, in which the 
highest need, ultimately that for self-actualisation, can only be expressed 
after lower needs are fulfilled. Rogers (1961, p. 35) also identified a 
"growth tendency, a drive towards self-actualisation, or a forward 
moving directional tendency [as] the mainspring of life". 
My question is "How do we transition between these levels?" What is 
happening to those around us as a result of our movement upward? In a 
world fuelled by greed I contend that it is at the expense of some other 
poor soul, often one who may be alongside us, family or friend; but 
equally some unknown individual in a distant land who is being affected 
indirectly by the combined effects of many he will never see. Their labour 
or resources are the enablers of our ascent - as long as we can detect 
movement upward then we are motivated to achieve, to strive further". 
"Furthermore, we may view Maslow's model as a fractal structure. There 
are incremental levels that we are not aware of For example, at the first 
level- the 'physiological needs' level of food and shelter- there are five 
internal levels: these can be thought of as the physical items at the first 
level, the sustainment, or security, of these needs at the next; the sharing 
and exchanging of food, warmth and shelter in a community or social 
grouping at the third level; and so on. Somewhere within this more 
complex model is the requirement to recognise, share and foster the. 
achievements and successes of others. I think our simplified view of this 
complex model is allowing greed and individualism to dominate". 
Satre: "Our conversation so far seems to have bounded the notion of 
good and evil and the existence of morals or ethics that allow these to be 
defined within the individual or group. If the behaviour of others, guided 
by their own beliefs, do not accord with ours, and we believe them to be 
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sufficiently insensitive to the needs of others, then we demonise them and 
call them evil if their behaviours are sufficiently extreme". 
I:.xion: ''I could ask you "What is evil"? I have been accused, and 
punished, for committing what others saw as an evil act. To me it was an 
acceptable course of action. Who are they to judge me". 
Guy: "Evil acts or evil people. People can only be considered evil if they 
perform evil acts. There is no evil without a manifestation of it through 
people. Adolph Hitler is considered one of the most evil individuals of the 
twentieth century. His views were extremist and dictatorial, striking fear 
into many, for others he was a man of great vision who held the promise 
of profound change, prosperity and growth for Germany. Definitions 
are always awkward. Words really mean nothing in themselves, they 
simply conjure up additional meanings found in other words. If we look 
for an explanation of evil, part of the understanding can be found in what 
evil is not. 
Good is what readily springs to mind. But good for who? Hitler and his 
goals represented good for him and the like-minded supporters who 
surrounded him. He saw evil in those who· didn't conform to his 
worldview, they represented barriers in his path to a righteousness that 
he passionately believed in. What we are really talking about here is an 
intolerance of diversity. The intolerance is what gives rise to a low 
threshold for action". 
Ixion: ''Evil is a useless term. You get what you want and you use 
whatever means you must to achieve it. You talked earlier of a 
'superman' Nietzsche- your 'Zarathustra'- one who has turned his back 
on Christianity. I don't understand how you can worship a god, yet 
abandon all the teachings of that god". 
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Nietzsche: "You twist my words Ixion. The philosophies of Zarathustra 
do not seek an abandonment of Christianity. They look to a grander "self-
sufficiency-in-joy"; an emancipation from the teachings of religion. We 
have gone beyond religion. We have discovered new ways from within, 
an examination of the self that provides us with purer ideals and morals. 
A need to externalise the origin of these through orientation against a 
religious or spiritual plane would pollute the very purity that derives 
from their source - the human soul. Christianity is but a step to 
enlightenment, it is not enlightenment itself, it is not the object". 
Guy: "You have all raised interesting points. My conclusion, and the 
main theme of our discussion it seems, is that there must be a deeper 
dialogue between the inner and outer worlds, the conscious and the 
unconscious. A lack of reflectivity, including lack of awareness (or 
choosing to blind oneself from an unpleasant reality) of the unconscious 
lies near the heart of many failures to act. If we are to change then the 
•,1 
realisation must originate from within. This is evident in th~~~words of 
McNiff (1995, p. 91) who makes the accusation that "so long as people 
believe it is sufficient to present their message only in conceptual forms, 
there will never be critical self-reflective practice, for practice will not be 
in the world, but in the imagination". 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have set out the framework for the thesis, providing some 
preliminary insights to my research approach and the major influences that have 
shaped my particular orientation. I have called upon the need for self-reflection 
throughout professional practice and explored some of the difficulties that must 
be overcome if success is to be achieved. My rich picture attempts to portray 
visually and symbolically the elements and relationships that bind the subject 
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together in a way that allows simultaneous expression of what is, what could be 
and possibly the paths that one may take. 
I have concluded with an analysis of my own thoughts and the concerns I have for 
the inability of the human spirit to bring about action. The world of self-reflection 
and heuristic inquiry embodied within the dialogue probably seems strange to 
some, as does my writing style that is necessary to preserve (and convey) the 
depth and richness of the exchanges. I consider this as my pathway on the hero's 
journey. and believe that it may lead us to new ways of understanding ourselves 
and the roles we can play in events. 
I leave the reader with a powerful quote from Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman 
in his address to the Human Face of Warfare conference held in Canberra and 
hosted by the Land Warfare Studies Centre in 1999. It summarises the key theme 
of his address wherein a new breed of soldier must emerge - he/she is a 
peacekeeper who can not only bring offensive action to bear, if that is warranted 
and authorised, but primarily the role and purpose is restorative and de-
escalatory. It is one of constructive not destructive measures. 
For the rest of your lives you are going to be faced with individuals 
who are fleeing. They are fleeing drugs and crime and poverty and 
violence and oppression and the fear that lurks in the heart of every 
man and woman and you have the authority and the responsibility 
and the mission to stand up and say "Friend, neighbour, brother, 
sister, are you looking for a safe place"? And they'll tell you 
"yeah", And then you tell 'em "then get behind me, because I'm a 
soldier and this is as far as the bastards are gonna get!" 
Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, (1999) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF (AUSTRALIAN) NATIONAL SECURITY: TIME 
FO.R A POST-MODERN MILITARY? 
Firstly, what business are we in? Well, in a superficial sense, we 
all know we are in the defence business. But what will that mean in 
the 21st century? 
Overview of the Chapter 
Lieutenant General Sanderson, Chief of Army 
New Era Security, 1996, p. 99) 
In this chapter I endeavour to provide an insight into the machinery of national 
security, with primary emphasis on attending to questions within the research 
topic. It will become evident that the situation is growing more complex and 
requires creative thought to develop options and solutions. Indeed, the sub-title 
for this chapter could have been: 'From Set Piece Engagements to Hot Peace 
Relationships, Where to From Here?' As will also become evident the need for the 
future scenarios presented in the next chapter, which serve to provoke unorthodox 
thinking and solutions, is drawn into sharp focus. It is my aim to make clear that 
we have yet to come to terms with where we now find ourselves, Grossman's 
earlier words of guardians protecting those who flee raises important questions. 
The final part of the chapter is devoted to the organisation over which the research 
is conducted - The Special Forces Group. 
Security is like oxygen - you tend not to notice it until you begin to 
lose it, but then once that occurs there is nothing else that you will 
think about. 
Joe Nye, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, USA (n.d.) 
Motivation- A Post-Modern Military 
Australia, in the closing months of 1999, stood astride a defining boundary in its 
military history; we witnessed the largest troop deployment since the Vietnam 
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War, coupled with the nearness of that deployment and the additional 
complication that Australia had no experience at leading large coalition 
peacekeeping operations, as INTERFET (International Force in East Timor) was 
ultimately to become. Leaping ahead almost two years to August 2001, we now 
witness a national resolve to deal effectively with people smuggling, involving a 
tense diplomatic situation between Australia, Indonesia and Norway and the 
primary involvement of the Australian Defence Force to contain and convey the 
illegal immigrants to a third country for processing. 
The question we must now ask ourselves is, "Does this herald a new, more mature 
Defence posture that relies upon the strategies of peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement and military diplomacy (Hills, 2000) to bring about favourable 
outcomes"? Outcomes which interestingly, still (and possibly will always) amount 
to the imposition of one nation's will upon another (Clausewitz, 1832, Howard & 
Paret trans.), but without the high casualty figures that we· seem (thankfully) to 
have grown a marked intolerance for. 
It is also interesting to note that at the same time as this operational deployment 
occurred the Australian Government chose to subject the largest component of the 
ADF - Army - to a detailed examination of its role, purpose and primarily its 
suitability for peacetime, peacekeeping and war. Although this examination pre-
dates the East Timor operation by several months (the Minister of Defence 
officially announced on 27 April 1999, that the Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) was to conduct this examination) 
it will lay bare many of the issues that have shaped the INTERFET deployment 
and hopefully expose many insights into the articulation of national security 
policy through to Defence. 
In addition to questions of suitability, the Committee was directed to "review the 
current and proposed changes to Army to ensure that it provides viable and 
credible land forces able to meet a range of contingencies" (Joint Standing 
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Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2000, p. xv). These 
'contingencies' that form the range have not been stated explicitly and, therefore, 
the range would appear to be open-ended offering little guidance for planners. 
Indeed, the report makes an early admission in their report that: 
the approach taken by us during the inquiry was that . peacetime, 
peacekeeping and war are not distinct and separable conditions. All 
armies must be able to operate within a conflict spectrum. To 
successfully resolve a dispute the Army must be able to be 
effective at both ends of this spectrum. In situations short of large 
scale coordinated violence, the Army must be adept at what we 
termed soft security measures. This includes an ability for 
negotiation, humanitarian relief and information 
dissemination .... [it] must [also] be able to apply physical force in 
what we termed hard security measures [emphasis added]. 
(Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, 2000, p. 5) 
The need for these soft security measures is increasing and reflects the 
observations made by Hill (2000). It is inevitable that military forces will be 
placed in operational contexts in which their training is limited. This is 
attributable to the single-mindedness of military leadership on war and 
warfighting. It has its origins in the belief that the spectrum of conflict is narrow 
and dominated by statements related to what the military uses to define itself, its 
raison d'etre. This conflict spectrum has been presented in a number of formats; 
all, however, resemble Figure 6 (Australian Army, 1998, p. 2-9). 
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Figure 6. The spectrum of conflict. 
It interesting to note that within this model, that contains the boundaries of what 
must be dealt with, 'non-conflict' elements are numerous. Although these are 
adequately described as 'military support operations' with the "focus on 
overcoming a problematic environment, be it physical, social or political" 
(Austral ian Army, 1998, p. 2- 10) the measures undertaken remain entangled with 
those related to confl ict (warfighting). lndeed, the words 'scale' and 'tempo' 
illustrated in Figure 5 have a pre-occupation (within their definitions) with the 
specifics of warfighting. Scale relates to "relative geographic range and/or 
political consequences of failure", whilst "tempo is the rate or rhythm of activity 
relative to that of the enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and between 
operations" (Australian Army, 1998, p. 2-9). These self-limiting descriptions. 
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containing words such as 'enemy', are unable to accommodate the complexities 
and ambiguities of non-conflict situations, wherever they are located on the 
spectrum or continuum. Discussions with Brunskill (1999) during a Defence 
Operations Research Conference in Adelaide (at which I co-presented a paper on 
scenario planning) indicated that 80% of the operational deployments over the last 
ten years have been non-warlike. Whilst it is uncertain what constituted the 
remaining 20%, it is clear that there is an imbalance and the ADF is being 
prepared, equipped and manned for tasks that it is (more) unlikely to undertake in 
the future. 
A Fixation on Fighting 
Given the above comments, it is uncertain whether a fixation with this paradigm, 
a confidence in a 'concept-led' approach that is dominated by responses to conflict 
(structured for war, adapted for peace) and waifighting postures can ever lead to 
more intellectual depth and rigor. The place for this intellectual depth, as a critical 
element, is illustrated in Figure 7 (Australian Army, 1998, p. 5-2) and one which 
is contained within a larger framework, labeled by Army as (unfortunately it 
seems to me) "The components of fighting power [emphasis added]". 
I Intellectual I The Knowledge to Fight I 
I FIGHTING POWER I The Capacity to Fight and Win I 
I Moral I I Physical J The Will to Fight The Means to Fight 
I l Pr:=~~aJ J l ~~~:~~= J l Values J I Leadership II Legitimacy ll ~::~:~ I 
I People II Organisation II s::~~~& II TraJnlng II Equipment II Doctrine I 
Figure 7. The components of fighting power. 
It is evident then that the entire construct rests on and is reinforced by the 
application of coercive power as a principal endeavour. Doctrine repeats the 
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necessity for a warfighting capability to be retained, albeit with a (much more 
frequent) requirement for the adaptation to employment in non-conflict situations. 
We should hope that diplomacy can avoid a situation where aggression will (ever 
again) be directed against us. Our role would then become one of buffering 
between two opposing sides who are unable to engage effective diplomatic 
measures. 
Notwithstanding all the above comments, any independent examination is 
warranted, indicates a healthy capacity for (national) self-evaluation and is not 
unlike that which is going on in other countries. Indeed, military forces worldwide 
are experiencing similar dilemmas as they are forced to recognise the importance 
of peaceful resolution and the associated structural changes that are imposed upon 
their primary role as instruments of national military power and policy. It is this 
subject, and the discovery of similar work being undertaken in the United States, 
that has confirmed the need for the development of the effects-based application 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
The difficulty remains for leaders and policy-makers in that the thinking must 
break free of current boundaries. What we are drawn to recognise is that "part of 
the problem is that we tend to think of conflict as, simply, a breakdown in a 
particular system, rather than as the emergence of another alternative [and for 
others legitimate] system of profit and power" (Keen, 1996, p. 14). Conflict is the 
inability of a social system to accommodate 'tension' and represents a natural 
escalation. 
Broad Progress 
Gone are the days of large military forces standing ready to protect other allied 
nations through the mechanism of ironclad defence agreements - a policy of 
deterrence. We are now firmly in an era of engagement and transparency, but one 
that remains troubled by the need to implement, more frequently it is becoming 
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apparent, United Nations mandated coalition actions to impose the will of the 
international community upon rogue states that would otherwise upset the fragile 
balance of peacetime competition. 
Furthermore, trade imperatives and the rapid expansion of the free market enabled 
through advances in communications technology have juxtaposed diplomacy and 
national prosperity as awkward bedfellows. This has introduced dilemmas in the 
provision of aid and infrastructure support to restore a working government and 
social framework as rapidly as possible following the withdrawal of 
peacekeepers. We can expect that the transitional phases in East Timor will be 
troubling for Indonesia, its major Asian partners and our Defence Force as we see 
and experience our way forward. 
The test to our diplomacy and strategic posture in the region is under immense 
pressure. How we fare will depend largely on our military and its ability to act 
with tact, sensitivity and above all an enduring de-escalatory influence. 
This chapter further addresses the core purpose of the Australian Defence Force 
as it is enshrined within the National Military Strategy, it further examines the 
difficulties arising from political and societal demands upon it to be a 'non-
violent' military instrument of national policy. This oxymoron is one that 
continues to bother defence planners as they confront the (changing) core purpose 
of the ADF and observe similar trends in other countries. Indeed the "Strategic 
Defence Review of July 1998 proposes that one of the ways in which Britain 
should contribute to the maintenance of international stability is through the 
creation of a new core military mission, defence diplomacy" (Hills, 2000, p. 46). 
For developed Western nations this may prove to be their most effective (and 
productive) use and could be considered post-modernist, an ideological departure 
from the use of destructive, coercive means. 
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The moral imperative of purposeful (post-modern military) action has taken root 
and is expressed in the following quote: 
Defending the New World Order will demand the collective use of 
military force, particularly to deal with some of the more violent 
convulsions of self-determination claims. This will require the 
political will to use military force for novel purposes: to defend 
democracy from violent overthrow, to protect the human rights of 
large groups of people (notably minorities) from egregious 
violations, to end humanitarian nightmares or to stop a devastating 
civil war. 
Halperin, Sheffer and Small, (1992, p.6) 
Self Determination in the New World Order 
My use of the term 'military post-modernism' aligns with the explanation given by 
Hodge (1995, p. 38) in the "sense it gives of an open-ended receptivity to the 
unpredictably new, in particular its responsiveness to new themes and new ways 
of thinking, writing and producing knowledge". We need a military that can avert 
conflict through deeper levels of cooperation with the elements of national power, 
combined with an effects-based national security strategy. 
National Security Strategy 
From this point forward it is necessary to occupy the reader's mind with 
descriptions of strategy. The subject is confused and multi-faceted, with a large 
intellectual divide between the government and military. Without over-
simplifying what is an enormously complex area I offer a quote from the Joint 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade that spells out quite 
crisply what (the role of) strategy is and for my purposes here it links strongly 
with language I will use later in Chapter Four. "Traditionally the role of strategy 
is to decide how military means can be used to achieve political ends [emphasis 
added]" (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 2000, 
p. 14). The reader may wish to return briefly to the glossary as these terms should 
start to clarify from this point forward. 
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In any consideration of Australia's military and its purpose it is necessary to 
understand the framework that positions the Defence effort - our National 
Military Strategy, which is distilled from a National Security Architecture. This is 
depicted in Figure 8 and clearly illustrates that Defence is but a single player in a 
complicated game. 
National 
Security 
Architecture 
l 
Elements of National Power 
.___Po-lit-ic-al _ _,, I Economic I ._I __ M_mt_arv _ __,l l.____s_o_cia_l _ _, 
l 
Military Policy 
Figure 8. Australia's National security strategy. 
The National Military Strategy 
Environmental 
The ADF has a framework of military strategies, or endeavors, that set out ways 
that Government might employ the ADF to achieve national security objectives. 
The framework, which supports Australia's National Security Strategy, consists of 
Australia's National Military Strategy (NMS) and subsidiary strategies, which 
describe the military contribution to dealing with a wide range of threats in peace 
and war. This military strategy has five components, each with their own set of 
operational and tactical elements. These are set out in Figure 9. 
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National 
Security 
Strategy 
National 
Military 
Strategy 
Shaping the Defending Protecting Defending Defeating Attacks 
Strategic Global National Interests Regional Against Australia 
Environment Interests Interests 
Figure 9. The National military strategy framework. 
The mission of the Australian Defence Force is to Prevent or defeat the use of 
armed force against Australia and its interests. This mission involves, therefore, 
two key dimensions: 
• the development and maintenance of the capacity to defeat any use or threat of 
armed force against Australia and its interests; and 
• the promotion of a regional and global security environment which enhances 
Australia's security by reducing the likelihood of armed attack against 
Australia and its interests. Policy direction is embodied within the White 
Paper. 
The focus of the White Paper (2000), which this chapter pre-dates the release of, 
will be on the development of military capabilities to meet the range of missions 
the Government wants Defence to perform at a given level of spending. In a 
Defence Portfolio document (Department of Defence 2000, p. 4) this was 
expressed whereby: 
The aim is to expose, in as stark a way as possible, the relationship 
between the strategic outlook, the essential roles and missions the 
ADF must perform, the Defence capability implications and 
money. The White Paper will demonstrate much more clearly than 
in the past the relationship between specific potential missions and 
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the cost of being able to develop and maintain the capabilities 
Defence needs to perform each mission. 
(Department of Defence- Portfolio, Defence intranet, p. 4) 
Having had several insights into the processes used to construct these 
relationships it is my belief that fundamental flaws prevented the discovery of 
new conclusions, therefore not offering decision-makers the starkness (of 
exposure) mentioned in the quote above. These flaws are beyond the scope of this 
thesis to address fully, but relate primarily to the inclusion of phraseology that 
denies the possibility of unconventional and asymmetric responses or measures. 
These unconventional and asymmetric measures will be explored in more detail 
within Chapter Four. In the meantime, the National Military Strategy will be laid 
out fully to provide a foundation on which to (strategically) analyse future 
capabilities. 
The five elements of the National Military Strategy are: 
• Defeating Attacks Against Australia. 
• Defending Australia's Regional Interests. 
• Defending Global Interests. 
• Protecting National Interests. 
• Shaping the Strategic Environment. 
Each of these are discussed in detail. 
Defeating Attacks on Australia - DAA 
DAA is the ADF' s primary task and, therefore, its primary force structure 
determinant (Department of Defence, 1997, pp. 29-31 ). The training, equipment, 
personnel and doctrine are bound up in the need to defeat attacks against Australia 
and thereby protect territory, population, resources, infrastructure or institutions 
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against a regional power. It is the essential foundation of Australia's wider 
defence posture and informs and shapes our major alliances. Defeating attacks 
against Australia is by definition a role that calls upon the full application of 
combat power to defeat an aggressor. 
Any moves towards a defence posture characterised by peace operations would 
necessarily alter the balance and makeup of the ADF. The notion of 'structured for 
war, adapted for peace' as a recently introduced construct to reconcile this 
imbalance and limit its damaging effects will be introduced later. 
Defending Australia's Regional Interests - DRI 
Australia's security from armed attack depends on the security situation in its 
immediate neighbourhood and in the wider Asia-Pacific region (Department of 
Defence, pp. 31-32). Australia's defence posture, therefore, must include the 
means to influence strategic affairs in the region and the willingness to contribute 
to regional efforts to promote regional security. Alongside these diplomatic 
measures at securing stability Australia must maintain a credible capability to 
engage in any conflict within the region that threatens our security. 
Defending Global Interests- DGI 
Notwithstanding its strong focus on the Asia-Pacific region, Australia also has 
clear strategic interests at the global level (Department of Defence, 2000a, pp. 3 
and Department of Defence, 2000b ). The foremost of these is Australia's 
responsibility to support the United Nations. Australia also has strong interests in 
supporting its major allies in resisting aggression, where the United Nations is 
unable to achieve this outcome - multi-national operations and operations other 
than war, also referred to as military support operations (These are operations 
other than combat operations. The Army further divides military support 
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operations into peace and support operations. Examples of military support 
operations include disaster relief, humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operations). 
Protecting National Interests - PNI 
This covers a broad range of peacetime activities that may be directed by 
government as being in the national interest. These include ADF participation in 
international peacekeeping, humanitarian, and disaster relief operations; 
evacuation of Australian citizens abroad; counter-terrorist operations; and 
maritime surveillance and response operations. Examples of this component of 
the NMS have, for simplicity, been bundled into the broader subjects of Defence 
Force Aid to the Civil Power (DFACP), Defence Aid to the Civil Community 
(DFACC) and Counter-Terrorism (CT). 
Shaping the Strategic Environment -SSE 
This strategy has as its aim the building of Australia's relationships with its 
alliance partners and neighbours in the region, so that the chances of conflict are 
reduced or, if conflict does occur, the chances of Australian and allied success are 
increased. This strategy requires military credibility based on a combination of 
relevant professional attributes and reputation as an effective fighting force. 
Education and training of foreign military personnel, ship visits, and exercises and 
exchanges are examples of activities conducted under this strategy. 
A review of the suitability of the Australian Army to provide viable and credible 
land forces able to meet a range of contingencies is timely in the light of 
Australia's present circumstances. The Army presently provides the ADF with a 
modest array of capabilities able to meet immediate needs. These capabilities are 
adequate for immediate peace and peace support operations, albeit with a 
constrained ability to sustain a commitment over time. 
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National Security Interests and Objectives 
It was stated earlier that the National Military Strategy was a supporting 
component of the National Security Strategy. It is important to remember that the 
protection of Australia's national security interests is a matter of national policy, 
not just defence policy, and requires the application of a whole-of-nation and 
whole-of-government approach. It is equally important to appreciate that this 
national policy is embodied within broader democratic ideals of tolerance and the 
pursuit of peaceful resolutions to tension. Nevertheless, it remains a fundamental 
role of government to ensure the protection of Australia's: 
• territory, airspace, territorial seas, and maritime resource zones; 
• citizens; and 
• national and international political and economic interests. 
From the three points above it can be deduced that the over-riding security 
interests are to safeguard physical security, to preserve Australia's capacity for 
independent decision-making as a sovereign State, and to sustain the existence of 
a democratic system of government - a government that is actively engaged in 
regional and international affairs in order to win (its own) prosperity and growth. 
This role requires protection against both military and non-military threats to 
national security. 
• Military threats are those that might be posed by the military forces of other 
nation-states. These threats may be direct, for example, the threat or use of 
armed force on Australian shipping, aircraft, territory or population centres. 
Military threats may also be indirect, for example, the committing of military 
acts of aggression in other parts of the world that put global security, or 
Australia's regional security environment at risk. 
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• Non-military threats are those that might be posed by other than the military 
forces of other nation-states. These threats cover a very broad range of 
possible occurrences, including deliberate disruption of Australia's economic 
activity, especially of its international trade; illegal immigration; influx of 
refugees and externally-induced environmental degradation. Other threats 
include pandemics; threats to primary industries from imported animal and 
plant diseases; illegal fishing; international sabotage of the national 
information infrastructure and transnational crime. 
Collectively these encompass a broad spectrum of situations involving both 
conflict and non-conflict- a question of risk, coupled with a level of likelihood -
or 'probability of occurrence'. These two inter-related issues have been displayed 
at Figure 10 (Adapted from Engelbrecht, Bivins, Condray, Fecteau, Geiss, & 
Smith, 1996). 
1.0 
Probability 
of 
Occurrence 
Humanitarian Peace-
operations keeping 
Peace- Terrorism 
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LRC HRC WMD 
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Figure 10. Conflict probability-risk functions. 
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1. High end global competitor 
2. Low end global competitor 
3. High end regional competitor 
4. Low end regional competitor 
5. Counterinsurgency 
6. Peace enforcement 
7. Dangerous nuclear/ industrial activities 
8. Large-scale nuclear, biological and/or chemical proliferation 
9. Non:-state terrorism 
If Figure 10 is an accurate representation on these two dimensions then positions 
6, 7, 9, 8 and 5 on the horizontal axis contain the largest area under the 
intersecting lines and, therefore, should focus defence planners' thoughts on the 
force structures necessary to succeed in these types of operations. Clearly, the 
ADF's present posture is aligned against position 3 -high-end regional competitor 
and a combination of positions 1 and 2 as part of alliances with the United States 
and others. 
It is uncertain whether any examination of the suitability of the Army for 
peacekeeping, peacemaking and war will consider the veracity and usefulness of a 
simple diagram such as this. The message is quite clear; the imbalance leads to an 
awkward organisational configuration that somehow is never able to match itself 
with the situations it finds itself in. This topic will be addressed in more detail 
within Chapter Four with several references to marketing orientation as a strategic 
organisational input. 
Before dealing with how decision-makers cope with this complexity it would be 
useful to point out that the National Military Strategy is under review, is likely to 
change to accommodate other issues and will change again in the future. Indeed, 
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the Military Response Options (MRO are subject to the Official Secrets Act) that 
are a detailed account of actions and assigned force elements is also under review. 
The unknowability of all this adds legitimacy to the 'structured for war, adapted 
for peace' theme that now demands our consideration. The source, level and 
complexity of threat will always pose considerable problems, if we position our 
approach firmly around conflict then we should not be surprised by events that 
confirm our lack of preparedness. 
Structured for War, Adapted for Peace 
The Chief of Army, in his address to the National Press Club on 14 April 1999, 
stated: 
There should be no doubt about this: the Australian Army's focus 
is- and must remain- the delivery of warfighting capabilities that 
are world's best practice. To aim for anything less would be an 
insult to our people in uniform; and a betrayal of the nation. I have 
seen the results of a peacekeeping culture in several armies in 
recent years. Those are not the kind of Army that this country 
needs. They are not the kind of Army that will earn the respect 
that is the foundation of successful peacekeeping. 
Lieutenant General F.J. Hickling, (1999) Chief of Army 
Address to the National Press Club, Canberra. 
Although Major General Hickling's words carry several messages, the key 
message is clearly that Army's posture and preparedness will remain one of 
warfighting and not peace keeping or peace-enforcement. To support this view an 
approach known as 'structured for war, adapted for peace' has been crafted by 
Army Headquarters staff that aims to secure confidence in our ability to adapt 
when warfighting skills are not called for. This is rather optimistic and fails to 
recognise that the skills are markedly different, as will be demonstrated in 
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Chapter Four where I present an effects-based analysis of defence capability 
planning. 
In peace operations it is possible for a young, relatively inexperienced commander 
to make the right tactical decision in the field, but the result, in the fullness of 
time, is found to be politically disastrous and inappropriate. It is my view that the 
premise of 'structured for war, adapted for peace' will receive critical review 
during the Senate inquiry and be exposed as flawed and unachievable. This view 
is reinforced by a senior Department of Defence official who declared: 
I do not think that we have yet got to the point of providing the 
Army with a really clear statement of what it is meant to be doing 
. . . To my mind at least, one of the key objectives of the present 
process is to make sure that we do that. 
Mr H. White, Deputy Secretary Strategy. 
This statement has particular relevance to the layered model presented in Figure 2 
whereby information flows are interfered with. 
Some Thoughts from Kosovo 
Briefly departing from the Australian context allows us to consider the confused 
events in other parts of the world. This perspective can enable us to better 
understand our themes. The former Yugoslavia is one area that cries out for a 
solution to relieve the suffering and endless political bickering that has crippled 
the country and destroyed the spirit of the people, although many would consider 
their resolve to have hardened it in ways that will inevitably lead to more violence 
- a spirit of anger and hatred. This example is also valuable in drawing attention to 
the complexity of the East Timor situation, illustrating that what one side values 
as being a favourable outcome may be totally inconsistent with what the other 
side perceives. 
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As a brief reminder, the conflict in Kosovo was: 
• Not a major theater war like Desert Storm. 
• Not like Korea, Iran or Iraq in terms of the operational planning guidance 
scenarios. 
• Not supporting U.S. vital interests, but 'humanitarian' concerns. 
• A return to Vietnam's 'gradual escalation' rather than Desert Storm's 
'overwhelming force'. 
• Not a fair fight: Major Power NATO vs. Third World Serbs. 
• NATO: 775 million people & 57% of world GDP. 
• Serbs: 11 million people & 0% of world GDP in a nation half the size of 
Victoria. 
• NATO: Essentially a live-fire military exercise (30,000+ air sorties were 
flown). 
• Serbs: No offensive or defensive weapons comparable to NATO. 
But STILL it: 
• took 1,100 aircraft and 70+ days to force Milosevic to concede (reinforcing 
the Clausewitzian doctrine that war is a clash of wills, the imposition of one 
nation's will upon another, or a search for asymmetry- a topic I will deal with 
more completely in Chapter Four). 
• allowed the Serb Army to withdraw from the conflict with most tanks, 
artillery and intermediate air defence weapons intact. 
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to new Continental security 
coalition 
Persuade NATO to acquire ~ 
means and will to conduct "our 
of area" military operations 
European Strategy 
Maintain a peaceful, 
prosperous & Independent 
Europe 
~ Prevent~ Into Albania & ~acedonia,thence to Greece & 
Turkey 
Maintain NATO relationship with 
Russia and give it a role In helping 
end the crisis 
Demonstrate European .l!llilll 
Figure 11. A common effort concealing widely differing objectives. 
Portrayed above (Figure 11, source unknown and circulated freely on the Defence 
intranet amongst planners) is a diagram that illustrates the divergence of opinion 
that can surround a single theatre. In this example, an internal conflict that is 
characterised by 'war' (an accurate definition has continued to trouble policy 
makers since the end of World War Two), is superimposed with a peace-
enforcement operation by a multi-national force operating under United Nations 
authority. I propose that a similar confused arrangement could exist when 
examining the roles and objectives of the participant nations in INTERFET. 
Staying with Kosovo for one further example, we can make several illustrative 
judgements about how the United States' effort has looked to allies and foes in 
other regions: 
• Many observers believed that the US and NATO applied power recklessly 
against civilians for less than 'vital interests'. 
• A reluctance to accept casualties and 'Poll as you fight' made the USA an 
unpredictable ally. 
• There are clear limits to US global surge capability and 'numbers' still count, 
Kosovo was an example of insufficient numbers being mobilised. 
• High-tech or not, the US can be fooled by good operational decisions. 
• Easier to bomb the civilian infrastructure first - get the military targets when 
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you can as they will generally be well hidden and difficult to engage. 
It is clear that many misunderstandings and misjudgments have occurred during 
the two peace enforcement operations highlighted in this section (Yugoslavia and 
East Timor). These are likely to increase in both frequency and consequence. The 
message for Australia and the focus of our attention here - the Australian Army -
is whether we can begin to think through these complex situations, develop plans 
and responses that are alert to all possible perspectives and transform the 
organisation to one that is 'restorative' in goals and objectives, rather than 
destructive. 
The Messages for Australia 
The shift towards a peace enforcement/peacekeeping posture for the Australian 
Defence Force is undeniable, it is part of a larger international movement. How 
rapidly this shift occurs and how successful it ultimately proves to be is dependent 
upon many things, not least of which is the ability of the Defence Organisation to 
recognise that we have departed from an age of 'set piece engagements' to arrive 
in one of 'hot peace relationships'. The ends of the continuum that these points 
define are far apart and the zone between is complex, ill-defined, overlapping and 
problematic for diplomatic and military strategies. Different structures and 
postures are called for. I assert that these demand tact, diplomacy and the 
involvement of the warrior diplomat in winning a secure region. 
Where to From Here 
We should look carefully to the experiences of our larger partner nations as they 
deal with the same issues. There is grave danger in not remaining prepared for 
periods of increasing tension, there is also grave danger in inappropriate responses 
or misreading indicators. Clearly a balance must be struck between an ADF that is 
optimised for war and one that does not possess the capabilities to respond to 
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situations that involve skills more aligned with peace enforcement or 
peacekeeping. 
The report of the Joint Standing Committee and the Defence White Paper 2000 
may herald a new role that can span the gulf from peace operations to war, 
hopefully preparing us for more peaceful resolutions to conflict. 
Here we will learn that each of us bears responsibility for our 
actions and our failure to act. Here we will learn that we must 
intervene when we see evil arise. Here we will learn more about 
the moral compass by which we navigate our lives and by which 
countries will navigate the future. 
President George Bush, 15 February, 1991 
Inscribed on the wall of the Holocaust Museum in Washington. 
In considering the realignments that may deliver a 'post-modem' military, we 
must now look to the organisation that may offer a place for these changes - the 
Special Forces Group. 
The Special Forces Group 
The Special Forces Group is an organisation comprising 1200 personnel, spread 
over five Australian States and Territories in seven separate locations. It has the 
role within the Australian Defence Force of conducting operations beyond the 
range and capability of other force elements. This definition (essentially a 
definition by exclusion) has become less useful as world events continue to 
surprise security planners; with operational deployments becoming more 
complex, less defined militarily - with a warrior diplomat, humanitarian, 
peacekeeper, rescuer, coalition participant and possibly UN sponsored action 
becoming more commonplace. 
The place for these developments to occur is within an unconventional 
organisation, where novelty is fostered. The novelty then must emerge on 
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multiple levels. It is not only about the behaviour of the people, it is also about the 
supporting training, doctrine, organisational structures and purpose. I have 
discovered that many of the business and institutional aspects contained within 
the broader field of organisational behaviour do not transfer to a military 
institution; there are cultural and ideological complexities that exist on many 
dimensions. These will also have to be discovered. 
The views expressed here are derived from a consideration of domestic, regional 
and global trends, characteristics and policies. The points made are intentionally 
simple and direct, and represent core opinions of complex issues, which can be 
analytically sustained. Considered in total they provide a clear direction for the 
strategic development of the organisation. 
It would be valuable for the reader to become familiar with the cultural subtleties 
and nuances that pervade an organisation of this nature, although not essential as 
they are mirrored in many unorthodox institutions (Rich, 1994). There is a 
growing fascination with these organisations, fuelled by the large number of 
published non-fiction books by ex-members containing amazing stories of 
operations and training (Connor, 1998; Homer, 1991). The purpose of Special 
Forces within defence and national security and how it became evident to me that 
a disciplined, systematic approach to futures thinking was vital to establishing a 
solid foundation for change and redefinition and one that would win support and 
ownership. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have prepared the reader's mind for the next two chapters with an 
understanding of national security strategy and national military strategy. It was 
not meant to be burdened with messages of messiness and institutional 
inadequacy (although I fear that some of these may have been conveyed). If this 
has occurred then I would like to emphasise that inter-departmental levels of 
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cooperation are (usually) high and genuine attempts are made to bring order to 
what is an extremely difficult area of policy with reasonable levels of success and 
effectiveness. As will be pointed out later there is a complexity and non-linearity 
that permeates this entire area of human (inter)action, almost defying any 
reasonable attempts to bring about desired effects (Alberts & Czerwinski, 1997). 
I have contrasted Australian policy with some examples of international efforts to 
control conflict, showing that perspectives differ dramatically and what may seem 
to be an appropriate course of action can be hopelessly inadequate. 
I have also outlined the nature and purpose of Special Forces and the important 
place it occupies with Defence bringing the discussion back to the context of this 
research. This outline will be used to foster acceptance of the need for forward, 
scenario-based thinking, the subject of Chapter Three. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONSTRUCTING PLAUSIBLE FUTURES 
The past is of no importance. The present is of no importance. It is 
with the future that we have to deal. For the past is what man 
should not have been. The present is what man ought not to be. 
The future is what artists are. 
Oscar Wilde 
Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter explains the use of Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR), a systems 
approach to futures planning that guides the construction of scenarios in a more 
structured way than many other methods, particularly those that demand high(er 
than normal) levels of imagination and creativity throughout. The aim of scenario 
planning, within the context of this research, was to provide a relatively 
unbounded forum for novel thoughts and ideas regarding organisational renewal. 
These unusual concepts and imperatives, that would be present within the minds 
of the organisation's members, must be expressed within a broadened perspective 
of the future. It would therefore, draw forth the collective knowledge (to be 
populated into the database in Chapter Four) that would otherwise remain 
unrevealed and untested. 
Its aim was not to attack conservatism or orthodoxy, but to provide an 
environment in which present beliefs could remain unchallenged, whilst 
simultaneously exploring other possibilities. This was achieved through the use of 
Checkland's (1972, 1980 and 1981) and Checkland and Scholes (1990) Soft-
Systems Methodology and the possibilities of accommodating individual and 
group concerns through adherence to the stages of SSM: an unstructured problem 
situation (SSM stage 1), a problem situation expressed (stage 2), a conceptual 
model (stage 4) and a comparison between stages 2 and 4, with all having a 
legitimate place as a repository of knowledge and information to enable 
purposeful activity and minimise 'rice bowl' discussions (stage 5). How I used the 
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full seven steps of SSM to preserve present beliefs, explore the new (stage 6) and 
then bring the two into juxtaposition (stage 7) will be set out in this chapter. 
The FAR methodology was selected as it provided for the manipulation into 
scenarios of a diverse range of change drivers. These drivers may be derived 
through various means in many futures planning, forecasting and predicting 
methodologies (Schwartz, 1991; Taylor, 1993; McRae, 1995; Builder, 1987; 
Digby, 1988; Loescher, Schroeder & Thomas, 2000), which in turn provide a 
macro framework from which to consider how events may unfold. I conclude, 
however, that the FAR approach exhibited a superior ability to rapidly distil a 
massively unworkable list of possible permutations into a reduced set of possible 
co-existent elements. In the final section of this chapter I also include some 
insights into the automated version of FAR that I developed. 
A novel approach was also taken to encapsulate the end-states that emerged from 
the construction of the Faustian tree, an integral part of the FAR process, allowing 
a re-examination of the drivers and their dominance in developing themes. As will 
be demonstrated this further extends and tests the FAR process. 
Seven drivers, major influences that cannot be changed, act to provide the 
boundaries for five future world situations arrayed on a Faustian tree, a map of 
interconnected scenarios. These future worlds are further developed into rich 
narratives that describe 20 individual scenarios. The product of the futures work is 
linked back to the organisation to provoke creative thought and unconfined 
dialogue designed to contribute to initiatives for fruitful change. This paper 
presents an account of the use of FAR to build scenarios for the Special Forces 
Group faced with an increasing rate of change in its operational environment. 
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(Organisational) Change as a Constant (Improvement) 
Before discussing in detail the use of FAR and the processes that led to the 
construction of the 20 scenarios I need to explain a model (see Figure 12) I 
developed at the beginning of the research that conveyed a sense of the dynamic 
nature of change and progress and the important place that the Special Forces 
Group occupies within this continuum of change. This model will be expanded 
upon briefly in Chapter 4 when fully exploring the nature of effects-based 
operations and what form(at) the organisational transformations need to take to 
accommodate the conclusions of the research. The model's use here illustrates that 
current paradigms are fragile and transitory and future events are already 
beginning to shape the change, indeed everything is in the state of becoming 
something else. 
Superseded 
A 8 
Figure 12. The nature of change and progress. 
The model can be viewed 
stationary, with events 
moving past from right to left 
- progress; or as 
movement towards the right 
past stationary periods. 
Special Operations (see Glossary) should exist at the forward or leading edge of 
military capability (within the rectangle labeled 'Special' in Figure 12) and remain 
the primary domain of Special Forces (see Glossary). They are the practitioners of 
these operations and have been screened, selected, equipped and trained to 
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perform them. Although I have not provided additional contextual information in 
these rectangles - Future what?, Special what?, Elite Conventional what?, 
Conventional what? and/or Superseded what? It is a simple matter to add 
'operations', 'administration', 'logistics', 'personnel', 'training', 'recruitment' or 
other descriptor. The operations, for example, conducted on the 'edge' must by 
definition be novel, unorthodox and surprising. It follows that the supporting 
administration, logistics, personnel management procedures and otherfactors, that 
support them must also be somewhat different . from the mainstream to 
accommodate that novelty. There must, therefore, be a movement of the boundary 
from 'A' to 'B'. This striving for difference has not (routinely) occurred and can be 
attributed not only to phenomena within the organisation, but also to a military 
and political leadership that is characterised by conservatism towards the very 
organisation that is expected to be doing different things (not the same things 
differently) in order to discover the newness that eventually others will benefit 
from the practise of. These are the qualities that Stacey (1996b, p. 314) regards as 
essential to thrive at the boundary between stability and instability because 
"systems are capable of novelty and variety (creativity and innovation in 
organisational terms) only when they 
are pushed far from equilibrium to the 
edge of disintegration". If 
'ordinariness' is preserved or imposed 
then 'difference' can never emerge. 
The model indicates, in an ideal 
setting, the requirement to reach 
forward and hand back military 
capabilities simultaneously. It is the 
only way by which progress can be 
made. Handing back is possibly more 
critical as it creates the organisational 
slack necessary for creativity, 
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I used this model on every occasion 
that I brought the subject of 
organisational change to a new 
audience. Its simple yet powerful 
messages have proved to be 
unassailable. There is an underlying 
logic that demands acceptance. 
Once this logic is acknowledged 
then every subordinate 
organisational issue somehow 
becomes swept up in the collective 
opinions that result. The model has 
become so central to the idea of 
orchestrated change that I intend to 
integrate its key features into the 
strategic plan. It is suggestive of a 
course of action that seems to 
provide an effective method of 
satisfying perceived needs. It is 
seductive. 
Personal reflections, 16 June 1998. 
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experimentation and innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1997), in any event this slack is 
necessary to achieve the three interwoven roles of undertaking core operations, 
enabling attention towards the new and emergent and the formal handing back to 
elite-conventionals and conventionals whose own capacity must be developed as a 
cooperative effort, allowing the necessary movement from the boundary at 'A' to a 
new boundary at 'B'. A fascinating account of an organisation's success in the area 
of experimentation and innovation can also be gained from Rich (1994) and 
Rogers (1995). 
This model was accepted quite readily and proved to be a valuable tool for 
building consensus around (at least the conceptual) initiatives for change. Its logic 
could not be disputed by senior decision-makers, but having accepted the 
powerful messages it conveyed they proved unable to adjust their behaviour, 
despite the existence of powerful indicators for change produced by the database 
application discussed in Chapter 4. 
I have confirmed many of the capability development, modernisation and 
operational analysis projects (many of which are subject to the Official Secrets 
Act) are advancing methods within the Elite Conventional domain. The discovery 
of new capability (doing different things), with an associated handing back of 
capabilities to secure the necessary slack has not been attended to with enough 
vigor and the organisation is essentially doing the same things differently. 
It is inevitable that over time many of the techniques, practices and procedures 
will be adopted by mainstream military organisations (those occupying the 
rectangle labeled 'Elite Conventional' and 'Conventional'). The message this 
model seeks to convey is that well forward of what is considered 'the way things 
are done' is a large part of 'the way things will be done'. There are new, more 
advanced methods that eventually will become mainstream (routinely performed 
within the conventional domain). They must become the focus of experimentation 
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and innovation now and become an area of interest and curiosity for Special 
Forces as part of a managed plan for change. 
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Figure 13. Scenario and effects-based planning mapped over Checkland's SSM. 
At Figure 1 I used Checkland's seven stage SSM model to introduce the ideas of 
'what is?', 'what could be?' and the possibility that these could be asked 
simultaneously to a group. As I have already stated I believe that scenario 
planning and effects-based planning constitute knowledge management systems 
and are valuable aids to the building and reinforcement of consensus. Figure 13 
shows how these processes can be mapped over the SSM model to secure the 
active involvement (and consensus) of planners. 
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To better (more efficiently) develop and maintain an appropriate (more effective) 
Australian Defence Force (ADF) its elements must be continually alert to the 
strategic environment (a subject dealt with at length in the previous chapter) and 
the shifts and adjustments that occur. These two factors combine to produce a 
military operations research focus that can inform decision-making on the three 
levels of: tactical, operational and strategic. On the strategic level an evaluation of 
overall operational capability may be undertaken as a means of securing national 
security, but as will be shown this falls well short of bringing forward the totality 
of change demanded through those shifts within the strategic environment. 
A military operations research approach can aid in answering three key questions 
related to national security (Nicholson & Duczynski, 1999): 
• What is it the capability seeks to do? 
• What performance measures should be used to judge capability? 
• What sort of analysis is required? 
One consequence of this questioning process is the requirement to balance the 
present capability needs with those required in the future, a need to maintain and 
develop/build simultaneously. The need for these to fuse together confirms the 
logic of an effects-based approach (the first and third questions) that is linked to 
current and future scenarios (the first question), coupled with the addition of 
ratings (the second question). The performance measures used to evaluate 
capability are discussed in Chapter Four (the second question). 
Considering issues of future capability expectations for the Special Forces Group, 
falls within the bounds of the definition of the term 'capability development'. One 
accepted definition is the function 'performance gap closing' in terms of force 
structure and preparedness (both are in the Glossary), where preparedness is a 
function of equipment stock holding, equipment condition, manpower and 
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training and preparedness relates to the time allocated to achieve operational 
deployability - an expression of poise. 
However, this definition is only accepted with the caveat that capability is not 
independent of external factors, nor is it a constant. It depends on the 
circumstances (the contextual environment) in which the forces would be 
employed. Special Forces conduct Special Operations, being outside the scope of 
conventional ADF elements in form, purpose and function. Adaptability is, 
therefore, a critical characteristic. 
Thus, the emphasis of this chapter is the conceptualisation and study of external 
factors and circumstances and then what role, if any, Special Forces may have in 
them as a contributor to a resolution. These can be derived by the formulation of 
scenarios to achieve the necessary dislocation from the present. 
Scenarios 
Scenario planning, and numerous other, albeit somewhat lesser known, methods 
have become increasingly popularised through the proliferation of management 
books dealing with futures thinking, coupled with a widening acknowledgement 
that systems thinking and practice may provide answers to many of the 
unstructured problems that plague organisations. For scenario planning to be 
effective, a useful set of scenarios must be constructed against which the 
organisation or area of interest can be tested. 
This useful set of scenarios must encompass a sufficiently broad range of 
conditional ingredients that offer enough possibilities for variation and 
divergence. Without this possibility for divergence a single path into the future is 
formed which, despite the boldest imagination, cannot accommodate more than a 
single scenario or a narrow collection of qualitatively similar (and therefore, not 
useful) scenarios. 
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The importance of isolating these multiple pathways into the future can be seen in 
Figure 14 below. It illustrates the variety of trajectories that are plausible, but of 
course only one will eventuate. It is likely though that this single future history 
will be a combination of those already foreseen as a result of thorough scenario 
planning. 
Furthermore, "In the analysis, as a prelude to finding ways to compensate for 
uncertainty, an effort can be made to forecast or map the many possible futures, 
rather than to predict a future environment in the sense of specifying a single 
sequence of events" (Quade, 1964, p .. 172). 
The model enables the positioning of different worlds out in the future, the 
pathways that can be conceptually followed through narratives have many twists 
and turns that must be explained. The directional changes must be attributable to 
something. These scenarios are the history of the future. 
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Now 
Figure 14. The importance of multiple pathways for ensuring diversity. 
These differing pathways are necessary to provoke decision-makers to consider 
variety. "In choosing organisational designs, people do not confront an infinite 
range of choice .... If their organisations are to be purposive, they have to be 
adaptive over a wide range of evolving circumstances" (Emery, 1993b, p. 214 ); 
providing further reinforcement for an adaptable organisation. 
The Context and Purpose of Scenario Planning 
Many emergency response organisations: Jaw enforcement, military, fire fighters , 
paramedics and disaster relief, to name just a few, use scenarios on almost a daily 
basis to sharpen their capacity to deal with the unexpected. Through a 
comprehensive set of 'what if statements and structured events they are able to 
rapidly cycle themselves through a bewildering array of problem situations. The 
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result of this focussed training and the associated flexibility of mind it demands is 
a highly agile team that can rapidly adapt structures, techniques and procedures to 
overcome situations in which indecision and hesitancy are not options. Pilots 
undergo multiple repetitions of emergency situations in simulators to create this 
necessary rapidity of response and action such that problem-solving is reduced to 
an instinctive sequence of behaviours, in effect allowing the mind to remain clear 
and unencumbered to deal with those few contextual aspects. 
The same signals and noise that invoke this stimulus-response mechanism are 
present in areas where a slower rate of adaptation (evolution?) can be appropriate. 
Nevertheless, the perceived equilibrium can be punctuated by rapidly changing 
events that accelerate quicker than policy making can contend with (the escalation 
in violence following the East Timor independence elections provides a vivid 
recent example). As stated by Schwartz (1991, p. 3) "not having tried to foresee 
surprising events, they are at a loss for ways to act when upheaval continues". 
These (shocking) realisations are made even more confronting when it became 
"evident from the public's response to this crisis [in East Timor] that the 
community's expectations of the Defence Force are greater than those perceived 
by the Department of Defence" (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade, 2000, p. 45). The key lesson presented is that policy makers 
are often institutionally blind(ed) to the array of surprising events that may occur 
at short warning, with significant benefits attached to the exploration of scenarios 
as a means of overcoming this. 
Stacey's (1996b, p. 37) explanation of complex adaptive systems operating at the 
boundary between order and disorder (chaos) provides a means of coping and an 
environment in which mutations occur spontaneously and much more rapidly, 
because "in open-ended change situations ... [managers] do not know how their 
actions may be related in a cause-and-effect sense to the outcomes of those 
actions". It is not easier to do nothing. 
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Various methods have been devised to cope with this, with scenario planning 
being just one. Additional and equally valuable insights can be gained from an 
entirely discipline. The diagram below (Figure 15) is borrowed from the work of 
Wickens (1992, p. 20) and Signal Detection Theory. It has relevance to decision-
making and certainly is an important device for this research, as "perfect 
performance is that in which no misses or false alarms occur" (Wickens, 1992, p. 
20). An important ability for policy makers involved in national security. 
State of the World 
Signal Noise 
Yes Hit False alarm 
++ +-
Response 
No Miss Correct rejection 
-+ --
Figure 15. The (only) four states of the world. 
The model can be summarised as: 
• There was a signal and it was detected- Hit. 
• There was no signal but one was created out of the noise - False Alarm. 
• There was no signal detected and no response was made - Correct Rejection. 
• There was a signal but it remained undetected- Miss. 
Scenarios can aid in the development of this ability as they can sensitise the 
observer to signals and noise, providing for more precise discrimination. A 
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diagram, known as a Faustian Tree, presented later indicates how these signals 
can be detected. 
The scenarios, and more importantly the use of them for long-term planning, are 
certainly not predictors of events, nor are they attempting to forecast the 
likelihood of particular situations. They simply aid in the provocation of new 
ideas. Before proceeding, these terms of forecast and predict require clarification 
as they are often used interchangeably in practice and within the futures literature. 
Borrowing Coyle's (1997, p. 78) explanations to distinguish between them he 
states that "prediction [gives] a sense of telling beforehand, whereas forecast has a 
sense of general assessment of a likely course of events. Thus, forecasting means 
to think systematically about the unknowable future in such a way as to generate 
understanding to support effective intervention in, or protection against, events 
yet to occur". Projection is another term that has become synonymous with 
scenarios, but its use should remain restricted to those methods that employ 
mathematical or statistical data to extrapolate trend lines into the future where 
some degree of reliability and validity offer the necessary (technical) confidence. 
These methods do not tax the imagination whatsoever, a recent example being 
that "Japan, the land of the planet's longest-lived people, now has more of its 
citizens aged 65 or older, than under 15. While records for the rest of human 
history can't tell us, it's unlikely any other society has ever been so old" (Cornell, 
2001, p. 7). The economic aftershocks and other destabilising influences 
(conspiracies of events) are what the futurist must contend with. I am not 
interested in projections. Communication with Coyle, one of the more prominent 
authors on the use of FAR and a visiting lecturer to the Australian Defence Force 
Academy in Canberra, has confirmed the need for this type of (systems thinking) 
work and its applicability for planners. 
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E-mail from Geoff Coyle 
·27 July 1999 
Guy, 
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I didn't get to see the paper you have written on Field Anomaly Relaxation but, if you want 
to send it to me I will be happy to comment. In the meantime, well done and good luck with 
your further work. 
I had a long talk with Charles Newton and he is hoping to get me out again to repeat my 
courses. If I do, I am sure that you would be most welcome to sit in on the effort. 
Keep in touch. 
Regards, 
Geoff 
The explanation of 'forecast' is more useful than projection for my purposes here 
and is certainly an ample descriptor for those personnel involved in the 
emergency, short-term situations mentioned earlier. What then for organisations 
seeking to adapt to changing events that may span many years and involve 
complex inter-relationships that conspire in ways that are not immediately 
evident? 
As a practitioner in need of a systematic and disciplined approach to developing a 
useful set of futures, the FAR methodology has proven to be highly valuable. 
Field Anomaly Relaxation 
FAR is one example of a structured judgement approach that allows the user to 
think systematically about the world and its unknown future. It allows multiple 
scenarios to be developed that are subsequently displayed in a Faustian Tree. The 
tree maps out the transitions and pathways that are plausible. It affords a 
transparent and traceable account of how the future scenarios are derived. The 
tree also provides for an aggregation of individual beliefs regarding the 
interaction of the drivers, ensuring a holistic and unbiased approach is taken when 
trying to derive likely future world scenarios. 
I 
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Russell Rhyne, the original architect of the Field Anomaly Relaxation technique, 
advocates adherence to a four-step process to projecting futures (Rhyne, 1974, pp. 
132-166; 1981, pp. 331-360; 1995; 1998). The process has been further 
developed by Coyle and a series of co-authors undertaking studies at the Defence 
Institute at Shrivenham in the United Kingdom (Coyle, 1984; 1985 and 1987; 
Coyle, Crayshaw & Sutton, 1994; Coyle & McGlone, 1995, pp. 65-79; Coyle & 
Yong, 1996, pp. 269-283; Coyle, 1997, pp. 77-93; Wood & Christakas, 1984). 
FAR's use here concerns an elite Australian military organisation - The Special 
Forces Group - and its attempts to secure a rightful place within Australia's 
(rapidly changing) national security infrastructure, with the associated recognition 
that this place may involve significantly altered capability sets and organisational 
structures from what has proven successful in the past. The study was prompted 
by a need to re-establish the organisation's unconventionality and heralds a move 
into areas that can only be illuminated by futures studies and the timely 
anticipation of changing circumstances. 
Little evidence is available of the use of Field Anomaly Relaxation outside those 
publications by Rhyne, Coyle, Coyle et al. and Duczynski (2000, pp 19-33). It is 
surprising that a method of such appeal and wide applicability has remained 
almost unknown, at least it has not been widely published in the management 
literature. Its one single drawback is possibly the tediousness associated with a 
thorough analysis of all judgements, a problem that has now been corrected with a 
fully automated version running within a Microsoft® application. 
The process steps for visualising futures using FAR are: 
Step 1: Form an initial view of the alternative futures that could unfold within the 
area of interest. 
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Step 2: Construct a language using Sectors that will become the dimensions of 
describing the area of interest; and Factors, which become the alternative states 
within each Sector and array these on a matrix to form whole field descriptors of 
all possible configurations. 
Step 3: Eliminate those Factor pairs that are illogical or cannot co-exist, forming 
a reduced set of whole field (full sector range) configurations. 
Step 4: Position the surviving whole field configurations on a 'tree' whose 
branches represent possible future states and transitions from one configuration to 
the next. 
A Brief Example of Scenarios 
If we take the four-step process just outlined and apply it to, say, a university 
setting in order to develop a reasonable understanding of these ideas at work, we 
may develop the following lines of thought: 
• The futures that could unfold are the manifestations of thousands of 
interactions within a university, between a university and its operating 
environment and the 2"d, 3rd and nth order effects of interactions that occur 
within the external environment. A sense of the totality of all this must be 
gained. The stable, but cyclical nature and the violent and unexpected shifts 
all must be appreciated. 
• Step 2 allows a language to be constructed around this expanded 
understanding. Level of government funding, student performance, staffing 
levels and capacity for change may be some of the macro determinants of 
performance. Each of these has a 'most favourable' and a 'least favourable' 
condition across a range: capacity for change may be expressed as habitual 
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inclination or delayed. Government funding may be surplus to planned 
requirements or fight for every dollar. 
• Combining these in Step 3 allows discrete 'snapshots' of the environmental 
state to be explored. A bold and decisive university leadership condition 
combined with rapidly rising student levels and a fight for every dollar 
funding condition gives rise to a particular scenario that will be qualitatively 
different from one that retains two of these conditions but has for example: 
stable student numbers. 
• Step 4 allows these individual snapshots to be strung together to form a range 
of trajectories out from the present, with branches and transitions providing 
for the movement up and down on the most favourable/least favourable axis. 
A Hybrid Method 
I have found the four-step Rhyne process to be somewhat limiting at Step 1 in this 
current work. If the initial view is constrained then the work can be flawed from 
the beginning. Indeed, Rhyne makes the suggestion that narratives and stories can 
be written to explore different themes (1974, 1981 and 1995). These could 
quickly take hold of the mind and form the basis for all considerations of the 
topic. Indeed, scenario planning done well has been described as providing a 
"fact-based, research-intensive, comprehensive picture of the future" (Rubenstein, 
2000, 14). 
A different approach was used that involved: group generation of a large list of 
drivers, with the criteria being that they must be beyond the organisation's ability 
to influence; compressing this list of drivers into broadened 'themes' that 
embodied the main thought being presented as the driver; and then entering Step 
2. Step 4 was followed by the construction of a strategic planning space that was 
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bounded by the axes of a cube using three primary drivers outwards from a point 
of origin at one comer. 
These modifications have been necessary due to the need to link this futures work 
into a larger study of organisational transformation using a technique that I have 
chosen to call effects-based planning. Rhyne has identified the importance of 
doing something useful with the results that engages a wider body of thought 
about change " ... the payoff from projections of this kind [FAR] usually erodes 
unless solid uses for them are visualised from the start and pursued" (1981, p. 
349). The fusion of these two processes: futures planning and strategy/policy 
making has corrected what has been identified as a main failure of existing 
planning. 
An Open Systems Orientation 
The slightly modified step 1 allowed an integration of the ideas of complexity and 
systems behaviour as set out by Emery and Trist in their foundational work on 
organisational environments, wherein "a main problem with organisational 
change is that the environmental contexts in which organisations exist are 
themselves changing, at an increasing rate and towards increasing complexity" 
(Emery & Trist, 1965, p. 21). Furthermore, the central premise was an 
acknowledgement that "a comprehensive understanding of organisational 
behaviour requires some knowledge of the lawful interdependencies" that flow 
unceasingly within, through and across environmental and contextual boundaries. 
These were expressed as: 
L11 - the processes at work within the organisation. 
L12 - the transactions and exchanges that penetrate the organisation/environment 
boundary flowing outwards. 
~1 - those transactions and exchanges that flow inwards. 
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~2 - the processes through which parts of the environment become entangled and 
inter-related. 
These lawful interdependencies have been discussed in great detail in a series of 
articles focussing on the theoretical foundations (Trist, Emery & Murray, 1997; 
Emery 1977b; Emery, 1996; Emery, 1999). These relationships, which 
accommodate the organisational behaviour and its origin, are illustrated in Figure 
16. Bringing this subject out of the theoretical and abstract briefly we find that 
Australia exists within, and is affected by, the international system; therefore, 
these systemic interactions must be mapped to gain an holistic appreciation. 
The Contextual Environment 
Figure 16. Environmental interdependencies. 
Indeed, "the significant drivers of change (actors) within the international system 
which influence modern land warfare are: globalisation, ethnic strife, non-state 
actors, population growth, environmental degradation and media presence" 
(Australian Army, 1998, p. 4-2). 
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These drivers of change, and the reality of their influence, must be viewed as a 
constant and ubiquitous condition. Primarily because "The failure to appreciate 
the fact that the behaviour of the actors is in part responsible for the environment 
which then impinges on them can lead observers - and actors as well - to 
underestimate actors' influence" (Jervis, 1998, p. 271). Emery (1977) has 
provided further explanation of this through comparison with a 
volatility/instability equation drawn from the work of Ashby, Gardner and May, 
wherein: 
Where 
n = number of components 
C = probability of a pair of elements interacting 
a. = average strength of interactions 
These interdependencies and "instabilities in large complex systems" (Emery 
(1977, p. 11) can lead to self-organising behaviour wherein "the components of a 
system in effect spontaneously communicate with each other and abruptly 
cooperate in coordinated a1,1d concerted common behaviour" (Stacey, 1996, p. 
330). It is a fundamental behaviour of complex systems that they adaptively self-
organise. The biological origins of this phenomenon inform us that "contrary to 
our deepest intuitions, massively disordered systems can spontaneously crystalise 
a very high degree of order" (Kaufmann, 1993, p. 173). 
Or they can behave destructively and deliver many unintended consequences that 
often run counter to our goals. As stated by Jervis "we cannot develop or find a 
highly specific agent which will do only one thing ... we can never merely do 
one thing" (Jervis, 1998, p. 261). Furthermore, "the apparent randomness ... can 
be shown to contain repeating patterns and the theory is valuable because it 
enables the search for "order within chaos" (Wing, 1999, p. 18). 
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The paradox of this has been neatly described by Rosenau (1997, p. 73) as 
'fragmegration' in order "to summarily capture the tensions between the 
[simultaneous] fragmenting and integrating forces that sustain world affairs"; 
furthermore "The parts or agents of a complex adaptive system, being related to 
each sufficiently to form recurrent patterns, do in fact self-organise their patterned 
behaviour into an orderly whole" (p. 84). The ongoing dilemma for systems 
practitioners is that the orderly whole may not be of our design and may continue 
to adopt structures and emergent behaviour that defies deliberate organisational 
adaptation. Indeed, "human social forces are created in the same manner as the 
forces of nature .... Neither can be visibly touched, although their effects can be 
felt" (Pentland, 1998, p. 295). 
So it was armed with knowledge of systems behaviour and its phenomena that the 
focus group began the task of crafting futures. 
Identifying the Drivers 
Recognising that a conspiracy of events and interactions prescribes responses and 
adaptation it then becomes necessary to form a useful view of these and of how 
they manifest themselves. 
Visualising the Future 
The first step of a Field Anomaly Relaxation (FAR) analysis is to define variables 
and their range which, when combined, allow likely scenarios to be built and 
described within a timeframe. To initiate the process, I facilitated a group 
consisting of several members of the Special Forces Group over a weekend in 
November 1998, with the express purpose of isolating the drivers of change. 
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A salient point was the justification of the need for the existence of an 
unconventional ADF element in an otherwise predominantly conventional 
defence force, especially where the prefix 'un-' also attached itself to terms such 
as 'liked'. Nevertheless, whenever threats to Australian security arise it is deemed 
essential to maintain the unconventional or special element. Such threats can span 
the full spectrum of psychological, economic, political, criminal and terrorism 
with operations ranging from offensive to defensive, recovery to reconnaissance. 
From this, two physical areas of operation were identified: the international and 
the archipelago/South East Asian region north of Australia which will generically 
be referred to as regional and domestic, giving three usefuland distinct zones. 
Causes of unrest or faction in each of these areas were envisaged to arise from 
any political, military or socioeconomic instability with environmental conditions 
playing a strong role as well. Due to their close economic ties it was thought that 
the relative economy of Australia to that of the region was a unique indicator of 
both domestic and regional (in)stability and the interplay between the two. 
However, the required response to deal with each combination of threat in each 
area demands a force that can operate as a single Service department (Army, 
Navy or Air Force) through to a multifunction, multifaceted corporation. At either 
end of this scale it must be capable of a high degree of interoperability with other 
defence force elements whilst maintaining its own identity. It is widely 
acknowledged that access to leading edge technology is imperative if Special 
Forces is, at best, to maintain their specialist capability. It is envisaged that the 
'procurement' of such technology might in the future involve renting, buying, 
recovering or procuring through what could be loosely classified as non-
conventional means. 
This leads to further discussion regarding the governance of the Special Forces 
Group and whether the adoption of a self governing corporate structure may best 
serve the Special Forces Group's interest. With such a structure, funding and 
profit-making responsibilities would fall at the Special Forces Group's own door. 
88 
Chapter Three - Constructing Plausible Futures 
Such financial autonomy would lead to increased access and certainly accelerated 
delivery of technology. Other issues such as correct force mixture and skill base, 
self-selection processes and contract work should also be discussed. How close to 
reality such ideas ever get would be dependent upon future scenarios and the 
political will of those in a position to make such decisions. 
Definition of FAR Matrix Parameters 
From this consideration the parameters political will, technology, domestic, 
regional and international stability, economic situation and environmental 
conditions are extracted. With some·careful manipulation, the first letter of each 
of these parameters form the acronym PREDICT which is adopted as the meta-
syntactic variable from which to construct the Faustian tree. The parameters and 
their meaning are summarised in a table (developed by Dr Nicholson, of the early 
project members) I will present soon. Also included are the sectors that describe 
the best to worst case for each parameter. The scale of the sectors is self evident, 
with the language of the adjectives perhaps reflecting the desirability of each 
state. 
Brief descriptions for each parameter will also be set out in the table. However, 
some discussion is given to explain the meaning of the parameters further as well 
as the limitations of the scale imposed on some of the parameters. Limitations are 
set to ensure that a manageable framework is constructed, rather than one that is 
allowed to extrapolate to enormous dimensions because the sector definitions are 
too narrow. The converse is also true - definitions should not be so broad as to 
make transition from one sector to the next inconceivable and thus render the 
analysis ineffectual. 
The first step was to identify the drivers that would be most influential in shaping 
events. As stated earlier these drivers need to be beyond the planner's ability to 
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influence, the only acceptable response being adaptation. Over 60 candidate 
drivers were identified at this first stage. 
These 60 drivers were then collapsed using affinity diagrams to reveal the major 
forces at work. The list that was taken to the next stage comprised seven key 
drivers, which is consistent with Rhyne's recommendations (1974, p. 139; 1981, 
p. 339); there is also a mathematically imposed limitation wherein the 'whole 
field' possibilities grow exponentially. Reducing the list to seven in this way does 
carry a risk that a driver (Sector) may become more dominant than others, 
embodying too many dissimilar items. This can be avoided at a later step in the 
process. It does, however, offer the advantage that reducing the numbers of 
drivers forces participants in the process " ... to reach past several trends to find the 
unifying themes behind them" (Engelbrecht et al, 1996, Chap 2, p. 7). 
The drivers selected were: 
• Political Will 
• Regional Stability 
• Economic Situation 
• Domestic Stability 
• International Stability 
• Condition of the Environment 
• Technology 
Political Will 
As the focus of this exercise restricts itself to the possible future operating 
environments of the Australian Special Forces, the Political Will we speak of here 
is the propensity of government to authorise special operations in support of the 
National Military Strategy. The employment of this component of military 
capability by governments is problematic, affected by a combination of the ill-
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defined boundary between military and non-military actions and the need for 
these actions to span the continuum of conflict. 
Economic Situation 
In an environment where peacetime competition endures, normal trade, business 
and investment exchanges will continue with resultant economic growth and 
prosperity. Australia's aim internally as the economic situation fluctuates 
externally is to protect against the damaging effects of chaotic global markets. 
Geographic considerations, amongst other reasons have forced Australia to pursue 
close ties with countries within the Region and as such developments in these 
countries do impact upon Australia and its economic position. 
Domestic Stability 
The domestic stability dimension is measured against the ability of government to 
match the expectations of the community in the delivery of goods and services 
and the level, duration and intensity of industrial action or civil unrest and 
discontent. It is an expression of social cohesiveness. The rise in violence 
witnessed in Great Britain throughout 2001, as (usually) unprovoked clashes 
between ethnic groups escalated into widespread property damage is a valuable 
case in point. This also provides an example of conflict within nations. 
Regional Stability 
Australia has a respected role in promoting and maintaining a stable region, one 
that is characterised by engagement through tolerance, dialogue and transparency. 
If any of these dimensions become affected, giving rise to mistrust, doubt and 
apprehension then stability within and between nations of the region may become 
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affected. Regional stability is characterised by an ongoing peacetime competition 
where government intervention is minimal and is limited to preserving diplomatic 
relations. 
For the domestic and regional areas cohesion was thought to be the best term to 
describe a state where, conservatively, there may be a high degree of adherence to 
law and integration of all members of society, through to the extreme definition of 
solidarity or union state (for example grounded in anti-social or violent unrest). 
International Stability 
For the parameter international conflicts, it was considered that there would 
always be some altercation, albeit minor or trivial, somewhere in the world, even 
a peace march may be considered a 'conflict situation'. Australia's participation 
in international conflicts has, in the past, primarily been in a peacekeeping or 
peace support role. However preparedness levels should be maintained so that 
transition to a more offensive role is straightforward. 
Condition of the Environment 
Environmental issues have become steadfast in the political agenda with the 
general population now openly voicing their concern of the effects of holes in the 
ozone layer, increased pollution with increasingly mobile populations, El Nino, 
mining of uranium, etc. Australia enjoys a comfortable position in terms of area 
and resources per head of population and as such environmental stability. 
However it would be foolhardy not to remain vigilant of environmental problems 
that are arising in some of its neighbours primarily because of booming 
populations. Also, the procurement of nuclear and biological weapons by 
countries that are politically volatile is of particular concern not merely from the 
environmental impact of detonation. 
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Technology 
Although technology is frequently avoided as a key driver in many futures 
studies, its use here was seen as important as advances in technology put a 
premium on the skills of people and in this area Australia has enjoyed a great 
advantage. 
In the case of technology the most undesirable state may be perceived as one 
where technology starts to retard. However, this was determined as being 
extremely unlikely. Even given a scenario of complete, worldwide obliteration, 
relatively speaking it would be a backward step from the present day. Even given 
that context, development of technology would, at worst, stand still; that is, it 
would be conditions external to the development of technology not the 
'mechanics' that would retard the process. 
Building the Sector/Factor Array 
When positioned as headings on a table (Table 1) these became the Sectors, 
incorporating the meta-syntactic language - PREDICT - to be used later (as a 
pronounceable word) when referring to different settings. The columns under 
each heading were then expanded to form a possible range of Factors or states in 
which that particular Sector could exist. These expressions range from the most 
favourable at the top to the least favourable. The final row in the table provides a 
brief descriptor of the factors' foci. 
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Table 1. Sector-Factor array 
Political Will Regional Stability Economic Domestic International Condition of the 
Situation Stability Stability Environ-ment 
p R E D I c 
1 Adventurous bold Cohesion Booming Cohesion Minor conflicts Improving 
Superior 
2 Fencesitting, Generally stable Parity Generally stable Regional conflicts Manageable/ 
procrastinat-ion, Competitive fixable 
cautious 
3 Avoidance, Localised unrest, Inferior, declining Localised unrest, Major theatre Continuing 
extreme discontent discontent wars, degradation 
reluctance multinational 
4 Paralysis, Widespread Widespread Mass destruction Meltdown, 
catatonia unrest, public unrest, public catastrophe 
uprisings uprisings 
5 Anarchy Anarchy 
Propensity to Political, military, State of Socio-political Scale ol military Effects on and of 
take risks socio -economic Australian stability conflict the physical 
stability of region economy relative elsewhere in the environment 
to that of the world 
re ion 
From this was produced a total of 14 400 possible whole field configurations 
( 4x5x3 ... ). Clearly there are many illogical pairs that need to be discarded 
through a process of relaxation (hence the name FARelaxation). As stated earlier, 
and which can now be seen, the exponential growth to unmanageable numbers of 
permutations can be similarly collapsed through a process of pair-wise 
comparison which, as well as defining pairs that cannot coexist, removes entire 
whole fields that contain a single illogical pair. 
Pair-wise Comparison 
This pair-wise comparison process can take a number of forms, all are judgmental 
and involve reaching some measure of consensus using a Yes/No decision, 
numbered scale or some other means to determine the degree of 'fit', or extent to 
which pairs can co-exist. The process involves a sequential (and somewhat 
tedious) pairing of all possible configurations (See Table 2). Participants soon 
realised that those pairs that were both high, mid-range or low in the table could 
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generally co-exist. Pairs with one in the high end and one in the low end generally 
could not co-exist, although there were exceptions and arbitrarily applying this to 
speed the process is fraught with danger. Pairs with one in the mid-range and one 
high or low involved the greatest discussion and accounted for the majority of 
time spent at this stage. I was also very careful at this stage to capture the nuances 
that resulted during these debates of whether one factor, or driver condition could 
go with another. It provided the raw material for writing the scenarios and brought 
forth a rich discussion of driver interactions. 
Given that the Sector/Factor array was reasonably compact (two columns of five, 
three columns of four and two columns of three) and the Factor descriptors are 
precise the pairwise comparison was completed fairly quickly. Too many Factors 
without clear distinguishing characteristics that neatly delineate vertically 
adjacent Factors can lead to a painfully slow and confusing pairwise exercise. 
Frequent questioning such as - "What are we actually trying to say here?" -
proved to be extremely valuable. It deepened the somewhat abstract ideas being 
dealt with and forced participants to consider the actual interactions using real 
examples (consensus building). 
95 
Chapter Three - Constructing Plausible Futures 
Table 2. Results of pairwise comparison 
Rl R2 RJ R4 R5 El E2 EJ D1 D2 DJ D4 D5 11 12 13 14 Cl C2 CJ C4 T1 T2 TJ 
PI y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y 
P2 y y y y N y y y y y y y N y y y N N y y N y y y 
PJ y y y y N y y N y N y y N y YIN N N N N y N YIN y y 
P4 N N y y y N y y N N y y y y y N YIN y y y N y N y 
Rl y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y y 
R2 y y y y y y N N y N N N y y y N y y N 
RJ y y y y y y y N y y y N N N y N y y y 
R4 y y y y y y y N y y y N N N y y y y y 
R5 y y y y y y y y N y y y N N y y y y y 
El y y y N N y y y N YIN y y N y y N 
E2 y y y y N y y N N y y y N N y N 
EJ y y y y y y y y y N y y y y y y 
D! y y N y YIN y y N y y N 
D2 y y N N N y y N y y N 
DJ y y y y N N y N N y N 
04 y y y y N y y N y N y 
D5 y y y y N N y y y y y 
11 y y y y y y N 
12 y y y y y y N 
13 N N y y y y N 
14 N N y y N y y 
C! y y N 
C2 y y N 
CJ y y y 
C4 y y y 
The table above allowed a relaxation down to 403 whole field configurations from 
14 400. Not nearly as many as indicated by Rhyne (1998, p. 7) "the first filter 
[pairwise comparison] ... normally filters out about 999 out of 1000; the second 
[whole field overall coherence] gets rid of about half those passed by the first". 
Nevertheless, the reduction was significant and achieved the aim of this step in 
the process- a reduction to a nearly manageable set of surviving configurations. 
In a further deviation from the method outlined by Rhyne (1974; 1991; 1998), but 
provided for in the improvements suggested by Coyle (1984; 1985; 1994; 1995; 
1996; 1997); and Coyle & Yong (1996) the surviving whole field configurations 
were clustered together, reducing the 403 to 46, a number now approaching 
manageability for further analysis. The clustering was based on the conclusion 
that if an individual PREDICT configuration changed by one Factor up or down 
across no more than four of the seven Sectors then the underlying themes would 
be preserved (See Table 3). A number of logic rules were imposed to ensure that 
vertically adjacent Factors with descriptors that could not be combined were not 
clustered. The result of this clustering, which was achieved using formula 
functions within Microsoft™ Excel, is illustrated in the table below. The grey 
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shaded rectangles represent, in this example, those Sector columns that were 
allowed to adjust up or down by one Factor. Any possible configuration that 
remains within this grey zone is regarded as belonging to the cluster and retains 
the qualitative 'feel '. 
Table 3. Clustering within the Sector-Factor array 
Political Will Regional Stability Economic Domes lie International Condition of the 
Situation Stability Stability Env1ron-ment 
p A E D I c 
I Adventurous bold Cohesion Booming Cohesion Minor conflicts Improving 
Superior 
1 Fencesftling, Generally stable Parity Generally stable Regional con!Ucts Manageable/ 
procrastination, Competitive fixable 
cautious 
3 Avoidance. Locaftsed unrest. Inferior. declining Localised unrest. Major theatre Continuing 
extreme discontent discontent wars, degradeffon 
reluctance multinational 
.$ Paralysis, Widespread Widespread Mass destruction Meltdown, 
catatonia unrest. public unrest, public catastrophe 
uprisings uprisings 
5 Anarchy Anarchy 
Propensity to Pollticel, military, State of Soclo-pollllcal Scale of military Effects on and of 
lake risks socio ·economic Australian stability conflict the physical 
stability of region economy relative elsewhere In the environment 
to that of the world 
re ion 
Cluster 25 for example, indicated by the shaded cells, contains numerous whole 
field configurations that are sufficiently alike that they can be clustered into a 
single set, with minimal (and agreed by those undertaking this stage of the 
analysis - another opportunity to build consensus) dilution of the individual 
elements. If the Factors do not possess enough depth within their expressions 
and/or verti cally adjacent descriptions are almost opposites then tules must be 
imposed to prevent inappropriate clustering, for example a Decision-making 
Sector may have 'deci sive', 'hesitant' and 'indecisive' as the sole descriptors, these 
mutually exclusive terms could not be clustered and any other whole field 
configurations that include these must also be kept distinct. 
I acknowledge that there was a significant ri sk of dilutjng the purity of the 
exercise up to this point. It was accepted, however, that in order to achjeve the 
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necessary further reduction this 'bundling' of configurations was no more 
significant than the logic used to group together the full list of drivers using the 
affinity diagram in the opening stage. The PREDICT settings which carry a 
qualitatively similar setting are set out in the table below. The further breakdown 
into 'a', 'b', 'c' and 'd' sub categories was forced through the need to not violate the 
'one up or down' rule mentioned earlier. These sub-groups were treated as a single 
entity in the later stages of Faustian tree construction and the generation of 
scenarios. The full set is presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. Results of clustering 
No 
1a 
1b 
1c 
1d 
2a 
2b 
3 
4 
4a 
5 
6 
7 
Sa 
8b 
9 
10-13 
11 
12 
14 
15 
16 
17a 
17b 
18 
19a 
19b 
20 
21 
22 
23 
PREDICT Configuration 
P1-2 R1 E1 
P1-2 R1-2 E2 
P1-2 R2 E1 
P1-2 R1-2 E1 
P1-2 R1 E2 
D1 h-2 
D1 h 
D1-2 h 
D2 h-2 
D1-2 l1-2 
P1-2 R1 
P1-2 R1 
P1-2 R1 
P1-2 R2 
P1-2 R1 
E1 D1-2 h-2 
P1 R1 
P1 R1 
P1 R1 
P2 R1 
P1-2 R1 
P1 R1 
P1-2 R1 
P1-2 R1 
P1 R1 
P1 R1 
E1 D3 l2-3 
E1-2 D3-4 h-2 
E1-2 D2-3 h 
E3 D1 li-2 
E3 D1 h-2 
E3 D1 14 
E3 D2-3 h-2 
E3 D2-3 h-2 
E3 D3 12-3 
E3 D3-4 l4 
E3 D4 h-2 
E3 D4 b-4 
E3 Ds h-2 
E3 Ds b 
R1 E3 Ds 14 
D1-2 h 
D1-2 h 
D2-3 h 
D1-2 l1-2 
D1-2 h-2 
D2-3 h 
D2-3 l1-2 
D3 b 
D3-4 h-2 
R2 E2-3 
R2 E2-3 
R2-3 E2-3 
R3 E1-2 
R3 E1-2 
R2 E3 
P1-2 R3 E1-2 
P1-2 R3-4 E1 
P2 R3 E2-3 
C2-3 T1-2 
c2 T2 
C2-3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C2-3 T2 
C3 T2 
C3 T2 
C3 T2 
C3 T2 
C2-3 T1-2 
c4 T1-2 
C3-4 T2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T2 
C3-4 T2-3 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T1 
C3-4 T1 
C3-4 T3 
C2-3 T1-2 
C2-3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T2 
C3 T2 
C3 T1-2 
Constructing the Faustian Tree 
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No PREDICT Configuration 
24 P1-2 R3 E3 D1-2 l1-2 
24b-25a P1-2 R3 E3 D3-4 12-3 
25 P1 R3 E2-3 D3-4 h-2 
26 P2 R3-4 E2-3 D4 12-3 
26a P1 R4-s E1 D1-2 h-2 
26ab P1 R4 E2 D1-2 h-2 
26b-27a P2 R4 E1-2 D1-2 h-2 
28 P1-2 R4 E1-2 D3-4 h-2 
29a P1 R4 E3 D1-2 h-2 
29b P2 R4 E3 D1-2 h-2 
30 P1 R4 E3 D3 h-2 
31a 
31b 
32 
33 
34 
35a 
35b 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
P1 R4 E3 
P2 R4 E3 
P1-2 R4 E3 
P1 R4-s E1-2 
P1 Rs E2-3 
P1 Rs E3 
P1 Rs E3 
P1 Rs E3 
P1 Rs E3 
P1 Rs E3 
P1 Rs E3 
P3 R1 E1-2 
R1-2 E1-2 
R3-4 E1-2 
R4 E1-2 
R3-4 E3 
Rs E3 
D4-5 h-2 
D4 h-2 
D4-s b 
D3-4 12-3 
D1-2 l2 
D3-4 b-4 
D4 12 
D1 14 
Ds 12-3 
D4-s l4 
D2-3 l2 
D1 h 
D3-4 l1 
D3-4 h 
D1 h 
D4-s h-2 
D4-s l2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3 T2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3-4 T2 
C3-4 T1 
C3-4 T2-3 
C3-4 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T2 
C3 T2 
C3 T1-2 
C3 T1 
C3 T1 
To make the future believable it is necessary to string the transitions into a 
plausible history that marks out how a future world could evolve from the present. 
These transitions track outwards from a present PREDICT configuration and 
branch according to shaping triggers that underlie the Factors and vertical 
movement. For instance, a movement of one level along the Political Will sector 
coupled with a multiplier in the Economic Situation can deliver dramatic changes 
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in the direction of the lines and branches, in effect becoming an intermediate, but 
vital, point on the path to other transitions. 
To maximise creative thought and discussion Coyle's recommendations (1996, p. 
275) on the methods employed to build the tree should be followed. A series of 
Post-It Notes™ covering all surviving configurations could be positioned on a 
wall and arranged and re-arranged as discussion continues around the workability 
of this or that transition and the events surrounding it. After several discussion 
and evaluation sessions the positions of these notes should stabilise and 
agreement can be reached that what is portrayed is a reasonably complete and 
plausible account of a future history. This point of stabilisation can also be 
evident in the fact that discussion points surrounding various surviving settings 
and transitions will become exhausted. There are several research opportunities to 
develop this stage further. 
An abbreviated view of the Faustian tree is set out in Figure 17 below. The bold 
initial number refers to the cluster number. No attempt is made at this point to 
establish times to the diagram. 
The transitions, with their associated PREDICT settings are illustrated in the 
figure below. A possible explanation for the transition from cluster 17 to cluster 6, 
which is characterised by a worsening envirgnmental condition C2_3 moving to C4 
and a lowering of economic performance E2_3 moving to E3, may be found in the 
continuing massive environmental damage resulting from forest burning in 
Malaysia and Indonesia with its effect on economic prosperity. 
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Figure 17. Simplified view of the Faustian Tree. 
Narratives of the Future 
Having constructed the Faustian tree and, thereby, creating a series of pathways 
through which the (ultimately) single future trajectory may travel, a set of rich 
narratives are called for. These narratives link the present to the future in a 
manner that adds substance, depth and most importantly breadth, effectively 
putting 'flesh on the bones' of the earlier, more structured thinking stages. 
The named worlds provide "a reference point that helps intemalise the world's 
implications" (Engelbrecht et al, 1996, Chapter 1, p. 3). Set out in Table 5 are the 
eight named worlds in the current study (these were derived by Dr Joanne 
Nicholson, one of the project members at a number of workshops in 1998). 
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Table 5. Named worlds 
Description 
Global love, peace and harmony 
2 Australia dominated by domestic strife 
3 Australia and allies okay, region finding it tough 
4 Australia and region in trouble, rest of international arena okay 
5 Australia and region okay, strife elsewhere 
6 Australia leading the rest of the world 
7 Austrp.lia and allies faced with a booming region 
8 Everybody's brawling 
Named Worlds 
Utopia 
Home Brew 
ArgyBharji 
Cast Adrift 
Trouble Elsewhere 
Great Southern Cross 
King Khan 
WW/11 
An example narrative, entitled Ebola Outbreak, selected from the full list of 20 
from the current study is set out below. Country names have been reduced to a 
single letter. 
2003, February 
Escalation of rebellion in the former B and G results in significant 
conflict embroiling U, K, T and Z military forces. Ecological crisis 
arises as Z forces employ defoliation by chemical and fire tactics 
to route rebel H and renegade T in and around R. U, T and K are 
swamped with refugees; collectively there is a call for 
international rescue of displaced populations. U additionally alerts 
the international community to the dire threats to gorilla and other 
primate populations forced to move also displaced. 
The sight of monkeys scavenging in the refugee camps becomes 
commonplace. Indian, European and US aid is forthcoming. 
Expatriate countries, Belgium, France, Germany and the United 
States offer a sponsored migration program to relieve an otherwise 
overwhelming refugee problem. International wildlife rescue bids 
relocate endangered gorillas and other primates to a variety of 
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international zoos and refuges set up specifically to handle the 
scale of the problem. Displaced peoples are given an option under 
a quota for emigration to these same sponsor nations. 
2003,May 
Illness besets refugee camps in Africa and those quarantined in 
several host nations of USA, France, Germany, Belgium and India. 
Symptoms are variably a flu-like condition, progressing to febrile 
delirium or alternately dysentery with violent abdominal cramps 
progressing to unconsciousness. Morbidity and mortality rise to 
alarming proportions within eight days. 
2003, September 
Simultaneously, a world-wide 'Zookeepers Syndrome' is reported 
through toxicology web sites of similar symptomology. World 
Health Organisation (WHO) subsequently identifies the pathogen 
as Ebola Virus. Global quarantine measures are immediately 
effected; however, secondary cases outside refugee concentrations 
are reported in the next week. 
Panic arises in areas around reported Ebola spot fires, in Florida. 
A military mobilisation is necessitated to contain fleeing 
populations. In Europe, similar containment measures are also 
enforced. In India panicking mobs overcome police lines meant to 
confine them in villages and areas of outbreak. In a plethora of 
nations the so called 'Zookeeper Syndrome' results in such a 
scattered pattern of outbreaks that police with military assistance 
cannot move fast enough to contain those in contact. 
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2003, November 
Throughout the western world a pin cushion pattern of outbreaks 
is generated as secondary Ebola cases propagate to tertiary 
contact patients. In most countries outbreaks are contained but in 
the near tropics of Florida, Southern India and in central Africa 
itself the outbreaks threaten anarchy as police and other security 
agents, hospital staff and medical workers also begin to be 
affected. 
2004, January 
Fragmentation of national . administrations can only just be 
managed by police and military resources. In this month, however, 
some patients begin to recover, particularly in the temperate areas 
of Europe and northern United States of America. 
As scenarios are really only useful when taken as a full set I have included a 
second one here that contains a more socio-economic angle. It is titled A New 
Hegemon and was drawn from the same work. 
After almost two decades of failed leadership within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), economies dominated 
by spiralling foreign debt, corruption within government and 
business, cronyism and the withdrawal of major investment 
interests in the region the promises of democracy and capitalism 
are as dim and distant as ever. 
Student action groups in non-violent protests express new demands 
for a stronger, more cohesive leadership across the CIS. In this 
climate of growing unrest a new figure - Nikita Chenakowski -
rises rapidly through the political ranks, emerging as a key 
individual; one who possesses a striking resemblance to a young 
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Stalin, bringing with him a sound business mind and an ability to 
remain focussed on the ingredients of a problem at a national 
level. 
Upon selection into the Economic Office his initiative for, and 
ability to make immediately successful, an Economic Forum for 
Cooperative National Development (EFCND) witnesses a 
dramatic reversal in the GB towards further aid and debt relief 
Under his strengthening leadership corruption is swept aside, 
confidence levels soar and the mood of the people changes 
dramatically. Foreign investment flows in and unemployment 
levels plummet as a prosperous market economy takes root, 
government spending strategies are supported and education, 
housing and health programs rapidly affect the plight of the 
disadvantaged. A wave of optimism sweeps across the region. 
On the other side of the globe relations between China and the 
United States remain strained following the UN enforced famine 
relief and aid programs into North Korea following the deaths of 
up to 3 000 000 elderly and young in the country's worst 
agricultural production result for almost a century. China's 
accusations of strategic·. opportunism come at a time of growing 
discontent, distrust of America's motives and a belief that 
capitalism is polarising attention towards consumerism and away 
from socialist values, a trend already evident in the CIS. 
Under threat of war between China and the United States over the 
sustained lodgement of large numbers of NGO 's, ·aid workers and 
unarmed military the United States is forced to withdraw 
prematurely, leaving the country in a fragile state and 
economically non-viable. China enters North Korea under 
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bilateral arrangements with ineffectual measures designed more to 
undermine the achievements of the United States than provide 
tangible assistance. Further failures result. 
Against this backdrop of international events Australia witnesses a 
rapid and marked adjustment in raw materials markets from those 
predominantly in SE Asia to N Europe. Demand levels plummet 
and export costs triple to capitalise on the expanding markets in 
Europe. 
Readers should be aware at this point that any number of fanciful stories could be 
utilised to portray disturbing series of events. The actual value is not in the 
geographic or situational detail of what is being described, but the ability to 
develop effective responses and national policies for coping. 
Building the Faustian Tree 
The next step entailed constructing the Faustian Tree, whereby starting from the 
current position and moving to possible futures is mapped out in both sequence 
(one transition after another down a single path) and parallel (multiple paths 
radiating out with tangled transitions and joins) to various termination points. 
Taking the former example, if starting from the current position one was to 
identify transitions from this position using the meta-language then the step from 
the identification of parameters or sectors to construction of the Faustian Tree 
could be shortened substantially. This method would allow a broad identification 
of the most likely (and unlikely) fields, however, the method may not be as 
readily traceable and possibilities may be missed or dismissed without being 
thoroughly considered. 
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A convention for constructing the tree could include solid lines to represent most 
likely progressions and broken lines for less likely progressions. Spiral symbols 
could be included to illustrate the transitions involving wild cards - events that 
require an extreme event or set of circumstances. The emphasis in this study was 
an holistic approach, therefore, all transitions were considered equally likely, 
although pessimism still prevailed when the option of reaching 'Utopia' was 
accelerated. While in the first instance this may not be the most pragmatic of 
approaches, particularly when the reality of operating within a budget is 
considered, it is the best approach to ensure that the broadest set of scenarios and 
possibilities are identified. The broader the set of scenarios and circumstances, the 
larger the dataset for application within the area of interest. 
The final full tree (developed from an earlier version by Nicholson), depicted in 
Figure 18, represents a picture of future possible scenarios ranging from the most 
pessimistic on the left to most optimistic on the right. This pessimism/optimism 
separation is achieved through a movement downwards in the Sector/Factor array 
table shown earlier. It is possible to express progressively more grim/favourable 
pictures using these descriptions and allow the transitions to account for this 
movement, a technique that has proven to be an extremely powerful visualisation 
aid for planners. An additional feature is that the named worlds can be located 
along the paths, providing a useful time step for scenario writers. 
It should be noted that while the FAR analysis allows the development of these 
scenarios within a rough 10-year timeframe, the exact difference between each of 
the scenarios is not necessarily linear. For example, it would be incorrect to draw 
conclusions that things only have to get a bit better for Utopia and things a lot 
worse for WW3. Further analysis is required to examine how 'far' we potentially 
are from each scenario and as such the Faustian Tree is considered to be an 
evolving document or 'work in progress' as more information and further 
developments on the world stage occur. It must be remembered that the aim is to 
forecast futures to assist planners, NOT define them. Schwartz (1996, p. 9) offers 
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that "the purpose of scenarios is to help yourself change your view of reality .... 
The end result, however, is not an accurate picture of the future, but better 
decisions about the future''. For organisational practitioners there is another 
opportuni ty lO reach consensus about the appropriateness of actions or policies. 
19/~1 
Figure 18. Faustian Tree of national security futures. 
For planners each of the numbers represents a single whole field configuration. 
The transitions repre ent movement up or down within the Sectors, allowing 
conditions to be expressed as improving, remaining fairly stable or deteriorating. 
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A Strategic Planning Space for Locating the Principal Drivers 
From the Faustian tree the main story-lines and themes to arise were dependent on 
either one or more of the three principal drivers: domestic stability, regional 
stability and international stability. The emergence of these three drivers 
coincides directly with current Australian strategic policy where defeating attacks 
on Australia holds the highest priority, defending regional interests second, 
followed by defending global interests. This provides strong testament to the 
usefulness and validity of the FAR method and the importance in gathering the 
subject matter experts with the necessary knowledge and expertise in a specific 
area. Such coincidences, particularly the national security relevance, increase the 
level of confidence in the conclusions drawn from the FAR analysis and 
strengthens the commitment to guiding strategic policy if individuals can come to 
the same conclusions themselves. 
The remaining parameters of economic situation and environmental conditions 
are mainly seen as contributors to the causes of instability while technology and 
political will dictate how, and if, action is taken to regain stability. The economic 
situation, condition of the environment and technology are also regarded as 
variables over which little or no control can be placed, although it is deemed 
important to closely align our understanding of the changes occurring in such 
forces. 
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Figure 19. Strategic planning space. 
ChapLer Three- Constructing Plausible Futures 
As stated earlier a further deviation from the FAR process was made at this point 
by positioning the three principal drivers as the axes on a cube (Figure 19) to form 
a strategic planning space. The drivers selected were International , Reg10nal and 
Domestic Stability. Using thi s planning space it became possible to position the 
eight named worlds within the eight sub-cubes. Developing this theoretical model 
one further level reveals that all possible configurations, transitions and 
movements in the three dimensions illustrated in the cone at Figure 13 must be 
accommodated within this cube. 
The low end on each axis is where levels of instability are high. The high ends, or 
tips of (one, two or all of) the three axes, allow an expression of low levels of 
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instability across international, regional and domestic domains. The numbers 
correspond to the eight named worlds in Table 5. 
Improvements Resulting from this Research 
The original process devised by Rhyne remains very e ffective. lts major drawback 
is its efficiency. Dealing w1th large amotmts of information and frequent 
judgements to aid analysis is tedious to complete manually. Tbe pai1wise 
comparison in particular is very time consuming even w ith the aid of spreadsheet 
formulae. A fu lly automated process (© Guy Duczynski 2000) has been 
developed that captures every key stroke, minimises repetitive actions and stores 
the information for reporting . Figure 20 shows a single form taken from the 
application. 
' Nw..tva\IIIIAu: .. u lrALTSI N rJ EJ 
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r [..!o~t.t., II 
r F1·.h~'*>' II 
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1 p .. _lj_A>-\'f'' " ... 
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(l:rott.:~ttUlo t f 
tr•~liWlil!.l oblty 
(:;.r.Ji 0'\ :;!tilt (..-~ttl! 
l"·'~r 
Can these two c:ondtbons c:oexost? 
Paralysis. catatonia Political Will 
Gtnerally stable Domestic stability 
Figure 20. Screen shot of pairwise comparison form. 
The tabs at the top of tbe screen give an indication of the features and functions 
that have been automated. At the time of writing this negotiations are underway to 
introduce this application to several university programs, management education 
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and Defence senior planning institutions. Whether this or some other model is 
employed detailed planning and policy making should not proceed unless 
decision-makers have taken stock of the present situation in all its detail or crafted 
a set of scenarios that illustrate the plausible futures. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have provided a detailed explanation of the use of Field 
Anomaly Relaxation (FAR)- the method used to achieve a comprehensive, albeit 
abstracted, view of the world beyond the immediate planning and defence 
procurement horizons. This chapter has also included the use of twenty rich 
stories that contained the narratives of change- the future history. 
Field Anomaly Relaxation has proved to be a useful method for crafting futures. It 
offers a systematic and disciplined approach to the formulation and manipulation 
of data and ideas. As can be seen from this research, however, there is a 
considerable amount of additional work that must be incorporated into the overall 
study to derive value. Scenarios themselves are useful and can lead decision-
makers towards insights that they would having difficulty at unaided by these 
devices. As a device for aiding in the building of consensus it was very valuable 
and built the foundations for following work. 
The creativity demanded of participants during this stage was often extreme. The 
disciplined and systematic approach offered by Rhyne's method was found to be 
superior to other scenario/futures techniques. 
Scenario planning is a fascinating and creative endeavour to explore possibilities 
for the world or parts of it. Often the future is too frightening to contemplate. It 
captures interactions in the contextual environment that people would much rather 
ignore, letting events take their course as an escape from engaging in purposeful 
behaviour. I will not dwell on why the scenarios cannot be retained, except to 
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declare that the advice I have received has indicated that they are extremely 
sensitive and should not be available as open source. I do not agree with this 
conclusion, but am bound to abide by the judgements of others. 
In any event, I hope that the production of the scenarios has proven to be an 
interesting and engaging account of my attempts to find a future. It has aided in 
the building of consensus, at least around the need for change. The task now is to 
put these scenarios to work and see how well the organisation performs. The 
information gained must now be held adjacent to the organisation to enable a 
determination on what these new futures mean and what responses they should 
inspire - the shape of change. These responses and the database application in 
which to express and evaluate them are the subject of Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING 
In the process of change there must first be a conceptual notion of 
what has to be done to fight successfully in the battle environments 
of today and tomorrow. This kind of sound conceptual thinking 
can only result from the close, reflective study of a wide spectrum 
of history, world setting, threats, technology, and of the trends in 
all those areas - and the projection of those trends into the future. 
Only imaginative people- officers who have been trained to think 
clearly about tough problems - can do this kind of thinking 
[emphasis added]. 
Overview of the Chapter 
General Donn A. Starry 
Changing the Army: The Roles of Doctrine, 
Development and Training 
(Evans, 2000, Ed. p.l49) 
This chapter is devoted to the progressive development of the database 
application - my knowledge management system - that provided for the capture, 
storage, evaluation and ultimately the (sometimes limited) acceptance of various 
themes pointing towards (inevitable) change. The entire approach earned the title 
of effects-based planning early in 1998, the reason for this will become evident 
within this chapter. 
I offer the caveats of sometimes limited acceptance and inevitable change in the 
preceding paragraph for two reasons. 
Firstly, although the method has proven itself to be a powerful aid to decision-
making and strategic planning, it is the concept (hence the quote above), more 
than the findings of this particular research project, that has attracted interest. Not 
everyone has the time or inclination for close, reflective study in order to reach 
sound conceptual knowledge of their own design. All, however, can make time to 
critically consider the theoretical models and concepts that others develop in order 
to determine overall validity (this is central to the double loop learning I will 
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discuss in Chapter Five wherein two, often contradictory, thoughts must be held 
simultaneously). 
Unless this conceptual validity is nurtured resistance will grow, enthusiasm will 
diminish, confidence will evaporate, dissatisfaction will set in and a group that is 
in pursuit of consensus will divide. As identified by Field Marshall Slim "there is 
only one thing more difficult than getting a new idea [concept] into a military 
mind and that is getting the old idea [concept] out!" Iwill further emphasise the 
importance of the acceptance of (this) concept later in the chapter as it is directly 
related to the quote that opens this chapter and has profound relevance for 
initiating change. 
It is a simple concept that recognises that we can achieve the same en~s through 
doing different things, not doing the same things differently. But it relies upon the 
construction, by practitioners, of a sufficiently complex vocabulary and 
phraseology to describe what we seek, a provocation (de Bono, 1977, 1986 and 
1987) that triggers creativity, dialogue and novelty. This construction is enabled 
because "a creative person may have a way of looking at the world which is 
different from the way other people see the world ... if that person is successful in 
expressing and communicating his own special perception, then we call him or 
her creative and value the contribution that takes some of us to see the world 
through a new perspective" (de Bono, 1984, p. 59). 
Indeed, (many of) the organisational practitioners who took part in the population 
of the database with information, language and knowledge of their own design 
(appear to me to) remain skeptical of the results that doing different things 
produced, a phenomenon I will address in Chapter Six when presenting an 
account of those who chose to not see. The totality of adjustment necessary to 
make the correction in organisational purpose was culturally threatening. These 
were responses not unlike Kuhn's (1970) paradigm paralysis displayed by 
scientists and others when the factually rich data gathered through their own 
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efforts is disbelieved in order to preserve a chosen frame of reference, a 
psychological allegiance. Kuhn's insights add further definition with his 
observation that "political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often 
restricted to a segment of the political community, that existing institutions have 
ceased adequately to meet the problems posed by an environment that they have 
in part created" (Kuhn, 1962). 
As stated, I describe the development of the database tool, its maturation into a 
fully functioning knowledge management system and extensive use of group 
thinking, whilst avoiding 'groupthink' (Janis, 1972), to enable judgement and the 
assignment of values to various linked elements within the database. Data 
population is also described along with the creation of a vocabulary or meta-
language in which to express and highlight key areas. I will also begin to 
introduce the ideas that caused me concern in relation to facilitating meetings. 
These began with subtle indicators but quickly took on profound meaning that 
drove me to alter my approach entirely. In addressing these I will also partly 
answer my second subordinate research question: "To what extent did the effects-
based planner assist in building and reinforcing consensus around initiatives for 
change?". 
It is also within this chapter that I provide additional answers to the primary 
research question: "To what extent can knowledge management systems build and 
reinforce consensus around initiatives for change"? In doing so I will also 
address the question of what (I believe) knowledge management is, and what it is 
not. I will leave the detailed explanations for the variety of responses, which gave 
rise to the extent of consensus, discussed here, for Chapters Five and Six. 
Furthermore, these individuals and groups, having (only partly) accepted the data 
and results, were often hostile towards the transformations necessary to achieve 
'fitness for purpose' (a term I will expand upon later when discussing 
'effectiveness'). The concept was sound and they willingly participated, but the 
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conclusions that were an aggregation of thousands of decision points, each quite 
innocuous, were more than many could accept. That they had played a role in the 
construction of these conclusions seemed to matter little, a phenomenon I will 
discuss later in this chapter when outlining the changes necessary to achieve 
alignment against the definitions used to position the organisation as set out in 
ADFP 45 Special Operations (mentioned briefly in Chapter Two). 
Secondly, I have maintained close contact with several operations and capability 
planners within the United States military who are making remarkably similar 
discoveries as they address identical capability development issues. There is a 
'movement', it has the 'authority of .a shared idea', a community of opinion that 
will pick up like-minded individuals and alter their perceptions. It is highly 
probable that the doctrine surrounding this will migrate to Australia through the 
more official channels of formal visits and exchanges of personnel. It is doubtful 
that I, one iconoclastic individual, will be visible (or rewarded) as an actor in this. 
These concerns are addressed in the reflective text boxes. 
In order to be successful at the task I have set for myself within this chapter it is 
necessary for me to spend some time on the subjects of strategic planning and 
policy, the determination of objectives and the isolation of the ends and means 
used to bring these objectives to reality. I make no excuse for this and declare two 
reasons for doing so. Firstly, to minimise any possibility of misunderstandings 
due to definition, concepts or understandings about how these subjects are 
entangled; and secondly to provide space for my own detailed examination of this 
topic within Defence planning and within the wider subject of management. I will 
deal with these subjects firstly from a conceptual, theoretical perspective and then 
provide specific examples from the research. 
What I present in these two sections provides a vivid indication (which I will 
leave mostly to the reader to discover) of why consensus can be so difficult to 
achieve. Particularly in the context of this research wherein a sound theoretical 
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model (a number of illustrations will be shown) relies upon enormous levels of 
cooperation and collaboration through and across departments to have any chance 
of being successfully applied in real life. 
I will outline the difficulties that occurred as new information was progressively 
developed within group settings, new functionalities created within the database 
to allow storage and integration and analysis/charting processes devised to ensure 
that each new segment was influencing, to an appropriate level, the entire package 
of information. 
The words within the database, but not its functionality, were the result of 
extensive workshops, discussions, interviews and strategic analysis sessions with 
changing groups of people,- so essentially this was a collaborative effort. The 
functionality, its most powerful feature, was the work of a core team of three 
individuals - myself as the project leader, an additional long-term member of 
Special Operations and a Visual Basic programmer. 
The methods employed are novel, original, allow the exploitation of key ideas and 
statements through a linked analysis and provide for a fair and balanced 
representation of sub-group contributions. I have personally briefed this method 
to the Minister for Defence, Vice Chief of the Defence Force, Deputy Secretary of 
Strategy, Deputy Chief of Army and the Director General of Policy and Plans -
Air Force. Although there were several others whose appointments cannot be 
mentioned for security reasons, the four above represent the highest levels of 
Defence leadership, national military strategy and capability planning. All 
expressed a genuine interest in the depth and complexity of the analysis and were 
quite taken by the ability of the approach to rapidly segregate (and aggregate) key 
elements and thereby isolate strengths and weaknesses within an organisation. 
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A Brief Literature Review 
I have elected to depart from thesis convention and include my (brief) literature 
review in the early part of this chapter, the section of the thesis that most 
completely concerns the product of the research. Enough has been written on the 
subject of scenario planning and it will serve no benefit for me to discuss this 
further. In any event the literature concerning futures studies of the military and 
national security is limited. Often it is subject to the highest security clearances 
and can be very specific and region-centred. These speak more about a 
preoccupation with technical superiority than is acceptable for divergent thinking 
such as that which futures studies call for (demand is the term that more honestly 
expresses this requirement). I will limit my comments here to a few articles that 
are important to this topic of effects. 
When I began this doctoral research, effects-based planning and effects-based 
operations were merely shapes in the fog. I had a suspicion that something 
interesting was beginning to take form. Elements were beginning to combine in 
ways that heralded uniqueness. I could find no direct comparisons in the literature 
of planning and decision-making. At least a method that seemed to so 
comprehensively bundle together ideas and concerns across such a vast domain, 
diagonally across the operational continuum (Figure 6) and vertically from 
national security strategy down to tactics (Figures 8 and 9). 
I must confess my surprise when articles appeared from a variety of sources. I am 
not sure whether this is a serendipitous phenomenon associated with heuristic 
inquiry, wherein questions posed by the topic or the researcher are satisfied by the 
isolation of information that seems to provide the answer. For me this did happen 
on many occasions. There were many others where an idle browse through a 
library on a defence establishment (and not really looking for anything in 
particular) would see me feverishly copying a number of articles of direct 
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relevance to the research, particularly that related to the concept of effects-based 
operations. 
Articles on Effect-Based Operations 
These are speci fic, highly focused articles on effects-based operations. They 
represent the well-developed thoughts that are emerging on this subject. 
Conceptually they are embryonic, a useful definition is yet to be framed, although 
I have created an e-mai l chat group of enthusiasts around the world and 
interesting ideas are beginning to take shape, practically they have made little 
progress against dogmati sm. Although my instincts tell me that this will change, 
when I am not sure, possibly only a few years, but the totality of change will be 
immense. 
The Five Rings. Air Force Colonel John Warden (retired) was the architect of the 
1991 Gulf War air campaign. He designed the strategies that led to the 
capitulation of Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War air campaign was built around a 
five rings concept (Figure 21). 
Figure 21. Warden's five rings model. 
Leadership 
System Essentials 
Population 
Fielded Forces 
120 
Chapter Four- 'Effects-Based' Planning 
Although not dealing specifically with effects-based operations Warden's model 
uses similar terms to describe how to reach the adversary's mind (back to 
Clausewitz and the 'imposition of our will') His approach recognises that an 
adversary functions as a system and, therefore, has systemic strengths and 
weaknesses that can be located and interfered with, in both a constructive and 
destructive way. 
The system can be attacked in one cataclysmic blow, or through the 'death of a 
thousand cuts'. Either way the outcome is the same. Central to the approach is a 
fixation on the leadership, not the fielded military forces. 
An additional feature that can be overlooked is that Warden's model is a fractal 
structure. The fielded forces ring has its own five rings embedded within it that 
allows a more precise description of vulnerabilities. 
Models such as this derive significant value from their ability to focus the mind. 
For example Warden's highlights the inadequacy of targeting the fielded forces of 
the adversary. That is what they are designed to do, strength is in collision with 
strength. He proposes that actions must be directed at the leadership for there to 
be any hope of success. The further one moves actions away from the centre the 
more difficult it is to bring about desired results through 2nd, 3rd and n1h order 
effects. A good introductory article on the five rings model can be gained from 
Warden, J. (1995) The Enemy as a System. 
Firing for Effects appeared in the April 2001 edition of Air Force Magazine 
(Deptula, 2001, p. 46-53). Whilst dealing mostly with the Five Rings model 
developed by Warden and the distinctions between parallel and serial operations 
he does make some important points that relate directly to the topic of effects-
based thinking. For example, "planning for effects raises complex issues. 
Planners, working with intelligence officers, must determine which effects on 
each enemy system [reference to Warden] will contribute most to the attainment 
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of military and political objectives" (Deptula, 2001, p. 50). He continues with 
"strategy means matching means and ends" (Deptula, 2001, p. 50) and "the advent 
of EBO [Effects Based Operations] calls for a basic realignment in war planning" 
(Deptula, 2001, p. 52). The key terms here are the political orientation, matching 
of ends and means and realignment. These are all central to the model I have 
designed with political issues being accompanied by psychological and economic 
issues. Underlying this is the theme of movement away from a destruction-based 
to an effects-based model that specifically orients towards the national strategic 
end-state(s). 
Readers interested in pursuing this topjc are urged to search the World Wide Web 
under effects-based planning or effects-based operations, with the Air University 
at Maxwell Air Force Base in Alabama providing a rich source of information in 
papers by graduating officers. 
( 
Effects-Based Operations 
In Chapter Two I discussed National Security and the need for a post-modernist 
approach. This approach is grounded in the existence of an embryonic concept 
called effects-based operations, an orientation to operations that is mindful of 
what the actions are in pursuit of. Chapter Three uses the scenario planning 
technique of Field Anomaly Relaxation to provoke thought away from the 
conventional and to seek these effects as aids and devices to planning. In 
providing some preliminary definitions of what effects-based operations might be 
I am cautious of the need to not pre-empt the ideas that will be presented (and 
formed within the reader's mind) within this chapter. 
It is my intention here to unpack the subject gradually and I am fearful that a 
prescriptive definition at the outset (which may not be as crisp and concise as I 
would like) may prove to be a hindrance. The (purist's) idea of effects-based 
operations is still new, it has yet to be accurately and completely defined, 
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although there is an accepted body of opinion around the idea that it constitutes 
planning downwards from the grand strategic objective to the methods employed, 
with the judicious execution delivering effects that achieve the desired (and 
stated) objective. 
It is very easy to get into a debate here about targeting as a principal military 
planning activity, which would account for most of the current difficulties. 
Targeting is aimed at destruction, which then becomes the primary measure of 
effectiveness. Effects, on the other hand, are total disrespectors of the mechanisms 
to bring them about; provided the outcome is delivered then other criteria will 
gauge the efficacy. Effects-based .operations must, however, emerge from 
engaging in effects-based planning and this is much easier to define. If we are to 
take these initial steps towards a definition then: effects-based planning is an 
approach that retains a fixation on what it is that we are trying to make happen 
through our actions. 
In the words of Clausewitz (1832) we will always be trying to "impose our will on 
our adversary" and our will must take different forms. It is these forms, and I 
believe seduction is a far more powerful form than coercion, that is the 
embodiment of these things that (are made to) happen. The actions or instruments 
that deliver this capitulation are unimportant in the initial stages of decision-
making. Effects-based operations, therefore, must be the actions that emerge as 
appropriate from this rigorous and thorough planning that use the desired effects 
as the point of origin for all conclusions on actions. 
I have merely introduced these thoughts here. I leave the subject for the time 
being and return in more detail throughout the chapter. 
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Strategy and Policy 
Although strategy and policy have been dealt with in Chapter Two, I need to 
revisit this subject to further clarify my (mis)understanding. 
I remain somewhat confused as to the place of this (strategy) subject after having 
reviewed Emery's (1993, p. 492) analysis of policy and strategy very late in the 
writing of this thesis. I had believed that my work was focussed upon the strategic 
plan "[as it] typically depicts a strategic objective, to be achieved within a 
specified period, and a hierarchy of sub-goals whose collective achievement will 
secure the achievement of the objective". My work contains elements and my 
reading of the literature within (at least) military strategic planning support this 
conclusion. 
I now discover that "a policy, however, is typically one step removed from direct 
pursuit of an objective; a policy typically seeks to produce a change in the social 
environment such that certain kinds of ends are more or less easier to achieve" 
(Emery, 1993, p. 492). Finally, Emery makes the point, which further clouds my 
thinking that "the distinction between strategy and policy appears to be the same 
distinction as that we make in military affairs between strategy and doctrine" 
(Emery, 1993, p. 493). Unfortunately, Emery does not go on to explain in detail 
how this distinction takes shape, although I believe that my attempts to fully 
explore this will reveal the meanings implied in her words and secure a deeper 
understanding of ends and means. 
Further confusion (for me) is introduced by Nicholson (2000, p. 22) who states 
"in the Australian context, strategic policy represents what a government wants 
and hopes to achieve to secure national security". He then goes on to say in the 
following paragraph that "military strategy . . . is a course of action planned or 
pursued by military professionals at the behest of a government. ... [with the aim 
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being to] give effect to strategic policy [emphasis added]" (Nicholson, 2000, p. 
23). All very sound statements so far. Nicholson then offers that " ... military 
doctrine provides a body of thought on the conduct of war that informs the 
development of both security and strategic policy, as well as that of military 
strategy". 
If I have followed the logic of these statements correctly, then national strategic 
policy is shaped by doctrine, not the reverse. This seems to me to be an 
outrageous assertion and one that must be rejected. The horse has now been led 
(quite willingly it would seem) into a position directly behind the cart, 
furthermore its bearing and outlook indicate no interest in the cart as on object to 
which its role could somehow be related. A contradiction to this is outlined later 
(Nicholson, 2000, p. 26-27) under the heading "Strategy and Doctrine- The Case 
of Australia" .. wherein a four step ideal relationship is described. He begins with 
the "identification and articulation [the current major weakness and one I have set 
out to address] of Australian interests and objectives in a national security policy". 
This is followed sequentially by a thorough analysis until plans, actions and 
standard operating procedures are developed. 
The information flows and is interpreted downward, actions combine and flow 
upward to produce results. This seems to me to be a far more accurate account of 
the real world and acceptance of this is more sound (based on underpinning 
conceptual models that support it) than the earlier statements on military doctrine 
informing strategy. 
A further return to Clausewitz reveals that "one must be clear what he intends to 
achieve ... and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; 
the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will ... 
prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and makes its influence 
felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail" (Clausewitz, 1832, 
Howard & Paret trans, p. 579). 
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Clarke ( 1999, p. 18) usefully divides the Grand Strategic, Military Strategic. 
Operational and Tactical Levels. assigns an actions profile alongside each and 
neatly accounts for policies and strategies at each level. l have reproduced his 
model below (Figure 22) as it will allow me to make several additional points not 
mentioned by Clarke. 
.,_ Objectives .,_ Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools 
.,_ Objectives .,_ Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools 
Operational Level .,_ Objectives.,.Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools 
t 
Tactical Level .,_ Objectives .,_ Strategy .,_ Plans .,_Tools 
Figure 22. National ~ecurity management architecture. 
For my purposes. Clarke's ( 1999, p. 20) critical observation is that "every 
strategy-making effort or consequent action, no matter how far down the 
structure, should have some traceable relevance to the service of grand strategic 
level policy objectives" and "[the] plans ... devised ... amount to more specific 
descriptions of 'what' will be done in accordance with strategy to achieve a given 
objective" (Clarke. 1999, p. 19). My only criticism with the model is that it fails 
to make a reasonable claim against the geo-political strategic environment into 
which the next (and absent) vertically pointing arrow should penetrate. This is the 
point of origin for my research and informs the efficacy. effectiveness and 
efficiency of all subordinate policies and strategies. There is sti ll no expression of 
the effects. It continues to lack a 'whole-of-govemmentness'. 
Furthermore, "effects-based operations are most effective as a top-down process. 
The higher up it begins, the more far-reaching [and focussed) its supporting 
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effects can be .... [it] begins with the [national leadership] providing clear, 
coherent national objectives against which those decision-makers wielding the 
various instruments of national power adopt supporting or supported roles as 
appropriate" Beagle, 2000, p. 110). 
From the many discussions I had 
throughout the period 1997-1999, with 
senior Defence planners and capability 
development project teams it has now (at 
the moment of writing this) become 
evident that there is an intellectual divide 
between strategy (at the National Security 
Committee of Cabinet level) and Defence, 
whose task it is to stand ready with the 
means to deliver outcomes for the nation. 
This intellectual silence appears to have 
"I have been staggered by the 
enormity of this institutional 
resistance. There appears to be 
reluctance on the part of 
government to provide precise 
guidance to the Defence force on 
what is sought through their 
actions, which is mirrored, by an 
identical reluctance within the 
military to engage in a productive 
dialogue of what it should be 
doing". 
(Personal reflection, 14 June 
1999) 
situated itself at the boundary of (grand strategic) policy and (grand) strategy. 
This topic is addressed in Chapter 2. 
Enough has been said here. The matter remains (for me) unresolved. I believe that 
one cannot be done without the other and that the activities associated with 
strategy and policy overlap in both context and content. Furthermore, the ends, 
means, effects, strategy, policy and doctrine domains must be considered in their 
totality if we are to approach precision in our thinking. A new doctrinal construct 
'-----
of effects-based planning is needed. 
The Role of Doctrine 
Doctrine is central to (military) thought. It sets the boundaries for thought and 
action. It guides the actions of an enormous array of practitioners and fuses their 
efforts. It is sometimes described as dogma and has earned this title a number of 
127 
Chapter Four- 'Effects-Based' Planning 
times for some unbelievable acts of stupidity and incompetence (Dixon, 1976, 
provides entertaining but quite tragic reading on this subject). The authorised 
definition for doctrine within the ADF is: 
the fundamental principles by which military forces or elements 
thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is 
authoritative but requires judgement in its application. 
ADFP 101- Glossary, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1994 
So we need a new fundamental principle. One that is alert to how actions couple 
together to deliver results. 
Ends, Means and Ways 
In this section I wish to thoroughly establish the concept (firstly from a military 
perspective) of ends, means and ways as enduring elements of all planning. A 
rudimentary framework I will build on later is shown at Figure 23. 
Ends Ways Means 
Figure 23. The ends-means linkages that form the ways. 
It illustrates the actions that are entangled with results and how a new level of 
purity must be brought to the examination of cause and effect relationships if 
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(military) strategic (and now policy due to my earlier observation) planning is to 
(ever) produce the outcomes we are in pursuit of. It is not my intention to 
investigate in great detail how this may relate to other (non-military) 
organisations. 
Having said this, however, my research has indicated that there is almost a direct 
qualitative correlation within the architecture of analysis for Police, Customs, 
Immigration and other quasi-military institutions. The inputs are behaviorally 
dominant and the outcomes are (in the purest form this model demands) also 
behavioral, things are done by people in order to bring about changes in other 
people that deliver the outcomes or objectives that are sought. 
The Ends-Means Construct 
All planners and decision-makers would recognise the enduring truth of the 
phrase 'begin with the end in mind'. The clearly stated end, objective or effect then 
stands as a clear beacon that all actions must be in pursuit of if success is to be 
achieved. Bartlett (1985, p. 39) offers that "there are several advantages to a top-
down approach. First, it helps force planners to concentrate on ends", my central 
argument remains that without knowing what you are trying to make happen any 
activity will give some measure of satisfaction - the ends must have primacy. 
"Second, it provides a systematic way to think through force planning starting 
from the broad or macro perspective", giving a sense of the contextual 
environment (Emery & Trist, 1965). "Third, ... a balance [can be achieved] for 
expectations about the short and long term", a fusing together of scenario 
planning and strategy/policy as I have done in the current research. "Fourth, ... 
useful criteria [is introduced] for evaluating, judging and choosing among 
alternative force choices", this is where my ratings of means-effects pairs is 
achieved. It is my conclusion that the ends have been reduced to a somewhat 
secondary position in the grand order of shaping national responses. 
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Although I would now need to return to chapter two to fully develop these ideas 
and position them within a national security context, the fundamental arguments 
can be located in the strategic marketing literature. For my comments here the 
terms operational environment and market should be considered as identical. 
Research has indicated a strong causal link between market orientation and 
organisational performance (Narver & Slater, 1990; Reukert, 1992), with "the 
ultimate objective of corporate decisions [being] marketplace success" (Berman, 
Wicks, Kotha & Jones, p. 91). 
Organisational learning with key elements of culture, structure and practice has 
also been strongly linked to market orientation (Day, 1994); with the importance 
of a values base, knowledge flows and resulting market strategies being used 
centrally on a behavioral construct (Sinkula, Baker & Nordeweir, 1997). 
Deshpande and Rohit (1983) identify the need for increased qualitative research 
through subjective interpretation of data as an aid to theory development, with a 
de-emphasis on hypothesis testing - making the behaviour rich in involvement 
and consultation - solving the problem progressively as groups and organisations 
learn together. 
Berthon, Hulbert and Pitt (1999) synthesise all these issues as a central 
management question related to innovation or response, with Duncan (1996) 
outlining the basic contradiction between an organisation that is configured for 
rapid change and adaptation in a turbulent environment, against that configuration 
needed for satisfactory implementation. Hedberg, Nystrom and Starbuck (1976) 
and Hubert (1984) offer insights into the 'experimenting' organisation that 
constantly mutates, fostering internal flexibility as a vital characteristic for 
success. 
Deshpande, Farley and Webster (1993) concerned themselves with the primacy of 
market orientation or innovation, suggesting that innovation success can re-orient 
a market. Han, Kim and Srivastava (1998) explore, from within a set of 
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hypotheses, whether market orientation and innovation and organisational 
performance are all pieces of the same inter-related management puzzle with 
further distinctions drawn from Daft (1978), Dalton (1968) and Damanpour 
(1991); wherein "technical innovations pertain to products, services and 
production process technology - they are related to work activities . . .. [and] 
administrative innovations involve organisational structure and administrative 
process - they are indirectly related to the basic work activities" (Damanpour, 
1991, p. 560) 
The central premise at work here is that indicators for change (within the context 
of this research) come from outside, in the environment and are a strategic 
necessity (Day, 1999, p. 13). 
Given the nature of Special Forces, and its primary purpose to conduct Special 
Operations, the conclusion must be that a combination of precise market 
orientation (this term is abandoned now in favour of the more appropriate 
[understanding of the] 'operational environment'), constant innovation and 
structural mutation as a stable organisation condition must become the norm. I set 
out how these are addressed later in this chapter, for now it is time to return to the 
ends, ways and means. 
This construct of ends, ways and means shown earlier in Figure 23 attains 
primacy as a core framework, but it must be approached in a particular way if the 
results are to prove useful. Before proceeding though I am cautioned by the words 
of Vendler (in Emmet, 1984, p. 67) who, when dealing with the relationships 
between cause and effect, states that "causes are facts, which are proposition-like, 
whereas effects are actual changes and processes in the world ... .'causes' should 
be paired with 'results' or 'consequences', which, like causes, can be limited, ... 
whereas effects can go on indefinitely". These concerns I think have already been 
accommodated in the recognition of n1h order effects, cascading effects and the 
belief that we can never only do one thing. 
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An interesting black box 'unknowability' cause-effect relationship (Figure 24) has 
been discussed by Sakulich (2001, p. 13-14). 
Strategic Result: 
discriminate effect 
Transformation 
Process 
("Meehan ism") 
Tactical Action: 
precise application 
of aerospace power 
Figure 24. Black box linking of cause and effect. 
Realm of 
correctness 
Realm of 
exactness 
He offers that "it does not make sense to talk about discriminate effects unless 
those effects are clearly defined in advance; if for no other reason, the decision-
maker must communicate the discriminate outcome to planners who must develop 
the means to achieve it" (Sakulich, 2001, p. 14). As I soon demonstrate, getting 
this information from senior policy-makers can be difficult. Practitioners 
inquiring co-operatively towards this information can offer an empowering 
alternative. 
Maxfield (1999, p. 202) was able to advance a simple task within decision 
analysis to "determine the set of possible strategies, assess the outcomes of each 
and their probabilities, evaluate the relative value of each outcome, and 
[therefore] calculate the optimum strategy". Harrison uses similar language to 
confirm that "once the search yields a sufficient amount of information to fashion 
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a set of alternatives, the next function in the decision-making process. is to 
compare and evaluate these alternatives .... The decision-maker must focus on 
anticipated outcomes that will probably meet the objectives ... " (Harrison, 1987, 
p. 48). It is (the profit) maximising behaviour of the economic person, "the 
merchant pictured by Adam Smith" (Harrison, 1987, p. 111). But the context of 
my discussion is not the marketplace, it is the social milieu where alternatives are 
endlessly complex. Furthermore, the black box in the Sakulich model possesses 
an enormous array of interactions. 
I gain some measure of comfort from Emmet (1984, p. 69) in her philosophical 
analysis of these dilemmas for decision-makers in recognising that "causes and 
effects are alike in being multiple, and this makes them more difficult to 
diagnose". It is not helpful to attempt to isolate individual cause-effect 
relationships, instead "why should we not have a [many to many relationship 
acknowledgement] where there are a number of actual causal factors playing on a 
situation producing a number of actual effects" (Emmet, 1984, p. 68). 
These then spiral off into a "hopelessly large number of possible outcomes", 
indeed "the very structure of the world in which the agent exists is undergoing 
change". This is the nature of the turbulent field of Emery and Trist ( 1965) 
discussed in Chapter Three. 
I will develop this simple model (Figure 24) into a complex array later in this 
chapter, showing what is happening inside Sakulich's black box, an array that 
incorporates an identical arrangement of linkages, but one that assigns values and 
forms patterns that can be analysed. Despite its simplicity there remains much 
confusion and disagreement (grounded in a lack of doctrine), as evidenced in the 
quote below: 
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End-state is reached by achieving objectives (military and non-
military), objectives are reached by achieving the expressed intent 
(statement of what the force must do to succeed with respect to the 
enemy, terrain and desired end-state) -what you want to achieve-
the 'effect'. Where is the 'newness' in this other than the word? The 
newness is in the focus of the staff planning elements. We need to 
drive commander's intent to lower echelons. But the lower 
echelons focus on 'destroy this' and don't focus on 'in order to .... '. 
By using a new name for an old process (given new Information 
Technology tools), perhaps we can develop a culture and process 
change that does not disregard the 'in order to ... ' part of mission 
orders. 
Participant comment from EBO workshop 
in United States 26 October 2000 
Without getting into the specifics, they will come later, there were countless 
occasions during the workshops I conducted that a reminder had to be spelled out 
on the framing of the statements: do something in order to make something 
happen is critical if a consistent and useful phraseology is to be developed. The 
quote above carries a powerful message for me in that the effect that is sought 
should be conveyed throughout all levels of thinking and must not be turned into a 
'destroy' this or that action that is not anchored to an effect. That a(nother) system 
is at work seems to have primacy once again. 
In reading Crombie (1972, p. 120) I note an interesting quote from Angyal that 
has relevance here, wherein "every system implies some kind of dimensional 
domain which makes the multiplicity of parts possible and at the same time serves 
as a matrix for the arrangement of parts into definite patterns". This domain is 
then expanded into depth or the vertical dimension, a progressive dimension and a 
breadth dimension. All have attracted my attention and demand further detailed 
examination to illuminate my own work; however, it is the second of these that 
informs this particular section as "the dimension of progression is the dimension 
along which particular actions and behaviours become linked into means-ends 
chains, the structured sequences of more or less planned, purposeful activity" 
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(Crombie, 1972, p. 121). The language of ends and means is very dominant and 
the idea of end-states, effects and actions need to become integrated. 
Nevertheless, caution is warranted when building these structures (as I will 
outline later) as "There seems to be an obsessive concern with the means at 
almost complete expense to the ends, so much so that stalemated social systems 
come as close to being purposeless as can be expected from a social system which 
is purposeful by definition" (Baburoglu, 1988, p. 217). I have found the 
sequencing of this integration to be critical. 
The reality of these facts, from a mi,litary doctrine perspective, is evident in the 
quote below: 
A nation will have a political aim or objectives and depending both 
on the nature of the conflict and the identity of the enemy, there 
will be a means by which the armed forces can best contribute to 
its achievement. To establish that means, the appropriate military 
aim should be selected and must be simple, direct, within the 
capabilities of the force available, and defined without any 
possibility of ambiguity. Each operation will itself have an aim 
that, while more limited, must also be simple, direct and clearly 
stated. 
Army Doctrine Electronic Library, 2000 
I believe that we are still waiting to witness any noticeable behavioural shifts that 
align with this thinking. Furthermore, the aim is limited by (and subordinated to) 
the capabilities of the available force. As identified by Jablonsky (1989, p. 53) in 
"the proper blending of these interdependent [ends, ways and means] elements, 
however, has always been a difficult process, made even more so in the modem 
era where limited objectives and diffusion of military power are the norms". 
Jablonsky then offers a quote from Henry Kissinger who recognised that strategy 
was not about superior strength, rather "to discipline the available power [means?] 
into some relationship to the objectives likely to be in dispute" (Jablonsky, 1989, 
p. 53). This feedback in thought and practice remains unchallenged. 
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What we see forming then is "a cascading means-ends chain of organised, loosely 
coupled, interconnected systems moving from generality to specificity" (Allen, 
2000, p 38). Allen's concern was that if "these elements could be more logically 
expressed then it should be possible to express the means by which management 
achieves ends .... Map[ping] what goes on ... in an organisation from top to 
bottom" (Allen, 2000, p 38). This is precisely what I have set out to do. 
Taking this Thinking to National Security 
This mapping of means and effects can be a hugely complex task to achieve in an 
international security context. Given the SE Asian region's current (in)security 
situation Clausewitz could now be considered only partially correct when he 
identified that "there is only one means in war: combat" (Clausewitz, 1832, 
Howard & Paret trans. 1976, p. 96); for war has taken on new meanings that have 
little to do with declared conflict between States. 
Furthermore, his recognition that "the multiplicity of forms that combat assumes 
leads us in as many different directions as are created by the multiplicity of aims, 
so that our analysis does not seem to have made any progress" (Clausewitz, 
Howard & Paret trans. 1976, p. 96) restores some contemporary relevance, as it 
gives us the freedom to broaden our view to that of imposing our will within all 
contexts that may not necessarily involve conflict. 
Our basic problem remains, however, and it brings us back to the words in 
Checkand's seven-stage model that "as the complexity of a system increases, our 
ability to make precise and significant statements about its behaviour diminishes 
until a threshold is reached beyond which precision and significance (or 
relevance) become almost mutually exclusive characteristics". A corollary 
principle may be stated succinctly as, "the closer one looks at a real-world 
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problem, the fuzzier becomes the solution" (Kosko, 1994, p. 148, quoting the 
work of Zadeh and his principle of incompatability). 
The fixation on warfighting mentioned in Chapter 2 is diminished further. The 
necessity for this has been highlighted by Shine (1998, pp. 5-18) when discussing 
the need for "using every means at the nation's disposal" which, in an effects-
based model, can integrate all possible contributors; a whole-of-government 
approach, the need for which has been mentioned in many different contexts, not 
only those that are related to national security. 
The doctrine at the op~rational level is sound and points to these issues, as can be 
seen in Figure 25 taken from an Australian Defence Force publication. The 
greyed text boxes on the right are Australian Government, Australian Defence 
Force Headquarters, Headquarters Australian Theatre, Joint Task Forces and 
Australian Defence Force Units. 
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Figure 25. Defence doctrine model of ends, ways and means. 
My primary criticism is that there is (always) a premature fixation on the means, 
rather than the ends. "What we do", not "What are we trying to make happen". 
This is certainly true for the military and is also evident within many other 
disciplines and organisations. I feel so strongly about this that I will repeat here 
the words of the Deputy Secretary - Strategy from a quote in Chapter 2 "/ do not 
think that we [who?] have yet got to the point of providing the Army with a really 
clear statement of what it is meant to be doing ... To my mind at least, one of the 
key objectives of the present process is to make sure that we do that''. In order for 
this to be successful it must be informed by a comprehensive understanding of 
what the ADF is trying to make happen (strategically for the nation). This loop of 
irresolution is closed when we acknowledge that we do not know what it is that 
we are trying to make happen. It is Government "who wills an end [and therefore] 
wills the means to that end" (Rousseau, 1762. Betts trans. p. 70). The various 
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elements of the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy as set 
out in Chapter 2 which attempt to explicitly set these out remain lacking in both 
quantity and quality of expression. 
In his analysis of strategy and crisis, Brigadier Wallace, when the Director 
General of Land Development, identified that: 
By constantly focusing on the desired end state, the circumstances 
we wish to prevail at the end of the crisis, the successful strategist 
shapes the near and mid-term situation to his own advantage. 
Taking a long view causes him to anticipate developments and 
drives his information requirements, naturally assisting him to 
build on the most valuable commodity for the strategist, 
foreknowledge. 
Wallace, (1999, p. 17) 
Having crafted an intent from the end-states Wallace then sets out a model for the 
thought processes springing from this, with a principal output being the "selection 
of the most effective combinations of effects" (1999, p. 19). It follows that an 
analysis of the contextually appropriate means to deliver these effects would be a 
natural extension of this 'top down' approach. Herein lies a practitioner's 
recognition that there are elements missing and the only way to determine what 
they may be and how they may be expressed is to formulate a coherent model that 
drives the mind away from actions (what we do) to outcomes (what we make 
happen). Having determined these then it is entirely appropriate to examine the 
possible actions (and what should be more accurately described as decision-
maker's options). 
Warden (1998) elaborates on this theme of knowing what each individual action 
contributes to the outcome when stating that: 
. . . as a planner or commander, you ought to be able to tell what 
each bomb has got to do with the peace that you want to follow the 
war. If you can't tell how a given bomb relates to the peace that's 
going to follow, then you probably haven't done your homework 
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well and you probably shouldn't drop that particular bomb. 
Warden (1998, p. 84-85) 
From these insights it is possible to deduce that the channeling of actions (or 
energy) to bring about stated ends must be informed by a clear vision and one that 
is not distorted by a particular orientation, preoccupation or ideological 
imperfection or inconsistency. A useful example of this is offered by Clarke who 
noted that: 
Alexander the Great who, while having very strong land forces, 
was very much weaker than his Persian adversaries at sea. Rather 
than challenge the Persian navy on the water for control of the 
Mediterranean, he identified their centre of gravity as the ports and 
decided that attacks on these would be the best way to overcome 
Persian sea power . . . . a simple expression of 'how' a particular 
manipulation of affairs might indirectly secure the desired 
objective [emphasis added]. 
Clarke (1999, p. 19) 
Alexander, acknowledged as one of the finest strategists, recognised the 
inaccessibility of his adversary's navy (his strength was land based), but 
recognised that he could reach his objective (located further upstream) through 
means that exploited his strengths. The importance of this indirectedness is further 
elaborated, (Clarke, 1999, p. 14) wherein "control of accessible upstream states or 
events can produce a measure of control over less accessible downstream states or 
events. Establishing this link between cause and effect, between means and ends, 
is at the very heart of the art of strategy". Alluding to these themes, students of 
systems thinking will recognise the truth(ful fantasy) in the following poem in 
Francis Thompson's The Mistress of Vision: 
All things by immortal power 
Near or far 
Hiddenly 
To each other linked are 
That thou canst not stir a flower 
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Without troubling a star. 
The Primacy of Effects 
Theory investigates all these ends and means according to the 
nature of their effects and their mutual relations [emphasis added]. 
(Clausewitz, 1832, Rapoport trans, p. 195) 
Effects are central to this chapter. I have already demonstrated that knowing what 
you want to have happen must be given primacy in planning. Without remaining 
mindful of the effects we are seeking, every action that is not securely anchored to 
an outcome can not only prove wast.eful, it can also run counter to other actions 
that are being undertaken simultaneously. This fact calls for a coordinated and 
thoughtful approach that will eventually become a campaign of orchestrated 
actions at the National level using all elements of national power. 
One of the greatest military theorists - Carl von Clausewitz offers several 
important insights to lay the foundation for a modern application of this thinking. 
"In the analysis of the means we encounter the same multiplicity as our viewpoint 
becomes more comprehensive. The higher the ends [or effects], the greater the 
number of means by which they may be reached". Furthermore "we can see that 
this may sometimes lead to a broad and complex field of enquiry in which we 
may easily get lost" (Clausewitz, 1832, Howard & Paret trans. 1976, p. 159). I can 
admit to becoming lost on many occasions, as the vocabulary used to describe 
national security issues becomes more complex, so too did the linkages that bind 
the construct together. Hope is available though in the slightly different 
translation of this section by Rapoport, who offers that as our knowledge 
deepens: 
The infinite variety of paths in which it [the means in battle] may 
be applied, leads us into all the different ways which the 
multiplicity of objects allows of, so that we seemed to have gained 
nothing; but that is not the case, for from this unity of means 
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proceeds a thread which assists the study of the subject, as it runs 
through the whole web of military activity and holds it together 
[emphasis added]. 
(Clausewitz, 1832, Rapoport trans, p. 133) 
From another interpretation comes an assertion that "the ends-means relationship 
clearly does not work on a linear fashion [as implied in the quote above]. The 
constant interplay is an interactive feedback process" and "the conduct [the means 
employed] of any conflict affects the character and [the altered] character feeds 
back into the political ends" (Bayerchen, 1998, p. 174). The set of effects then (a 
list that is both generic and context-specific) must sit atop the ends, means and 
ways framework. The (almost limitless) variety in which these can be coupled 
together broadens (and complicates) the scope of planning, but also builds in 
flexibility, novelty and agility for dealing (imaginatively and creatively) with 
current events. 
Ayling (2000, p. 6) also recognised that the ends, ways and means framework was 
equally useful at provoking a consideration of future force concepts within 
defence to shape the ideological positions before they become a damaging 
interference. Indeed, the disrespect that this construct shows for Service (Navy, 
Army and Air Force) identities is one of its greatest strengths. This disrespect is 
evident in transcript extracts from a workshop on effects-based operations held in 
the United States that I have included as Appendix 1 that I will make specific 
reference to and make comparisons with my own observations on similar 
workshops in Australia. 
This single Service (Navy, Army or Air Force) orientation can be attributed to the 
early fixation (on the means) that is allowed to occur on the tactical and 
operational levels, rather than (the ends) at the national strategic level. Indeed, 
Warden (in Clarke, 1998, p 78) in a search for useful definitions of" ... 'winning', 
'to win' or 'victory' [discovered that] there was whole lot of things in there about 
how to do tactical things, but almost nothing about the final end states that were 
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supposed to be the result of this action". It is evident from these observations that 
very little consideration is given to 'that which is sought'. Rather 'that which is 
done' dominates the thinking. It would appear to be the case in any endeavour, as 
illustrated by Albert Einstein (1950, chap 14) who wrote "perfection of means and 
confusion of goals seem-in my opinion-to characterize our age" and also by 
Hoffer (1973, p. xx) "We have perhaps a natural fear of ends. We would rather be 
always on the way than arrive. Given the means, we hang on to them and often 
forget the ends". In an organisation such as the military, which by its nature must 
have an action ori(1ntation, the means are certainly blocking out a clear sight of 
the ends they are in pursuit of. 
Furthermore, also from Warden (1995, p. 2) comes the statement that "we cannot 
think strategically if we start our thought processes with individual aircraft, 
sorties, weapons, or even with the enemy's entire military forces. Instead, we must 
focus on the totality of our enemy .... [only after doing this thoroughly] can we 
begin to think about how we are going to produce the desired effect on the enemy, 
the weapons, the delivery systems, and other means [emphasis added] we will 
use". The very intent of this research, indeed it goes beyond to the contextual 
environment. 
Only when these elements of ends and means are bound together can a useful, 
purposeful understanding of the roles that are played by each of the 'ways' be 
arrived at. It may be the only way to bring a new synthesis to our understanding. 
I promised earlier that I would demonstrate the presence of patterns in these 
linkages and how these patterns could be interpreted. Figure 26 represents my 
initial attempts to formulate a deeper understanding of what I was only just 
beginning to construct. It seemed to me that there was something akin to a strange 
attractor at work and the various ideas that were presented by a large number of 
practitioners within the organisation would build a visual representation of actions 
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at work. The random arrangement of lines in Figure 23 sparked my curiosity to 
develop these ideas further to isolate the patterns and determine their meaning. 
Effects Means Capacities or Competencies 
Pattern A 
Pattern B 
Pattern C 
Figure 26. Patterns formed within the ends, means and ways model. 
Note that I have substituted the words of ends, ways and means with the language 
that I was beginning to develop of effects, means and capacities or competencies. 
I was criticised by many for this departure from convention. My discussion on the 
ends, means and ways model to this point confirms that the ideas were already 
present. My intention was to force a new perspective. To preserve the purity of 
the process throughout it was suggested that I abandon the term effects and return 
to objectives and end-states. In my view effects are an expression of objectives. 
End-states are located in a position off to the left of this diagram and are delivered 
through achievement of the effects. 
The patterns are evident within the figure, heralding the possibility of strange 
attractors entering the model (and they did). A fact I will demonstrate shortly. 
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• Pattern A describes a pair of effects that are anchored to the same set of three 
capacities or competencies through a single means. If this means is tightly 
bound from both sides it possesses considerable criticality as an action. 
• Pattern B describes a single effect anchored to multiple means, each of which 
has a supporting set of capacities. Looking sequentially at several effects and 
determining whether the same set of means and capacities are bound together 
raises issues of undertaking that means in separate locations simultaneously -
a question of concurrency. 
• Pattern C provides for the pairing of a single effect and a single capacity and a 
count of the number of means that bridge between these two (a chart will be 
illustrated later that performs this action). 
The information gained from this exercise is reduced to a numerical set of 
possible paths that can be traced either from the sides (single effects to a single 
capacity) or from the centre outwards (single means to multiple effects and 
capacities). These results will be displayed as charts later in this chapter. 
On 3 August 2000, a slide (Figure 27) was presented to senior Defence capability 
managers as part of a methodology formulation project. It represents a quite 
honest attempt to link the ends, ways and means together and apply some 
criticality and importance metrics to the lines that bind the model together. As 
will be seen later in this chapter it is a highly simplified (and copied) version of a 
more sophisticated model that arose from my research. Notwithstanding this, the 
concept has gained a foothold and attention is now beginning to be directed at 
(what I consider to be) the right areas; although the institutional resistance 
remains high despite the 'concept-led' declaration by Army discussed in Chapter 
Two. 
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I have discussed the theoretical foundations of this for too long, but as I confessed 
in the beginning of this chapter it was a necessary thing for me to do. Armed with 
this extensive knowledge and the importance of putting what is a comprehensive 
and thorough theory to some useful purpose that can inform the efforrs of a vast 
number of people, I now move on to a discussion of how (I was able) to make this 
(begin to) happen in the Australian Defence Force. 
The e-mail below and personal reflection provide some closing thoughts to this 
section on my (a~ yet unrecognised) work and the (undeclared) interest of others. 
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Tony Forestier, Air Power Studies Centre, provided me with your e-mail address, advising me that 
you had a database that was able to prioritise capability. 
I would be keen to speak to you about this issue, as the Directorate of Current Capability 
Guidance is coordinating the development of the Defence Capability Planning Guidance (DCPG) -
a guidance document to prioritise capability at all levels. 
Could you please call me before Thursday, (if possible as I will be on leave from Thursday 
22/3/01) to discuss what you have done, and to make arrangements to visit us the next time you 
are in Canberra. 
Thanks and Regards 
John C. Guthrie 
Deputy Director - Capability Planning Integration 
Directorate of Current Capability Guidance 
Capability Systems Staff 
Department of Defence 
Russell Offices 
Canberra AUSTRALIA 2601 
"The linking of lines and attachment of values to prescribe 
additional meaning was my design. I shared it openly so I 
should be thankful that it has found its way to a good use 
(Defence White Paper - Defence 2000 Our Future Defence 
Force). I still feel anger though that supposedly clever people 
doing extremely important work cannot attribute clever ideas 
to those who originated them. Furthermore, I believe the 
purity of the approach has been polluted by the inclusion of 
inappropriate (platform-centric) statements to describe the 
'abilities'. The likelihood of gaining credit in what is 
(unfortunately) an ego-centric environment is greatly 
diminished". 
I am reminded of the work of Liddell Hart (1943) who 
recognised that "the destruction of the enemy's armed forces is 
but a means - and not necessarily an inevitable or infallible 
one - to the attainment of our goal. It is not, despite the 
assertion of the military pundits, the sole, true objective in 
war" (Hart, 1943, p. 151). 
(Personal observation, 10 September, 2000) 
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Defence thinking is progressing quite rapidly towards acceptance of these 
concepts. It is uncertain when institutionalisation (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978) 
will occur, if ever. Of equal doubt is whether the purity in the approach can be 
maintained, it is too easy to revert back to a means-dominant paradigm. 
Getting an Effects Orientation Started 
Throughout 1998-99, I participated in a series of Concept Initiation Teams (CIT) 
under Project Sphinx. These were structured workshops conducted by the 
Directorate of Future Warfare at the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation (DSTO) facility at Fern Hill in Canberra. The workshops employed 
a group decision support system, whereby each participant (up to 40) had his or 
her own keyboard and could review their own individual comments and respond 
to the ideas of others as they appeared on the group area projected onto a large 
screen. This proved to be a very powerful way to elicit information. Assertive 
ideas prevailed, not assertive people. My earlier comment of the 'authority of a 
shared idea' would be given the greatest chance of success in this collaboration-
rich environment. 
There were five separate two-day sessions conducted. The subjects dealt with 
were: 
• Concept 1 - Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
• Concept 2 - Command and Control 
• Concept 3 - Tailored Lethality 
• Concept 4 - Force Projection and Protection 
• Concept 5 - Force Sustainment 
Without knowing the significance of my actions (then) I was able to convince the 
workshop leader that Concept 3 - Tailored Lethality should be altered to Tailored 
Effects, producing a more appropriate (and useful) title and, most importantly, it 
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would dramatically enlarge the problem and solution spaces. The title Tailored 
Lethality, although not challenged at all by the group, embodied a fixation on 
conflict and the military measures to resolve conflict - locate the defeat 
mechanisrnls and apply military (and lethal due to the preoccupation commanded 
by the title) force. Tailored effects, on the other hand, did not possess this 
imbalance and therefore did not produce this single-mindedness. I believe now 
that this may prove to be the most significant event in getting the concept of 
effects-based planning impregnated into the military mind. Military force still has 
its place, but it (eventually) will stand adjacent to the other means available to a 
nation to resolve a situation. 
A document released later that reported on the workshops contained the following 
statement: 
Tailored effects shift the emphasis from the application of force to 
the delivery of effects tailored to a specific circumstance or 
mission. It has equal utility across the spectrum of conflict [see 
Figure 6] particularly where earlier; 'softer' interventions may yield 
reductions in tension [an unfortunate reversal in thinking back to 
conflict]. The concept involves greater mixing of traditional force 
projection and unconventional information operations. 
With the circulation and endorsement of this document Defence now have a 
doctrinal beginning that fosters discussion, exploration and examination of these 
issues. I do not hesitate in claiming this as my achievement, what level of 
penetrati,on this achieves will be determined by others. 
This concept has since proven central to the development of future approaches 
and, along with the other four concepts, has yielded 25 embryonic sub-concepts. 
Nine of these 25 have become key concepts ('tailored effects' was one), six have 
become enabling concepts (tailored effects was one) and ten have become 
supporting concepts (tailored effects was in three). Whilst this cannot be 
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considered a dominating result a 25% penetration of an idea into a new concept is 
certainly promising and could herald a departure from traditional thinking. 
Final Thoughts on Ends, Ways and Means 
At the heart of all planning then, regardless of its purpose, scope or urgency is the 
need to balance these ends and means. To achieve effective planning a 
straightforward linear process is normally adopted that specifies objectives and 
the various arrangements of means that can be coupled together in different ways 
to accommodate risk, cost and other factors that are important to decision-makers. 
Emerging from this process should be, a range of options, each possessing the 
common characteristic of being able to deliver the desired outcome, but at the 
same time presenting the decision-maker with the capacity for phased or 
escalating application combined with appropriate adjustments in risk and other 
factors. 
My extensive use of other authors' thoughts on this subject now allows me to 
focus on the construction of my own knowledge management model that brought 
these ideas to an audience, allowed their thoughts to range free, developed a 
language in which to express the effects, distilled these into the subordinate 
means and other elements. 
Before doing this, however, I would like to spend some time addressing the 
subject of knowledge management in general. 
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Knowledge Management 
Knowledge Management caters to the critical issues of 
organizational adaptation, survival and competence in face of 
increasingly discontinuous environmental change .... Essentially, it 
embodies organizational processes that seek synergistic 
combination of data and information processing capacity of 
information technologies, and the creative and innovative capacity 
of human beings. 
(http://www.brint.com/km/whatis.htm on 19 Apr 2001) 
The term 'knowledge management' has yet to receive a stable definition, mainly 
due to the phraseology used to express what it is. Essentially it is an (as yet 
incomplete) extension into a new field or domain for the general term 
'management'. It therefore sits (uncomfortably) adjacent to 'quality management', 
'information management', 'risk management', 'people management', 'data 
management' and all the other forms of something management. In hindsight, it 
would have been more helpful to present this subject under the broader heading of 
knowledge sharing, an idea I gained from discussions with another doctoral 
student. 
Furthermore, the domination of the noun form of the word 'manage(ment)' has 
caused a distancing between what is being described and what is actually 
occurring. From the quote above we can see that it is more a fusion of patterns of 
information that can be extracted from noise with the creative ability of the 
human mind to derive meaning. Knowledge sharing uses a verb in the passive 
voice and lends more action to the term, more appropriately describing the object 
of the action. Further information on the ability to see signals out of noise can be 
gained from Wickens (1992). 
Finally, the knowledge (that is being managed) is often described as both tacit and 
explicit. The tacit form being the memories and thoughts of members of the 
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organisation and the explicit being how these (tacit forms) are manifested within 
the workplace or organisation. Discussions I have had with individuals studying 
knowledge management have been interesting and fruitful; reinforcing my belief 
that much confusion continues to surround the subject. I contend that explicit 
knowledge is behaviour. If we talk of (the manifestation of) explicit knowledge 
then what we can observe and measure must be the behavioral basis or 
foundations upon which the knowledge rests. 
My description of a knowledge management system simplifies this confusion 
somewhat as I choose to employ the Hall and Fagan (1956) definition of a "set of 
objects, conceptual or material, with their interrelations". My Microsoft® 
Access™ database is constructed of objects with material expressions that 
illustrate interrelations. 
Effects-Based Planning - Making it Work 
Effects based is not a concept, strategy, operation, warfare, or 
targeting. It is a mindset! It is a mindset that planners and 
operators need to ·get a better grip on. That better grip can be 
gained as a result of technology and utilization of other new assets 
or processes. 
Participant comment from EBO workshop 
in the United States 26 October 2000 
Effects-based planning is not a new term. It is an extension of the very simple 
idea of 'begin with the end in mind'. Without knowing what is ultimately sought, 
in very precise terms, and what therefore shapes all organisational effort decision-
makers are unable to build the organisational elements that can deliver those ends 
or objectives. Without a clear understanding of effectiveness there will not only 
be inefficiency but a failure to achieve objectives. Effects-based planning uses the 
objectives (or effects) that are sought as the point of origin from which all 
analysis proceeds. It forces decision-makers to consider the primary purpose for 
which their organisation exists. The results gained from the process give powerful 
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insights into the 'fitness for purpose' and directions where high pay-off gains can 
be achieved. Although I have mentioned the term fitness for purpose several times 
up to this point I need now to anchor it to a precise and simple definition of a 
system by Coyle (1996, p. 4), he says it is a "collection of parts organised for a 
purpose". This suits my own purpose as the collection of parts is the vertical 
arrangement of environment, grand strategy, policy, national security, national 
military strategy, ways and means. 
This neatly binds together Checkland's purposeful activity- goal focused, which 
is mindful of Coyle's system orientation - a collection of (organised) parts. Correll 
(2001, p. 2) adds emphasis to this in. his article on the purpose of war wherein he 
states that "the idea of effects-based operations is that success in armed conflict 
should be measured by results, not by destruction. Did the operation compel a 
political outcome[?]". Embodied within the question is the need to have a 
purposeful objective. 
It is now time to put these ideas to work. 
Demonstrating the Concept 
It took many months before the database features illustrated in Figure 28 took 
shape and actually began to work as designed. The three main functions of 
linking, rating and charting are now presented as steps. Additional features within 
the database are also presented. 
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I 'Effects-Based' Operations Concept Demonstrator 
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Figure 28. The main functional components of the database. 
Steps to Effects-Based Planning 
There are six steps to the process of effects-based planning: 
• Step I End-States. Using either a future-focused/scenario-based view or one 
aligned with the present (or what the organisation is trying to bring about in a 
current setting) firstly develop a comprehensive list of end-states that captu re 
the characteri stics of the contextual environment (see the Glossary for a 
definition). 
• Step 2 Effects. Determine the effects that can be imposed that satisfy the end-
states. Effects, ends and objectives are used interchangeably here. Effects suit 
my purpose better as it more accurately describes (and can accommodate) a 
situation that remains fluid. Ends and objectives have a sense of finality to 
them that is inconsistent with the strategic and enduring perspectives that are 
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sought. This step can involve the introduction of scenarios if a long-term and 
future focused view is required, or it may simply be a detailed examination. 
• Step 3 Means. Consider, in the broadest terms, what actions, or means, can 
bring about or make a contribution towards the achievement of these effects, 
establishing links between them. 
• Step 4. Capacities or Competencies. Determine what competencies or 
capacities must be utilised for the means to succeed. 
• Step 5 Ratings. Rate each of the linked pairs using appropriate criteria to 
establish additional meaning. 
• Step 6 Assess Strengths and Weaknesses. Review the results to gauge 'fitness 
for purpose' using the graphing techniques built into the application. 
The Steps Explained 
Step 1 - Determine the End-States 
The research was future focussed and relied upon an examination of the scenarios 
to determine end-states. The twenty scenarios set out in detail in Chapter Two 
have been reproduced in heading only below with their associated end-states: 
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Table 6. Scenarios and derived end-states 
Scenario 
Indigenous Crisis 
Drug Crime 
Syndicates 
Sponsored 
Offshore 
Eco-cyber 
Terrorists 
White Supremacy 
Movements 
SE Asian Anarchy 
Multinational Piracy 
China Sea 
Scramble 
Antarctic Challenge 
Transmigration 
Consolidated 
Forces of Islam 
Climactic Chaos in 
Oceania 
Australia the Pariah 
Middle East 
End-State 
Stability is restored within Australia whilst preserving the States' 
primacy for law and order, employing measures acceptable to the 
majority within Australia, minimising economic disruption and 
international disapproval and without major legislative 
amendment. 
Stability, trading relationships and peaceful competition are 
restored in the region, employing measures acceptable to the 
majority within Australia whilst avoiding: 
• domination by any non-allied major power, 
• significant international disapproval, 
• displaying bias contrary to trading interests and major or 
high profile ADF involvement. 
Corporations operate within the climate of national sovereignty, 
trade and shipping in the region is unimpeded. Australia has 
good relations with neighboring governments and avoids 
significant international disapproval. 
Stability is restored to the South China Sea with exploration 
continuing, whilst avoiding non-allied superpower domination of 
the region. Australian national support to ASEAN is 
demonstr1;1.ted. 
Sovereignty is restored to the Australian Antarctic Territory 
without breach of international agreements, retaining international 
support for actions and with minimum use of force. 
Refugee flows into Australia cease. Humanitarian crisis is 
relieved. Pressures causing refugee movement are mitigated. 
The majority of refugees have been returned to home countries. 
Australia's actions area accepted internationally. 
Stability is restored within the region, whilst avoiding direct 
conflict with governments. Domestically State authorities are able 
to cope. Australia has successfully contributed to coalition 
peacekeeping operations. 
Stability is restored in the region. Non-allied major power 
involvement is reduced to a minor level and the threat of 
domination is ended. Evacuation and resettlement programs are 
well advanced. 
Stability is restored within the region and pressures causing 
refugee movement are mitigated. Australia gains international 
approval for its contribution. Within Australia the States are able 
to cope with law and order, employing measures acceptable to 
the majority whilst minimising economic disruption and 
international disapproval and without major legislative 
amendments. 
Stability is preserved within the region and within Australia. The 
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Meltdown 
Ebola Outbreak 
United States 
Stumbles and Falls 
Gene Warfare 
There Can Be Only 
One 
Information Warfare 
WMDs to Order 
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End-State 
pandemic is contained well beyond Australian shores. Adequate 
markets are retained. 
Biological disaster is averted. Economic capacity for self-
sustainment is achieved. 
Strategic opportunism is prevented. A rogue or hostile hegemon 
or coalition does not fill the void left by the United States. Stability 
is preserved. 
Quarantine of Australian crops is maintained. The spread of crop 
viruses is contained. 
Domestic stability and structure are restored. 
International alliances are maintained. Domestic stability is 
maintained and regional stability supported. Russia has not acted 
against Australia or the region. 
Domestic stability is maintained and regional stability is 
supported. 
Note that many of these end-states sweep up a broad range of issues that sit well 
above the achievement of purely military objectives. 
Although I made attempts to consult Government (Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, National Security Committee of Cabinet and various parliamentary 
secretaries) on what might be the(ir) end-states and associated effects, the 
information was not forthcoming. Indeed it was often implied, I certainly inferred 
it from the non-cooperative (I have deliberately avoided the term hostile) 
responses, that this type of information would not be shared and that discussions 
along these lines was considered totally inappropriate, although a reasonable 
explanation for this position could not be given. As will be seen later there is a 
requirement for this dialogue and others have identified the need for it to occur. 
Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the end-states are sufficiently comprehensive and 
expressive that most of the Government concerns have been captured. Wallace 
(1999, p. 18) uses similar language in crafting an intent (not dramatically different 
from my end-states) for a renegade group of hostage takers in a foreign country, 
wherein "The Government's intention is to achieve the safe release of the 
hostages, while reinforcing the authority and sovereignty of the Seeland 
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[fictitious] government and without heightening the residual threat to Australian 
nationals and expatriates after resolution of the incident". The clear message is 
that the end-states must be comprehensive. 
Step 2 - Develop the Effects List 
The effects list was completed as a workshop involving key practitioners from 
within the organisation. Facilitation and knowledge elicitation skills on my part 
proved to be vital. Without the ability to prompt the group for the right 
information, and recognise it when it is revealed, the purity of the process would 
be destroyed and individual prejudices and biases could be introduced, with a 
high probability of groupthink becoming dominant. 
The effect list should be sufficiently expressive and comprehensive. It is 
important that all areas of interest are captured. Consider Australia's aerial 
surveillance operation Coastwatch, it exists to satisfy a purpose. All of its actions 
are in pursuit of something, however, I believe that it is unlikely this organisation 
has ever fully explored its role within the national security framework and 
thoroughly and forthrightly expressed what these 'somethings' are. An effects-
based orientation ensures that this is done before any actions are considered. It 
would ensure that every action is securely anchored to an effect and, therefore 
they are purposeful. 
Step 3 - Develop the Means List 
Each effect is taken in tum with the group asked what actions can bring about this 
effect. No evaluation or discussion should take place at this point. The usefulness 
of each mean will be dealt with at a later stage. It is difficult in the early stages, 
but as these steps progress it is usually found that previous means can also make a 
contribution to a later effect. A second linking process occurs. 
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If an organisation is interested in innovation and competitive advantage then a 
fairly unorthodox approach should be adopted during this stage. This is where 
creative thought becomes important and must be fostered within the group. 
Step 4 - Determine the Competencies or Capacities 
This step is similar to the previous two. Again each means is examined to 
determine the elements that combine to make the means possible. Again links are 
built to continue the construction of a cascading effects-means-capacities 
framework. 
Step 5 - Examine Each Pair of Effects-Means Pairs. 
The pairs are rated on a numerical scale against criteria that are developed by the 
group. These criteria can be 'financial exposure' or 'risk'; 'immediacy' of the effect 
if time is an important consideration; 'level of community endorsement' to build in 
concerns for environmental considerations; and 'totality' or 'potency' for an 
indication of how much contribution a particular means makes. 
It is important to recognise that a means cannot be rated unless it is anchored to an 
effect. If I hold a spoon in one hand and a shovel in the other then one is no better 
than the other, they are both implements. I have no way of determining which is 
more suitable. If I receive information that a hole in the ground is required then 
the shovel would appear to be more useful. However, there is still no context. If 
the hole is at an archeological site then I could consider that both of these 
implements are too clumsy and a brush may be the preferred implement to 
complete the work. 
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Step 6 - Review the Results 
Using the automated database a series of reports can be generated that indicate 
'fitness (or unfitness) for purpose' across a number of dimensions. 
An example of the reports that were produced to alert decision-makers is shown 
in Figure 29. Note, due to security requirements, this chart has been taken from a 
generic effects-based operations demonstrator and all words that are displayed on 
the two axes have been altered to numbered effects and means. The ratings on a 
scale of 1 to 4 have also been randomised. The colours, however, are an accurate 
portrayal of the ratings that have been awarded to each means-effect pair, in this 
case against 'Political Exposure'. 
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Figure 29. Two-dimensional display ofPolitical Exposure. 
The coloured rectangles in the 
figure above indicate that a link has 
been established between an effect 
(on the vet1ical axis) and a means 
(the horizonta l axis). A blank 
means that no relationship has been 
assigned. The colour inilicates the 
rating that has been determined by 
the workshop participants on a 
Researchers ta lk of experiencing a 
"sudden, striking realisation" 
(Moustakas, 1990, p. 9) the 
phenomenon of breakthrough. My first 
came upon the single 'mouse click' to 
produce the graph in FiglLre 29. It was 
the moment of illumination. Not the 
warm glow offered by a Jjt candle in a 
darkened room, but the intense, almost 
painful incandescence of a thousand 
beams. 
Personal reflection. 17 F ebmarv. L 999 
single criterion. The means have been automaticaUy arrayed horizontally at the 
top of the chart, the means with the most links with the effects list is positioned in 
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the first column, giving valuable insights into utility - the more links the more 
valuable or critical that means becomes. Likewise the capacities that are anchored 
to each of the means become equally important, with the same value assigned if 
links are high in number. The results of this can be seen in Figure 30. 
Me:cns- Capadties 
1.1 eans: Capacities: 
.. ~~~~~~··...,.:II,.HP~ I Jo J • "So" T. :t 1 .. 111J'1J I•IS.I"ITI.ItJi.JorJ'JoJoJ1-Ji..M-JoT.HJtJ6JIJJ'JJJ• 
Figure 30. Relationships between Means and Capacities. 
In this figure the means have now been transferred from the horizontal axis to the 
vertical. The order has remained the same (larg~st number of linked effects at the 
top) with priorities or importance now being evident on two dimensions, as the 
capacities have taken on the utility ranking of the means for the previous Figure. 
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Revisiting Scenarios 
As outlined earlier in this thesis a scenario planning method was employed to 
achieve sufficient dislocation from the present. The 20 scenarios (included as 
Appendix 2), with the contextual ingredients contained within their individual 
narratives, allowed critical thought to flow forth, unburdened with prejudice, 
preconception or limiting paradigm. This is an important area to revisit as it is 
possibly the only source of a sufficiently broad list of strategic effects. 
The Importance of Effects 
Effects-based strategic thinking and planning will (I believe I have demonstrated 
this sufficiently to make this claim) become the primary analysis tool whereby 
military strategic, operational, tactical and capability development planning is 
undertaken. I can say this with reasonable confidence because there is a 
simultaneous and spontaneous convergence of beliefs and approaches that has 
recognised the futility of platform-centric thinking. This convergence is evident in 
many Western nations and whilst still in an embryonic stage carries with it 
powerful messages. 
The Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
(JSCFADT) inquiry into the suitability of the Australian Army for peacetime, 
peacekeeping and war was forced to manufacture useful definitions in order for 
the analysis to proceed. Indeed, the very notion of suitability had to be defined. 
What do we mean when we describe something as suitable? Against what criteria 
is the judgement made? Although I will refer repeatedly to my own chosen 
definition of 'fitness for purpose' I will be forced at various times to depart from 
this in order to adequately describe and accommodate the contributions of other 
work. 
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An examination of the Parliamentary Report From Phantom to Force, which 
followed the inquiry, reveals: 
The suitability of the Army could be assessed against a number of 
criteria. Its effectiveness at satisfying defence strategy objectives is 
one criterion [this matches well with the National Military/Security 
Strategy discussed in Chapter 2]. Another criterion could be how 
well it has performed in operations that are not a priority within 
current defence strategy, such as East Timor [I have addressed this 
in Chapter Three under a broader context of scenarios]. 
(Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p. 7) 
Additional detail from the report tha~ prepares for an understanding of an effects-
based orientation to capability planning is the statement that "no capability should 
be critically dependent on only a single means or technology" (Joint Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, p. 8). This assertion is central 
to the architecture of the database. 
The work and central functionality of the database relies upon a sound 
understanding of effects-based thinking as the means are all anchored to an 
outcome and each outcome may require different capability sets. 
Planning Backwards from Scenarios 
The twenty scenarios set out in Appendix 2 paint a vivid picture of disturbing 
events in the future. They were crafted· through adherence to a disciplined, 
systematic analysis of drivers and represent a relatively comprehensive account of 
degraded states of domestic, regional and/or international stability. It would be 
valuable to paint a more favourable picture of States cooperating, but the aim is to 
'stress' the organisation and subject policy to extreme forces to determine its 
robustness. 
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Deriving End-states 
Politicians and military strategists look to end-states to provide an expression of 
the outcomes of an intervention. Stated simply, we have undertaken a number of 
actions (although any consideration of what these may be at this early stage would 
be premature and predispose our thinking) in pursuit of objectives, to ask "what 
does the picture look like now?" and describe it in useful ways. Although I do not 
wish to dwell on end-states in this section, some examples from the National 
Security study are: 
• Refugee flows into Australia cease. Humanitarian crisis is relieved .. Pressures 
causing refugee movement are mitigated. The majority of refugees have been 
returned to home countries. Australia's actions are accepted internationally. 
• Corporations operate within a climate of stable national sovereignty. Trade 
and shipping in the region is unimpeded. Australia has good relations with 
neighboring governments and avoids significant international disapproval. 
• Stability is restored within Australia whilst preserving the States' primacy for 
law and order, employing measures acceptable to the majority within 
Australia, minimising economic disruption and international disappproval and 
without major legislative amendment. 
These end-states should effectively 'set the conditions' for (a return to) peace. The 
text used should be drawn from an understanding of desired movement vertically 
within the columns at Table x, remembering that the most favourable conditions 
lie at the top with characteristics deteriorating towards the bottom of the table. 
From these end-states it is then possible to derive a set of effects that are 
appropriate for delivering that end-state. These effects must be viewed in a 
particular way that has relevance to military contexts, it will then be possible to 
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extend that line of thinking into other contexts. In the military an ideal known as 
'imposing our will' on our adversary is used. It is a useful expression that captures 
the full meaning behind engaging in a chosen set of strategies. It is not limited to 
the use of force, violence or offensive action to achieve objectives. Indeed the 
idea of coercion that underpins an offensive posture is very limiting. Seduction 
has frequently been used to describe a far more powerful means of achieving ends 
and opens the possibility of achieving objectives without having to resort to 
violence. Indications of a move away from conflict can be gained from the quote 
below: 
Effects Based Aerospace . Operations & Dynamic Battle 
Management. 
These concepts leverage the asymmetric advantages of aerospace 
power to create the desired effects at the right place at the right 
time. This initiative will develop information management and 
decision support technologies to facilitate battle management 
beyond the first-level, attrition-based strategies that hinge on 
massed, force on force operational concepts. Instead, this 
methodology seeks 2nd and higher-order effects and prompts 
commanders at all levels to determine what effects will best 
achieve operational objectives [emphasis added]. The JFACC then 
can weave these effects into his theater-wide scheme of maneuver, 
directed through dynamic, real-time command and control. 
(Air Force Research Laboratory, 2001) 
The Effects List 
The effects that I was able to derive from a detailed consideration of the end-
states and scenarios are set out below: 
Broaden range of influence. 
Coerce individuals and groups. 
Conform to domestic/friendly community expectation. 
Counter instability/restore a working community. 
Deny freedom of action/dominate an area. 
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Deter specific behaviour (actions/involvement). 
Discourage strategic opportunism and adventurism. 
Disrupt/destabilise operations and business markets. 
Establish and preserve dialogue. 
Generate/foment instability. 
Increase risk/cost to opponent. 
Induce/compel deployments. 
Influence/support dissident group. 
Inform decision-making. 
Minimise a vulnerability. 
Relieve humanitarian disaster. 
Shape (prevent/inhibit/interdict/channel /encourage) movement and supply. 
Shape public (world/domestic/opponent) opinion. 
Undermine general trust/morale 
The Means List 
Considering each of the effects in tum built the following list of means: 
Accompany other forces. 
Attack by close action. 
Attack by stand off. 
Attack leader moral/financial integrity/authority. 
Close reconnaissance/monitor specific target/named area: of interest. 
Collect human intelligence. 
Collect technical information/items. 
Conduct wide surveillance. 
Create false business or inject super-competitive products. 
Cue precision weapons. 
Damage product or brand. 
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Deceive physically/electronically. 
Deny resources/render key infrastructure ineffective. 
Disrupt shipping and facilities. 
Disseminate physical/electronic psychological operations material. 
Empower local functionaries and support local organisations. 
Enable infrastructure. 
Engage with neutral/hostile groups through intermediaries. 
Escort specialists. 
Establish haven. 
Foster and exploit relationships with key individuals. 
Gather evidence. 
Gather information from stand-off (technical/cueing). 
Generate/train forces. 
Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO effort. 
Interfere with aircraft movement and facilities. 
Manipulate financial holdings/stocks. 
Manipulate/damage business functions. 
Materiel/financial/intelligence assistance to dissident movements (onshore also). 
Orchestrate 3rd party attack. 
Penetrate/ threaten leader physical security. 
Penetrate/infiltrate groups/networks. 
Provide close protection. 
Provide communications. 
Provide vital services and/or resources. 
Recover detainees/friendly forces/authorised personnel. 
Release selected information. 
Seize and recover individuals or groups. 
Sponsor relocation. 
Strike individuals or groups. 
Tap-hack electronic information systems. 
Threaten/damage leader personal wealth. 
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The Capacities List 
Each of the means relies upon the possession of certain capacities, as set out 
below: 
Administer business 
Analyse information 
Assess and respond to threats 
Breach information systems 
Broadcast information 
Build personal profile 
Communicate electronically 
Communicate using foreign languages 
Defeat security systems 
Deliver training 
Elicit information 
Employ destructive materials 
Employ small arms 
Employ support weapons 
Employ target acquisition and cueing devices 
Establish and maintain cover/legend/appropriate norms 
Establish rapport/win trust 
Evade capture 
Evade surveillance and access control measures 
Handle and preserve evidence 
Handle and secure personnel 
Identify networks of contacts 
Implement psychological operations 
Interfere with electronic/manual information systems 
Interfere with production and services 
Manage distribution of resources 
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Manoeuvre on and under the water 
Move with stealth 
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Observe, record/photograph, collate and report information 
Observe/monitor using surveillance/intercept devices 
Operate in a civilian environment 
Place surveillance/intercept devices 
Provide funds 
Provide medical/health support 
Provide shelters and basic living facilities 
Recreate events 
Seal an area 
Secure an area 
Seize an area 
Track financial dealings and assets exchanges 
Utilise service and civilian aircraft, watercraft and vehicles 
After having, up to this point, completed the entire language of effects, means and 
capacities in a series of workshops, and knowing of my earlier attempt at forming 
a more advanced framework of linkages I returned to see what this new 
information, now fully linked, would reveal. My early designs were crude and 
clumsy. Figure 31 shows an actual Powerpoint™ slide produced to enable 
analysis of these ideas and further discussion in workshops. It can be seen that a 
range of possible relationships was becoming evident, but there was a clumsiness 
to this visualisation that did not accommodate the hidden order that binds together 
the strategic situation with the actions that can deliver an outcome. 
This model was critical to the formulation of later ideas and led to the many-to-
many relationship building within the database, with assigned ratings then 
becoming possible across linked pairs. 
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This was a knowledge breakthrough and led the accelerated understanding of 
other supporting concepts. The different patterns were already becoming evident 
although the presence of a 'strange attractor' was still some months away. 
Scenarios (End-states) Effects Means Capacities POSTED 
Frequencies 
[:sS11--===~~~~~~~ M1 
S2 M2 
S3 --M3 
.................. . ............................................. . 
S4 M4 
S5 
S6 E6-:;:::? M6 
E7/ M7 
sa EB Ma 
.................................................................................... 
S9 t E9 M9 
S10 E10 M10 
S11 E11 M11 
s12 Dimensions E12 M12 
S13 (Concurrency) E13 M13 
S14 E14 M14 
S15 E15 M15 
S16 E16 M16 
S17 M17 
S18 M18 
S19 M19 
S20 M20 
M21 
M22 
M23 
M24 Ratings 
Figure 31. Initial diagram to enhance linkages and relationships. 
As can be seen from the first tentative lines that were drawn, relationships were 
established to provoke deeper thought on what could be revealed through a model 
such as this. The groupings were fairly stable, although the text that formed the 
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numbered elements had not yet been written. It also became evident around this 
time that some form of ratings would need to be devised between the adjacent 
effects and means columns. 
Assigning Ratings 
In order to determine the values of the various pairs each was subjected to a 
ratings judgement. A four-dimension, four-point scale was used that assessed each 
individual pair, with its associated set of Capacities. The four dimensions were: 
• Political Exposure, 
• Totality of Effect, 
• Immediacy of Effect, and 
• Capability to Undertake. 
Political Exposure 
This dimension makes a judgement as to the political appeal associated with a 
course of action. It is measured in terms of the potential for embarrassment, which 
provides a useful metric against which to assess the likelihood that an operation 
will be authorised. 
The following four-point scale was used: 
Political Exposure 
1. Extreme - Failure is likely to lead to condemnation at the international level 
with long-term personal consequences 
2. Severe - Failure is likely to lead to widespread political fallout 
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3. Moderate - Failure may result in significant political embarrassment and 
possibility of career consequence 
4. Minimal- Failure may result in minor and short-term political embarrassment 
Totality of Effect 
Totality of effect was measured using: 
1. Minor - The effect is negligible or uncertain in scope 
2. Moderate - A useful proportion of the desired effects is expected 
3. Extensive - A high proportion of the desired effects is expected 
4. Absolute - The desired effect is delivered 
Immediacy of Effect 
Immediacy of effect made useful distinctions on the ability to bring about change. 
The four measures were: 
1. Deferred - Delay is sufficient for cause-effects relationships to not be evident 
2. Delayed - Changes are set in motion, but some time will elapse before effects 
are evident 
3. Timely/Prompt - Events occur within a small fraction of the relevant 
time frame 
4. Immediate- Attributable changes are instantly evident 
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Capability to Undertake 
Capability to undertake forced a judgement against our ability to use the set of 
capacities, within the various means to bring about the desired effect. The scale 
was: 
1. Unable - Insufficient elements of capability preclude consideration 
2. Under Developed - Latent capability only 
3. Constrained- Capability exists with limiting factors 
4. Proficient - All elements of capability are present and practised 
This approach is immediately adaptable to any situation. Model verification work 
undertaken in other subject areas has utilised rating dimensions of: level of 
community acceptance, permanency, cost, physical risk and environmental 
sensitivity. All have proven to be equally revealing as supporting devices to 
strategic planning. 
I mentioned earlier of effects-based operations work being conducted within the 
United States military so some similarities are worth noting before proceeding 
with this line of discussion on my particular approach. The slide below (Figure 
32) was presented at an effects-based operations workshop in Norfolk Virginia 
during the period 22-27 October 2000. It illustrates the emergent definitions and 
the need (that others are also experiencing) to quantify in some way the effects 
that are delivered. These are strikingly similar (no information sharing occurred 
prior to this) to my definitions of totality of effect used to rate various effect-
means pairs within the database. I provide other examples later. 
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• Direct Effect (AFDD 2-1): "Result of actions with no intervening effect or 
mechanism between act and outcome. Direct effects are usually immediate and easily 
recognizable." 
• Indirect Effect (AFDD 2-1): "Result created through an intermediate effect or 
mechanism to produce the :final outcome, which may be physical or psychological in nature. 
Indirect effects tend to be delayed,andmay be difficult to recognize." 
• Total Effect: All effects acting on a target/set/system/COG 
• Complex Effect: Effect resulting from direct+ n-order effects 
- "The effects of dislocation, destruction and diversion create delays." (AFDD 2-22, emphasis added); 
- "Through the combination of destruction, disruption, diversion, delay, and deception, aerospace 
power is capable of denying an enemy the ability to offensively employ his forces. • (Id) 
• Cascading Effect: effect that ripples through an enemy system, often influencing other 
systems as well 
- Typically the result of influencing nodes that are critical to multiple systems 
- Typically flows from higher to lower levels of war 
~~-~~Vicious & virtuous spirals 
Figure 32. Attempts at defining levels of effects. 
7 
It is encouraging to note that the same information is being formulated at opposite 
ends of the globe, at almost the same time and with (until recently) no sharing of 
information. I will discuss the results of this collaboration in Chapter Seven. 
Subjecting each of the means-effects pairs to a rating framework was recognised 
within the workshops that I facilitated as an extremely powerful way of 
determining value and utility. For example, totality of effect is an elusive metric 
and "it is bound to be easy if one restricts oneself to the most immediate aims and 
effects" (Beyerchen, 1998, p.194). But all of the parts are interconnected and all 
(of the) effects influence subsequent actions which then change the purpose 
slightly. 
In expanding upon this subject (possibly beyond the point at which I should have 
stopped) I may have entangled myself (and the subject) even further. 
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I now need to return to the workshops and the continuing process of taking the 
linked items towards individual ratings to provide for the comparison. 
Ratings Continued 
There were up to twenty separate rating teams involved, that totaled over 100 
people, with each team generating its own discussion and judgements about what 
a paired means-effect meant. However, it soon became evident that there was 
general agreement from across the Special Forces Group on the capability to 
undertake dimension (beginning to build consensus). There was only minor 
divergence on the other three rating dimensions. Subsequent research with 
detailed statistical analysis using the knowledge management and knowledge 
elicitation methods devised here may reveal valuable quantitative data. This 
research has a qualitative interest only, the statistical analysis and determination 
of statistical significance is the subject of a later project. 
The associated Capacities list for each group of Means is displayed in the bottom 
right of the form. Scrolling down through the Means-Effect pairs (there are 306 of 
these) out of Accompany other forces and into Attack by close action will bring 
up a different set of Capacities. These Capacities remain the same regardless of 
whether the overt or covert button is selected, however, these operational types 
generally produce different ratings as they will draw upon the application of 
different Capacities within the relevant set. 
Charting the Results 
The intersection point (indicated by a coloured rectangle) indicates that a 
relationship has been established between a means and an effect. The colour 
indicates the averaged ratings awarded by the teams and illustrates the relative 
Political Exposure associated with the application of a particular means to bring 
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about a desired effect. Non-coloured rectangles are where no relationship exists. 
Similar charts can be produced from the data to indicate Overt, Covert and 
Clandestine operation types against Immediacy of Effect, Totality of Effect, 
Capability to Undertake and an averaged Political-Totality-Immediacy set 
(although this has some limitations as a blurring effect results from mixing 
factors), producing a total of 15 charts. Any changes made to the ratings will alter 
the colours at the intersection points provided the averaged number moves from 
one colour band to another. 
The Importance of Relationships, Dependencies and Criticalities 
I have spoken elsewhere of strange attractors. Anyone who has even a superficial 
knowledge of these would admit to their beauty, elegance and grace as a rich 
visual representation of the phenomenon of self-organising and emergent 
behaviour. More importantly, phenomenon that is (usually) untouched by the 
direct hand of man (insect populations, the behaviour of weather, predator-prey 
interactions, waves on a beach and simple numbers such as the Fibonacci 
sequence). My initial reaction to the charts produced was that an unusual 
underlying arrangement of order had been revealed. 
The diagram below (Figure 33) is a report produced by the database. At a greater 
magnification the attraction towards various elements is self-evident. The left-
most column contains five (selected from the eight) named worlds. The next 
column is the twenty scenarios produced by the Field Anomaly Relaxation 
method (the subject of Chapter Three). The third column is the 19 effects. 
Columns four and five are partial views of the 42 means and 42 capacities. I 
describe this as a mod 1 of strange attraction without hesitation as the elements 
that are displayed were each considered in isolation. 
177 
Chapter Four- 'Effects-Based' Planning 
Relationships were derived progressively and no attention was paid to existing 
linkages. The report was produced by a single mouse click within the database 
and represents a compilation of thousands of individual decisions, each unrelated. 
Figure 33. Report from the database highlighting relationships. 
This Figure highlights the ability of an effects-based orientation to quickly arrive 
at judgements on the importance of possessing various capacities and how these 
link back to effects through means. It illustrates the growth rightwards of the 
many-to-many relationships. The column indicating the POSTED (People, 
Organisation, Support and facilities, Training, Equipment and Doctrine) has been 
omitted as the work here is still incomplete and my departure has stalled the 
progress somewhat, although indications are that valuable information is within 
this 'Cantor dust'. 
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I have also spoken of 'the authority of a shared idea' and believe this to provide 
another example of assertive ideas dominating, not assertive people. The 
consequences of this as further reinforcement of a knowledge management system 
building and reinforcing consensus is quite potent. If any individual is 
uncomfortable with what is displayed then it is necessary to review the entire set 
of data in an attempt to force new relationships and cause a new pattern of lines to 
emerge. This would be dishonest, manipulative and would not offer success as the 
microscopic detail cannot be readily rearranged to form a new whole. 
More Powerful Images of (an} Organisation 
I have borrowed the heading for this section from the book by Gareth Morgan. I 
believe it is appropriate as this is where the optimum configuration can be 
illustrated in a visual format. The previous Figure highlighted the density of lines 
that bind the elements together. The Figure below (Figure 34) displays the 
number of links that tie together the People statements in POSTED with the 
effects. The ability to trace the number of lines across each of the six physical 
elements of capability demonstrates the characteristics and attrributes of the 
people who get the job done. 
I have already stated that this work is incomplete and even finding the preciseness 
to actually express this information will itself pose a significant problem to be 
overcome. It needs to be done though. As these links are more fully developed the 
blue colours will invade the chart from the left and push rightwards the warmer 
colours. Looking at each of the six charts for POSTED will reveal the full story 
on the organisation and how it should be configured. This forms another powerful 
visual indicator for change, as the language has been devised by practitioners and 
they have confirmed the relationships - a consensus expanding approach. 
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Covert Relationship Paths 
Effects Perscnnel 
Perscnnel 
.:~ ...... 
Jf:,...,ulw 
Jtc,..,..r.eu 
Figure 34. Count of the links between People and Effects. 
I wish now to close this section as I believe that the method, which I have 
thoroughly explaine~ demonstrates enormous potential to inform decision-
making. As this was the work of a limited nwnber of individuals it was necessary 
to verify the data against the results of an organisational poll. 
The Five Key Challenges 
In 1998, under the authority of Commander Special Forces (the actual 
correspondence I drafted for his signature and sent out to every member is 
included at Appendix 3), I initiated a study to gauge the level of tacit consensus 
180 
Chapter Four- 'Effects-Based' Planning 
towards change. Not change in any particular area or change for any particular 
reason, but the general mood within the population and what appears to be 
directionally right as each individual sees it from their own perspective. 
The question posed was: 
"What do you consider to be the five issues that the Special 
Forces Group needs to confront in order to propel us into the 
future?" 
I am hopeful that this provoked some deep(er) thinking as: 
To ask a provocative question is a creative act in itself. The 
formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution 
which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental 
skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old 
questions from a new angle, requires a creative imagination and 
makes real advances in [social] science. 
Einstein, in Einstein and Infeld (1938) 
The response was very encouraging, with several key themes emerging. A total of 
603 ideas, comments and suggestions were received, loaded into a database and 
broadly categorised. The full set of responses is set out at Appendix 4, including 
categorisations and links to findings of the effects-based planning database. 
Format and Content of Responses 
Format styles ranged from brief thoughts and hastily scribbled entries on a scrap 
of paper, through to well researched, thoughtful and comprehensive arguments 
spanning several pages. Several examples are shown in Figures 35 - 38 below. 
Many groups submitted the results of discussions and workshops, combining their 
ideas and strengthening their thoughts and concerns through their own consensus. 
Others elected to submit individual ideas. Some of the ideas may have been 
spontaneous thoughts surfaced through just asking the question, others may have 
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been the result of years of experience and the culmination of many ideas and 
thoughts. 
It was not my intention to analyse these to any depth, my aim was to gain the 
information, develop themes and common issues, superimpose these over the 
results and conclusions of my own database and locate the common ground. It 
was an attempt to corroborate that the scenarios and effects-based approach were 
directionally right for the organisation. 
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Figure 35. Response examples- Hastily written notes. 
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21-ll!.i-98 Ill 16:16 I !AI (Cll Fli HO. 61296002279 f. 
SF GROUP· ISSUES 
' 1. Development of a corporate plan - ioduding a mulceting plan. $ A. 
"' 2. Development ofa loq term (or lengthy) PR plan. 
... l. Dovelopment of weu proarwion plans for both Officers and NCO's in I he group 
».. 4. Dcvdopmenl ora cunnins plan to ensure SF Officus aro infiltrated into key, impo1 tanl 
and influential positions at aU JeveJs throughout bolh the Army and the ADF. 
e. S. Pro1ctive mark a ins I selling of the Comm1ndo capability at IJIIevelJ -need to push 
our requirements I Development at ADHQ, Army office, AST and LHQ. Dietate progrw on 
'out ttmls. 
" 6. MIMing of the SF Oroup • particularlyHQSO anci4RAR(Cdo). 
7. Provision of more visibility I communication from the top down •that is HQSO to the 
Units. 
- \., 8. Co-ordinate of and «:quity of. SP convnitmmts to the COAl> I PMSA I AOP's. 
9. DCJVelopmcnt/ Word of an SF group Development I Doelrine I Eqliipmcnl plan. 
lO. Special Foree• Allowancea lo include aU members ofSpcclal Forces (including 
Officera). 
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Figure 36. Response examples - Faxed bullet point notes. 
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HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
MINUTE 
SOJI/4 
DEFlNING THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES 
References! 
A. HQSO 569/98 dated 13 Mar 98. 
I. Tile ProcuRmt•l J'ro«U. The belt moasun~ orlrost in 1 buruuctaey is lhc n:spomibility 
to expending fUnds. 1bc curRnl procumnent prooeu i1 cwnbelwmo. Trthe SF Group Is to uploit 
new tochnoCoSY 1nd develop new, potentially clandeJtine, e:apabilities. it needs its OWJ1 disctete 
funding, wilh the 11ppropritlc conlrOt mechlnisrns built in. A guannteed regular level offundln&o 
even or relatively sm1ll amounts (uy SIMI year) would .allow the SF Group. to aehievc 1 "lead. ina 
edge" po'ition wilhin Defence.. Wo would have to accept however that 1001c oflhe projects would 
fail. This funding would auist in lhc dcvdopmcnl p-occu. 
2. The DevtfopmentProCftl. SF Group should be at the kadingcdgeofteclmological 
innowtion will! it Dcfcn~ We should be providing those short notice letding edge (pan.) miliwy 
eapabllllles thltare requiml by Government. We do not n:ally know wflallhey m:l There should bo 
atratcgk auidancc that moulds our effoft. In absence of this we should be developlnJ our own. Being 
lfle leading edgo. thero should bo II\OR l•titude in our procwet.thatallow for development padls to 
end in options thlt an other than succ:ess.MI 
3. Focu oa Eq•lpmeal. We arc very focussed ou equipment We should concentrate our erlon 
on future cap~bllil)' and theref01e deYCiop cqanisations, .sttvc:tures, doWine. tactlca, procedures AND 
£HEN wb1t equipmenl is needed ua WHOLE SYSTEM. 
-4. l•plolrTec••olou. TherelsmuchTALKaboutcxploitJn&technoiOI)'. SoonlheSF 
Group will have secure coonectlvity throuahOUI. We will be In po1itioo 1o be the lud in lhe 
developmcotorpcoceuc.~ and procedures from an Army and ADF pmpeclive. A l)?lem like Lotus 
Notes for example would &ivc w the potential to streamline our processes (as long as we know wf\llt 
tfleyarcl). 
5. Rnpoaaibiliry, We should be p1BhiqresJXX1sibility down lO tfae lowest Jevel. Individual• 
who own, or CGnJider themaelvu to 1 part or, 1 proce11 will work hatder and b)' and imptove it. We 
should encourage innov.uion, new Ideas and nor be a hid ofmd.lna mislikes. 
(02)9SJS9266J 
27-Mar-91 
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Figure 37. Response examples- Formal and structured letter . 
. S KF.Y CHAT.JFN(;Ji.~~ 
J.Orie.JJtntion toA.oiil /P.u:i11c,, 
2.llecTuiting o[botlz.~·,~ ... r..~, 
.'I. Per.~ on ma.1mgemen t .~kills, 
.f.Ad;Jpt.ltitm of" the 11r.H; 
Su4cccpta1JC(' ofcl:mJ.IgC. 
Figure 38. Response examples - Powerpoint slide. 
The responses provided hours of interesting reading and certainly deserve a more 
thorough analysis. My aim was satisfied, however, in that the results of this 
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organisational poll and the workshops I facilitated with the gradual construction 
of the database indicated common themes. 
Initial Exploration 
My preliminary analysis of these responses involved detailed reading, reflection 
and openness to the ideas. My approach was deliberately non-judgmental. No 
attempt was made at initial categorisation or coding .. A second and third reading 
several days later saw the formation of themes, heralding the beginning of a broad 
appreciation of the content and context. What was first pure data now took form 
and meaning. 
To aid in deciphering I turned once again to the methods of heuristic inquiry. I 
was faced with a similar problem to Clarke's (1988) analysis of the 
psychologically androgynous male, which led to the formation of a "viewable 
panorama of over 200 components" (Moustakas, 1990, p. 50), each of which 
gradually located itself within a colour-coded quadrant as understanding matured. 
Clarke reports that "The process of watching these quadrants take shape was 
fascinating" Clarke, 1988, p. 94). 
I have already presented my algorithm-based coloured representation of similar 
processes. My task was now to superimpose the 603 responses over this earlier 
work to gauge the degree of 'fit'. Stated another way, "was the outcome of my 
research completed within the effects-based application supported by the results 
gained from a sample of the organisation's members after prompting with a 
simple question"? Initial analysis and categorisation (into 19 subject areas) 
revealed the graphical information displayed in Figure 39. The aim of this was to 
determine around what broad topic areas are opinions attaching themselves to, 
and thereby, where could consensus be isolated to mobilise action for change. The 
areas in which change should occur (the what, with the why having been 
thoroughly accounted for through the involvement of scenarios and end-states) 
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had been identified through the effects-based application. This step sought to 
determine ways in which these changes may be realised (the how). 
Personnel 
I I 1 I 
Training 
- j I 
Leadership 
I 
Capability 
Operations 
I I 
Managerrent 
I 
Selection 
Equiprrent I 
I 
Technology 
I 
Categories Comrunication 
Marketing I 
Adrrinistration I 
Pay p 
Mxed Gender =:l 
Resources ::::J 
Postings ::J T 
Security ::J 
Qvilian Agencies D 
Part lirre [] 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Number of Responses As s igned 
Figure 39. Initial categorisation of responses. 
It was encouraging to note that the greatest area for high payoff organisational 
adjustment was located around personnel, with training formal a vital mechani sm 
whereby this could be achieved and leadership setting the inspiration and goal 
orientation. Capability, operations and management provide the bedrock against 
which these could be realised. 
186 
Chapter Four- 'Effects-Based' Planning 
Deeper Analysis 
To further concentrate the effort and locate the high payoff areas I subjected the 
categories to a Pareto analysis. The 80% line was located between the 81h and 9th 
categories. The Personnel, Organisation, Support and facilities, Training, 
Equipment and Doctrine construct for expressing the physical elements of 
capability relationships to the reduced set of categories is set out in Table 7. 
Table 7. Category-POSTED relationships. 
p 0 s T E D 
Equipment 2 3 13 2 22 4 
Selection 32 5 2 9 1 5 
Management 11 34 15 3 6 5 
Operations 32 26 9 15 3 26 
Capability 24 33 23 16 9 22 
Leadership 47 35 10 10 4 23 
Training 50 15 6 68 9 24 
Personnel 78 37 11 15 3 4 
It can be seen from the sample responses (Figures 35-38) that they were script 
based and no attempt was made (when posing the question) to anchor them to any 
particular area of the organisation or its performance. 
Plotted on a chart these results can be seen at Figure 40. The four tallest columns, 
representing paired P - Personnel, T - Training, P - Training, 0 - Personnel and 0 
- Leadership point very clearly to the correlation between the results of the 
workshops and database construction and the Five Key Challenges project. 
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Figure 40. Responses arrayed against POSTED and Categories. 
The responses, though in many cases quite specific, in totality contained themes 
that pointed towards more detailed indicators of direction. For this reason protocol 
analysis seemed to offer a preservation of the 'qualitativeness' of these 
submissions, yet provide for a cross-match with the output of the effects-based 
planning database. 
Protocol Analysis 
It should be evident by now that there bas been a multi-faceted new construct 
developed out of the active involvement, discussion and debate of individuals 
learning within groups. These groups aided the development of a plam1ing model 
and also submitted (previously) their thoughts on the futw·e of the organisation. 
Whilst I cannot claim to be skilled in Protocol Analysis, it was a discipline I 
turned to quite early on in order to bring some order to the enormous range of 
experiences that I was able to draw together. My reading was quite superficial 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1 984~ Fonteyn, Kuipers & Grobe, I 993) and tJ1e knowledge I 
gained seemed to be applied in what I could only describe as an enthusiastic 
amateur. Despite this the ability to explore topics and problems and search 
towards solutions was effective (if not efficient) and brought forth the reasoning 
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that makes problem-solving possible. 
The ability to 'mentalise' in language was also a great aid to building consensus 
and encouraged a more probing analysis of the topic. ft was not enough to just 
think about something in a certain way, it became necessary to verbalise the 
thoughts so that others were more able to fu lly appreciate the mental concepts that 
shaped opinions. 
Finding the Realignments 
As thi s research is about locating the areas for change (bui lding and reinforcing 
consensus around initiatives for change) it is time now to discuss the mechanisms 
by which this was achieved. 
Scenarios Effects Means 
Figure 4 1. Finding the realignments. 
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The Figure above (Figure 41) illustrates the model's architecture and how the 
realignments that have resulted from a comprehensive and thorough appreciation 
of the organisation's purpose can be used in a meaningful way, gaining additional 
means by associations that exist within the relationships is just one. Remembering 
that POSTED stands for People, Organisation, Support and facilities, Training, 
Equipment and Doctrine, each of which must be configured in different ways to 
generate capacities, that enable various means to be undertaken in pursuit of 
effects, which satisfy strategic outcomes within an immediate, near future or far 
future orientation. I discuss this in more detail later in this chapter. 
What has occurred up to this point of the analysis is that practitioners within the 
organisation have been removed (intellectually) from their current world. They 
have been provoked into thinking about plausible futures. They have used these 
futures to explore and discover new conditions for the organisation (albeit 
grounded within the definition that provides its raisons d'etre- see Glossary). And 
finally they have discussed what realignments may be necessary to win success. 
This analysis has worked progressively rightwards and is now at the instant of 
reflecting back to the left, up and through the organisation to reach the effects and 
scenarios that provided the point of origin for the work. Greatly simplified it has 
asked "What does right look like?" "How well does this organisation fare against 
our (new) image of rightness?" "What reconfigurations and realignments are 
necessary to achieve higher levels of 'fitness for purpose'?" 
What Do I Mean by •Fitness for Purpose•? 
Several times I have mentioned the term 'fitness for purpose'. It is time now to 
make myself clear on this subject. Casting back to 1946, and the work of the 
brilliant Herbert Simon, we find in a subject unfortunately mostly unrelated, that a 
"purpose is a collection of activities whose orienting value or aim is at a high 
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level in the ends-means hierarchy" (Simon, 1996, p. 119). An appropriate 
definition and one that incorporates useful support phrases that I ave dealt with at 
length. It was fortuitous to stumble upon this brief reference as it combines these 
other words central to my topic - means and ends. 
For more explanation we must search in a broader domain, one that touches on 
organisation and systems theory. Specifically the work of Mintzberg (1979); Scott 
(1961, p. 264) "the only meaningful way to study an organisation is to study it as 
a system"; also Katz and Khan (1966, p. 274) "the social scientist wishes ... to 
predict their effectiveness" and "all social systems, including organisations, 
consist of the patterned activities of a number of individuals. Moreover these 
patterned activities are complementary and interdependent with respect to some 
common output or outcome" (Katz & Khan, 1966, p. 276); yet we must also 
recognise that "social behaviour ... is the action of differences" and cooperative 
behaviour leading to consensus may not occur. 
I would now like to return to Simon's detailed explanation and his preceding 
paragraphs, in which he uses the analogy of typing to make further distinctions of 
purpose, but his point was to distinguish it from process, and mine is not so there 
may be little to be gained. As I have endeavored several times within this thesis to 
position the mind at a higher level of consideration within the subject of strategy I 
consider it acceptable to continue with "typing is a skill which brings about a 
means-ends coordination of muscular movements, but a very low level in the 
means-ends hierarchy" (Simon, 1996, p. 118). The letter 't' has value only insofar 
as it is necessary that it be typed. Metaphorically, my letter 't' performs a much 
more significant role. I need to know which word it is part of and how that word 
combines with sentences, paragraphs and chapters to produce a story. The 
significance of the 't' emerges at the highest level of analysis. 
Figure 42 also gives an example of the discoveries that have been made. Working 
from right to left, if a certain POSTED configuration provides for certain set of 
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means, then a slight (informed through analysis) adjustment to this configuration 
wi ll yield a new means for minimum investment. The solid lines indicate an 
existing set of capacities linked to a single means, the dotted lines highlight that 
another set can be completed by the simple addition of two additional capacities 
(until this time not recognised as linked and contributing to other means). The 
lines that link up all these lists can be tracked left and right to determine 
dependencies and criticalities. The pre-existing set of capacities li nked to a means 
(the lower of the two patterned rectangles), which are supported by a stabilised 
POSTED configuration have been utilised to enable a different (and possibly 
new) means (the higher patterned rectangle) to be undertaken. 
Scenarios Effects 
Additional Means 
gained 
Means 
Figure 42. Finding high pay-off realignments. 
Capacities 
POSTED 
Elements 
Analysis 
driven 
realignment 
within 
POSTED 
leads 
to 
benefits 
flowing 
between 
these 
two 
columns 
The Figure on the next page (Figure 43) presents a global view of the model. 
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Working from the left-hand side of this model is Rhyne's (1974, 1981, 1995, 
1998) future scenarios construct; combined with Emery and Trist's (1965) 
contextual environment-organization lawful transactional interdependencies 
model. The five large (and linked) spheres represent Rhyne's 'Sectors' (I have 
called them Drivers: D1, D2, ... ), whilst the smaller spheres (that would 
surround each of the Drivers) represent Rhyne's 'Factors' (I have chosen to call 
them Conditions: C~o C2, ... ). The interaction of these within Emery and Trist's 
L11, L12, ~~ and k 2 framework provide for (troubling, neutral or opportunity rich 
interactions) a two-sided perspective, which can then be re-expressed as 
favourable or improved scenarios - "we have done something to get ourselves out 
of this fix, although we have no idea just yet what that might be, but this is what 
'good' looks like; it is where our actions are going to take us" -the desired End-
state/s. My reasons for the re-naming mentioned earlier is simple; the scenario 
planning vocabulary has settled on 'drivers' and that convention suits the current 
work whilst 'conditions' are mentioned in national security/defence doctrine in a 
quite specific way and that also suits: 
End-state will be identified at the national and military levels as 
follows: The national end-state is the set of desired conditions, 
incorporating the elements of national power that will achieve the 
national objectives; the military strategic end-state is the set of 
desired conditions beyond which the use of military force is no 
longer required to achieve national objectives [emphasis added]. 
ADFP 9 Joint Planning, p. 4-3 
I have already spoken of the 'strategising' that aims to shift the conditions 
upwards in the Driver/Conditions table to deliver more favourable states, this 
topic will not be revisited here. 
The next section of the global model at Figure 43 then enters the organisation at 
the point where effects must be matched to a scenario. The margins between the 
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grand strategic, strategic, operational and tactical; and capability 
management/development domains are illustrated towards the base of the 
diagram. Having arrived at this point I have now fused scenario planning with 
strategy and strategy (through operations) with the organisational 'fitness for 
purpose' characteristics to enable the (most appropriate) strategy to be imposed 
and be successful. 
The task remains to identify a stable state to enable operations to proceed, with 
flexibility designed in to provide for active adaptation. The (configuration of this) 
stable state is arrived at through a stepped series of decisions that are informed 
through the frequency and utility of various arrangements of means-effects pairs 
with their associated capacities. The process for achieving this is set out in 
Appendix 5. 
Have I Built and Reinforced Consensus? 
In 1983, General Donn Starry described seven requirements to transform a 
modem army. The third and fourth have profound importance for me and the 
work I have undertaken. These were: there must be a spokesman for change (the 
third), and that spokesman must build consensus and expose new ideas to a wide 
audience, for a reformer must have followers (the fourth). Certainly we have 
enough spokesmen for incremental change. But what I am talking about is not 
incremental change. I am talking about realignment, what Senge described as 
metanoia - a shift of mind (Senge, 1990, p. 13) and what (he describes) "is the 
most accurate word in Western culture to describe what happens in a learning 
organisation [and is one] that hasn't had much currency for the last several 
hundred years .... [a] special meaning of awakening shared intuition and direct 
knowing of the highest, of God" (Senge, 1990, p. 13). He reinforces this later with 
the assertion that "real learning gets to the heart of what it means to be human" 
(Senge, 1990, p. 13). 
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There was no inspirational spokesman who could rally minds and opinion within 
this research. There are many, however, who seek to build consensus through 
their active and forthright participation. These are the (imaginative, iconoclastic) 
people described in the opening quote to this chapter who remain alert to events 
beyond their immediate professional focus. General Starry restated the importance 
of these people in 1998 (Starry, 2000) in his assertion that the task of intellectual 
consensus building remains the single biggest obstacle to be overcome if change 
is to be effected. 
I have delayed answering the question long enough. I have set myself a 
monumental task. I have designed and built an extremely powerful application. I 
have, with the involvement and assistance of hundreds of people, populated the 
database and reported compelling information. I have exposed this information to 
a wide audience, including the Minister for Defence and several other highly 
placed Defence personnel. I am a reformer yet the followers are few. 
Organisational realignment has not occurred, yet the people within the 
organisation have been confronted with a view of themselves that has proven to 
be unsettling and it is grounded in robust methods of their own design. 1 am 
confident that the conceptual validity has been established. More work is now 
required in different contexts to test the concept fully. 
A rich research path has opened. There are more than enough social and 
institutional problems around 'fitness for purpose' to be explored using the 
framework I have designed. 
It would be unethical now to distort my goals to claim success. Have I, therefore, 
failed? I do not believe so. Others may judge differently. In judging I urge the 
reader to now quickly read the quote at the beginning of Chapter Seven before 
returning to this point. 
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Summary and Conclusions 
This is the largest chapter and the most difficult to summarise, although the 
conclusions are very straightforward. It has covered the full development of the 
effects-based planning application and presented the results in simple graphical 
format. It has mapped over Checkland's seven stage model of SSM and 
accompanies the scenario planning phase set out in Chapter Three. There is no 
doubt that this represents, in its totality, an original and powerful way to anchor 
an organisation to its environment and subject it to a series of criteria to determine 
its fitness for purpose. The ability of this application to inspire change efforts and 
spur internal realignments to accommodate the imbalances presented in the 
various graphs remains uncertain. There are many issues of culture and leadership 
that must be coupled to this effort to win success. If I were to include a 'where to 
now' section it would reinforce the need for these factors to become more strongly 
represented (consensus forming?) than I have allowed for. 
It has been an enormously satisfying undertaking and involved a great amount of 
personal learning. 
The Mis-guidedness of Inappropriate Ends and Means Matching 
In closing this chapter I would like to relate a personal story that concerns the 
imposition of a totally inappropriate set of means (in pursuit of Western ends, not 
culturally appropriate effects) upon a small African nation. It occurred from 1976 
to 1978. My father was the project leader. Australian foreign aid officials had 
determined that the quality of life for African villagers could be improved if they 
were not forced to undertake the long, daily walks to the nearest river and back 
carrying water for drinking, cooking and washing. 
The decision was made, with the cooperation of the African State's national 
government, to complete a project to locate nearby underground water, construct 
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wind-powered pumps and train locals in their maintenance and repair to ensure 
that the equipment remained operational after the project team had departed. 
The project proceeded with much fascination and excitement displayed by the 
children; adults appeared ambivalent. For the villagers, life continued as normal, 
with the herding of cattle, preparation of meals and the performance of the many 
daily domestic duties that characterises life in a small African village. 
After some weeks the first flows of clear, cool water into a trough in the centre of 
the village occurred. On some occasions, the first time this happened in each 
village it was met with a small ceremony to mark the achievement, more for the 
technical marvel than to identify with the value of flowing, freely available water. 
The women, whose job it was to fetch the water each day from the river now had 
more time on their hands, more than they knew what to do with. What used to be 
a long walk and a social event that provided them with the opportunity to interact 
with other women, engage in small talk and watch their children play had now 
become a superficial task, a brief and lonely affair that lacked the contact, social 
banter and deep cultural significance. The symbolism had been stripped away. 
Within six to nine months all of the wells had fallen into disrepair, maintenance 
programs had failed and the water had stopped flowing. Much of this decay had 
been accelerated by the removal of brass fittings to be worn as jewelry, a visible 
measure of a person's societal status and wealth and viewed as more desirable and 
socially important than water. 
What had been seen as an admirable project and one that would enhance the 
quality of life was misguided, culturally and socially disrespectful and at odds 
with the value system in place. 
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To use the framework of effects-based planning developed within this chapter, the 
question of "What are we trying to make happen?" (within a culturally appropriate 
boundary) had never been asked of the African villagers. The means, therefore, 
were flawed and doomed to failure. They were contextually inappropriate. 
Similar concerns have been raised by Rogers (1995). He questions "what rate of 
change will allow a system to achieve the benefits of an innovation, and yet not 
produce disequilibrium in the social system?" (Rogers, 1995, p. 424). It is a 
search for optimality of form and pace. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THOSE WHO LISTENED (AND EVENTUALL V SAW) 
All men dream, but not equally, those who dream by night in the 
dusty recesses of their minds awake to find it was vanity. But the 
dreamers of the day are dangerous men, that they may act their 
dreams with open eyes to make it possible. 
T.E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom 
Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter describes the impressions and reactions of those individuals and 
groups that were able to consider the benefits and advantages of an effects-based 
orientation over the conventional force-on-force model, identify applications for it 
in their work and actively broaden their knowledge in this emerging field of 
professional practice. Before proceeding and dealing with actual dialogues that 
took place, I need to qualify these statements with my observation that I did not 
expect an abandonment of individuals' current beliefs. 
Indeed, the ability to sustain two conflicting ideas in the mind simultaneously is a 
rare ability (the foundations of which are discussed more fully in a later section 
within this chapter) and one that I witnessed on many occasions in undertaking 
this research, particularly those who are the subject of this chapter. That they were 
able to suspend their prejudices and entertain the idea that an alternate approach 
may herald a new method for solving problems was instrumental in securing their 
support and willingness to participate. 
There are four separate groups that I discuss: 
• The actual participants who took part in the workshops. 
• The leaders and decision-makers who I reported to regularly on my progress 
as an action researcher. 
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• Other senior Defence and government personnel to whom I had a professional 
duty to inform of the work. 
• Overseas based groups I have maintained contact with throughout, who are 
undertaking strikingly similar (albeit conceptual) work. 
Although I can claim some credit for having changed behaviour in the manner of 
Mackay (1994) and to some degree the underlying attitudes, it was only through 
the careful and considered use of (successful) communications techniques of 
knowledge elicitation and reflection of information that this resulted. These 
techniques stem from the use of: 
• information which is, to the audience, credible truth; 
• formats for presentation which will attract and excite the audience; 
• measures designed to exploit psychological or physiological needs; and 
• conclusions that are suggestive of a course of action which seems to provide 
an effective method of satisfying those needs. 
I was conscious of these throughout the research and will make specific 
comments about them as counter-points in the next chapter when dealing with 
those who were unable to, or chose not to see. 
I also note the widely used quote that a prophet is rarely welcomed in his own 
land. I can attest from first hand experience that this is probably the case. Whilst I 
do not claim to be a prophet, the greatest interest in the methodology developed 
out of this research has come from overseas, particularly the United States and 
New Zealand, and to a lesser degree Malaysia and Norway. In offering an 
explanation for this interest I attribute it to military creativity (see the Glossary for 
a definition) and a person's ability to cope (or thrive) in an unstructured 
environment. One thought I have retained throughout in order to sustain my 
enthusiasm is that there can be an enormously "long period between the 
conception and the reality and the many hazards that attend pregnancy and birth" 
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(Wohlstetter, 1964, p. 132). (I believe that) It is inevitable that this model will 
succeed as a planning aid, I have witnessed too much analytical effort and 
expenditure of resources (mostly within the United States) to doubt it. 
There is, however, the requirement for creative people. Discussions with 
colleagues in the United States have revealed that the same polarity in thinking is 
evident. On one hand there is a group who are actively fostering the exploration 
of new ideas in relation to planning, and there is an equally active group who, 
despite making profound statements about the need for a new concept for 
planning, continue to revert back to established patterns of thinking. 
I have mentioned the need for creativity, which can be combined with a deeper 
understanding of the context. This combination sets a fertile environment for the 
mind of the practitioner to look for new mental models. 
The Context/Process Quadrants 
The ability to cope or thrive mentioned earlier has its origins in creativity and the 
capacity to deal with ambiguity, a subject I will address briefly with the aid of the 
model at Figure 43. The model recognises the existence of a context (the situation 
or environment that one is surrounded by) and a process (the actions one may 
employ to deal with events as they emerge from the situation or environment). 
The context and process lines have known and unknown at their extremes, 
allowing for the expression of four different states of knowing and acting. 
This forms the boundary offered by Stacey (1996a; 1996b) between certainty and 
uncertainty and the behaviours of (groups of) people as they attempt to learn their 
way (cooperatively) forward. "The key point is that when they have to operate far 
from certainty, members of organisations are also likely to find themselves far 
from agreement with each other" (Stacey, 1996b, p. 27). This tension allows the 
generation of new modes of action as "managers have no option but to change the 
202 
Chapter Five- Those Who Saw 
way they make decisions as the level of uncertainty, ambiguity and anxiety is 
tuned up" (Stacey, 1996b, p. 27). 
Unknown 
Known Process 
/ Jr.. 
High need for structure 
,,j" 
.I" 
Context 
Known 
Figure 44. The process-context matrix. 
Quest for novelty 
Unknown 
A capacity for coping with high levels of ambiguity is now, more than ever, an 
essential pre-requisite for creativity. There is a place at the edge of mental 
disintegration where "we are able to hold the ambiguities and paradoxes of life 
and contain the anxiety they generate" (Stacey, 1996, p. 14). The pace of change 
can be so rapid that the retention within the mind of an out -dated idea can be 
devastating in terms of delaying the recognition of the new (at the limits of 
detection) and more importantly, integrating it readily into the thinking that is 
underway (Dixon, 1976). 
This is an important distinction as it implies that not only does a creative 
individual tolerate the unexpected, he or she actually enjoys the novelty of it and 
feels liberated in the space offered by the lack of immediate solutions. 
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In summary, individuals operating in a known process/known context quadrant 
rely on clearly defined behaviours for their responses to situations and, therefore, 
are not called upon to demonstrate unusual or unconventional solutions. This is 
contrasted by those (creative) individuals who operate comfortably within the 
opposite quadrant, wherein new processes have to be derived for frequently 
changing contexts. 
It is accepted that creative individuals enjoy operating at the boundaries. "Why is 
this the space for creativity?" "Why is the unstructured, open-ended and 
ambiguous the zone where (great) minds do their greatest work?". Perkins (in 
Sternberg, Ed, 1988, p. 373) identified that they have been driven there by the 
lack or "exhaustion of opportunities [solutions] within the boundaries". This 
notion is certainly supported by Kuhn's (1962) observations of science (and 
scientists) being driven across boundaries that were believed to be etched in stone 
(profound historical examples can be gained from readings of Copernicus, Bacon 
and Gallileo to name just three who endured years of dogmatism and institutional 
resistance). 
There is also the realisation that creative individuals are rarely able to rely on 
others (especially those less creative) for assistance. The creative process "is a 
way of being informed, a way of knowing ... what shows itself as itself, casts a 
light that enables one to know more fully what something is and means" 
(Moustakas, 1990, p. 10). This is an individual journey. Furthermore, "the 
learning that results is self-directed, self-motivated, and open to spontaneous 
shift" (Douglass & Moustakas, 1985, p. 44). Although Senge (1990, p. 13) spoke 
of metanoia, or a collective mind shift to a new paradigm, it is extremely rare in 
real life and each person must undergo their own (discomforting) reconstruction 
of their beliefs. Researchers need an ample dose of this ability as "by the 
principle of the interdependence of opposites, [their knowledge will] become the 
seedbed for the emergence of some new, useful and illuminating bit of order" 
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(Heron, 1988, p. 53). The "essence ... is an aware and self-critical movement 
between experience and reflection" (Reason, 1988, p. 6). 
I believe that the people who are the subject of this chapter exhibited a quest for 
novelty, a tolerance of ambiguity and a desire to fully explore possibilities within 
their professional practice. 
The table below (source unknown) illustrates the dichotomy of states that are 
possible; illustrating that markedly different behaviours are important if creative 
problem-solving is to occur. 
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Conventional Frame 
(Low Capacity for Creativity) 
Long term future is predictable to some 
extent. 
Visions and long-term plans are central 
to convergent thought. 
Vision: Single shared organisation-wide 
intention. A picture of a future state. 
Strongly shared cultures. 
Cohesive teams of organisational . 
actors operating in a state of 
consensus. Discourse scarce. 
Decision making as a purely logical, 
analytical process. 
Long term control and development as 
the monitoring of progress against plan 
milestones. Constraints provided by 
rules, systems and rational argument. 
All change is the realisation of prior 
intent. 
Top management drives and controls 
creative innovation and inventiveness. 
General mental models and 
prescriptions for many specific 
situations (single loop learning). 
Adaptive equilibrium within the 
environment. 
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New Frame 
(High Capacity for Creativity) 
Long term future is unknowable. 
Dynamic and fluid agendas of ever-
changing creative, innovative issues 
are central to the organisation. 
Challenge: Multiple aspirations, 
stretching and ambiguous. Arising out 
of current ill-structured and conflicting 
issues with long term consequences. 
Contradictory counter-cultures. 
Learning groups of organisational 
members, surfacing conflict, engaged 
in dialogue, publicly testing assertions. 
Discourse rich. 
Decision making as exploratory, 
experimental process based on 
intuition and reasoning by analogy. 
Control and development in open-
ended situations as a political process. 
Constraints provided by need to build 
and sustain support. Control as self-
monitoring learning. 
Creativity spontaneously emerges from 
the chaos of challenge and 
contradiction, through a process of 
real-time learning. 
Top management creates favourable 
conditions for complex learning and 
invention. 
New mental models required for each 
new strategic situation (double loop 
learning). 
Non-equilibrium, unstable, creative 
interaction with the environment. 
Those who are able to shape an organisational (and cultural) environment 
characterised by the right-hand side of the table will be rewarded with 
considerably more creativity. 
206 
Chapter Five- Those Who Saw 
Organisations and their Environment 
The model below (Figure 44) from Stacey (1996, p. 64) illustrates the constant 
oscillations that occur across the boundary (the shaded line) between the 
organisation (the setting for creative behaviour) and the environment. This is the 
JHaG.f{)-fJl'Ocess that connects the actions-of individuals within an organisation with 
the responses of those outside it. The important message that should be taken 
from this model is the operation of the feedback systems that provide new inputs 
from which the receiver can grow. There is little philosophically to separate the 
notions of single and double-loop learning from Piaget's emphasis that learning 
occurs through the incorporation of lower-level skills into higher-level skills, 
itself a process that results from exposure to progressively more complex issues as 
a function of maturing. 
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Figure 45. The endless cycle of creative interaction. 
The research participants confronted many discovery phases as the project 
unfolded. This occurred on a personal level and on a technical level as the 
complexity of the models (FAR and EBO) increased. As this environmental 
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volatility increases the velocity of the cycles is accelerated, eventually reaching 
Emery and Trist's turbulent field (1965), the place for greatest creativity. 
This model of organisational learning highlights the dynamic nature of the 
creative process, including the consequences of choices and actions. It also makes 
proYision for uncertainty and complexity and the essential processes of learning, 
providing a valuable explanation for the interactions that occur between an 
organisation and the environment in which it operates. It is a quasi-double loop 
learning system that carries within it the discoveries gained elsewhere. 
In dealing with the subject of creativity we could throw up as many leadership 
models as are available to compare and contrast the elements that provide for, or 
inhibit, creativity. However, it is not that simple. Exploring the literature uncovers 
a blurring between leadership and creativity that indicates the two have become 
more closely interdependent than previously thought. 
Although dealing mainly with the subject of genius, Simonton (1984) makes an 
interesting observation on leadership and creativity that is useful for my 
discussion here; offering that there is no distinction between creativity and 
leadership and "when the most famous creators and leaders are under scrutiny the 
distinction between creativity and leadership vanishes, because creativity 
becomes a variety of leadership". A somewhat cliched, but still glaringly relevant, 
statement is that from Machiavelli's The Prince- ''There is nothing more difficult 
to plan, more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than the 
creation of a new order of things ... "; certainly one of the primary responsibilities 
of a creative leader. 
It is axiomatic that leadership establishes the environment which tolerates (at the 
minimum) or energises (at the maximum) creative endeavour. Approaching the 
subject of leadership in this way has a particular appeal, as it allows us to isolate it 
from its more orthodox, industrial origins - that of controlling labour. 
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True Double Loop (Creative) Learning 
Although there is a degree of linearity within the model, a magnification of each 
discovery, choice and action cycle uncovers the possibility for creative 
discoveries to be made. This further level of complexity is illustrated below 
(Figure 45) as an additional loop that exists to the side of each discover phase. 
Previous Mental 
Model 
New Mental Model 
Figure 46. The space for creativity as a function of new learning. 
As those engaged in some kind of productive effort or learning cycle through the 
discovery, choice and act process, they will confront situations that bring about a 
pause, preventing immediate movement from discovery to a subsequent choice. 
At this point they are 'thrown out' into an examination of whether this represents 
the formation of a new mental model. For me this occurred on a number of levels 
simultaneously: in my interactions with project team members, observing the 
interactions amongst team members, guiding the development of the automated 
FAR and EBO applications and the self reflection that accompanied me 
throughout the research. 
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This self-examination questions the issues at all levels, deconstructs them and re-
assembles them in order to make a sound judgement on whether this set of issues 
constitutes a new order of things. If it does, then a comparison is made against the 
previous mental model to determine the extent of divergence. 
If it is sufficiently great then a 'different' discovery condition is returned to, one 
that has replaced the old with the new or integrated or synthesized the new 
information. If the differences are subtle, then it may be possible to retain the old 
mental model intact, albeit with recognition that some new ingredients are now 
present, but the order of things has been preserved - for this single cycle anyway. 
Regardless of the outcome of this self-examination, a more informed choice can 
now be made towards closing with the next act stage. 
Stacey (1996, p. 130) concluded "the space for novelty in the human mind, as 
with all other complex adaptive systems, is one in which paradox is held and 
endlessly rearranged rather than resolved". The propensity to accept the new 
mental model then will accelerate the cycles and therefore the tempo of creativity, 
giving life to the characteristics required to operate in the unknown context, 
unknown process quadrant discussed earlier in this chapter. 
From this it can be concluded that those who are able to hold themselves in this 
zone of tension, where the new and the old are in conflict, will display higher 
levels of tolerance towards ambiguity. They should be comfortable in the cycles 
of discover, choose and act and the pauses whereby the possible existence of new 
mental models are considered. 
A Conspiracy of Coincidences 
As I look back upon four years of intensive research, involving almost continuous 
development, frequent discussions and numerous presentations, I see that there 
has been a conspiracy of coincidences that has (partly) secured the acceptance of 
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this idea, I believe it has taken root. The moment of truth occurred in Sydney on 
the evening of 19 February 2001. It was by pure chance that I picked up the 
Australian Defence Magazine (Cotterill, 2001, p. 70) and read of an interview 
with Air Marshall McCormack, the Chief of Air Force, by Daniel Cotterill. He 
asks: 
"Do you see the RAAF's future strike capabilities being driven by 
weapon or platform considerations, or will there be a shift to 
defining such capability via effects-based methodology [emphasis 
added]?" 
To which Chief of Air Force replied: 
"Air 6000 is going into effects-based methodology as I described. 
We are really talking about the effects and then what is required to 
get those effects. The replacement syndrome is dead as far as I am 
concerned. The headquarters is now looking at effects-based 
methodology as the way to go." 
Although I plan to monitor developments very closely following these statements, 
my fear is that a less than absolute understanding of the conceptual purity of this 
approach will elude those involved and the work may become polluted with the 
approach discredited shortly thereafter. Indeed, the statements made by Chief of 
Air Force may have their origin in an earlier presentation I gave to Air 
Commodore John Blackburn (the Director General of Policy and Planning- Air 
Force) and his principal staff in Canberra during 1999, where I gave a detailed 
explanation of effects-based thinking within strategic and operational planning 
contexts. 
It came as some surprise to learn that the work I had completed to that point and 
the methodology devised formed the entire solution to Phase Two of their futures 
project; interestingly, whilst they would have been still devising a way forward 
they were able to immediately recognise that the solution I had devised was 
equally appropriate to Air Force. 
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Interest from the United States 
Towards the end of 1999, I made contact with a fellow military operations 
researcher at the Naval Warfare Development Command (NWDC) at Newport, 
Rhode Island. After several e-mail exchanges it became evident that we were on 
parallel paths and had come to the same, and startling, .conclusions about strategic 
and operational planning within an effects-based orientation. His team and many 
large workshops he had hosted appeared to be still grappling with many 
conceptual issues I had already overcome. Appendix 1 includes several accounts 
of discussions surrounding the concept and practice of effects-based operations in 
the United States. Their clear advantage was that they were able to marshall 
together a much larger team of analysts and consider larger issues. 
Many graduate papers are also published out of the Air University dealing with 
effects-based operations (Beagle, 2000; Kreighbaum, 1998; Stehlin, 1997; 
Sakulich, 2001) and the Air Force Research Laboratory in Rome, New York 
(McCrabb, 2001) and United States Joint Forces Command in Washington D.C. 
(2001). 
Although I believe I had progressed well beyond their early conceptual debates, to 
a working database fully populated with organisational information, there were 
many areas in which we were able to share our thoughts and ideas. Indeed, after 
finally reaching a level of frustration with so few others to discuss this topic with 
I phoned the Naval Warfare Development Command (on 28 April 2001) and 
spoke with Commander Mike Waldhauser. He indicated that the only way to 
accelerate the process was to get together in person, suggesting that a visit 
sometime in August to October by several of his team appeared to be the best 
option. Several weeks later I secured an invitation to participate in the largest 
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national gathering of effects-based operations analysts in the United States during 
the period 17-27 July 2001. 
During my two weeks at Newport, Rhode Island in July I was able to present my 
work to over 50 individuals from a range of military, civilian and government 
or~anisations. With Global Wargame 2001 being conducted, with its focus on 
effects-based orientation, it proved to be a valuable and timely visit, particularly 
in light of the large amount of analysis being conducted to explore the concept of 
effects-based operations. Indeed this formed the second round of detailed analysis 
around effects-based operations and also formed a large part of Global Wargame 
2000, with a well-developed understanding that their "purpose ... is to de-
emphasise preoccupation with massive physical destruction of the adversary" 
(Watman, 2001, p. 77). 
Despite this it remains an elusive idea that has remained in the shadow of the 
targeting/physical destruction paradigm and "it would be hard to claim that 
effects-based operations look appreciably different from current US military 
practice" (Watman, 2001, p. 79). The names of the individuals that I spoke with 
are not important, but some of the organisations included the Joint Warfare 
Analysis Centre in Virginia, the National Nuclear Security Administration in 
Washington, Boeing in Seattle and Virginia, Training and Doctrine Analysis 
Centre - Future Concepts Directorate in Kansas and the United States Army 
Special Warfare Centre and School in North Carolina. 
Responses from all these people were very favourable and, although it was not my 
intention to build consensus around my particular model and methodology, I 
expanded their understanding of effects-based operations. 
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Interest from the New Zealand Defence Force 
I have maintained e-mail and telephone contact since 1998 with a member of the 
New Zealand Ministry of Defence, who has been undertaking a similar project for 
the New Zealand Special Forces. They are struck by the same vexing questions of 
"What does good like?" and "What adjustments or transformations in capability 
are required to maximise fitness for purpose?" 
In early 2001, I was advised that the New Zealand defence science organisation 
had adopted my model and were making minor modifications to accommodate 
issues unique to their strategic circumstances. 
Their use of the model is evident in the e-mail below (permission to reproduce 
granted): 
[The New Zealand Ministry of Defence] MOD is conducting a capability 
review of NZDF Special Operations. The review has adopted an effects-
based planning methodology. This methodology uses a scenario based 
planning approach. Effects based planning analyses the scenarios by 
focussing on the overarching outcome required by defence and security 
policy (and the effects required to achieve the outcome) rather than on the 
tools that may be employed. In so doing effects based planning allows for 
a 'green fields' approach to planning by emphasising the policy effects that 
should be achieved and the means (or broad responses) that may deliver 
these effects before military capabilities are addressed. 
MOD's use of the effects based planning has been guided by the ADFs 
Special Operations futures work. The Defence Technology Agency is 
developing the structure for a database that will present the linkages 
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between the scenarios developed for employment of NZDF Special 
Operations Force with: 
National security objectives 
Effects required within the scenarios 
The means required to bring about these objectives 
Broad responses required of NZDF SOF 
Special Operations Forces required 
The intention of the database is to illustrate the criticality of effects to be 
achieved under each scenario. The effects will be accorded a rating and 
these values will then affect the capabilities selected automatically by the 
database. They will show the policy effectiveness of maintaining and 
developing specific capabilities. We are also planning on developing other 
conditions, such as the manner in which an SO is to be undertaken (overt, 
covert or low visibility) which will also drive Special Operations 
capabilities. Once these capability requirements are determined and 
attending costs have been identified a transition plan will be developed. 
The plan will establish a path to develop Special Operation capabilities 
from those currently maintained by the NZDF to those recommended by 
the review. 
Interest from the Norwegian Defence Force 
In 1999, I presented two papers at the 181h International System Dynamics 
Conference in Bergen on the West coast of Norway (one each on FAR and EBO). 
After delivering my paper on effects-based planning I was approached by a 
civilian member of the Norwegian Defence Force, who expressed a genuine 
interest in the model. He explained that they were undertaking analysis work that 
could benefit from the use of these techniques and would like to discuss in more 
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detail how this could occur. My almost immediate return to Australia and the 
distance between us combined with a lack of funds for a return trip has prevented 
any close cooperative work in this area. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have attempted to provide explanations for those who were able 
to accept unconditionally the logic of this planning approach. I recognise them as 
being creative and possessing leadership for the new and unorthodox. They thrive 
in an unstructured environment and look to ambiguity as a source of excitement 
and interest in their professional practice. There is a sub-culture of intolerance of 
mediocrity. The assumptions held by many have been surfaced through the Five 
Key Challenges organisational poll. Similarities of view are evident. 
There is much work to be done. I remain in frequent contact with many 
individuals and groups who believe that this approach is sound, holds the promise 
of superior performance, binds strategy, operations and tactic and secures the 
optimum organisational configuration. 
In the double loop learning model displayed earlier we are probably towards the 
end of the 'discover' phase, 'choice' will come soon once the truth becomes 
inescapable (the comparison between the new and old mental models), that will 
involve serious leadership issues within the requirement to 'act', before entering 
the new 'discovery' that comes with reorientation. 
After arriving at this point and attempting to reach an understanding of why a 
group could see the logic for such an approach, be culturally open to new ideas, 
recognise leadership towards a new paradigm that they themselves had 
participated in, I now look for a single explanation. The word that springs to mind 
is inspirationalism. They have fashioned scenarios, constructed a complex 
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language that explores all facets of organisational life and purpose, used these two 
in a way that aids decision-making and formed (shared?) opinions about change. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
AND THOSE WHO DIDN•T 
There is nothing more difficult to plan, more doubtful of success, 
nor more dangerous to manage then the creation of a new order of 
things ..... 
Machiavelli, The Prince 
In this chapter I provide perspectives on that set of individuals and groups that 
consistently were at odds with my attempt to build consensus. They were 
dissenters, a term I favour as it simply offers that they held a different opinion, 
neither a good thing nor a bad thing, just different. I need their difference as it 
helps me answer the questions I have posed to myself. I have a curiosity for the 
origins of their dissent: 
"Was it me?" 
"Was it something I said, or allowed to be said by others in one of the many 
workshops?" 
"Was it an aspect of the workshops, the structure or process used?" 
"Was it the dynamics within the group that gave rise to their dissent?" 
In exploring these questions it remains necessary for me to search for the 
positives (as well as the negatives), I am still learning and reflecting at this stage 
and there are defining moments still to be experienced and disorientation 
dilemmas to be felt (Merriam, Mott & Lee, 1996; Edwards & Usher, 1998). 
"Why am I even asking myself these questions?" 
For those who were the subject of the previous chapter I explained their readiness 
to accept new ideas as being a function of their creativity and tolerance of 
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ambiguity - characteristics from within. With the non-acceptors I (cannot help 
but) look for explanations outside of the participants. 
My aim throughout has always been to allow powerful ideas to dominate, rather 
than powerful people. I believe I have been successful at this. "Could it have been 
that they possessed an idea or thought that alone was not sufficiently powerful 
enough?" "Did not attract enough consensus and, therefore, allowed a negativity 
to pollute the rest of their involvement?" 
I am conscious of the need to not judge their views, or criticise their position in 
any way. They adopted the point of view that was most comfortable and their 
steadfast opposition to achieving a strategic reorientation provides valuable 
insight into the behavioural phenomena at work within organisations. 
It would be easy for me to explain this position as being contained within the 
opposite quadrant from the quest for novelty. This would be unfair. 
Research Role 
My approach throughout the workshops was mindful of the need to draw out 
individual thoughts and perceptions, mix them with others, and guide the 
discussions to arrive at an agreed understanding or conceptual position then load 
that into the body of work. As the information and shared knowledge grew it 
would demand a new feature or function to allow its integration. Again there was 
the possibility that my role had interfered with the formation of the overall result. 
I believe that somewhere in all of this were the points that gave rise to 
disagreement. 
I did not set out to build a new order of things. I set out to discover how a shared, 
loosely arranged order of existing things could be arranged more precisely and 
completely to produce a more accurate picture. One that all those involved could 
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agree with and declare that "yes that is an accurate picture of the product of our 
lengthy discussions, there is enough of the existing body of knowledge to give a 
foundation and the new information is sufficiently moderated by group consensus 
that it has passed the test of eligibility". Yet the group that assisted and actively 
participated in this process can still decide to disagree with the overall work. 
In considering whether people accepted or rejected these methods I was conscious 
of my role and behaviour because: 
• my interactions with the individuals that I interviewed for the studies were 
shaped by the group memberships that each of us brought to these 
interpersonal interactions. 
• my formulation of the research problem and my interpretation of the data was 
shaped by my membership in a particular age, gender and organisational 
group. This theoretical orientation shapes the research process (Kram, 1988, p. 
247). 
This allows my attention to be (re)drawn to the research questions: 
Question - "To what extent did my adaptation of the Field Anomaly Relaxation 
method assist in building and reinforcing consensus around initiatives 
for change?" 
Answer - The scenarios were very successful as a tool to provoke thought. The 
adaptation become insignificant, the product delivered was sound and 
workable. The 20 scenarios were able to be loaded into the front end of 
the effects-based planning application without problem. 
Question - "To what extent did the effects-based planner assist in building and 
reinforcing consensus around initiatives for change?" 
Answer- The effects-based planner was valuable in two ways: firstly, it enabled 
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the detailed examination of organisational purpose with practitioner 
involvement and secondly, it allowed the linking of ends, ways and 
means in a more complex model that drew into sharp focus the 
strengths and weaknesses within the organisation. That the model was 
able to be completed with 19 effects, 42 means and 42 capacities was a 
strong indicator of consensus. The indicators for change resulting from 
this were the result of each person's efforts. 
Question - "How was my involvement in the creation and use of these knowledge 
management systems beneficial or detrimental to the achievement of 
consensus?" 
Answer- My aim was always to guide the development of these models. There 
were occasions where it was necessary to prescribe specific elements 
or functions, however these were minimal. At times progress was 
slow, which meant the loading of data was delayed, which meant 
participants became distracted. I saw my role during these times as a 
decision-maker and someone who could maintain momentum. This 
role may have been harshly judged at times. My response to that 
would be "I did my best under the conditions". 
Question - "Could my biases, assumptions and prejudices interfere with the 
employment of these knowledge management systems?" 
Answer - I was conscious of my personal actions throughout. At times they may 
have been too forceful. At others I may have let the research groups 
find their own direction. I believe that I had little idea how the project 
would unfold so any attempt to subvert the project into a specific 
outcome would have no basis. 
Researcher Behaviour 
Kram (1988, p. 248) identifies the need to ask several important diagnostic 
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questions related to perceptions, behaviour and reactions of the researcher during 
the research process; the reactions (and authenticity of response) of others to the 
researcher's probes and how the interactions determine the nature and quality of 
the data. I recall my comments on self-reflection made in Chapter 1, wherein I 
identified the difficulty of pausing to critically view the moment to gain a deeper 
understanding of the dynamics - the moment of self-reflection. If the signals one 
receives (from those involved or supporting the research) are distorted or mixed 
then no amount of reflection will uncover the true data, only that there is 
distortion and what the possible explanations for it might be. 
"So where does that leave me?" 
"Was something not said by these individuals that would have allowed their 
dissenting positions to be surfaced?" 
"My personal opinion is - yes." 
"What might the explanations for this be?" 
"Could it have been my approach or manner?" 
"Possibly." 
"Could it have been an underlying unwillingness to openly share information that 
manifested itself in the particular group assembled for that workshop?" 
"Possibly." 
"I can already detect that is a fruitless search for meaning and disappointment lies 
at its end." 
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Maybe it would be a more simple process to expose my own condition. Finding 
out who I am "... is not an easy task . . . It requires inquiry into one's past to 
discover how identity [and group memberships] have shaped current values" 
Kram, 1988, p. 262). 
While admittedly in the beginning, there was no overall method to be applied, I 
acknowledge that this was to be progressively constructed through the 
involvement of others. This has been successful, insofar as those that actively 
contributed and participated. 
The Research Assistants 
This was a research project that demanded the involvement of many others, my 
(mostly) cooperative co-inquirers. As well as the information that was elicited and 
integrated into the database their personal ·involvement (and level of 
cooperativeness) was also empirically examined. Reason and Torbert state that 
"participation is a political as well as an epistemological imperative which affirms 
the basic human right of persons to contribute to [a] decision which affects them 
and to knowledge which concerns them and purports to be about them" (Reason 
& Torbert, 2001, p. 8). I have also discovered that people will exercise the basic 
human right to withhold information from a moment of inquiry or decision, 
electing to retain, rather than volunteer, knowledge that could prove critical to 
overall understanding. To continue these authors' comparisons of scientific 
positivism versus the participative linguistic tum this withholding could be 
described as 'neutralism' with its effects identical to data not obtained through the 
scientific approach. 
If I believe that information was withheld (and I do) then where does that leave 
the validity of the research? Are the planning models still valid? Or are there large 
sections of functionality that (will always) remain absent. But, "the primary 
purpose of research/practice is to enhance human flourishing. To do this it must 
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generate valid information within action situations so that those involved can 
understand them more thoroughly and act in them more effectively" (Reason & 
Torbert, 2001, p. 19). The models must be valid, the data may need to undergo 
refinement to more accurately express the various elements, however the action 
situations fostered active involvement, understanding was enhanced, consensus 
was built and participant effectiveness grew dramatically. 
This is the goal of cooperative action research. Yet, "the group cannot achieve its 
goals and fulfil its mission unless there is clear consensus on the means by which 
goals will be met; the means to be used have to do with day-to-day behaviour and, 
therefore, require a higher level of consensus" (Schein, 1992, p. 58). This 
consensus is built by the leader. 
A paradox of culture change leadership is that the leader must be able to not only 
lead but also to listen, to emotionally involve the group in achieving its own 
insights into its cultural dilemmas, and to be genuinely participative in his or her 
approach to learning and change (Schein, 1992, p. 389) and "the field of strategic 
management addresses the problems of managing dynamic changes in the 
relationship between a firm's action and its environment" (Argyris & Schon, 1996, 
p. 251). 
Schein offers that as this volatility between the organization and its environment 
increases the adaptive survivalist imperative becomes more pronounced whereby 
"analysts concerned about planning and adapting to an uncertain and 
uncontrollable future would argue that as environments become more turbulent, 
the ability to tolerate uncertainty becomes more necessary for survival and 
learning, suggesting that organisational and national cultures that can embrace 
uncertainty more easily will be inherently more adaptive" (Schein, p. 103, p. 11). 
They also speak of a first, second and third person dimension of inquiry. To me 
the imagery that conveys this best is Escher's reflective sphere. This metaphor of 
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self in action with others and for others is represented in several ways. Firstly, in 
the first person I am an observer of myself, the background, that remains visible 
around my reflected image in the sphere, provides the context and the moment, 
but it has little relevance to my image, it blurs as I attempt to see myself clearly. I 
am distanced from the influence of this background as I scan inwardly. Changes 
in the background, or context, will not have an effect on me immediately. Even as 
I indirectly adjust to these changes I am unable to precisely link my responses to 
the shifts in the contextual. In the second person I am fixated on the context, the 
reflected image is blurred. 
Changing an organisation's structures and processes is therefore difficult because 
it involves not only consideration of efficiency and effectiveness vis-a-vis the 
external tasks but also the reallocation of internal 'property'. Similarly, changing 
rewards systems and status allocation systems in the internal workings of the 
organisation may be difficult because such changes will affect how work is done 
and how well goals are achieved. In summary, as cultural assumptions form 
around the means by which goals are to be accomplished, they will inevitably 
involve the internal issues of status and identity. Thus highlighting the complexity 
of both the analyses of means and the issues surrounding efforts to change the 
way an organisation accomplishes it goals. (Schein, 1992, p. 61). 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter I have attempted to understand why some elected to dissent. I may 
have unintentionally labeled them uncreative, as I stated that this was a 
characteristic that was evident in those who did agree, not only with the method, 
but with my approach and the content. I see that this is wrong. I have also spent 
some time on research group behaviour, my behaviour and the implications of 
these for the models that sought to build consensus. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CREATIVE SYNTHESIS 
This is what I have done, what I have thought, what I was. I have 
told the good and the bad with equal frankness. I have neither 
omitted anything bad nor interpolated anything good ..... I have 
shown myself as I was: mean and contemptible, good, high-
minded and sublime, according as I was one or the other. Gather 
round me ... my fellow men; let them hear my confessions, lament 
for my unworthiness, and blush for my imperfections. Then let 
each of them in tum reveal, with the same frankness, the secrets of 
his heart at the foot of the Throne, and say, if he dare, "/ was better 
than that man!" 
Rousseau, (1782) Confessions, p. I 
Overview of the Chapter 
In this chapter I reflect on the research path, the changes that have occurred in my 
professional practice, the effects I have had on others whose involvement I have 
sought and the significance of the entire experience upon myself. It will form the 
explication phase and aims to "fully examine what has been awakened in 
consciousness, in order to understand its various layers of meaning" (Moustakas, 
1990, p. 31 ). It is within this chapter that I will attempt to validate the research, 
securing the warrants of truth and honesty that I sought at the outset and 
throughout. 
So How to Validate This? 
This research has been of the qualitative form. It has celebrated the role of 
individuals and sought to approach them as humans, not subjects. Yes, there was a 
purpose to the research; a purpose that commanded my attention and 
contemplation for five years; a purpose that filled my mind with thoughts, dreams, 
and visions of success and failure; a purpose that saw knowledge elicitation and 
co-operative inquiry as being central to the formation of consensus around 
initiatives for change. 
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How can I look back now and gaze over the path I have trodden to satisfy those 
who must rate my performance. They were not with me. It has been a solitary 
journey. Only I have struggled through the development of solutions, stood in 
front of (sometimes hostile) groups for seemingly endless presentations, urged the 
i-nvelvement of others and rejoiced in the ready acceptance by the believers. The 
themes (that were there from the beginning, invisible but close) have steadily 
revealed themselves to me, they have rewarded me for my efforts; although, I can 
recall many times when the way ahead was denied to me, amplifying my 
disorientation. 
I recognise that I have been engaged in cooperative inquiry, it had a purpose, the 
methods devised were participative, as was the progressive development of the 
product. If I was to isolate the reason for non-implementation I could only suggest 
that it was a combination of lack of senior executive support and commitment 
coupled with a lack of broad-based support. These two are related and need some 
further explanation to highlight their relationships. 
Broad-based support (Berman & McLaughlin, 1978, p. 15) would create a critical 
mass of mood and expectation that a reorientation of management opinion would 
be achieved. This would be reflected in a heightened awareness of the need to do 
something (strategically) with the organisation as a result of this disquiet (this has 
often been described as 'precipitating a crisis'). These messages would then be 
reinterpreted by the organisation's members and seen as a focused intent. The self-
reinforcing nature of these information reflections was absent. Once the 
information was presented that clearly highlighted a direction and pace of change 
it was the management's responsibility to clearly articulate an opinion. 
This did not occur, devalued the quality of the analysis, legitimised the status quo 
and undermined the prospects for more thorough analysis linked more strongly to 
change efforts. 
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Is this a cultural phenomenon? I do not believe so. Rather it was a manifestation 
of intellectual rigidity and a preoccupation with the events of the day. Doing what 
is urgent and avoiding what is important. 
As an exercise in achieving change this project has proven to be unsuccessful. As 
an aid to building and reinforcing consensus within practitioners I believe it has 
been a success. 
The (integration of) knowledge that has arrived with me at the end is extensive. I 
have deepened as a person. I have entered into all facets of the subject and 
emerged intact. I can communicate with others and myself with greater freedom. I 
can engage with a subject that is not familiar to me and entertain thoughts and 
emotions that once eluded me or were embarrassing. I can confess my 
shortcomings. I am able to reflect more completely and meaningfully on a wider 
range of subjects. I am more open, more encouraging of dissent. I am one who 
appreciates the absurdity of life. 
I am who I always was. 
I am (back) at the place I never left. 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
T.S. Eliot, Four Quartets, 1971 
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In Knowledge and Human Interests Habermas (1972), expounds the idea of 
'validity claims' arising from the process that he terms 'ideal speech situations', 
during which people can communicate freely and honestly and openly with no 
coercion or distortion, he emphasises the importance of self-reflection. For 
Habermas, the overall goal of discourse is "an inter-subjective mutuality of 
reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one 
another" (Held, 1980, p. 333). This can only be 
achieved by each participant reflecting on his or 
her words and practice. As Escher does in the 
figure to the right when holding the reflective 
sphere aloft to view the disembodied image of 
himself drawing himself drawing himself .... 
Some interesting observations and comparisons 
can be made with Reason and Torbett's (2001) 
call for a 'tum to action' and their consideration 
of first, second and third person level of social 
involvement. 
Escher is painting, he is engaged in artistic recreation, it is an activity rooted in 
the first person, there is no other purpose than to create an image of viewed 
reality. But the image he creates gives a sense of looking back at 'the other' (self) 
as in the second person. If this were a landscape it would be that landscape's 
awareness and recognition of the artist and easel in its presence for the purpose of 
capturing the viewed panorama in some medium. The third person orientation 
forces the viewer of Escher's work to analyse the effect upon oneself, like I am 
doing now, and like I am doing to you as you read these words and contemplate 
their effect on you. We are Escher's eyes, looking at Escher in his studio, the hand 
is mine. 
This fusion of perspectives sets up a powerful emotion of our place as an 
individual, a person among many others and as a member of a single community. 
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Communication with the deepest self is made possible, communication that is 
honest, forthright and explicit; it is a realisation of the self. As expressed by 
Jacobi in her presentation of Jung's psychology "it leads the individual to know 
himself for what he would like to be - and probably nothing is more difficult for a 
human being"_ {Jacobi, 1973, p. 132). 
But human communication can be distorted by communicative incompetence, by 
domination or by unbalanced instrumental action (strategic (inter)action) of 
indoctrination and propaganda. Ideally, agreement should be reached by an 
acceptance of the position that has the better argument (Held, 1980, chapter 12), 
but what does better mean? This discussion brings me back to the 
acknowledgement of 'dissent' as a necessary characteristic of cooperative inquiry. 
With dissent there can be no better, only different. Difference leaves the path 
clear for cooperation and deeper inquiry as underlying assumptions are explored 
and surfaced. Heron (1988, p. 44) offers that "validity is enhanced by a diversity 
of views that overlap. It is not found simply in the common properties of the 
different views, but rather in the unity-in-variety of these views". 
In terms of writing styles, John Van Maanen in his book Tales of the Field: On 
Writing Ethnography (1988), encourages the research writer to tell striking stories 
with interest (does it attract?), coherence (does it hang together?), and fidelity 
(does it seem true?). He advises the researcher to recall in the present tense, to 
avoid giving away the ending to help build a degree of tension, and to use 
condensed but rich contextual descriptions, artistic nerve, unusual phrasings, fresh 
allusions, rich Janguage, cognitive and emotional stimulation, puns, and quick 
jolts to the imagination. This idea of 'fragmented knowledge' is furthered by using 
a novelistic style which unfolds event by event, conveying uncertain meanings for 
an audience unsure of where it is being taken and why, and with characterisation 
for individual voices: "characters ... must be given names, faces, motives, and 
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things to do ... lines to speak" (p. 104). I hope that I have woven a captivating 
thread that commands the attention of the curious. 
This is in agreement with Zald, who contends that rhetoric and artistry are crucial 
and that "the scientific and technical model emphasizes logic, clarity and data 
representation in its rhetorical stance, to the exclusion of intuition, allusiveness, 
imagery" (Zeld, 1993, p. 521). He goes on to mention that confessional or 
impressionistic modes of writing may take us closer to the truth. 
I look at this simultaneous development of self, others, self with others and the 
purpose of and product of the actions undertaken through participative inquiry as 
the "quality of attention", discussed by Reason and Goodwin (1999, p. 10) when 
commenting on the work of Torbett. These authors offered that attention must be 
given to "intuitive knowing of purposes, intellectual knowing of strategy and 
embodies knowledge of one's behaviour and an empirical knowing of the outside 
world" (Reason & Goodwin, 1999, p. 10). One can not only do, one must also be 
alert to the actions that the self is engaged in as the doing is done. 
Have I been self-reflective throughout? Segal has identified that "before we can 
either reflect on or defend our practices, our practices must have become explicit 
as a theme for concern" (Segal, 1999, p. 74). My practice has certainly been 
explicit, to me and others. This explicitness must come as a rupturing moment, or 
to use Mezirow's language, a disorientating dilemma. We are back now 
considering Escher drawing his reflection. This ability to (vividly) see oneself (as 
others do) is given great clarity in Sartre's Being and Nothingness (in Segal, 1999, 
p. 79) wherein a man looking through a keyhole is preoccupied by the subject of 
his attention, he is interrupted by footsteps and "turns his gaze from the room [to] 
see a man looking at him" he now sees himself being looked at as a voyeur. 
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The Final Metaphorical Form 
Continuing with my metaphor of a gathering storm, which I introduced in Chapter 
Two, I now sense an anti-climactic moment of unrewarded effort and a 
dissipation of the gather(ed)ing forces of change. The culmination has not 
occurred. The flood of life-giving water to promote new growth has not 
eventuated, there is a barrenness of apathy, lethargy and rigidity that was there 
before. The soil remains unproductive. I must confess. at this point that physical 
reward and visible evidence of acceptance of my approaches was not the 
motivation. Although I genuinely felt that the journey was honorable and sincere, 
I am left with a sense of loneliness and pessimism and through to the visible 
changes in the system I was an occupant within can provide few perspectives on 
that set of individuals and groups that consistently were at odds with attempts to 
build consensus. I have attempted to rationalise their motives, described their 
worldview as it came into conflict with mine. I am also conscious of the need to 
not judge their views, or criticise their position in any way, a positive I reinforced 
in the previous chapter. They adopted the point of view that was most comfortable 
and their steadfast opposition to achieving a strategic reorientation provides 
valuable insights into the behavioural phenomena at work within this 
organisation. 
I looked for something (different and changed) outside of myself. The change has 
(only) occurred within. I believe I have set things in motion. There are ripples but 
they have yet to touch a shore and be reflected. 
In expressing this discontent I find salvation in the fact that although the local 
conditions may have remained stable, the season is altering. It is part of a larger 
cycle and my storm was dissipated through a need to preserve its energy for a 
larger gathering that will exert its influence later. 
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Where to Now? 
The method works (but it didn't this time). It has potential to inform policy and 
strategy across an enormous field of industry and endeavour. 
What are we trying to make happen? - this question as a point of origin for all 
analysis and consideration is extremely powerful and secures a purity that other 
approaches may not deliver. I have spoken to practitioners involved in developing 
policies for minimising drug use, discouraging graffiti, altering driver behaviour 
in speed-controlled areas such as outside schools and reducing the adoption of 
smoking in youths. All have commented favorably on the utility of the model and 
its ability to isolate consensus around key high-payoff areas. The effect that one is 
in pursuit of concentrates the mind and all consideration about what actions are 
appropriate. 
Further research may extend the model and develop new insights into the 
formulation of policy and consensus building. Whatever additional research 
springs from this work the enduring ends, ways and means construct remains 
central. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this final section I set out four brief points: 
1. Purposeful thinking and acting is an important part of organisational renewal 
and growth and deserves attention to derive more successful methods for 
planning and policy making that engage groups in cooperative inquiry. 
2. There is a multiplicity of contradictions that demand divergent thought. If a 
way forward to satisfactory solutions or progress is to be made then 
contradictions and divergence must be accommodated and accepted as the 
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natural order of things. Consensus can only be approached as an ideal. Indeed 
dissent is a vital quality to be preserved and accommodated within 
cooperative inquiry. 
3. National security organisations are in a transition period between two raisons 
d'~re, providing a brief opportunity to speculate and dislocate thinking from 
the conventional, constraints originating from dogma and a narrow field of 
vision. A futures orientation can achieve this necessary dislocation of 
thinking. 
4. Comprehensive knowledge management systems can assist in the crafting of 
organisational futures. Field Anomaly Relaxation and effects-based planning 
coupled with facilitated teamwork qualifies as a comprehensive knowledge 
management system and has potential to build consensus and communities of 
change. It can create a microworld in which cooperative inquiry can occur. 
Epilogue 
I wish to close with some thoughts that are inspired by Mezirow and his critique 
that "in traditional societies learning focuses on acquiring the outlook and skills 
necessary to perform according to well established rules and customs" (Mezirow, 
1990, p. xiii). I have chosen to break free, to seek new meanings from my own 
discoveries, creative wanderings and self-reflexion, what Freire has described as 
conscientization. A reflective engagement with the totality and enormity of a 
subject, or what Shor calls "extraordinarily reexperiencing the ordinary" (Shor, 
1987, p. 3). These themes are central and prevent mediocrity in qualitative, 
heuristic research. 
In my research I have sought to construct a non-traditional society of learners who 
perform outside the established rules and customs, who can explore together. But, 
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at the same time, their approach is disciplined, forthright and accommodates the 
(presence of) dissenters, without damaging their ability to express different views, 
or have these views folded into the thoughts and ideas of others. The way is open 
for others to develop the approach. 
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APPENDIX 1 
EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS WORKSHOPS 
The information set out here is a compilation of discussions and debates 
surrounding the topic of effects-based operations. Most comments were from 
structured ~workshop settings designed to achieve specific outcomes for this 
research. Others were the thoughts of interested individuals and groups shared 
when the information was relayed throughout the organisation. I refer to 
comments as either coming from the facilitator - me, or an anonymous participant. 
Participant 
"I just don't get what all the fuss is about with being so precise, framing 
everything inside an 'effect' like this. Everything we do as a military organisation 
is to achieve our objectives. This has been going on ever since man picked up a 
rock or spear". 
Facilitator 
"That may be so. There is always a purpose to our actions. My only concern is 
that we begin our planning too low down. Our aim here is use the desired effect as 
the point of origin for our analysis and consideration of what will deliver that 
effect. Typically we start with what are we able to do, and then we look around 
trying to find a way to fit that to the problem. What I am suggesting is that we 
forget about the things that we do for the time being and focus on what are we 
trying to make happen. I think this would be more productive". 
Participant 
"We've spent all this time getting the scenarios together, we have our end-states, 
let's keep the top-down approach going and see what we come up with". 
Facilitator 
"Okay, we need to keep a military mind throughout all of this. Clausewitz wrote 
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about imposing our will on our adversary. This is a very important concept and 
one that must guide us through this next stage. When we talk about effects, we 
should recognise that they will be imposed. The language must be reasonably 
forceful and active. I need statements that speak directly about what we want to 
make happen through our actions, and remember we haven't determined what 
those aetions are yet. That is the next step, these will be anchored to the effects so 
the planning hierarchy continues downwards". 
Participant 
"What we need are a few politicians in the room. This sort of information needs to 
come from Government". 
Facilitator 
"You're exactly right. But we don't have them so we need to give this our best 
shot. I'm sure with the expertise and experience we have in the room we can get 
this right and that will give us some really interesting information to work though 
with. Remember that most of what we do has been devised from the bottom up, so 
in the middle somewhere we should experience some difficulty as we draw these 
two domains together". 
"We don't have a definition yet for effects-based operations. We know that we are 
beginning at the top and working our analysis downwards. Let's assume for the 
time being that the model I presented earlier is fairly complete. I has scenarios on 
the left, with a single end-state for each derived from that, then the effects that can 
be imposed within that scenario, with the means next, capacities or competencies 
further to the right and the finally physical elements of capability forming the 
right-most column. In an effects-based orientation it is the effects that provide the 
beacon for our efforts, everything must be directed towards these." 
Participant 
"Surely it's not up to us to define the national strategic end-states. I would have 
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thought that was a job for government. The National Security Committee for 
Cabinet meets every time there is a crisis to develop a course of action. Why can't 
we find out what they think our end-states are, and also our national effects. From 
those we should have a reasonable chance of getting the military effects". 
Facilitator 
"You're right, it is a job for government, it's really a collaborative effort between 
government and al the instruments of national power, of which Defence is just 
one. The National Security Committee bases the devlopment of their alternatives 
on the strategic threat scenario they are faced with. We could construct a whole 
series of scenarios that contain a rich narrative of events, actors, geography, 
politics, society, and economic ingredients. These would form a problem space. 
As they plan their way out they would determine which ingredient and its 
associated condition offers a point of leverage, a weakness that they can apply 
strength to. The aim is to change that condition in a way that is more favourable 
to us". 
"If we look at Kosovo, there is a leadership with a specific intent and a whole 
package of ingredients that make a contribution towards instability in that region, 
a system. Our role is to determine what effects can be imposed on the system to 
force it to change, to trip it into another set of behaviours. In crafting these we 
must look beyond destructive measures or the use of military force alone as the 
means. We should really be thinking about synthesising our efforts with those of 
other government departments, particularly those that have representation at the 
National Security Committee. 
The end-states that are reached after we have been successful are really an 
expression of this now changed scenario. The scenarios in front of you that we 
have been working from have been written using a very sound future forecasting 
method, they are situated well into the future, but they are reasonably expressive 
of events that could happen in a only a few months". 
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"I am convinced that is why our approach here is so powerful. We have the 
scenarios that describe drivers and the various conditions that they can exist in. 
the end-states allow us to describe the vertical movement up the table in the 
columns of those drivers that offer solutions. The effects help us explore what it is 
that we want to have happen as a result of our actions, although we haven't 
determined just what that might be. The means are the actions we can undertake, 
so the whole model cascades downwards. It is not so simple to build this from the 
bottom up, in fact I think it would be impossible to gain any meaningful 
structure". 
"There is another aspect to Special Operations undertaking this anlysis and that is 
our definition: Measures and activities designed to achieve military, political, 
psychological and economic objectives (or effects). Remember we are trying to 
shift our fixation away from military objectives, not because they are 
unimportant, but because they do not give rise to any creative or lateral thought 
on this subject. It is the political, psychological and economic effects that offer 
interesting ideas and the possibility that we can take the organisation ad its 
capabilities in a new direction. No simply because we think it is a good idea, but 
because these are informed by a more startegic orientation in our thinking". 
Participant 
"It makes sense to me. Let's give it a try and see what we come up with". 
Participant 
"I agree, I am sure something like this must be going on somewhere in the 
planning process but this approach seems to link everything together very neatly." 
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SCENARIOS 
Not the New World We Ordered 
Appendix 2 
These scenarios were derived from the futures planning workshops using Field 
Anomaly Relaxation. Although the full futures tree diagram has been presented in 
Chapter Three it is repeated at the beginning of each of the five major named 
worlds developed with the paths to that world highlighted. A Reserve officer -
Captain Richard Taylor - and a veterinarian by profession wrote them, in a 
different format. They have been modified slightly to fit this thesis. 
Home Brew 
• Indigenous Crisis 
• Drug-Crime Syndicates Sponsored Offshore 
• Eco-Cyber Terrorists 
• White Supremacy Movements 
Argy Bharji 
• SE Asia Anarchy 
• Multinational Piracy 
• China Sea Scramble 
• Antarctic Challenge 
Cast Adrift 
• Transmigration 
• Consolidated Forces of Islam 
• Climatic Chaos in Oceania 
• Australia the Pariah 
Trouble Elsewhere 
• Middle East Meltdown 
• Ebola Outbreak 
• United States Stumbles and Falls 
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• Gene Warfare 
WWlTI Everybody's Fighting 
• There Can Be Only One- Fighlto Become World Power 
• Millenmum Bug 
• Information Warfare 
• WMDs to Order 
Home Brew 
Indigenous Crisis 
2000 June 
Australian aboriginal elders express disappointment at no formal expression of 
reconciliation resulting m a widespread call for a treaty. 
2000 October 
After failure of aboriginal activists to secure any significant media coverage of 
protests during Sydney Olympic Games a new leader emerges, Jack Wangebari, 
calling on "The Koori People to bring their cause lo the world spotl ight" . 
March 2001 
255 
Appendix 2 
Impatience at resolution of land rights leads to sizeable demonstrations in Sydney, 
Melbourne, Canberra and Perth. Jack Wangebari calls for formation of 'Koori 
Assembly of Tribesmen' (KAT) to unite their cause. Several Aboriginal Elders 
denounce the new activists' movement but win wide support from urban 
indigenous people. Unsanctioned development, particularly in mining and 
logging, of lands over which aboriginal claims are pending becomes a central 
issue of protest in the opening volleys of rhetoric of the KAT organisation. 
August 2003 
Under political pressure over mounting deficit budgets and national debt and 
resentment of KAT protest disruptions; the 'All Australians Equal' Bill 
I 
effectively eliminates special consideration for aboriginals in social security. 
April2005 
The PM calls a 'Congress of Aboriginal Elders' to assure continued community 
support for their reserves. 
Conference in Noumea of 'Pacific Indigenous Peoples' attended by Pacific 
islanders; Papua New Guineans; Polynesians including April 2005Maoris, 
Melanesians, Australian Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islanders and Kanakas call for 
an international charter recognising indigenous rights. June 2005This wins 
r general international support but not regional or domestic acceptance. 
February 2007 
Armed aboriginal groups and unofficial white militia clash in Charleville. 
Fighting continues for three days until riot police reinforcements suppress 
hostilities with army assistance to pacify the hinterland. Jack Wangebari is 
arrested. Guerrilla campaign in New Caledonia commences to attempt to oust 
French rule. 
April2007 
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French New Caledonian counter-terrorist military forces conduct a successful raid 
on defended positions outside of Noumea. A large cache of small arms, 
explosives and, worryingly, several small canisters of chemical weapons are 
recovered. 
September 2008 
New Caledonian Intsum is released linking Pacific Islander terrorist organisation 
in Noumea with other radical groups, including Maori and Koori terrorist cells. 
Chemical weapons are of Iraqi origin. 
May 2009 
New Zealand police recover explosives and chemical weapon canisters in a Maori 
urban fortress after a raid in Hamilton. Origin again is Iraqi, believed to have been 
supplied through associated terrorist cells in Noumea. 
April2010 
KAT groups embark on widespread bombing campaigns initially on mining 
infrastructure at sensitive sites, two months later Parliament House in Canberra is 
targeted simultaneously with state parliament houses of each capital. 
Simultaneous outbreak of riots in rural towns and centres of larger cities by 
radical aboriginal groups to March the 51h anniversary of the Charleville uprisings 
and incarceration of Jack Wangebari. Several towns including Charleville, 
Wilcannia, Ceduna and Kunanurra fall under the control of radical indigenous 
cells. In the town of Mt Isa nerve gas is unleashed on non-indigenous population 
in response to armed civilian opposition to a KAT assault on the town 
Drug Crime Syndicates Sponsored Offshore 
June 1999 
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Conference on heroin production and trafficking held in Myanmar boycotted 
because of human rights issues by all but Australia and New Zealand. Myanmar 
government agrees in co-operation with the two target countries to assist in 
interdiction of heroin production and trafficking. 
October 2000 
The first free elections are held in Myanmar in over fifty years. Elected 
government announces the opening up of Myanmar borders to allow increased 
trade with the world. 
February 2001 
Conglomerate of Thai-based multinational corporations start acquiring properties 
in northern W A and NT after acquiring estates in newly independent East Timor 
(notably all properties have airfields). Stated purpose is for high-value tropical 
hydroponics network. 
April2002 
After extended debate Federal Government sponsors 'safe heroin administering 
havens' in all capitals and a number of regional centres to take heroin usage out of 
the streets. Cantonese Chinese in China Towns of Brisbane, Sydney and 
Melbourne take further the initiative in establishing illicit "heroin dens" 
reminiscent of opium dens of the 19th century. 
September 2002 
Japan, Malaysia and Korea lead Asian recovery and open a free trade zone to 
allow easy access to cheap labour Markets in Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Myanmar. 
Augtist 2003 
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Reserve Bank of Australia announces GDP for 2002/2003 financial year is in 
sharp Decline from 4.2% for 1999/2000 record growth to present exponential 
Decline into negative growth. 
June 2004 
Property Markets in Australia slump leaving vast numbers of property owners 
with negative equity. As emergency sell-offs follow values continue in a 
downward spiral and a patchwork of urban Decay develops in larger cities. Gangs 
of youths displaced from broken family homes acquire inexpensive properties 
collectively and fortify them against rival gangs. 
December 2004 
Government concern is expressed at the rising use of opiate drugs, principally 
heroin and designer drugs, by increasing populations of displaced youths. 
Cantonese drug trafficking syndicates are taking advantage of the rising Market 
but recently additional supply is arriving from Thai/Myanmar sources. Massive 
oversupply of opiates cause prices to drop dramatically with large quantity 
purchases (and hoarding) becomes common. Some murderous clashes occur 
between rival Cantonese and Thai-based suppliers in urban centres. 
July 2005 
Covert battles in Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne effectively shut down large 
components of the Cantonese drug supply network. Curtailment of supply results 
in sharp price rises of opiate-based drugs. Domestic crime skyrockets as gangs 
raze their urban environments to fund ongoing drug use. Large areas of cities and 
regional centres become unsafe at any time of day as gangs target the innocent for 
thefts and muggings. Rival gangs engage in territorial skirmishes. 
February 2006 
Thai intelligence sources expose the major supply route from jungle bases around 
its border with Myanmar, staging through light aircraft bases in Borneo, East 
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Timor and Northern Australia under the fronts of multinational corporate 
structures. The Australian Government gives a firm resolve to interdict the supply 
route and forms an agreement with Thai and Myanmar governments to defeat 
drug syndicates at their source. 
Eco-Cyber Terrorists 
January 2001 
The world survives the much heralded "Year 2000 Bug" (Y2K) with minor 
disruption of services and industry in non-government and non-fiscal areas. Small 
and medium capital intensive businesses are the most disrupted forcing many to 
rebuild and restructure. Mining companies are typically affected the most 
severely. Just as in the 1980's "Young Urban Professionals" (YUPpies) of the 
financial world principally came to the fore; a new breed of technologically 
trained professionals, made wealthy by a boom in demand for their services 
emerge. In Asia economic recovery favours the educated and the gulf between 
rich and poor widens. An undercurrent of popular dissent remains fermenting. 
June 2003 
Non-government Environment Summit held in Darwin attracts widespread 
interest from young educated people of Asian and western nations. Discussions 
focus on industrial pollution, nuclear waste proliferation, agricultural practices 
and pollution of waterways and food chains, forest clearing and atmosphere 
quality and developed nation environment attitudes and global warming. A firm 
but ambiguous resolve is reached to lobby governments and industrial leaders to 
adopt globally sustainable practices for "A New World for the New Millennium". 
A sophisticated campaign to market these ideas is launched across the internet. As 
technological professionals add their weight into a progressively fashionable 
movement marketing becomes intrusive, hacking into web sites of industries and 
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government departments considered to be endorsing environmentally unfriendly 
practices. 
September 2004 
The campaign metamorphoses subtly into one of Information Technology 
propaganda as information web sites and data files are corrupted by 'Ecology 
Technos' (ETs). 
November 2004 
Economic indicators, having wavered after a boom in year 2000, now have 
definitely started to slide as small and middle sized businesses that failed to 
restructure efficiently after Y2K disruption begin to fold and the multiplier effect 
of lost employment impacts on the rest of the economy. The media spotlight is 
focussed on the roles of Australian and multinational company involvement in 
mining in Papua New Guinea. Their actions in Borneo and Sumatra, involving 
forest clearing and burning, have left deep scars on the landscape and rendered the 
land unusable for many Decades. 
February 2005 
Secondary effects are that attention has also been brought onto mining and 
forestry activities within Australia. Environmental groups rumble with outrage. 
Some commentators liken the support for environmental protection now to the 
fervor of the Vietnam Moratorium movement of the early 1970's. The 
'Environmental Technos' take up the call for punitive action. 
March 2005 
There is a wave of protests outside offices of Mining and Resources Government 
department offices in Canberra, Forestry departments in State capitals and the 
offices of Australian and multinational companies thought to be involved in 
environmentally degrading activities in Sydney and Perth. The moral 
righteousness of the movement inspires and attracts growing support from 
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students and the increasing numbers of the young jobless. Over a three week 
period protests become more intense until the firebombing of a corporate office 
block in Sydney and the mass invasion of offices in Perth lead to a State and 
Federal police crackdown. 
April2005 
Riot police are used to break up subsequent attempts at staging environmentalist 
demonstrations. 
June 2005 
Attention is turned to sites of environ~ental degradation; a campaign of domestic 
sabotage on mining and forestry plant and equipment in remote areas and fertiliser 
factories and chemical plants in industrial areas begins. Increased security and 
police presence at target sites identified by HUMINT informants largely counters 
this trend. 
August 2005 
In smaller regional coastal centres heavily reliant on forestry and in towns in W A, 
QLD and NSW workers and community members protest at the threat to their 
livelihoods made by the environmentalists, claiming them as predominantly city 
dwellers ignorant of the necessities of their endeavours. 
March 2006 
Within the environmentalist movement there arises major dissent. One faction is 
appalled at the use of escalatory activities such as sabotage and bombing, with 
genuine concern for human casualties and property damage, reverting to 
individual affiliations such as to the respected institution of Greenpeace. An 
alternate faction is headed by 'Technos', gradually having accumulated the power 
of wealth as a group they now see the opportunity to bring the less educated and 
pro-action elements under their control as 'environmental soldiers'. As a splinter 
group they identify a new modus operandi of harnessing their technological edge 
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to counter activities they identify as environmentally damaging by Decisive 
means. 
11 April 2006 
Employing a media campaign that exploits information technology the new group 
attracts these 'environmental soldiers' in the hundreds. With a headquarter quorum 
of an estimated 28 technos they pool some of their considerable wealth and begin 
acquiring logistics support including small merchant· vessels; aircraft; including 
helicopters and all terrain vehicles. An arsenal of arms and munitions from 
international dealers is also built up and concealed. 
16 April 2006 
After drought affects most of Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South 
~ Australia through an El Nino summer large numbers of waterways begin choking 
with blue-green algae. The resultant ecological impact on fish and waterfowl and 
the necessity to import potable water to inland regional centres attracts wide 
media coverage. The heavy use of phosphate based fertiliser is implicated and the 
effects of phosphate leaching into waterways is highlighted by environmentalists 
groups. Technos mount a campaign challenging the credibility of environmental 
protection agencies. 
28 April 2006 
Superphosphate manufacturers around Australia and CSIRO soil analysis 
laboratories simultaneously find their data files and processing computer 
programs have been corrupted with viruses introduced by hackers. Environmental 
technos claim responsibility, boasting that they have the capability to disrupt any 
environmentally damaging industry by accessing computer networks by satellite 
up-links from their Maritime fleet. Public reactions are mixed from resounding 
support to protest from graziers and farmers to demonstrations by process workers 
laid off while fertiliser plants are forced to shut down temporarily. A report is 
published detailing how Jabiluka yellowcake, after processing, has found its way 
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to supplying plutonium-generating nuclear power plants in Pakistan with the 
product then on-sold to Arabic countries and used in a nuclear armaments 
program. Renewed protests erupt from environmentalists in Darwin as yellow 
cake is trucked into port for shipping. 
A surprise raid on phosphate mines on Christmas Island by armed 'environmental 
soldiers' results in several casualties and destruction of the mining plant. 
Subsequent investigations reveal the mines were subjected to an assault planned 
in detail and executed by ship-based helicopter insertions. Three days later 
underwater explosions sink a merchant vessel in the Arafura Sea transporting 
Jabiluka yellow cake from Ranger mines. The Australian Government announces 
its resolve to bring the environmental terrorist movement to justice. 
White Supremacy Movement 
February 2000 
The new millennia gives rise to unusual beliefs and cults; characteristically based 
on prophecies with a biblical bias. 
August 2000 
As all short-term (millennium changeover) prophecies fail to eventuate most of 
the zeal dissipates. Some cult members disassociate from the failures then 
gravitate to surviving millennia cults. One cult attracting a growing following 
within Australia, and with affiliations overseas in Europe, Canada, New Zealand 
and USA is the Phineous Priesthood. Based on the Book of Revelations the belief 
is that they are 'Soldiers of Christ' called up 'at this chosen time of Armageddon'. 
In Australia a charismatic, if not Rasputian leader, 'Seth Avatar' advises that the 
new millennia commences in September of 2010; based on the Phineous 
theological interpretation exactly 2000 years since Christ's crucifixion. Avatar 
adheres to interpretations of biblical passages, particularly in attaching spiritual 
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dimension to the stated mission of the Phineous Priesthood: "To make ready the 
world for Armageddon by preparing for purging of the mud people and the 
unworthy". 
Declining economic stability domestically combined with rising unemployment 
and wholesale failure of other cultist ideologies creates an increasingly rich 
harvest for recruitment of new members. International convention in Austria of 
I 
'Aryan Nations' includes the Phineous Priesthood as part of the synonymous 
'Christian Identity' movement. 
March2003 
Consensus is drawn of an impending Armageddon that "we have gone to sleep 
since WWII but this is going to be the awakening"; and that a new order of 
humanity will be the final result. To achieve this necessitates atonement of our 
'Brothers of Other Followings', (presumably the Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and 
Taoists;) the subjugation of those identified as 'God's Failures' and the 'Mud 
People' (identified as the coloured races and Jews.) 
February 2004 
Attention is brought on a base camp at Mt Tambourine, Queensland after police 
trace a gang of skinheads suspected of involvement in a street brawl resulting in 
the deaths of four aboriginals in Brisbane. The police contingent of eight officers 
are ambushed as they approach, withdrawing with three casualties and reporting 
close to one hundred armed defenders occupying the Mt Tambourine fortified 
base. A siege by tactical response police teams ensues reminiscent of that of 
Waco, Texas. After 10 days a police assault results in a mass suicide apparently 
prepared as a contingency by Seth Avatar and including tens of women and 
children as well as the mass of defenders. The event is the subject of intense 
media scrutiny. 
July 2004 
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The Phineous Priesthood is shown to have a larger than ever membership 
following claims for responsibility for the bombing of gay bars in Melbourne and 
Sydney, desecration of synagogues in several cities and the execution style 
murders of small groups of aboriginal men in regional towns and city centres. 
Similar events unfold in other western countries concurrently. International law 
enforcers target and follow known members of white supremacists movements 
affiliated with the Phineous Priesthood. Frequent entries to Australia through 
Cairns Airport are noted and visits to an apparent Phineous stronghold in the 
Atherton Tablelands are confirmed. 
February 2005 
A charter bus explodes in a crowded school playground in suburban Perth. 46 
children are killed and 82 injured in a horror reminiscent of Omagh, Ireland in 
1998. Later the Phineous Priesthood admits a mistake was made. The bus had 
been chartered for a Jewish school but a driver's absenteeism led to a last minute 
rescheduling. Public opinion is one of outrage with angry demands for decisive 
retribution. International media focuses on the global network of white supremacy 
movements. The Australian government declares the Phineous Priesthood 
outlawed and promises military action. With memories of the police failures at Mt 
Tambourine overseas media reports view Australia as a nation at flash point with 
political credibility at stake. 
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Argy Bharji 
South East Asian Anarchy 
January 2000 
Indonesia withdraw!i from East Timor, Australian troop~ deployed a~ 
peacekeepers in resultant power vacuum. Social infrast11.1cture becomes very 
fragile. 
February-November 2000 
Clashes between combined PNG/Indonesian patrols and anti-separatists guerillas 
in West Irian/PNG borderlands, both coastal and highlands. 
December 2000 
South East Asia monsoons fail, region is thrown into drought Crop failures fuel 
dissent actions in some areas. Indonesia withdraws from West Irian. PNG calls on 
Australia for assistance in quelling violent dissents, in response to an absence of 
Indonesian rule between indigenous and Melanesian groups. 
June 2002 
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Commitment to Bougainville continues. Serious rioting in Jakarta spreading to 
Surabaya and Bandung as protests at the Indonesian government's failure to 
address the dire economic situation deteriorate into venting of frustrations by 
large sections of the population. 
January 2004 
After nearly two weeks of violence spreading into other provinces of Indonesia 
the government steps down, declaring martial law. New elections are announced 
for April the following year. 
June 2004 
A Kuala Lumpur government corruption scandal precipitates widespread 
demonstrations in Malaysia eventuating in partial suppression by riot police in the 
capital but necessitating full military action in other areas. 
November 2004 
Indonesian elections result in a questionable overwhelming majority for the head 
of military forces as president. Singapore raises in the UN forum the issue of a 
growing refugee problem as both Indonesians and Malaysians flee to Singapore. 
March 2005 
Recurrence of civil unrest in Kuala Lumpur as government orders a crackdown on 
dissidents. The Malaysian Army is used to assist civil authorities. Thailand 
expresses concern at a potential meltdown to civil war on its border as internal 
rifts emerge within the Malaysian military. 
December 2006 
Thailand sends troops across its southern border into Malaysia to create a buffer 
against unrest and refugee influx. Singapore likewise responds by sending troops 
into the Malay peninsula and into Sumatra in an attempt to interdict the growing 
refugee problem. 
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March 2008 
Australian humanitarian effort is expanded in Indonesia as it still faces 
widespread famine and starvation. Humanitarian workers request the assistance of 
Australian military escorts as it becomes apparent that large armed mobs are 
beyond the control of the Indonesian military in the more remote areas where aid 
distribution networks are stretched. 
June 2008 
China announces serious concern at what it views as a scramble for territories 
brought on by power vacuums as .successive governments fail in SE Asia. 
Included in the rhetoric is reference to 'Australian New Imperialism'. Vietnam 
enters the situation by publicly backing Chinese initiatives for naval exercises in 
the South China Sea. Others view this as a treacherous and shallow means to 
secure continued aid following successive poor crop yields. Thailand and the 
Philippines call for support from Australia and Japan in deterring the exercising of 
Chinese military forces in SE Asia. Peaceful protests are held in Australian 
capitals against embroiling Australian Military Forces any further in what to be an 
(inevitable) escalating conflict in SE Asia. 
Multinational Piracy 
June 2003 
Indonesia experiences further internal turmoil after the 1999 elections. Modest 
economic recovery has been made by attracting some multinational corporations 
through offers of a 'tax haven' status. 
October 2004 
A world market downturn in metal prices with declining demand following 
recession of steel, aluminum and alloy manufacturing nations jars Australia's 
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economy. Rationalisation follows in Australian mining industry with 
fragmentation and takeovers leading to consolidation of the domestic ore mining 
industry being restricted to several conglomerates only. One notable multinational 
group, 'The Firm', also buys interests in SE Indonesia, attracted by tax 
concessions and cheap labor as well as accessibility to shipping. Security 
eencerns lead to raising of corporate paramilitary forces of both maritime and 
land forces ostensibly to protect their commercial interests. Most recruitment 
comes from former Indonesian militia disenchanted by poor pay and conditions 
from their own government 
March 2005 
Indonesia relaxes its control over Moluccas and Lombok-Makassar Straits in 
favour of tacit contracts to commercial paramilitary forces to escort their mining 
product north. There are widespread rebel threats of Maritime piracy made from 
pro-integrationist groups on Timor as well as separatists of the Ceram and Lesser 
Sunda Islands. 
May2005 
'The Firm' declares key shipping channels as their 'Zones of Economic Control'. 
In order to offset costs of providing security they impose 'Safe Transit Fees'. 
Shipping through these waters are imposed a variable scale of fees on the spot. In 
the UN this raises loud international protests and is regarded as protection 
reminiscent of the Chicago gangster era. 
June 2005 
'The Firm' procures a small fleet of destroyers apparently purchased through 
brokers after Decommissioning from the Russian Navy. The stated use is for safe 
escort of commercial shipping, however, they are instrumental in imposing a 
board and search procedure on shipping from rival multinational conglomerates 
carrying Australian escorts. At the end of the month small arms exchanges on 
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boarded ships are reported before the impounding of three ships transporting ores 
from Australia to Korea and Japan. 
July 2005 
Australian government diplomatic approaches to Indonesia to resolve this 
. interruption to domestic exports are met with polite apologies but an expression of 
an inability to intervene. While UN argument continues over legality of 'The 
" Firm's' actions, supported by a collection of countries benefiting significantly 
from revenue raised from 'The Firms' activities, no sanction is forthcoming for 
~ Australian naval action. Domestically opinions favour action. 
China Sea Scramble 
June 2003 
Definition of national economies in the new millennia is becoming increasingly 
blurred as large multinational conglomerates acquire corporations and resources 
throughout the Region. Depreciation in Asian corporate empires through the 
economic crisis of the late 201h century has facilitated the process. 
March2005 
Environmental concerns regarding the fire-clearing of jungles, ocean outfalls of 
industrial effluent, over-fishing and land degradation leads to ASEAN Nations 
agreeing to a joint program for the preservation of the region's resources for the 
future. 
August 2005 
After many years of lobbying, Australia is finally invited to join ASEAN. 
Cheap production costs lure multinational conglomerates to establish heavy 
industry interests in Southern Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan, 
including petrochemical industries such as plastics and oil refineries. 
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February 2006 
Multinational sponsored exploration of the Northern Australian Basin begins in 
agreement with Indonesian interests. 
August 2007 
Failure to produce adequate oil reserves from the Northern Australian Basin 
coupled with OPEC upward pressures on oil prices leads commercial interests to 
look to the South China Sea. Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam and 
Malaysia reach a consensus to exploit Spratley and in principle, the Paracel 
Islands for their oil potential. 
January 2008 
Corporate occupation of Spratley Islands begins. China voices its objections and 
moves a maritime taskforce to claim the Paracel Islands. A naval encounter with 
Vietnamese naval forces south of Hai Nan secures a Chinese victory and firms 
their posture in the South China Sea. 
February 2008 
Naval approaches to the Philippines 300 nautical miles from the coast of Manila 
is headed off by a strong presentation of naval and air force by the Philippines. 
Singaporean, Malaysian and Vietnamese military forces are mobilised, Japan 
supports a US carrier group movement into the Taiwan Strait. ASEAN calls on its 
allies, including Australia for naval and specialist support in confirming their 
international rights for exploitation of the South China Sea. 
Antarctic Challenge 
November 2004 
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After a three and a half year period of conflict involving tribal rebellions in the 
Congo and Angolan areas of southern Africa peace is restored by cooperative 
military counter insurgency between South African, Zimbabwe, Tanzanian, 
Mozambique, Ugandan and Kenyan military coalition. To all participants it is 
evident that stability in their region will depend on mature governments 
cooperating. 
January 2005 
OPEC raises oil prices by 18% by restricting supply, precipitated by diminishing 
yields from existing oil wells and mostly poor results from new exploratory 
drillings. India, with an accelerating domestic industrial development, steps up its 
exploratory ventures around its own continental shelf and further south into the 
Indian Ocean in a joint venture with Indonesia. 
May2005 
The African Union, loosely modelled on the success of the European Union, is 
formed. Immediately Mozambique raises concern about increasing Indian naval 
presence off its coastal waters and around those of Madagascar. Common defence 
and developing domestic industrial base toward maturing economies are the first 
stated aims of the African Union. 
June 2006 
Inflationary effects of increased oil prices adversely affect the European, 
Canadian and United States economies. Renewed exploration in the North and 
Irish Seas and within the Scandinavian Arctic Circle for oil is not promising. 
Britain and European partnerships venture into the South Atlantic, staged out of 
the Falkland Islands, for new oil fields. The United States explores southwards 
into the Pacific and Southern Oceans likewise in searches. 
January 2008 
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Australian Antarctic overflights locate an unidentified expedition with heavy 
tracked vehicles in western Australian Antarctic Territory. An investigative team 
is despatched by helicopter from Mawson Antarctic Base. After landing nearby, 
the team discovers that the expedition belongs to a South African group exploring 
for oil fields to supply to the developing African Union nations. 
February 2008 
Reports of the African intrusion into Australian Antarctic Territory results in 
Australian diplomatic protests reinforced by the remainder of the Southern 
Hemisphere international community, particularly New Zealand. Protests levelled 
at the African Union are stone-walleq, with representatives of the member nations 
insisting that the African expedition are of a multinational oil company, without 
knowledge or consent from The African Union member nations. 
Australia's Mawson Base sends a representative lobby group to the African 
Union's Antarctic Expeditionary base camp, now stationary and drilling for core 
samples. The Australian contingent orders the Africans to cease drilling and make 
arrangements for their departure from Australian Antarctic territory. After several 
days of non-compliance the Australians become increasingly agitated by the 
apparent arrogance of the drilling team and sustained non-compliance with 
conveyed Australian government demands to cease their explorations and 
withdraw from Australian Antarctic Territory immediately before the winter seals 
them in. A heated argument ensues and the March 2008Africans produce small 
arms sub-machineguns. A young African worker, in an attempt to fire shots over 
the heads of the Australians, fails to control his weapon and unintentionally kills 
one Australian delegate and wounds another. Australia resolves under popular 
public consensus, to issue a final ultimatum for withdrawal. African oil drilling 
activities continue in Antarctica. The Australian Government orders a military 
land force strike on the African Party 
274 
Appendix 2 
Cast Adrift 
Transmigration 
July 2000 
Economic crisis in Asia concertinas inro developing regional countries in a 
'second wave' as long-term impact of defaults by creditors and the collapse of 
infrastructure generating industries is fully fe lt. Where possible governments try 
to attempt public led recoveries by tryi ng to bolster infrastructure projects and by 
increased defence related industry spending. 
Febntary 2004 
Drought brings about widespread failure in the rice crops across the Indian sub-
continent. southern China and SE Asia. Japan is moderately affected by failu re of 
mon oonal rains. Regional trade s lumps further as trade barriers are raised and 
Australian agricultural and mineral exports consequently decline. Australia is 
inexorably drawn into the regional recession. European and American economies 
are successfully insulated by measures implemented against the earlier Asian 
economic crisis of l997. 
August 2005 
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Asia has slid into an economic and social abyss and Australia, now reliant on 
regional trade, follows the downward spiral. As Australian unemployment rises 
above 18%, social unrest is marked by escalating crime and violence. Negative 
returns on rural endeavour bring record farm foreclosures and much productive 
land lies fallow while nearby Asia face famine. 
March 2006 
Asian waterways are becoming animated, as people faced with starvation 
following the fourth year of famine become desperate to find a better existence by 
emigration. India announces a plan to lead the world in merchant marine industry 
by government sponsored radical enlargement of the ship building industry. In an 
effort to tap into the wealthier economies of the rest of the world India begins 
marketing mass maritime transport. New shipyards are commenced in Madras and 
Bombay. 
August 2006 
Sri Lanka falls under Indian caretaker government after escalated civil conflict 
renders the previous government incapable of managing its internal affairs. SE 
Asia, Japan, Australia and New Zealand remain in economic doldrums as the 
inertia to restart their economies fails with loss of faith from the thriving 
economies of the rest of the world. French and British peacekeeping forces are 
deployed into Fiji following a failed military coup after a pro-Indian government 
is seated in power. Indian migration into SE Asia is markedly increased with 
maritime fares slashed as new ships begin to come onto line. 
October 2006-November 2007 
Deserted farms and paddy fields attract masses of Indian peasants. Dislocated 
Malays, Melanesians and Indonesians continue to relocate from their home 
countries, now often on Indian passenger ships, in a general south east direction in 
search of a better life. 
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January 2008 
Unmanageable waves of illegal immigrants begin to arrive at Port Headland, 
Broome, Derby, Wyndham and Darwin. In the first six months of the year an 
estimated two and a half million illegal immigrants arrive in Australia's 
northwest. Indian maritime is operating apparently with the tacit consent of its 
government. Australia's protests are lost in the mass trend of transmigration being 
experienced by all SE Asian countries. The UN, inundated with grievances from 
affected countries, fails to develop a plan of action. 
Consolidated Forces of Islam 
January 2001 
Saddam Hussein dies of a coronary heart attack. A brief struggle takes place to 
establish the Minister for Internal Affairs as his successor over Saddam Hussein's 
nephew. Saddam Hussein's relatives quickly escape into self-imposed exile. 
Religious motivated violence repeatedly flares in regions of Indonesia; Local 
dissent takes on a religious fervour and spreads collaterally into Borneo, Sulawesi 
and eastern Malaysia. Dissent in Myanmar begins to flare as Muslim sections of 
the population hear of a renewal of their faith in other nations and try to assert 
their own religious freedoms. 
March2003 
A summit of Arabic nations held in Cairo forms a new and deep alliance, made 
possible by the rise of a new generation of national leaders. Its aim is to bind the 
member nations under a common constitution. The alliance is initially comprised 
of ten nations: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, 
Iraq and Iran bond under a common zeal to promote the Muslim faith to world 
power status politically in order to spread the message of Allah as the dominant 
world faith. 
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February 2005 
After several conferences the new constitution has been drafted and ratified 
between the member states, which have now increased to 15, including Algiers, 
Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Nations of Allah have 
agreed to be governed overall by representation in a congress located in Mecca. 
the world is astonished at the rapidity and magnitude of this consolidation. The 
new national leaders have their people largely excited in playing an historic part 
in the promulgation of their faith. Based on peace by consensus, old conflicts 
have apparently been put aside. 
The first sitting of the Congress of the Nations of Allah takes place in Mecca with 
religious leaders appointed from each member nation. The message to all the 
faithful is to spread the word of Mohamed further around the globe. In Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Indonesia and other countries with a critical mass of Muslims these 
direction is transmuted to become known as 'The Crusade of Jihad'. Whilst the 
formation of the 'Nations of Allah' has brought stability and peace to the Middle 
East the opposite effect is taking place in SE Asia. Australia is, in a lesser way, 
embroiled in religious motivated violence as youth gangs from some Arabic 
countries interpret the movement to be a calling to inflict retribution on other 
ethnic groups such as the Turkish and Indian ethnic communities and the Jewish 
faith. 
December 2005 
Religious fervour has continued to increase intensity of conflict between 
Christians and Muslims in Indonesia, Muslims and Hindus in Myanmar and 
Muslims, Buddhists and Taoists in Malaysia and the Philippines. It is as if the 
former conflicts of the Middle East have simply been transferred to the Far East. 
February 2006 
An undeclared state of civil war has developed in Indonesia and parts of Malaysia 
and the Philippines. Religious terrorism by way of bombings and armed clashes 
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occur in urban Australia. Christian groups in Indonesia, with little or no 
government control over the violence, call on friendly nations to help pacify their 
regions. 
Climactic Chaos in Oceania 
March 2005 
After a three-year stunted recovery SE Asia is again left behind by the western 
economies. This time around Australia, with its trade and financial ties further 
developed with its neighbours, is not so insulated from the Asian economic 
decline. 
May 2005 
A United Nations environmental report reveals that ocean temperatures have risen 
by almost two degrees Celsius over the last 100 years. Ocean levels are 
unmistakably rising by over one metre in this period. Polar ice caps are 
diminishing in size and icebergs in the Arctic and Southern Oceans are a more 
frequent occurrence as they detach and begin drifting. Whale migration patterns 
are changing as available ocean nutrients diminish. Penguin and sea lion 
populations are also being affected as repercussions are felt through the food 
chains. 
September 2005 
Record neap tides begin to be experienced with flooding of sea front settlements 
and towns becoming commonplace globally. Tropical monsoons and hurricanes in 
the mid-Pacific and Atlantic oceans have caused much damage during the 
Northern Hemisphere seasons. 
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March 2006 
Emergency aid and rescue programs have been mobilised in the Caribbean and 
northern Pacific islands. 
Extremely violent cyclones ravage the south Pacific. Indonesia, Papua New 
Guinea and Northern Australia each declare emergencies after receiving a 
battering from devastating storms. Evacuation of numerous coastal towns creates 
a policing problem in the affected countries, both from refugees and from looting 
within deserted settlements. 
April2006 
The direst emergencies of the season occur through the south Pacific Islands as 
smaller atolls are all but submerged and islands are flooded. The emergency takes 
on an international dimension as the small nations of Solomon Islands, Fiji, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and French Polynesia call for assistance in evacuating many of 
their islands. An international response first from the nearest developed and able 
countries rescues thousands of displaced islanders. French, Malaysian, 
Singaporean, Australian, New Zealand, French and British naval and air assets are 
the first to assist. Japan offers assistance once it has attended to lesser 
emergencies closer to it in the Marinas and Marshall Islands in cooperation with 
the United States. 
May2007 
India surprises the international effort by arriving six days after the emergency 
effort commences with a relatively large naval fleet, first at the Solomon Islands 
and then at Fiji and Tonga. 
June 2007 
Tongan and Fijian governments are dismayed at the numbers of Indian Marines 
left in their countries ostensibly as assistance to civil security and as 
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reconstruction parties. Indian fleet command procrastinates in replying to Fiji's 
query as to when the Indian military will withdraw. Fiji loses its patience when an 
ultimatum for commencement of withdrawal by Indian troops is ignored and it 
becomes evident that presence is subtly being built up in the Solomon Islands, 
Fiji, Tonga and Tuvalu Islands. Fiji speaks collectively for its neighbours and asks 
for Australian, British and New Zealand military presence to help intimidate the 
Indian forces to withdraw. 
Australia the Pariah 
November 1999 
The right of appeal to immigration courts is abolished in Australia. Suspect 
visitors have a bond imposed before being allowed entry. 
February 2001 
Australia, with memories of disclosure of the full scale of atrocities discovered 
recently in East Timor, leads renewed criticism of abuses of human rights in 
Indonesia, Myanmar and China. USA tries to soften the strength of attack on its 
most favoured trading partner but Australia maintains its stance. 
August 2001 
Australia again comes under international criticism, particularly from European 
nations, for its refusal to adhere to targets to reduce green house emissions on the 
grounds that geographical and socio-structural differences for Australia make 
these targets unattainable without severe compromises to the economy. 
November 2001 
The USA, having bought emission permits from less developed South American 
countries, joins in the condemnation of Australian intransigence on the issue. 
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March 2002 
Australia, with a change of government, reduces immigration quotas significantly 
as unemployment rises. Renewed religious motivated violence and moves for 
autonomy in Indonesian islands and Timor escalate. 
July 2002 
Internal conflict in Indonesia and East Timor results in increased migration into 
northern Australia. A Red Cross report slams living conditions in internment 
camps in northern Australia. Legal rights of internees under Australian law are 
branded as unacceptable. 
October 2002 
Australia implores neighbouring countries to impose restraints on their 
emigration. 
December 2002 
Unable to create additional detention holding facilities for illegal immigrants and 
pressured by international condemnation of treatment of detainees, capped by 
domestic outcries to curb immigration; Australia tasks the navy to drive ships 
arriving with illegal immigrants back out to sea. Whilst an Australian Navy 
destroyer is attempting to tow a merchant freighter overcrowded with 
Melanesians intent on illegal immigration a disaster predictably occurs. 
January 2003 
The merchant freighter lists and sinks in heavy swells in the Timor Sea. 
Melanesian casualties are in the hundreds. Global censure follows. USA and 
European media vilifies Australian hypocrisy over human rights and Australian 
policies. 
282 
Appendix 2 
February 2003 
In East Timor pro-integrationists Timorese Popular Democratic Association 
(Apodeti) seize the opportunity to denounce Australia's part in participation in 
peacekeeping duties there. 
March 2003 
A campaign by pro-integrationists to escalate violence in East Timor targets 
Australian military bases in East Timor. Other Indonesian islands follow suit, 
particularly in Ambon. Protests arise from ethnic groups within Australia, 
particularly Asians in inner cities, over immigration restrictions. Many examples 
of the government refusing family unification by disallowing immigration of 
extended family relatives are brought to the attention of the international media 
now focussed on the issue. 
Counter protests by Australians feeling estranged by large areas of the urban 
landscape being dominated by imported cultures and resentful of the poor 
economic situation support the government actions on immigration. To counter 
the escalation of violence perpetrated by pro-integrationists in East Timor an 
increased counter-insurgency style operation is stepped up by large Australian 
Army fighting patrols. 
In the hills near Manatutu an Australian Army company stumbles on to large 
Apodeti militia base. After a brief but bitter battle 67 Australian soldiers, mostly 
wounded, are taken prisoner. 
Apodeti forces announce demands for disarmament of independence fighters and 
withdrawal of Australians from East Timor. After a week of failed dialogue 
between Australians and Apodeti military leaders the Apodeti threaten to begin 
executing the prisoners, referring to them as 'hostages'. In Australia loud outcries 
convince the government to take decisive action. 
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Trouble Elsewhere 
Middle East Meltdown 
October 200 I 
After surviving the meltdown of neighboring Asian economies Australia 
succumbs to long term reduction in regional trade and slips into recession. 
January 2002 
Iraq renews a loose alliance with Egypt. Syria and Jordan as intermediaries in 
trade after relaxation of the ten-year-old trade sanctions. 
March 2002 
Israel elects a right-wing hard-line government. 
June 2002 
A renewed escalation of Kurdish uprisings in eastern Turkey. northern Iraq and 
Syria induces coalition forces to split focus of enforcement of no-fly zones over 
both the northern and southern Iraqi border air corridors. 
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August 2002 
A diplomatic dispute escalates between Israel and Palestine, as agreements are 
reneged upon under new Israeli intransigence. Palestine receives the backing of 
Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Iraq joins with renewed rhetoric against Israel. Syrian 
forces clash in limited armoured skirmishes during Israeli military exercises on 
their mutual borders. 
February 2003 
Iraq launches a conventional ground offensive to route Kurdish guerrillas in the 
north. USA fails to convince coalition partners to intervene by launching military 
air strikes. 
September 2003 
Israel raises alarm in the UN of renewed WMD in Iraq's arsenals. 
After months of frustration in trying to rally support to force Iraq again to 
relinquish its WMDs, Israel launches its own air offensive against suspected Iraqi 
stockpiles of chemical/biological weapons. Iraq retaliates with SCUD strikes onto 
Israeli cities. Syria and October 2003 Jordan mobilise their military forces and 
sanction passage of Iraqi forces through their countries. Iraq poises on three axes 
of advance near the Israeli borders. Iraq precedes conventional invasion into 
Israel with chemical attacks on Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. Two days later Israel 
replies with limited yield nuclear strikes on Iraqi conventional forces in Syria and 
Jordan. Iraq succeeds the following night in delivering a high yield nuclear bomb 
onto Tel Aviv. 
December 2003 
A five day war with exchange of repeated nuclear strikes as well as deployment of 
chemical and biological weaponry from Iraq ensues before military commands of 
both sides, now without government, sue for peace brokered by Coalition forces 
from their stand off positions for intervention. A dust cloud of fallout 
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circumnavigates the globe forming an annulus north of the Tropic of Cancer, the 
bulk of which initially precipitates onto the Indian sub-continent and far east Asia, 
however some reaches over to Mexico, Cuba and the Caribbean. 
February 2004 
Outbreaks of a myriad of deadly illnesses in populations and stock in the lower 
Northern Hemisphere follow. Pakistan, India and Bangladesh are the worst 
affected although serious epidemics also occur in Southern China, Myanmar, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. World economic markets are thrown into 
turmoil with uncertainty of the full implications. Australia's recession is 
exacerbated. Some Jewish, Palestinian, Kurdish and Arabic terrorist cells continue 
to fight domestically in Europe. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) unravels several viral and bacterial 
strains from the NBC Middle East War fallout but are stretching their resources to 
address the pandemic problems. In affected countries lawlessness and armed 
banditry is also becoming rife as civil and military personnel are affected with 
illness alongside the rest of their populations. The UN appeals for special aid 
teams from all countries able to provide assistance in mass vaccination programs. 
Ebola Outbreak 
April2006 
Escalation of rebellion in the former Belgian and German Congos results in 
significant conflict embroiling Ugandan, Kenyan, Tanzanian and Zairian military 
forces. Ecological crisis arises as Zaire forces employ defoliation by chemical and 
fire tactics to route rebel Hutus and renegade Tutsis in and around Rwanda. 
Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya are swamped with refugees; collectively there is a 
call for international rescue of displaced populations. Uganda additionally alerts 
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the international community to the dire threats to gorilla and other primate 
populations forced to move also displaced. 
The sight of monkeys scavenging in the refugee camps becomes commonplace. 
Indian, European and US aid is forthcoming. Expatriate countries, Belgium, 
France, Germany and the United States offer a sponsored migration program to 
relieve an otherwise overwhelming refugee problem. International wildlife rescue 
bids relocate endangered gorillas and other primates to a variety of international 
zoos and refuges set up specifically to handle the scale of the problem. Displaced 
peoples are given an option under a quota for emigration to these same sponsor 
nations. 
June 2006 
Illness besets refugee camps in Africa and those quarantined in host nations; 
USA, France, Germany, Belgium and India. Symptoms are variably flu like 
condition, progressing to febrile delirium or alternately dysentery with violent 
abdominal cramps progressing to unconsciousness. Morbidity and mortality rise 
to alarming proportions within eight days. Simultaneously, a world-wide 
'Zookeepers Syndrome' is reported through toxicology web sites of similar 
symptomology. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) subsequently identifies the pathogen as 
Ebola Virus. Global quarantine measures are immediately effected; however, 
secondary cases outside refugee concentrations are reported in the next week. 
Panic arises in areas around reported Ebola spot fires. In Florida a military 
mobilisation is necessitated to contain fleeing populations. In Europe, similar 
containment measures are also enforced. In India panicking mobs overcome 
police lines meant to confine them in villages and areas of outbreak. In a plethora 
of nations the so called 'Zookeeper Syndrome' results in such a scattered pattern 
of outbreaks that police with military assistance cannot move fast enough to 
contain those in contact. 
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July 2006 
Throughout the western world a pin cushion pattern of outbreaks is generated as 
secondary Ebola cases propagate to tertiary contact patients. In most countries 
outbreaks are contained but in the near tropics of Florida, Southern India and in 
central Africa itself the outbreaks threaten anarchy as police and other security 
agents, hospital staff and medical workers also begin to affected. 
August 2006 
Police and military resources can only just manage fragmentation of national 
administrations. In this month, however, some patients begin to recover, 
particularly in the temperate areas of Europe, northern United States 
United States Stumbles and Falls 
August 2008 
United States continues to experience internal agitation. Economic disruption 
partly created by Y2K effects on production and services fuels the disquiet. In 
Washington D.C. A gathering of blacks as a show of solidarity if not force, is held 
again, organised by Louis Farrakhan to mark five years since the first uprising. 
Again over a million people participate. The Muslim intonation set by this leader 
is identified by right-wing whites as Arabic and therefore deplorable. 
September 2008 
A counter demonstration of force is played out in Washington D.C. involving 
right-wing white supremacist groups joined by factions of the National Firearms 
Association. The burning of effigies before The White House ignites fervour in 
the melee. A black counter protest at the racially inspired show of hatred brings 
about a violent clash. Attempts by police and security forces to quell the 
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hostilities spreads violence further into the city's streets. Destruction of property 
and looting continues into the night. 
October 2008 
The President calls out National Guard. Tear gas and baton rounds are used 
against armed and angry mobs. Small arms fired, there are some injuries and 
many arrests but the uprising is quelled in the short term. Public regard for the 
government deteriorates, winter sets in, the poor and· disadvantaged feel colder, 
poorer and increasingly disadvantaged as the Executive claims to be fixing all 
economic ills for the people. In reality only the working middle and upper classes 
are benefiting from new government strategies. Class resentment is now added to 
the still seething racial unrest of a few weeks before. Employment security is at an 
all time low and fear of losing what security they have sends America's working 
poor onto the streets to highlight their plight. 
December 2008 
North America is largely non-unionised and non-militant. Union membership 
increases and waves of rolling stoppages start to damage essential services such as 
power, mail, transport and hygiene services. 
March2009 
As problems develop and increasing numbers of 'uninvolved' Americans are 
affected by shortage resentment grows, random violence escalates with shootings, 
robberies and murders. There are numerous violent demonstrations all across the 
US, far too many for the National Guard to deal with adequately. Rationalism is at 
an all time high. At an understaffed military biological warfare installation in the 
Nevada desert, there is an accident. 
The prevailing winds are blowing the wrong way and instead of dissipating 
harmlessly over the desert, the pathogen spreads westward into populous 
California, killing hundreds and infecting thousands. In spite of Governmental 
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denials, the high profile media coverage, rumours about bungled containment 
programs and the coverage of struggling, overfilled hospitals are too much for the 
people. 
April2009 
Fear explodes across the nation, people panic and try to escape the west coast 
where all is chaotic, Traffic accidents, riots, murders and looting ensue ... racial 
and class resentments rise again in the panic. The anny is called in but is itself 
fragmented with sick and disaffected soldiers. 
August 2009 
Internationally among the globally spread US military bases morale plummets for 
fear of the plight of family and friends at home. Military strength is thinned out as 
units are recalled to assist in restoring domestic stability. 
October 2009 
The global finance world is thrown into a spiral as loss of confidence depreciates 
the $US dragging linked currencies with it. 
December 2009 
US Federal Government announces reluctant downscaling of foreign aid. Third 
world countries look for new friends in the world. 
January 2010 
US forces in the Balkans are reduced by over 80% as military personnel are 
recalled. Air bases in Turkey and the Gulf are likewise thinned out. United States 
carrier groups and submarines are recalled to Hawaii and the Western seaboard 
leaving an all time low presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
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May 2010 
Violent clashes in the Balkans again flare between ethnic groups. Iraq and Turkey 
renew their persecution of their Kurdish populations. 
June 2010 
NATO and Russian forces are taxed to contain renewed fighting. Renewed 
fighting in Panama and Nicaragua erupts forcing the remaining US military to 
withdraw. Australia again seeks membership of ASEAN and is accepted this time 
as nations realise the increased need to maintain stability in the region with a 
diminishing US influence. 
November 2010 
~ The US calls on its coalition partners to increase their commitments in 
maintaining global stability. Britain, France, Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
agree to deploy greater military strength to key areas to help avoid potential chaos 
as the 'Global Policeman' retires. India volunteers to assist policing the Indian 
Ocean, Japan seeks to change its Constitution through the Diet to patrol the 
Marchianas, Marchtial Islands, Micronesia, Sea of Japan and East China Sea to 
the Taiwan Strait. 
ASEAN nations meet to renew a more vigilant strategy of poise in Southeast 
Asia. Australia and New Zealand reach agreement on new responsibilities for 
policing the South Pacific Ocean. A surprise amphibious attack on the under 
manned Diego Garcia, succeeds in establishing an Iranian presence on the 
formerly strong US base. Both the US and the UK do not have significant naval 
assets in the region and call on their traditional allies in the region for immediate 
assistance to reassert control. The tacit implication is their desire to not see India 
seize the opportunity to assert control. 
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Gene Warfare 
November 1989 
A new disease is documented in the United Kingdom affecting the national cattle 
herd - Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis. (BSE) - as a viron apparently mutated 
from that affecting sheep, causing the 'slow virus' disease Scrapie. Attention and 
research is directed toward this new evidence of nucleic acids able to cross 
species barriers. 
September 1995 
'Accidental' release of an experimental calicivirus from a CSIRO research station 
on Kangaroo Island off the coast South Australia - Haemorrhagic Viral Disease 
(HVD) -results in the death of 95% of rabbits in that state within six weeks. The 
model is of extreme concern for epidemiologists; particularly those involved in 
biological/counter-biological warfare studies, but also those purely concerned 
with public health worldwide. 
November 1997 
Anxiety over public health is amplified with the announcement of a suspected link 
between BSE and Croitszfeldts-Jakobs disease in humans, evident in its onset 
within the brain's cerebral medulla with delayed symptoms of several years. 
Epidemiological studies in the United Kingdom are inconclusive, as is the ability 
to trace the presence of viron nucleic acids. 
April1998 
Concern over the use of genetic engineering in monoculture of foods mounts, 
with fears of long-term integrity of individual human DNA as well as that of 
uncontrolled propagation of dominance enhanced genomes and their potential to 
ascend food chains with unpredictable consequences. 
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August 2001 
Pleas by Iraq for a lift of trade sanctions after ten years of hardships imposed after 
their defeat by coalition forces in The Gulf War are rejected by a UN Council 
after reports that Iraq's continued research and development in WMD's cannot be 
ruled out. After a period of halcyonic development, even leading the world in 
economic growth, Australia begins a period of down turn. Trade August 2003with 
Asian neighbours has deteriorated in mineral and manufactured commodities but 
new agreements on trade in agricultural goods has restored investor confidence, 
particularly Trans-Pacific trade in agricultural goods. With the economic down 
turn Australia uses quarantine as an argument for enhanced barriers to agricultural 
imports. 
September 2003 
An outbreak in South East Asia of a new disease in rice - Rice Rot Diseases 
(RRD) - causing husks to deteriorate prematurely results in general crop failure. 
China and Japan, although mostly self sufficient, have no rice surplus to offer. 
With the threat of famine alternatives are sought to the rice staple. This includes 
cereals and processed cereal products. Spoilt rice is silaged and fed to livestock. 
October 2003 
Cereal crops across Canada, United States, Western Europe and Russia result in a 
disastrous failure in wheat, sorghum, rye and barley harvests as they ubiquitously 
succumb to various fungal and viral disease as they approach maturity. 
Commodity prices for cereals and cereal by-products skyrocket as a result. 
Australian, New Zealand and South African producers receive enormous 
incidental benefits. In Canada, Europe and the United States spoilt crops are, 
where possible, processed and used as stock foods. 
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February 2004 
Northern Hemisphere prevalence of crop failures leads to urgent agricultural 
science investigations commissioned by various countries around the globe. The 
only areas not apparently affected in the Northern Hemisphere appear to be 
northern Africa where a diet of cous-cous, taken from immature wheat husks and 
semolina from millet continues to be consumed as a staple. Almost 
simultaneously British, Canadian and German researches discover a common and 
apparently new genome in wheat varieties collected from around the Northern 
Hemisphere. 
This genetic research, which would have taken over a decade only twenty years 
before, has been assisted by nucleic acid mapping databases developed and 
recorded by genetic research laboratories. The new genome, masking several 
believed responsible for plant resistance to diseases as well as some affecting 
metabolisable protein contents and thus well mapped from research, has appeared 
inexplicably in multiple wheat varieties. Within several days an almost identical 
nucleic acid sequence is demonstrated in other cereal types. The next week the 
same disease is discovered, although fragmented into several loci, in rice samples 
from India and Southeast China. 
March 2004 
Testing of samples from the Southern Hemisphere prove negative except for some 
cereals from Brazil, Venezuela and Chile. Speculation is that quarantine has been 
effective in protecting Australia and New Zealand. Explanation is not found for 
samples from the African countries to be free of the offending genomes, however 
an additional genome is found prevalent in these African samples subsequently 
shown to code traits known to dominate those found at the loci of the 'alien' 
nucleic acid sites. 
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Catastrophe strikes the livestock industries of the Northern Hemisphere as feedlot 
animals succumb to a peculiar cerebral storage disease. Typically affected 
animals rapidly become dumb and stand catatonically with no motivation to move 
at all being evident. After several days, particularly on being coerced to move, 
drink or graze, these animals will suddenly fall, sometimes seizure, scream and 
die. Post-mortem consistently show an increased fluid accumulation, sometimes 
with blood present, in the white matter of the brain cerebrum around the brain 
stem. Microscopy and culture do not reveal any bacterial presence and affected 
animals are seronegative to any known pathogen for such an encephalitis. 
May2004 
After a number of months a breakthrough is made by Canadian researchers 
discovering the presence in the nucleic acids of affected animals of an alien DNA 
sequence resembling that in Rice Rot Disease and in the offending genome 
causing maturing cereal crops around the northern hemisphere to fail. 
Repercussions of combined staple crop failure and evidence of a vicious viron 
ascending food chains pandemic throughout Asia, Europe and Northern America 
are of fear and panic. 
In Auckland an Algerian posing as a representative of an agricultural business is 
apprehended for suspicion of the authenticity of his passport and identity. Several 
canisters are discovered in his personal luggage containing vacuum-sealed dust. 
Forensic examination proceeds as the man's explanations of his identity and 
purpose for visiting the country continue to arouse suspicion. The canister 
contents are identified as modified wheat, barley, rye and sorghum pollens with 
modified genetic content. The altered nucleic acid sequences are flagged as 
identical to those found in failing Northern Hemisphere cereal crops. 
Two weeks later a Tunisian woman is likewise apprehended for possession of 
several identical canisters in her possession in Rio de Janeiro. Later in the same 
week a Libyan woman claiming to be reuniting with her immigrant uncle is 
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detained in Melbourne, several of the offending canisters are found to be in her 
possession. Specialised interrogation of the detainee two days later discloses that 
she has been coerced into the task of relayjng the canisters on behalf of an 
organi ation she know to be dispersed across northern Africa calling themselves 
the Phoenicians. She is aware of the prevailing terror the pollution of the gene 
pools of the world's staple crops has caused and finally proclaims that "The 
Phoenicians will continue to bdng the world to its knees". 
WWIII 
There can be Only One - Fight to Become World Power 
June 200 I 
European, US, Australian and other economies can finally no longer ward off the 
effects of the Asian economic stagnation. A world-wide recession is developing. 
Cruna and India lead the world in economic growth with their large domestic 
market and maturing economies. In Australia unemployment rises alarmingly 
and the $A follows the $US in depreciation. 
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September 2001 
Congo and Uganda, escalate in tribal based rebellion. British, French and German 
UN forces are sent to intervene. 
February 2002 
Australia joins ASEAN after recognition of its success in restoring order in East 
Timor after the Indonesian withdrawal. 
March2002 
South African forces advance into Uganda to assist Ugandan army attempts to 
quash Hutu rebels. Fighting extends into Kenya as rebel forces travel covertly 
within a refugee exodus from the Congo. 
May2004 
The Indonesian government capitulates as it fails to manage widespread civil 
unrest. A military government replaces the old to try to restore order. Malaysian 
and Singaporean governments begin to fragment under pressures of opposing 
factions within their failing economies. Singapore especially finds itself 
susceptible to world-wide depressed Marchkets. The European Union is tested as 
member states dispute the relative effects of varying depressed GDP's on the 
declining Euro. In Australia a growing trend of armed gang warfare by 
disenchanted jobless youths follows the example of urban America and stretches 
police resources. 
July 2004 
Protests at factory closures are becoming commonplace and increasingly violent. 
Angola erupts in renewed civil war and combined South African, Ugandan, 
forces, fresh from conflict in the Congo, move to pacify the warring factions. 
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February 2005 
Indonesia collapses into civil war as rival factions within the military rule grab for 
territorial holdings. 
April2005 
Fighting spreads into Borneo and Sumatra. Sri Lanka suffers a major Tamil 
guerrilla offensive and India intervenes by occupation. African Summit proposes 
formation of 'The Free States of Africa', with constitutional unity between nation 
states within the southern half of the continent, a single currency and a single 
military service. 
January 2006 
Concurrence is reached with the new 'rainbow super nation' to be inaugurated. 
January 2008 
An international summit of world-wide fishing industries reveals a 60% decline in 
fish stocks over the previous 50 years. This is attributed to over-fishing, effects of 
changing ocean currents with global warming and most recently a marked decline 
in piscine fertility attributed to accumulated ocean outfalls of heavy metals and 
sewerage residues in continental shelves. 
May2006 
Europe, USA, Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand accuse Russia, India 
and China for the latter while India and China argue that the September 
2007western world is responsible for global warming. The effect on the small 
island economies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans combined with severe declines 
in tourism have pushed them to breaking point. Later in the year India occupies 
the Maldives 'to assist them in the distribution of aid'. 
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November 2007 
After three and a half years of civil war with failed intervention at the periphery 
by Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, China sends peacekeepers into Jakarta at 
the invitation of a Chinese-Indonesian backed military faction. 
July 2008 
China sends assistance with military escorts to collapsed economies of Micronesia 
and India responds by sending expeditionary forces into Sumatra. ASEAN forces 
are put on heightened alert. 
September 2008 
Arabic countries unite under a renewed Islamic movement. In response to Arabic 
expansionist rhetoric there is general unrest in Khazakstan, Armenia, Central 
Independent states and from the Kurds to the north. Russia leads its new NATO 
allies into Central Independent States, and Khazakstan to intervene in border 
outbreaks of armed skirmishes and to secure its oil fields. Pakistan declares 
alliance with Islamic Nation. India increases its military presence on its western 
border with Pakistan. And its naval fleets muster into the northern Indian Ocean 
and near the mouth of the Arabian Gulf. 
January 2009 
NATO forces, having suppressed Serbian aggression, cross into Albania to route 
guerrilla bases mounting retaliation raids on Serbian occupied villages. An 
Albanian strike on a chemical processing plants near Kosovo releases a toxic 
cloud killing hundreds of Serbs. NATO is forced to increase their presence as 
Serbs try to rearm underground militia groups. 
February 2009 
China simultaneously strikes air and naval bases in northern Vietnam and mounts 
a seaborne attack on Taiwan. Chinese marine forces seize Paracel islands and the 
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northern Spratley Islands. US and British carrier fleets move to counter sudden 
Chinese aggression but cannot manoeuvre to effective range before the surprise 
invasion of Taiwan by PRC forces is made successful. 
As US and allies engage in escalating naval combat in the South China Sea India 
initiates surprise air and sea attacks on Diego Garcia in an attempt to prepare for 
amphibious assault. India's aim is to force US forces out of the Indian Ocean and 
take over as sentinel against Islamic expansion in its direction. The US responds 
strongly with the single carrier group remaining in the Indian Ocean against 
Indian fleets but cannot manoeuvre additional carrier groups otherwise committed 
in the Pacific. After several days with heavy losses US forces withdraw south-east 
from the Indian Ocean towards Australia. 
March 2009 
One Australian submarine is lost and another damaged in naval combat with 
Chinese naval elements in the Malacca Straits as they attempt to clear the route 
for an ANZAC naval contingent movement to the South China Sea. 
May2009 
The Chinese President delivers a speech stating that while Europe expands its 
influence into Asia Minor, The Islamic Nation looks to expand beyond Egypt into 
northern Africa. United Free African States annex c<?untries northward through 
their continent and India grabs at the Indian Ocean and SE Asia, China will assert 
its rightful claims in Asia to restore world balance of power. Chinese naval forces 
extend south into the Arafura Sea. Combined US/ Australian naval fleets move to 
halt this south-east advance. 
June 2009 
Chinese amphibious assaults seize islands in the Timorese and Arafura Seas. 
The Australian population becomes increasingly restless with regional instability; 
northern populations begin to migrate to southern states anticipating conflict 
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within Australia. Police and military resources are taxed controlling the domestic 
instability. India invades Mauritius by unopposed amphibious landings. Their 
apparent aim is to secure complete dominance over the Indian Ocean given the 
mounting strength of the military forces of the new United African Free States in 
the south and the Islamic Nation in the north. 
United Free African States calls for allies in condemnation of Indian expansionist 
aggression. The Indian navy experiences limited clashes with Islamic States' 
naval forces in the Arabic Gulf and with PRC naval forces off the western Malay 
peninsula and Free African States' navy in the south-west and is in a stand off 
position with US/ Australian naval fleets in the south east Indian ocean. China 
aggressively defends air space over its new acquisitions of Taiwan and the Paracel 
and Spratley Islands in the South China Sea, the islands annexed in the Arafura 
Sea and over Java, Sumatra and Borneo in SE Asia. 
Millennium Bug (Y2K) 
In the two years prior to January 2000, there was a high profile media campaign 
highlighting the Millennium Bug, an anticipated problem based on computer 
inability to handle a four-digit date/time configuration. Computers with the 
original configuration would be unable to process the date 01101/2000, instead 
processing 01101100, meaning that any computerised date/time inventory system 
could not distinguish it from the year 1900, therefore any information arising 
from these systems was liable to be compromised. 
As debate about the exact nature of the Millennium Bug heats up, increasing 
numbers of information technology experts came forward to say that nothing or 
anything could go wrong, from shops having ordering difficulties through to 
planes falling out of the sky and missiles exploding in their silos, essentially the 
entire fabric of society breaking down. 
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By the end of 1999, many experts were advocating withdrawing enough money 
from the bank to survive a few weeks, stockpiling food and fresh water, then 
heading to the hills to wait the thing out, for better or worse. This declaration by 
\ 
so many experts led to a panic rush on banks and stores. Some of the smaller 
building societies collapsed and food shortages were rife. Chillingly, weapon 
sales increase with the revival of a survivalist ideology. 
June 2001 
With the much touted arrival of Year 2000 (Y2K) initial problems are not quite as 
severe as had been prophesised by the pessimistic. Most basic services had made 
ready to convert the computer based operational systems and databases. In Asia 
markets, and banks in some instances, are unprepared and are forced to cease 
trading for a period of weeks. Financial markets although superficially prepared 
for Y2K changeover, experience repeated system crashes and temporary market 
closures as glitches are encountered in the networks. 
September 2001 
Realisation comes that on a basic level some people and organisations have failed 
to understand the depth of the problem. Whilst most enterprises and services cross 
over to the date/time configuration seamlessly it becomes evident that smaller 
organisations right down to farm or raw material level have been ill prepared. 
Insidiously problems of supply of component products, spares and disposables 
and distribution systems mount. 
February 2002 
In a myriad of small failures progressively building toward major system 
miscarriages. Hospitals running electronic therapy management systems are 
generally able to changeover. Most common problems are with accessing records 
that had not more recently been drawn on. The real problems arise when stocks of 
medicines and surgical disposables faltered almost a year later as manufacturers 
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were having difficulty with replenishing their depleting stocks due to the failure in 
supply of some key raw materials. 
May2003 
Essential services experience increasing failures. Power, water, gas and fuel 
supplies, although initially able to operate intact, subsequently falter as 
maintenance on facilities fail. Perishable spares become unavailable, as their 
manufacturers are unable to acquire raw materials to produce them. 
July 2004 
Insidious sequential erosion of business confidence and social fabric is initiated 
and fuelled by the frustration of progressive failures in supplies and systems. 
December 2004 
Protests directed at governments and qangos commonly escalate through violent 
demonstrations to riots as suppressed frustrations are vented. The Government 
announces a far-sighted plan to correct the economy by restructuring and 
investment but fails to secure credibility. Resurgence of 'survivalists' mentality in 
anticipation of anarchy is seen. Radical movements of diverse ideologies find the 
recruiting fields bountiful. Some scramble internationally for resources by 
militant governments to secure a reliable supply of raw materials. 
February 2005 
South Africa makes a grab for Angola, Russia enters Kazakstan to extend its 
access to oilfields. Police and military forces in non-aggressor countries are thinly 
spread attempting to restore stability domestically before being tasked with the 
control of incursions by aggressor states. 
With conventional forces largely committed to containment of domestic 
aggression and limiting the extent of foreign raider incursions they are unable to 
mount effective deterrence or counter strikes. Moreover, lawlessness begins to 
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erode the social fabric of developed nations. In the United States groups of 
survivalists emerge from wilderness areas to pillage small communities for 
supplies. 
May2006 
In towns and cities throughout Europe, the Americas and developed African 
States panic buying increases, as demand for food begins to outstrip supply, 
leaving people without basic necessities. People leave the cities to wait out 
anticipated trouble, thereby avoiding being near any military installations ... in 
case of a nuclear malfunction or accidental missile strike. They leave behind 
many empty houses as prime targets {or looters and other opportunists. 
Largely the global common view is that renewing former socio-economic 
structures will restore order, either or, particularly for ideologically motivated 
groups, a new script for humanity will emerge. In the mean-time survival and 
posturing for the best status for recovery motivates populations. 
The Information War 
September 2000 
Announcement that an estimated 1 billion people are now interconnected on the 
internet, in the previous three years the greatest growth has surprisingly not been 
in countries of greatest technological development but in those developing. These 
principally were Argentina, Iran, Peru, Egypt, China, the Philippines, the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, and Slovenia in that order. International investment favours 
the developing nations with the ability to utilise technological input, some 
intrinsic resources and infrastructure, yet prepared to maintain inexpensive labour 
markets. 
304 
Appendix 2 
Regions, rather than nations, are left behind most represented by Asia and 
Oceania. A gradual change in perception of other regions as being those of 
opportunity conversely is evolving. Such regions are represented by southern 
South America, Southern Africa and north-eastern Europe. Asia in general 
remains stunted as she tries to restructure from the economic collapse of 1998. 
The relative rate of acquiring internet literacy reflects this. Australia's hectic leap 
in economic growth of 1998-1999, has apparently peaked and economic 
indicators show a relaxation of the economy. 
February 2003 
Commercial release of inexpensive microwave Satellite Uplink Communications 
(SUC) initially rivals digital microwave communications (hand held phones) but 
is destined to replace the older technology. This is accelerated by incorporation 
into numerous appliances of everyday personal use. Of paramount significance is 
the wireless connection of personal computers of a variety of formats inter-linking 
them with increasing numbers and increasingly varied and remoted peripheral 
applications. 
The personal computer notebook evolves into a complete personal office, 
constantly interconnected with the invisible whirring web of world wide 
microwave communications. Individuals go about daily affairs with initially 
'hands free' interconnectivity comprising a ·minute behind the ear, on the throat 
speaker and microphone arrays inputting to a pocket or belt mounted sue 
personal computer. 
Other applications range through car GPS navigational systems becoming 
standard to industrial applications to the point that componentry is even re-routed 
during transit to sites where it is best utilised through market fluctuations in 
commodity or consumption markets. 
November 2004 
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Three results of the hyper revolution in interconnectivity is heavy reliance on 
satellite relays, concentration of information management power on software 
developers and a new social unrest in third world countries made newly aware of 
how disadvantaged they are within a global info-sphere. 
March 2005 
Need for increased satellite communication capacity is eased by the growing 
viability of commercial low to medium orbit payload business first pioneered by 
Virgin Airways with trans-atmospheric transporters, or commercial space shuttles. 
Other multinational corporations are quick to emulate the new technology. 
A multinational Space Control Centre is necessitated to coordinate the boom in 
space traffic. Microsoft Corporation, after an eight-year wrangle in the US courts, 
wins a landmark case for using its market dominance to expand its software 
utilisation to service and control customer access to the internet. As the uptake of 
communications booms, however, some others, particularly those with a 
technological niche in hardware configurations, especially in satellite relays, 
emerge to rival Microsoft. 
June 2005 
Those with the means to best utilise new technologies pace ahead of those who do 
not. Third world countries are better off but are more aware of their disadvantaged 
status. Their resentment is made louder by their new ability with limited 
technology to make themselves heard. Third World disgruntlement and the 
vulnerability of the intemetted world is first demonstrated by a surprise attack on 
the city financial exchanges in London by a High Energy Radio Frequency 
(HERF) burst. This attack erases all electronic transactions of the day's trading 
and much that has not been down-loaded to remote data banks. 
July 2005 
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The repercussions on world markets are significant. The source is traced to a 
heavy electronic apparatus installed within a vacant building in the Moregate area 
identified by Ministry of Defence technical experts as being a powerful, but 
relatively unsophisticated, multidirectional HERF gun. 
August2005 
An, until now, little heard of terrorist group networked across northern Africa, 
'The Moorish Fighters', claim responsibility. The motivation is unclear apart from 
a demonstration of their ability in what is realised to be the first employment of a 
Weapon of Mass Disruption (WMD). Evidence is published in The New Yorker 
of the results of a 'black' operation incursion into a clandestine base of 'The 
Moorish Fighters' that they have received technical assistance and funding from 
Russia. 
Large parts of the internet are rendered dysfunctional by a virus attacking the 
servers. Whereas a volley of viruses in the previous few years have transferred 
across internet connections attacking data bases with increasing sophistication and 
specificity, this new virus is not so discerning. Although apparently seeking out 
internet address suffixes denoting nationalities, the web of communications does 
not recognise sovereign borders. At the same time a subtler virus is launched 
through the net targeting power, water, gas and chemical processing heavy 
industries in Asia, Northern America, Western Europe, Australia and New 
Zealand. As a result, in Basel, Switzerland a pharmaceutical plant accidentally 
releases a massive toxic plume spreading from Europe through South East Asia 
and into Australia. 
In northern England a nuclear power plant disperses radioactive water into the 
Tyne River. Rapidly the situation worsens as disruption spreads into the control 
mechanisms of essential service providers forcing key facilities either to shut 
down or malfunction with disastrous consequences. Power blackouts spread 
across the globe. 
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The intentional nature of the attack on global information systems becomes 
evident as Russia begins systematically to target military and communications 
satellites with HERF weapons directed from their own satellites in orbit rendering 
them un-programmed and inoperative. The degree of frailty of the 
interdependance of the world on computerised interconnectivity is realised in 
absolute terms as world communication goes off line. Orders cannot reach US 
military facilities and fleets. 
News correspondents, viewing the Red Army rolling into the Ukraine and the 
Central Independent States of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and seizing oilfields in Mongolia are unable to inform the rest of the world. With 
the world's main powers blinded the opportunity to pursue regional objectives, 
with coaching from Russian envoys, is pursued. Algerian forces move into 
Tunisia and against Libya. Zairian forces move to seize resources in northern 
Angola. Northern Korean Naval Forces engage the Japanese fleet in the Sea of 
Japan. Regional conflict flares again in Panama, Costa Rica and Nicaragua. 
Domestically, as in many crippled countries in Northern America and Western 
Europe, there are loud cries of protest at the interruption to power, water and gas 
supplies and the environmental disasters caused by malfunctioning heavy 
industries. As unconfirmed reports trickle in of the anarchy breaking out in 
several theatre conflicts, a new resolve of calm and resolve to weather out global 
mass disruption emerges. 
WMDs to Order 
2000-2002 
Destabilisation after the economic collapse throughout SE Asia in the late 1990's 
spreads through the region. Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines all 
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begin to succumb to unrest spurred by the re-emergence of ethnic and religious 
differences within their borders. In Borneo for example Indonesian, Malaysian 
and British troops in Brunei are tested to contain resurgence of ancient tribal 
feuds resulting in a cycle of murderous attacks and general instability. 
Similar unrest ferments between minority groups in a patchwork throughout Asia. 
In Cambodia, Laos and Thailand a new popular leader - Lorn Png - emerges 
gaining support for raising an irregular army intent ultimately on reasserting a 
'Cham Empire' through Indochina. In western China revolts by economically 
disadvantaged peasants are brutally repressed as they are in Tibet with a renewed 
indigenous push for independence. In Northern Korea students are massacred 
reminiscent of Tiananmen Square rioting to support reunification with South 
Korea. 
March 2002 
Deep concern spreads through the western world as new medical reports are 
released that the current generation has been short-changed in its health 
expectations. Fertility in males in developed countries, suspected of being in 
decline for some time, is confirmed as now being on average less than half that of 
fifty years previous. Additionally, aging populations are exhibiting an epidemic of 
a wide assortment of cancers. Exposure to multiple industrial and domestic 
chemical agents accepted as part of the environment of an industrialised society is 
signalled out as the principal causative factor. 
November 2002 
Disaster is added to the recipe for discontent as a terrorist strike rocks the USA. 
The huge explosion in a toxic waste dump in Utah exploits the media focus on the 
Salt Lake City Winter Olympics. Long term effects can only be speculated at but 
fuels the prevailing social climate of health concerns 
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January 2003 
A nuclear generator meltdown in Czechoslovakia results in fallout spreading over 
Western Europe. Memories of Chernobyl are resurrected. The net effect in the 
western world is a growing awareness that not only are populations greying as life 
expectancy increases, but global birth rates are on the decline. One result of the 
environmental concern is fierce opposition to continuation of heavy industry in 
developed countries with pressure on large corporations to take such activities 
offshore. 
After four years of successive and worsening current account deficits, largely due 
to declining mining exports with loss of Asian customers for raw materials, 
Australian interest rates are rapidly elevated as inexorably the Reserve Bank is 
forced to relent on monetary policy~ Government resorts to resurrecting rhetoric 
of "the recession we had to have" faced with the inevitability of the situation. 
Repercussions of plummeting levels of investment are felt within Australia 
through the next two years as foreign enterprise seeks opportunities in cheaper 
labour markets in South East Asia. Just as Australia has enjoyed a relative 
economic boom since 1998, with economic growth leaving that of its neighbours 
in the region well behind, the situation is reversed with multinational corporations 
diverting its interests into the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam and 
South Korea. Similarly new enterprise flirts with opportunities in Brazil, 
Columbia, Chile, Venezuela and Argentina. The net effect in these countries is to 
widen the gap between the wealthy and the impoverished. Recruitment into 
irregular armies and militias is subsequently re-invigorated. 
In many places multinational corporations, their interests inadequately protected 
by sovereign defence forces, raise their own security forces. Asian governments, 
and to a lesser degree some governments in Africa and South America, condone 
these private armies as they enhance their own forces of suppression on 
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insurrectionists. This is viewed as essential to maintain investment within their 
borders from multinational corporations by enforcing a domestic stability. 
Meanwhile a global shift of economic activity back to Asia leaves a wake of 
industry contraction and enterprise closures through Europe and northern America 
as well as in Australia and New Zealand. Just as in other Western nations 
currency depreciation a contractions of government spending on infrastructure, 
defence and social services compounded with multiplier effects bring about 
serious declines in living standards and bank foreclosures. 
February 2004 
Expressions of dissatisfaction mount, occasionally with protests such as outside 
closing factories becoming violent with destruction of commercial property. 
Disgruntled individuals increasingly identify and join with issue motivated 
groups, a process greatly enhanced by new freedoms in communication found in 
the internet. Such groups likewise find alliances and exchanges of ideology with 
partners that without internet exchange would otherwise seem unlikely. 
Australian government announcement to accept a multi-billion dollar nuclear and 
toxic waste dump into central South Australia is met with outrage from 
environmental issue motivated groups yet greeted as the cash injection needed to 
tum the economy around by others. 
Within Australia's indigenous community deep rifts occur between groups and 
their newly acquired wealth from royalties. 
June 2004 
The recently expanded Jabiluka uranium mine has caused divisions between the 
large mining and pastoral companies and the traditionalist landowners who 
deplore the desecration of their spiritually significant lands. These native title 
landowners are increasing their claims which they are acquiring rights over at an 
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accelerating rate with land rights claims. As in Asian countries in July 2004the 
past few years multinational companies involved expand their security forces. 
September 2004 
Violent clashes become increasingly frequent between such security forces, the 
police and defence forces in aid to the civil power with environmentalists and 
indigenous groups. 
December 2004 
Populations of nearby communities are divided between concern, sometimes 
unfounded, for their health with nearby industrial activity and clash, sometimes 
violently, with those welcoming the positive effects on local economy. 
January 2005 
Internationally poor economical climate and social unrest gives rise to long 
suppressed and unresolved conflicts. The 1, Balkans again flares up in fresh 
violence, Kurds clash repeatedly with Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi troops. 
April2005 
Basques receive renewed support for terror campaigning, as do Irish 
Republicanists and Unionists. 
June 2005 
Paraguay finally collapses into civil war drawing Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia 
into shared conflict. 
August 2005 
Indochina erupts in new fighting led by Lorn Png against alternately Thai, 
Cambodian and Vietnamese troops in hit-and-run strikes. 
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Central Africa declines into anarchy as incongruence between tribal ethnicity and 
sovereign borders again draws government troops of Uganda, Kenya and Zaire 
into combat with Hutu and Tutsi rebels 
September 2005 
The world is successively shocked when China implodes in civil conflict with 
regional armies set against each other, principally the south against the north but 
in a distorted picture as individual provinces declare faltering allegiances. 
Globally an outbreak of use of chemical weapons appear being put to use first in 
China, soon after by Lorn Png' s forc.es against Vietnam. Biological weapons are 
proved to have been used in Rwanda 
October-November 2005 
Discovery of an attempt to generate nerve agents for use against civilian 
populations is uncovered in a disused factory in Cheyenne, Wyoming. FBI 
intelligence summary discloses that the perpetrating issue motivated group 
purchased the information to attempt chemical weapon manufacture from a 
multinational mercenary like group. 
Israeli Intelligence releases a report that a Palestinian cell within its borders has 
likewise been apprehended attempting chemical weapon manufacture. An 
international broker has again supplied some chemical components and 
connection is confirmed with lethal information sources purchased from a 
multinational security entity. 
A rash of reports of use of mostly chemical, occasionally biological weapons 
being used in conflicts within China, United States, Central America, Western 
Europe. Customers for the various weapon recipes or components raw materials 
are variably guerrilla movements, issue motivated groups and multinational 
companies seeking draconian measures to secure their aims or own security. 
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APPENDIX3 
INITIATING LETTER ON THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES 
This correspondence was drafted by me for Commander Special Forces signature 
and sought to elicit the widest possible views from the organisation. Many 
responses were startling in their creativity and boldness. As this had never been 
attempted before it was not surprising that some concerns about the chain of 
command were raised. It remained, however, a genuine and sincere attempt to 
secure opinion. 
HQSO /98 
AUSTRALIAN ARMY 
HEADQUARTERS SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
MINUTE 
See Distribution List 
DEFINING THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES 
"Increasing attention is being given to clearly defined goals and 
corporate values, strategic planning, teamwork, ongoing critical 
self-analysis . . . high performance organisations increasingly 
perceive that their competitive edge is gained through their 
people". 
Glenn Review (1995) p.33 
1. I am sure you would all agree that the old ways of doing business are 
becoming less effective. This raises the question of how we are to identify the 
core issues and implement the appropriate changes. It is my belief that the 
solutions we seek are within the SF Group and an efficient means must therefore 
be found to draw out these core issues. 
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2. If you are a vehicle mechanic at Holsworthy, a storeman at Williamstown or 
a medic at Swanbourne I want to know what you think. 
3. I ask that you consider the following question: 
"What do you consider to be the five issues that 
the SF Group needs to confront in order to 
propel us into the future?" 
4. As you may have guessed, this is not about any particular unit, it is about 
our survival and growth as a new organisation operating in a different and rapidly 
changing world. The issues each of you identify will be combined with others to 
form a complete, accurate and concise expression of what we need to think 
about. 
5. The involvement and participation of every individual in this process is 
critical. Start thinking now and fax your response to HQSO as soon as possible 
(handwritten is fine). The results will be sent back to units as soon as we have a 
complete list. To allow the project to proceed we must have all responses at 
HQSO by 27 Mar 98. . 
6. If you are in Sydney feel free to drop in and discuss the project with the 
SOJ5/8 group. I look forward to receiving your comments. 
P .J. McNAMARA 
BRIG 
COMO SF 
(02) 95359 2476 
Mar98 
HQSO 
COSASR 
CO 1 Cdo Regt 
CO 4 RAR (Cdo) 
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APPENDIX4 
RESPONSES FROM THE FIVE KEY CHALLENGES QUESTION 
The responses presented here were analysed by members of the various 
workshops. The aim was to poll the organisation for beliefs, expectations and 
concerns. These were then surfaced as part of an orchestrated campaign to locate 
consensus with a diverse body of opinion. The information vindicated 
qualitatively the results of the futures planning (Chapter Three) and the effects-
based planning (Chapter Four). 
Table 9. Full set of categorised responses. 
nt<'•r\Alo<:u:I\{Q. our systems into the intelligence infrastructure 
n Australia to achieve seamless connectivity and 
8 Management of human resources. Break away from 
conventional career structures and develop specialists in 
their fields 
Operations 
Operations 
Management 
9 Consult widely outside the organisation, we have become Communication 
too insular 
1 0 Keep all those within the organisation informed, rather than Leadership 
alienated 
Consolidate Restructuring the Army (AT A) changes: Management 
Develop 4 RAR (Commando) 
'3_~_ise Jb..~ .§p_~~j~)_fQ!:.C2~~-T!~J!!l!:!9_Q~r~t~~--------------- -- ·----------·1--,-------,--------·---------!-,--,-·t--_-~+c--:+-_-·,-+-:c·:-t-::c-t 
clandestine 
Management 
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4c 18 Increase the awareness of current methods and Personnel 
technologies through the secondment of members to 
1-----o---- -··t· r~J~Yil.r:t!~f)_e_ciaJis_t_ Ci'{~t_Q~g_c:t!lisa.!LC?!:l~.?.l'lsl ';_'_2r)~;;_·_<:~nc~l.""'::::~----~---+---------:·--:-:---+::-:+-:---:-t~-~--:-o+~c+:--:-~ 
4d : 19 Develop a better covert communications capability through Communication 
undetectable unendorsed use of current communications 
23 Development of career progression plans for both officers 
and non-commissioned officers in the Forces Gro 
5d 24 Development of a cunning plan to ensure Special Forces 
officers are infiltrated into key, important and influential 
positions at all levels throughout both the Army and the 
Australian Defence Force 
Capability 
• 25 Proactive marketing/selling of the Commando capability at all Marketing 
levels - we need to push our requirements/development at 
Australian Defence Headquarters, Army office, Headquarters 
Australian Theatre and Land Headquarters. Dictate progress 
on 'our' terms 
-·-·----· ---····-· --------- ·-··----···--···-------··----- ---------------------------+,------·--···---·· 
. 26 Manning of the Special Forces Group - particularly Personnel 
. H~_a.Qgua.!1~~s~p~cic:t!_Of)_l:l~§lt!2.1'l~_?.f'!Q4RABJ<.?g~-----
27 Provision of more visibility/communication from the top Communication 
dow_l} __ -:__11'!?t .. J~_!::I~<:t~9uarters to the units 
28 Coordination of and equity Management 
to the COAD/PMSAIAOPs 
Special Forces allowances to include all members of Special Pay 
l---i-------·FFg~9~~-{[Qclu~il'lg_off[9_~~~L_______ __ _____ __ __ _ _ _____ _ -·:-:-----------------+-=----------------:-··------------+----
6a Due to workload and mental pressure endured by the Personnel 
Special Forces soldier, a course/plan/wind down period 
should be established to aid the soldier at point of discharge 
fit back into society at a higher level than that that is 
currently provided. I believe if done effectively a network of 
assistance can be called upon if required by the parent unit's 
undation members to aid members with problems in 
fields, such as a civilian career. Although this is the 
practices at this stage, in 1 0-15 years this could very well be 
a viable 
7a ' 32 If a soldier is cross-trained giving him the ability to diversify Pay 
his skill, it is my belief that the soldier should be paid for the 
skills learned. This should surely apply to the Special Forces 
environment. At this point in time there is N incentive to burn 
and bust one's body apart from personal pride and goal 
achievement. Motivation and morale would surely be raised 
considerably if acknowledgment of one's commitment was 
evident one's 
8a 33 ng strategy 
~nt:or<>t·inr•<> tO rolilro<><> 
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1 0 . 43 Ensure capabilities are needed (ie fill an existing gap in 
a Australian Defence Force/National capability and operations 
Government is willing to commit Special Forces to) and that 
the capabilities are viable/survivable (ie in realistic 
environments include high-tech threat for strategic Special 
rati 
10 44 Be able to rapidly procure leading edge technology 
b 
10 
c 
10 
d 
11 
10 
11 49 Special Forces Group needs representation within the 
b ADFWC of the Directorate of Land Warfare 
11 50 Officer tactics training is currently centred on conventional 
warfighting. Some portion of the ISC, IOC and AOC should 
be devoted to SO to inculcate the wider Army community 
with the notion that SO is another option available to 
commanders. The Special Forces Gp needs to balance 
marketing against the need to minimise OPSEC. It must 
maintain its mystique whilst explaining its capabilities to the 
Appendix 4 
Management 
· Leadership 
Capability 
Technology 
Selection 
Capability 
Capability 
Marketing 
Training 
rest of the ADF and Australian Government ~ --·---------- ···----·-·----.L---·-·-··-·------··-···-·-·-----L ___ L._ __ .c_ __ L ___ Jc ___ L __ __, 
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11 ! 51 The Special Forces Group needs a better understanding of Personnel Y Y N N N Y 
d J its own history, its successes and its failures. An operational 
L_ r~~~il!.£'l.qell wj_~hil} HO§Q_2.9uld proyide this --.. ----~---~ ----· --+:-:-+::-·+-:+:~+::-:+-:: 
11 I 52 The Special Forces Gp in conjunction with DOGM-A needs Personnel Y N N N N N 
e ! to develop an officer career plan to incorporate important 
i facets of service in non-Special Forces units such as 1 .... J.~I!9.~-~ .!!~i!:t!!1_g__~D5.l.tu_!t_~~~~ed~C::~!i_~r1.. -·---·----- ___________ 1-:------------ . ______________ ...... ___ ...... __ _ 
12 ! 53 Review, rationalise and adjust all SO staff processes in order Leadership N Y N N N N 
a ! to establish 'bes~ractice' i!l_all areas _________ ·-·---~---------r-:c-·-· _ .. _______ ---:-~-:-=-~::-:-+·~-::--:1 
12 J 54 Successfully establish and develop the Commando Capability N Y Y N N N 
b ! capability, rationalise SASR to reduce duplication, maximise 
12 i -55 -6r~r!~n~~~~:~~~i~:ic~s~W~~c;~P<>~C?~~~rii--<fe-cori>s----·· Iead-erslliiJ ______ ·v· -v- N' -,( r'i' N 
c .L....... .. .................. ----- .. -----------------. -.. -___ .. _ .- .. . .. . ... ............................ ............................ .................. .... . .......................................................... ------ .. ---- .. . . ........ . 
12 I 56 Identify and adopt selected emerging technologies and Technology N Y N N Y N 
d i capabilities relevant to the future battlefield. or theatre of 
12 i 5i ~;f~~!~~~lleiJaieiltialoTiildividua·lsto-contri'bllte-to sl)eciaT- Personn-er·-~- v N N v N N'-
e i Forces contingencies through multi-skilling and continuous 
J ......... .~.~~!!:1.!.!1.9 .. ______________ ........................... ·----- ------------------------~---------------·-----··-- ----------------------------- 1-:--:-
13 i 58 Common information management plan within Special Communication N Y Y N N N 
__ ( .......... E.c::>_rQ.~-~--<:i.P ........................ ______________ --------------------- . -- ---------------------------...... ...... --- _________ .. ___________ .. ____________ · ....... --- -- ------ ------- ------ -------
13 i 59 Common admin SOPs within Special Forces Gp 
b ! 
Administration N N N N N y 
Leadership 
--IV --y N N N N 
N~ Management N y N N 
13 i 60 More emphasis placed on Commandos, poor cousin to 
c SASR 
13 i 61 Prioritise our objectives both within Special Forces and more 
d ! _ _!rnportai"!!!Y- within the HQ _ ---------1-
13 i 62 More emphasis placed on Admin and Log in order to spt ops Leadership N N y N N N 
e j ___ mq~~--~!!!c::_i_~~!y ____________________________________________________________________ ---- _____ ____ __ _______ __ 
14 f 63 More staff for orderly room Personnel Y Y Y N N N 
a t 
14 i 64 One computer system for all Special Forces units (integrated Administration N N Y N N N 
b J__ _____ -~9!_~a.~~ 9.! loc§l!~r1.9_QQ.C_!!~~.!l.!§ __ ~!li!_Ln_fQ~_I!\_a!LQ!l1 _______________ ------------------------ ___ ___ _ __ ___ _ _ 
14j. 65 A paperless headquarters (all information to be scanned Administration N N Y N N N 
c . onto hard drive for quick and easy location of 
14 r·ss ~~~~:~~~~f~e--headquarters is mannecfand operational 24 Personnel .. Y Y N 1 N N .N 
d i hours a day in all departments. This eases the build up of 
_ _L ______ -~-0!~:. ___________________________________ ------------------------------------.---•-----------.---------··-· ·-----------------------·-- ~ 
14 j 67 Only file relevant information Administration N N Y N N N 
e ! 
-·-- ------------------.----------~------------------·------------------- -------------- --::-:- ,...,...~..,--
15 i 68 One administrative computer system for Army. I have been Administration N N Y N N N 
a ! to three different HQ and each one had its own Data 
--L--- ~as~/Reg!~!~!-~~Y..~!~I!l_: ___ ~---·------~-.------~------~-----~------ _,_·-···--~-------·~--- r-~· ··---
15 ! 69 Clerical manning for HQ. We are down to two clerks, which Personnel Y Y Y N N N 
b l __ means that we are covering_!hree jobs as well as ours. _ ___ _ _____ _ 
15 ! 70 Why certain staff officers last year could do their own filing Personnel Y N Y N N N 
:5 ~1 ~~:i:;;~~f~!if~:~r~~I~ =~~;}!i~:. -- PerSOnnel ~ N v · Nj,N- N N 
d .. l. ____ LHQIVIC Bks have a sports. afternoon every Thu. __ __ _ 
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Communication 
Personnel 
a happier Personnel 
Personnel 
Management 
Leadership 
and surmount every difficulty to Leadership 
! 82 The group is held together through internal cohesiveness 
: ratherJhan_external ... -~r~~-_(~elly1J~?-4:L____ _ ______ _ 
17 ! 83 Selection and maintenance of the aim (principle of war). 
e · Think of the group, strive to be cohesive, get rid of petty 
jealousy, achieve excellence, support your mates and 
Leadership 
Leadership 
18 84 The lack of clear direction, eg it seems to take a long time for Leadership 
a decisions such as where we move to, what equipment we 
choose to be made. There are probably very good reasons 
for this but it still seems ann 
18 · 85 The lack of modern equipment, facilities and basic resources Equipment 
Appendix 4 
b such as communication 
-------·····-·----------··- ·-· -- ---~---- ------:--·::·-----,----,------·+=·--------·:-:-----------· ------f··:··:-+-:c:-
18 86 The lack of operational experience. Maybe specialisation in Operations 
c one field eg amphibious may be less enjoyable. We should 
in these peaceful times, take whatever job comes up as long 
as there is the chance of gaining some experience (and a 
18 lack of manpower. What can I say? Personnel 
d 
19 88 The Procurement Process. The best measure of trust in a Management 
a bureaucracy is the responsibility to expend funds. The 
current procurement process is cumbersome. If the Special 
Forces Gp is to exploit new technology and develop new, 
potentially clandestine, capabilities, it needs its own discrete 
funding, with the appropriate control mechanisms built in. A 
guaranteed regular level of funding, even of relatively small 
amounts (say $1M/year) would allow the Special Forces Gp 
to achieve a 'leading edge' position within Defence. We 
would have to accept however, that some of the projects 
would fail. This fundi'l9~QU1d assi§!_!_!:l __ t!]_E3 __ d _______ ~'-'"'~-~e_,_cn_t, __ ~-----'---------------------'---·'----'----O---"'--'-----' 
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19 89 The Development Process. Special Forces Gp should be at Leadership 
b the leading edge of technological innovation within Defence. 
We should be providing those short notice leading edge 
(para) military capabilities that are required by Government. 
We do not really know what they are! There should be 
strategic guidance that moulds our effort. In absence of this 
we should be developing our own. Being the leading edge, 
there should be more latitude in our processes that allow for 
development paths to end in options that are other than 
successful! 
19 90 Focus Equipment. We are very focussed on equipment. We Leadership 
c should concentrate our effort on future capability and 
therefore develop organisations, structures, doctrine, tactics, 
procedures AND THEN what equipment is needed as a 
WHOLE SYSTEM. 
19 91 Exploit technology. There is much TALK about exploiting Management 
d technology. Soon the Special Forces Group will have secure 
connectivity throughout. We will be in position to be the lead 
in the development of processes and procedures from an 
Army and ADF perspective. A system like Lotus Notes for 
example would give us the potential to streamline our 
as we know what 
We shou be pushing responsibility to Leadership 
e lowest level. Individuals who own, or consider they are 
part of, a process will work harder and try and improve it. 
We should encourage innovation, new ideas and not be 
afraid of maki 
20 i 93 Paperless Office. For example all incoming Administration 
a ! correspondence be scanned into the computer system. This 
· would prevent documents from going missing and make 
access to the documents by all, simpler and faster. This will 
also help with the accounting of documents much easier and 
remove the need to keep unnecessary paper on file. Only 
the author has the responsibility to have the original 
document on hard for 
20 i 94 All units need to use the same computer system (same Administration 
b ' software and administrative databases). Every unit seems to 
be wasting resources designing their own database to suit 
their unit's needs. Due to the lack of centralisation, each unit 
seems to be replicating the same information, just in a 
different format. This doesn't just waste time and resources 
designing but also time training a new user posted to the 
unit. 
20 Formal training in software used in your work environment. 
c 
20 Responsibility for your own work. Everyone has a specific Management 
d job to do and in a small unit it can become quite busy. 
Sometimes it is necessary to delegate a menial task to the 
lower link in the chain. This chain should be limited to your 
relevant area of responsibility. It is fact that in most cases the 
lowest link in the chain is in the Q Store or Orderly Room 
and most that e have r own 
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specific job or area of responsibility. Because they forget 
this, the work these areas are responsible for, gets neglected 
because they get bogged down doing everyone else's menial 
Appendix 4 
tasks. When you multiply your menial tasks by the amount 
L ___ -~=:~;J~~~u~!~~;J!~~.-~~~~~~9~~-~:~-~-:~~-:_::~----- --~-·------- j 
:~~~ ~;~:~~~E~~~~~~1;~~~::~r::~-A::tr:tion Y N ~N N N 
21 I 98 Operational capability results from effective and realistic Leadership Y N N I Y N Y 
a · training. This is not new. This is achieved when all levels of 
command comprehensively understand the direction, intent 
and end state of the required objectives. This direction is 
best articulated in the form of a Training Directive. Ideally, 
Training Directives should encompass key objectives and 
likely contingencies as well as addressing key 
responsibilities for training management and capability 
overlap. Further, it is enhanced when opportunities for 
, overseas attachments and deployments are maximised. In 
_ L ..... ~b2~.L~l~~!_Qi~E!l_9!!9!l.J~_ctlcJi!ed. --------~-----------·------- --·--------·------ _________ _ 
21 l 99 It is imperative that the resources allocated are realistic and Management N N Y N N N 
b · ensure the required capability is achievable. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that resources are finite, there is a point 
which if gone below, the capability will not be realised. It is 
accepted that this places the onus on the user to only 
. request what is required. This is dependent on the 
I experience of the trainer - something the Special Forces 
L--- §~9.!P-.!~_1").5?_~~il9.~.£!: _________________________ ---~------------------ ---------·------------·--- __________ _ 
21 i 1 0 The framework that makes up the management of the Management N N N N N N 
c ! 0 system must be clearly understood. This is currently not the 
! case. The introduction of the NATO Staff System needs 
clarification. Whilst generic descriptions have been offered, 
there is not a definitive over-riding document available which 
clearly articulates job function and description. For the Gp to 
move into the future, four key issues musts be addressed: 
(1) What exactly is the NATO Staff System? 
(2) What fundamental changes does its implementation 
require? 
, (3) What are the key job functions and descriptions? 
! (4) Does this system represent the best possible practice for 
_1 ___ ~~~-0 Group at al~ level_~----------------- ---------·-+-:-+-:-:-+-:-j_- __ 
21 l 10 With a clearly defined Staff System, it is imperative that the Leadership N Y N I N N Y 
d 1 flow and passage of information is a two-way exchange. A 
number of instances have occurred that would indicate that 
the passage of information down the chain is not as timely 
; nor complete as it might be. This normally manifests itself as 
I an unpredicted change in direction that is not anticipated by 
i the units. . 
21TTo The SpeCial Forces Grc)u-prriust maintain-an-holistic------- Leacfership-----~--N ·N- N N N 
e i 2 approach. No one particular unit makes up the team. 
I Mutual pride and professional respect is borne by the 
i attainment.~~ common goals. As situations, org~nizations 
_L __ and ~ab11i!1es 9han~_ we cannot afford to be mfluenced_ ___________ __ '---'--- ____ L_ 
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::l:;i~i~~~~~~~~~~~~~;f;:~~d~::;:.:~=-:: :j: :-: 
b i 4 support and preparation prior to, during (if possible, eg 
i Commando qualified Marine Mech) and after should be I 
! considered. HQSO should have Logistic Advisors for unit 
commanders to liaise with. This would also assist in the 
development of the Special Forces Group as ILS can be 
arranged by the user who knows what is required and when 
, it is required. This would ensure the Special Forces Group 
i --··· ets the right equipment !2!_ the right~~--------- __ _ _ ---~~--:---~ -:-r-:--:-
22 1 0 Maintenance of Capability. Ensure the appropriate steps are Equipment N Y Y N Y N 
5 developed to maintain unit equipment. Without the 
equipment in an operational state of readiness, the Special 
__ Forces Group has N c~itbiliW..: ____________ _ 
10 Communication and Intelligence. Commanders at all levels Communication Y N N Y Y N 
6 should be able to communicate within and outside the 
Special Forces Group. Computers are an ideal, however 
security must be maintained. N mission will succeed without 
sound communications and intelligence. Intelligence briefs 
should occur to all members (regardless of rank) of the 
Special Forces Group whether the member is ECN 079 
____ jCommandoLor EC£'-L146-2 (Fitter/ArmtL ____ . --··--· -····--·· .. ·----· 
22 10 Morale and Training. The maintenance of morale is and Leadership ) 7 '-N ~i\1' --,( ·N N 
e 7 always will be a commander's responsibility. Realistic 
training and continuous course development will ensure the 
Special Forces Group has members who are keen to provide 
__ the manpower for the unit's capabilit~ -~------------- -~· .......... ____ ..... ~-
23 1 1 0 Structure. Define the overall structure of the group and in Management N Y N N N N 
a _L 8 parti2_ular, the roles of the l!!dividual Ul]jts:_______________ ----·--··-+--+--+-
23 I 10 Training. Ensuring that the right people are trained for the Training N N N··v N~-
b I 9 right job. Special Forces training school would aid this goal 
I_ an_Q__§lch!eve mucl!_~_ficie~EY.:.__________________________ -----·----·~------- ·---r-:-- ____ ...... -:-:- ___ _ 
23 ! 11 Facilities. High quality output requires high quality input. We Operations N N Y N N N 
c ! 0 must have appropriate facilities for training and as a firm J ___ biise f_Q!J_aun2..!!!.r:lfl_9_1~era!~<>~-~·------------------------ _____________ _____________ ________ _ ___ -·-- _________ --.,.. __ 
23 ! 11 Equipment. We must be wise in the acquisition of Equipment N N N N Y N 
d ! 1 equipment. Choose what is required and then fight to get it. Jl 
1 AVOID acquisition of un-needed 'nice-to-haves'. ! Maintenance of this equipment must be considered and 
_L ___ p)~.!lne~_tC>! .. ~~f_9R E _P~!~b_~se_. ______________ . ______ --------------·------- _____ ·---- ___ _ __ --·- __ 
23 1 11 Communication. Must have quick and reliable means of Communication N N N j N Y N 
e ! 2 communicating inter and intra unit. The Special Forces 
1 ! WAN is an ideal step, however if this is a long time coming, 
2-4-+fi' t~~~~f ~:~s~~~~~~~~~:~!icr:~~e~~ohlem-at 4 FfA'R('cdo)' PersonneT··--······ ·:y- -f~r ·· v· --N 1\f N 
a I 3 
24l11 Our jobS. as mechaliics"iS-an-overlooked.job.''we seem-to-be- Personne-l --- y N y N N N 
b l 4 used more as general duties people than mechanics. With I 
i the current manning we have only two mechanics on the 
L__ .f.~2.~r at ~DY one time. If one goes awayJor an~ day_ duty or i 
---
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24 : 11 Communication within the Battalion. At times we get tasks 
5 which are needed in unrealistic time. This is caused by the 
Communication 
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1..--"+----+C::-_;h_,a~"'-in~_O.::_f, .Ci>ll}'!l_f!r'l.~ £~'!~!!)g ~t~lg_I}J~~~~~._ __ ---·------- ·-···--·-----------·+:::::.··--· :-·---------·-c··--~- -t·:c·:·-t--c-:·t:-~-·i·:- c·t ·:-::-J·-~:--1 
· 11 Funds to buy specialised tools and emergency parts. Equipment 
6 
11 Time. The workshop seems to be doing a lot of non- Personnel 
7 maintenance time (NMT) which is out of our control, thus 
r~cc:I.L.J .. Cfr19.!~-~J!rr:!~ ~QfJ?!Q_!:J~:J91~--'---·c···-----------·--::-··:--·-:-· ---··:···c·------ ------"--··!-::--·-·---· --- ----------···· -----·····+·:": --L::-:+·::-·:-i-··:-. ·t:-:··:··t-~·:·1 
11 Information Operations and C2W: SO needs to develop Capability 
a 8 capabilities for effective employment in 10 and C2W. At the .. 
same time we should Not try to develop these in isolation or 
competition with other ADF force elm, but rather where our 
existing skills or niche role can provide a unique skill set. 
Examples: 
(1) Physical attack on enemy C31 systems: infrastructure 
targeting and strike and standoff weapon (such as EMP), 
attacks on civil infrastructure such as telecommunications 
and power. This would lead to a requirement for higher 
technical expertise in these areas. 
(2) Use of adversary C31 systems. EA on remote systems, 
physical hacking of isolated and secure computer systems, 
tapping of PSTN networks (capabilities developed with 7 Sig, 
their employment with us or in areas where they cannot go). 
(3) PR, PA and CA. The understanding that we don't fight in 
Vietnam anymore and that often the overt use of Special 
Forces is more valuable than the actual task they are doing 
(I cite the comments by Mick Malone prior to POLLARD). 
The use of Special Forces strategically inCA, PA or PR may 
mean that Special Forces needs to develop much more 
media savvy, and also change its MO to accommodate 
media. Stop thinking that 'putting on a show' for DGPI is a 
farce and that civi media are the enemy. 
(4) Better OPSEC. Anyone who thinks that Special Forces 
are currently good at this should come and see me. They 
are not. This should not be read as a need for increased 
effort for security but smarter use of security. Some in SASR 
think that everything they do is TOP SECRET, when what is 
l-----+------}~ealy_Qeil!9 .. ~9n~.l~. ~~~1~~-~f-~91! _______ ~ _ __. ___________________ -------··--·-+::c·-----·---···-· -.--------··--· ---·t--·:·:·-t-,·:.·l-
25 11 Getting rid of the 'cult of the beret': Personnel 
b 9 Selection process at the moment is still a product of social 
·--····-·'·------' 
cloning - he gets selected because he's like me. What we 
tend to produce is Special Forces soldiers that are to a 
particular template that is often suited to door-kicking, but 
less suited to some of the future roles that we are after. 
HUMINT, for example, requires female, Nondescript (ie not 
6'4", built like a tank and wearing the Special Forces watch 
and daypack) and of different character. What about direct 
entry to Special Forces, older recruits (ie stability and 
maturity) etc? 
(2) Does a few weeks of selection followed by a few years 
as a troop commander translate to the best staff officers? I 
would that unit and HQ staff are Not the best for 
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the job, and indeed are paid better because of their previous 
prowess at TACTICAL skills. If Special Forces wants to 
remain the best, they need to attract the best for each job, 
not simply assume that because someone is beret qualified 
Appendix4 
r-:-::----, ..... tb.E!Y}El!:'"ICiLI')_!b~e-~tin __ ~_~t~ii2~---------~------·-·------ ------------------·- _________ ..... l-.. ____ ---· 
25 12 Merit based promotion (a problem across the Army not just Personnel N N N N N N 
c 0 Special Forces): 
Officers are not promoted on merit until they have served a 
minimum of 15 years, a joke in a society that has moved 
away from the 'job for life' mentality. (1.5 to 4 yrs, 3 to 4 yrs 
L T: 6 yrs CAPT; 3 yrs to PSC; plus usually 1 to 2 yrs PSC 
until promotion). What this means is that jets (and those that 
continually.study to gain new skills) progress at the same 
rate as also rans (you really need to tread on your dick not to 
make MAJ these days. 
(2) Flexible posting/promotion. NSW Police has a similar 
system where internal vacancies are offered. Fixed 2 to 3 yr 
postings, but with the ability to apply for your own job again 
at the end of posting. People who apply can be any rank, ie 
LCPL can apply for the SGT job, and if he has the skills and 
experience he gets promoted. People who are happy being 
CPL range controllers can stay that way for years if they 
· want to. 
-1------ ------------------------------·-------- ----------- ----1-:--:-c-:---·--c-:- ---
25 I 12 Developing roles in a comprehensive security environment Capability Y Y N I N Y N 
d ! 1 incl: drug enforcement, illegal immigrants, terrorism (beyond 
I ! CT resolution), environmental damage, currency flight, 
2s-h2 f~i~~~t~~~-~~~~·a~~~rs-toidentifYTdiois arlc!The ability ____ Person-nel··--·--ry- 1\f--i\ffN t-f .N 
e ! 2 (and conviction) to sack them. See the private sector - we 
: are not a sheltered workshop, nor an instrument of social 
i 1 policy.___.----·-------·--·------·-------·--·-------------------.-------·------------·-··-·--· _______ __ -:·+·-:+::-:+:-:-+-::-:-! 
26 i 12 A proper work ethic exists for all personnel involved with Personnel Y N N N N N 
~j_ __ ~ .92.!:'"1t:>!:lt~!.§Y~!e~~~--------------------------------------------------------------- ------------·------------- ______ ____ _____ ____ ___ __ _ 
26 j 12 Proper and effective control of resources and personnel - not Personnel Y N N N N N 
c i 5 wasting a person's time. 
26 I 12 The employment opportunities 'tor clerks needs to be mo're- Y N N N N N 
~,-§_ attractive due to t~_e shQ_~~_g_e eXt:JE!rie_r:!9.~.9:_________ t----,-·--------1-::-:-+-:-:-+---- __ _ 
26 ! 12 A more relaxed environment due to the high work rate of Y Y N N N N 
.;.___L ___ r _!ig~o. ---·-~·-------- . _________ . _ . ---------+~o--:+--:--:-f--:--:-f--:o-:-1-::-:-i 
27 ! 12 Endorsement of an SO capability master plan (similar to the Capability Y Y N N N N 
a I 8 Equa Plan) by COMO Special Forces, LCAUST and 
__ J ____ (;Q_M~~I__Q.~t!()_t~~y~_C1r_?_QQ~ __ C1!lE!<3.S.L ______________ . ____________________ ------------------------ ---- ---- --- --- -----
27 i 12 Ensuring there is adequate manpower to man Special Personnel Y Y N I N N N 
%?-h ~ ~~~cu~-fnia~e~~i-!~~~~~il9tc>--covercT ·iransterfo-4 RAR--- Leadership ------- 'N v N+r\f -N 'r\J-
c j 0 (Cdo) and UW role to SASR (to ensure SASR does not ' 
___ J.. ______ rP_E!_GOme~cJ!:!!}Q~Il!i!l~ .. ~~Y.L ___ ~---------------- ---------------------- ---.,-. ___ ---··· ---- ____ "" ____ _ 
27 113 Increased operational employment of 1 Commando Regt. Operations N Y N N N N 
d \ 1 
' - --------------------~"~-----~ -~-~·"---- - -~--:-!-::-:·"-:--- ,.-- 1-:-:-
27 ! 13 Addressing EW void at HQSO as well as OPSEC matters Operations N Y Y N N N 
e ! 2 across SO as a whole. 
!a·r~r~ -~=~f~~::;;~t-~~~:~!~~~:F=orces--Av-n7Airwir1Q-with __________ OperaiTons·-----·- ·y ·y '( -N·r·r.r i\J" 
--1------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------~------------------ ------~---------------- ----- --- --- ------ --- ----
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28 ! 13 Equipment. The ability of the Special Forces Group to Equipment N N N I N Y N 
b I 4 purchase 'off the shelf' SO equip in order to ALLOW ALL 
UNITS within the Special Forces Group to benefit from being 
equipped with 'leading edge' technology. This will enhance I 
2a ~ 1s- ~~~~~~~~b.~~a!~9~~g~:~rr~~¥~iL:ai~~~~i ~-~~irt Time-------- operatio-ns------ · --r,r --r\f N1~f ·r'f r:J 
c · 5 Special Forces Group Personnel. A change in Federal 
- ' Government legislation is required in order to allow PT 
__ i ~~;~;~~~:~;~!~~r;r;~~~~~~!~;:pep~;~~~~~~~;!~~~ -----~--- -~------~- -~- _______________ J ___ _ 
28 ! 13 Concentration of the Special Forces Group. Concentrate the Management N Y Y ' N N N 
d ! 6 Special Forces Group in one location in order to increase ! training efficiencies and interoperability across the Special 
! ------- .f:Q!:9~~~!9_~2:______________________________________________________________________ ----------------------- ---- ---- --- ------- ----- -----
28 ! 13 Full Time/Part Time Scheme for Commando FE. Selection Y N N N N N 
e 7 Introduction of a 'Ready Reserve like scheme' where 1 
Commando Regiment part time personnel-serve for 12 
months on full time service with 4 RAR (Cdo) then transfer to 
1 Commando Regiment to complete their four year part time 
commitment. This will increase the overall operational 
capability of 1 Commando Regiment while enhancing 
____ !------- l!l~~roperability wit!!i__13_~~(9dQl~-------------------------------------------- ____________________________________________ .. 
29 [ 13 Regional associates have long viewed AS Special Forces N N N Y N N 
a I 8 and our activities with a mixture of respect and suspicion. I 
would suspect that with our current moves towards Special 
Forces expansion that this would, in some areas, generate 
hostility and promote the development of measures to 
counter Special Forces capability. We have for many years 
; now offered training to our neighbours and they have had the 
I opportunity to view our abilities both at home and abroad. I 
L--- be!ieve that in th~ long~!~!l_!_his i~U! k~y- issue.----~-------~----------------·--------------- ____ __ ___ __ __ 
29 : 13 ADF perception of Special Forces at present, as evidenced Personnel Y N N N N N 
b · 9 by the reluctance of units to reinforce Special Forces (4 
RAR}, I believe to be one of, 'Why should we do it for you 
when it is to our disadvantage?' This being obvious 
reference to the 1/98 Commando Selection Course. This 
reluctance and the drain Special Forces places upon already 
stretched manpower resources of ARMY units must be 
addressed if we are to successfully continue to reinforce our 
units. Is there a way we can obviously benefit other ARMY 
't ? 
-----!------- .':JD~------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------ ---- ----- ------ ----- -
29 ! 14 Repaying the debt has long been in contention among SASR Personnel Y N N N N N 
c 0 members. It is however the only real means by which the 
rest of the ADF can actually see the advantages of having a 
large Special Forces group. It is easy to see the effect that 
SAS soldiers posted to regular units has. This process 
however is met with little enthusiasm from members of 
SASR. I myself was posted from SASR in Dec 95 to 3 RAR. 
I found though that there is a huge gap in the levels of 
training, an even greater gap in the levels of ability, but a 
desire among the rank and file to increase their ability and 
skills. Unfortunately there is N conduit to improve the 
situation. 
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Special Forces has a role here in our own back yard. I 
believe that Special Forces should expand the support it 
offers other Land Comd and Trg Comd units by increasing 
the Special Forces commitments to regular units and the 
ARMY schools. The added exposure of SASR (Special 
Forces) personnel to these units would create a long-term 
gain thereby increasing the Special Forces pool. Career 
issues of SASR personnel would require very careful 
consideration. 
~~- ·--··---------·-~-~~--~--¥--~~-~-~~..,_¥Y.~,~~~";;-~-~-.~¥.~~---"~·-~~~-=~~~-N-< --~-·---·--~-
29 14 Enthusiasm. I believe now more than ever before, that there Personnel 
d 1 is a requirement to reinforce the values that Special Forces 
hold high. We confront this daily by maintaining the drive 
and the go forward, the can-do attitude. BUT WHY? We 
need to see the effects that this daily re-affirmation has on 
us. For many Special Forces members, there is N longer the 
cutting edge involvement and for some it has never been 
there, having only arrived in an Special Forces unit in a 
support role. There is a requirement for all involved to at 
some time view the wider picture or experience Special 
Forces expertise. We need our support personnel, we value 
1--r--~~..::th:,:.:~m and _'!fe must have them workingJ.<?!. us. ___ -------~~-- --·---------
- 29 I 14 Technological competencies. C3/C4 is rapidly developing to technology 
e I 2 become a core requirement amongst all ADF personnel on 
! attainment of rank. Little is done to improve the capabilities 
of serving members to cope with the demands (even at unit 
level} in this area. Officers generally are exposed to 
computer technology {be it only word processing or 
spreadsheets) and it is well incorporated into their training. 
This is not the case for ORs. Most aren't exposed to the 
requirement until they have to start corresponding as an 
NCO. Special Forces is embracing Digital Transfer and 
information technology as the means of the future. If there is 
1 a foreseen requirement, Now is the time to commence 
---
-····---
L ___ tr~Lr)ing_:_ ____ --------·-~--------------·-····--···-.--··--------- _____ _ 
30 ! 14 Vision. If SO is serious about a collaborative approach to -
a 3 the development of corporate strategy then a strategic 
process model should be developed. This would allow wide 
participation in SO development. I am not suggesting an 
additional work load but a rationalisation of a number of 
concurrent process wrapped up into a corporate strategic 
development plan. There are plenty of examples of these 
processes around but I don't know of any that are in use in 
any Army organis~tion. I would be more than happy to 
assist in the development of such a model if it was part of a 
wider rationalisation of work flows within the headquarters. 
: The outcome of this process should be a vision (in the best 
Leadership 
--·-··-·-··--
_ i _ corr:?.<?!.~~-~le} __ ~I}Q__~~-~bei_ of_!l:l_~~~~<:>_r:_ thrus~-----··-- ·-·----·--------
30 [ 14 Organisational Learning. There is a mountain of literature on Leadership 
b 4 the philosophy of a learning organisation. Senge is probably 
at the forefront of this and his book titled the 'Fifth Discipline' 
should be a must read. We cannot possibly get better at 
what we do until we have an effective process in place to 
___ analyse and apg[y_our exe_~rien2_~s. _There_ are frameworks _____ _ 
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such as the POR/PAR process for dealing with reviews but 
these are generally ad hoc and are not treated with the 
proper priority. This is evident in unit PARs that are full of 
detail that keeps re-occurring. We could be much better at 
---'- _ __ !!_SjiJ_Q _Q_l!I'~~Q~!]_~I]_<?_~~_!Q_9_~~-~!~-~_ff_El9_k_ ___ _____ ~ ______ _ ______ ----------~------- . -
30 ! 14 Personnel Management. In an environment of leaner Leadership 
c I 5 organisations and increasing change, the management of 
· the individual will be central to organisational efficiencies and 
therefore capability. 
The Army prides itself in the management of people and SO 
probably does better than much of the wider Army. I 
contend that we are mediocre managers of personnel and 
outdated procedures constrain the way we use this resource. 
The use of PT and ex-FT personnel is evidence of this 
aspect. The PT is a most cost-effective component with 
potential for development; Notwithstanding the perceived 
capability difference in comparing the wages bill of SASR 
and 1 Commando Regt. 
This is purely anecdotal but reflects on the people you 
started training with and it seems that many of the best (and 
worst) potential have left. This is a significant waste of 
training resource and leadership potential. This indicates an 
inherent incapacity of Defence to provide people with an 
adequate career challenges. We should take a broad 
perspective of personnel management and allow people 
flexibility in pursuing a career both within and outside 
Defence. If the organisation is to take full advantage of 
opportunities, we must retain and invest in bright young 
f=:--+-:---:+"::-::e~o~-----·------------------- __________ _ 
30 ! 14 Structures. The most efficient organisations are usually not Management 
d ' 6 hierarchical. Unfortunately, the military is blessed with an 
organisation that would be more at home in the industrial 
age. There has been a fair amount of work into units and 
organisations but these do not question the fundamental 
existence of the regimental structure. Are these regimental 
structures appropriate to a Joint environment small, capable, 
integrated teams that require minimal administration? An are 
these structures able to deliver operational synergies? 
Teaming and project management should be adopted 
instead of the Napoleonic (functional) staff structure. People 
still retain the functional responsibilities but operate as part 
of a team. This should improve workflows and management 
_L ____ withi!l_!_~~ organi~_ation. ------------------------------------------ -----~------
30 I 14 New Technologies. Information technologies are Technology 
e I 7 revolutionising the way we communicate and gain 
knowledge. Resourced properly it will deliver the economies 
and capabilities we seek for operations and administration. 
This seems to be widely accepted but funding and 
purchasing arrangements are Not in place to allow us to take 
advantage of the potential. The materiel process is Not 
producing the rate of outcomes we need to develop 
! capability. We should have a slick process in place to 
__ L_ ~vai!:J~!~--~nd _!!1~-~!Q~~~~Qew 1~h!:'QL~gj~~----~------~----~- ______________ _ 
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. f 30f l 14 Creativity. It is widely acknowledged in the business 
t 8 community that creativity is a competitive advantage. De 
Leadership Y N N N N N 
Bono contents that creativity is the sole domain of humans 
(at least at present) and machines (computers) will inevitably 
take over all other work. So to be skilled in creativity and 
use the creative process (assuming it can be taught) is 
essential to future individual and group effectiveness. 
The estabtishment of a dual organisation cultures that can 
-+--~- ~ustain the ro_!:.J~inel conv~!l!ional!y m~ll.§!.9~--~-----~--·--·- ---------~------·· --r..-:- -~- --.- __ _ 
31 I 14 Manning the Special Forces Group in a shrinking army: Selection Y N N 1 N N N 
a i 9 (1) attracting the interest of the right kind of person in the 
first place; 
(2) motivating the soldier to want to test himself with 
selection; 
(3) ensuring that selection is sufficient to identify the desired 
qualities in an individual without exposing him to an 
unacceptably high risk of injury; . 
(4) Examining possibilities for recruiting. This could include 
raising the profile of the Special Forces Gp in all three 
services, including the reserve components. Examining the 
possibilities for direct entry recruiting of civilian life or straight 
out of JET training, and reviewing the role that female 
soldiers could play in combat or combat related positions. 
Direct entry recruiting of civilianas is currently undertaken by 
1 Commando Regt, B Coy, 4 RAR (Cdo) contains a high 
proportion of soldiers posted straight out of I ET training and 
female soldiers are proving that they have the necessary 
physical and mental toughness to complete the current 
. Commando selection course. 
31l15 Retention of selected and t=-:ra'-7in_e_d-=-s=-p_e_c7ia-:"l Forcesp-ersonneT:- Personnel___ Y N N N N N 
b · 0 Keeping the soldier motivated and interested. Poor 
leadership, training and administration will quickly 
demoralise an intelligent high achieving soldier and he or 
she will generally leave Not only the Special Forces Gp but 
the Army. 
{2} Having a realistic career path open to soldiers within the 
Special Forces Gp. 
{3} Ensuring that a realistic attitude is taken to the 
manning/tasking ratio and that we don't require soldiers to 
work unrealistic hours on unachievable tasks as a result of 
reduced manning. 
(4) Ensuring that the soldier remains adequately 
. remunerated for exposure to high risk training and having to 
j---~~ maintain a very hi~h s!ate~9L!eadin~ss to move.--,---------+-
31 ! 15 Acquisition of equipment and technology and continuous Technology 
c i 1 development of processes and procedures: 
Continuous research and development to find ways to 
enhance the likelihood of success for the Special Forces 
mission. This includes constant development of doctrine, 
tactics and SOPs as well as equipment. 
(2) Embracing relevant leading edge techNiogy in order to 
, give the Special Forces soldier a battlefield advantage. 
N Y Y N Y N 
-~--~~ ~ ~~~- J~) ___ §!!_~~!r:t!I'1.9Jh~er.:.~2.~!~_r:nJ'l_r:t!_E~~~~~-!_~~!l~~~ !h~L____ --------·----·-------- -·-· ____ ___ _ _____ _ 
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acquisition of technology and equipment is timely and that it 
reaches the soldier before it is obsolete. 
15 Training: 
2 Each element of the Special Forces Gp needs to define its 
core tasks and concentrate its training on achieving the 
highest possible standard in the execution of those tasks. 
Secondary and tertiary tasking should have commensurately 
less training directed towards it. 
(2) By its nature, Special Forces training is expensive in 
resources. The Special Forces Gp needs to ensure that 
none of the allocated resources are wasted on inappropriate . 
or irrelevant training activities. 
(3) Training must be varied, interesting and rewarding for 
participants. It needs to be relevant to the core tasks and 
should concentrate on those types of operational 
deployments that the Special Forces Gp is experiencing 
more 
15 Maintaining an Operational in everything we do: Operations 
3 As the likely force for short warning deployments it is 
essential that the SF Gp ensure that it is able to operate 
comfortably in both the Joint and Combined environments. 
This will mean that we need to exercise all components of 
the Special Forces Gp in the Joint and Combined 
environments as often as possible. Regular work with Allies 
will assist with the development of common procedures and 
equipment interoperability. 
(2) The Special Forces Gp needs to ensure that it is Not 
misemployed during major exercises and that the tasks 
allocated are both realistic and relevant to the aims of the 
'conflict'. 
(3) The other emphasis should be on training for 
deployment on operations in an undeclared or Nn-warlike 
environment with limited objectives or Special Forces 
tasking. The Special Forces role in Peace Ops (both 
peacekeeping and peacemaking) and PsyOps should Not be 
Appendix 4 
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15 Specialist Equipment. As the Special Forces Gp is primarily Equipment 
a 4 task orientated, it would be fair to assume that the 
conventional equipment would Not altogether be adequate 
for the mission accomplishment. Specialist equipment 
should be required to be specific for the task at hand. Some 
of the areas to look at but Not limited to are: 
(1) Comms Equip, 
(2) Wpns, 
(3) Clothing, and 
rtation. 
32 15 Realistic Training. Realistic training and resources go hand raining 
b 5 in hand to effect a properly equipped and well trained fighting 
force. 
15 Resources. The availability of resources for realistic training Management 
c 6 is an integral part of the mission accomplishment, some of 
these would include: 
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16 Person management skills 
~ c 1 
r 33 16 Adaptation of the new 
~ d : 2 
' 33 16 Acceptance of change 
3 
16 Better access to intelligence. Implementation of the Special 
4 Forces WAN and other C31 systems will improve the 
situation, however, more lnt staff within the Special Forces 
Gp and better liaison with Defence and outside agencies will 
increase the effectiveness of al Forces lnt 
Security 
Personnel 
Operations 
Mixed gender 
Leadership 
Personnel 
Personnel 
- 34 16 Improved guidance on the assumption of roles for the Leadership 
b 5 Special Forces units. While units are aware of impending 
role changes or variations, I believe there is N clear time 
frame and directives for the implementation of these role 
changes. One example is the prospect of Commando units 
on the CSAR role. 
34 Increased interoperability between Special Forces units. 
c This relates to the training of personnel as well as equipment 
procurement. Differences in basic skills and the courses for 
these skills need to be guided in the same direction so that 
all units recognise them. One example is the medics course. 
Until recently, Commando Medics course was not fully 
credited for personnel moving over to SASR. Demolitions 
and Patrol or Recon Courses are one area where 
compatibility should be sought. Equipment procurement 
should be a joint Special Forces issue to ensure compatibility 
and associated training levels on that equipment is standard 
t------;-------·- across th~g-~Q_l:l_Q~----------·-----~-~----------------------~-------- --------------+,=--
34 i 16 Expanded research and development interest. With the rate Technology 
d ' 7 of advance of technology, an increasing number of 
sophisticated weapons systems and other equipment that is 
of direct interest to Special Forces units is being developed. 
It is imperative that either the group or units maintain visibility 
over these developments and where practical, implement 
systems of procurement and training in this equipment. 
While units currently have a limited R&D capability, I believe 
an increased in this field is 
; 16 More I believe that security, 
I 8 both in some areas and 
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needs atte 
advantage 
ntion. Being a full time unit, SASR has some 
in that isolation and compartmentalisation of 
:. information is relatively effective, however with more public 
attention o n Special Forces and related operations, I see a 
. need for a 
! operationa 
better education package on the effects of 
I security and/or its breaching as well as other 
::_ . .1-- __ physical se 
35 : 16 Across the 
curit~ issues. __ 
board entrance tests for all Special Forces units 
· a __ _L ___ !! .0.~_9iv[g_~_~!L 
--------------------------------~-------------------~---------------------· 
35 ! 17 Cross-train 
b I 0 Forces uni 
35-Tfi -Atter-car:e-·i 
ing in courses and exercises for all Special 
ts. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---· 
raining courses, streamline individuals into 
c j_1_~pecialist g 
35 ! 17 Specialist s 
d I 2 and S ecia 
35 ! 17 Train with 
roups. 
upport units: Special Forces helos, fixed wing--
I Forces !>.P~! troops. ------------------
allied Special Forces units to keep abreast of 
e i 3 techno_!QgJ. 
36 i 17 Equipment/W 
onl! 4 Testing is t 
and technigues. 
eapon. Procurement is taking too long. 
aking years for equipment that has been tested by 
y i various cou ntries, namely the US, UK etc. We should try to 
ller numbers and use the equipment/weapons for ' buy in sma 
specific tas 
out to be c 
ks that they are designed for. This would work 
heaper and more effective for its users as they are 
er~_eq~[p_~~~-f_oLt.h~.~ ta~~~·--- ---~------- --·-------- _ ., - ':l~i!!9J'!c:l.c! 
37 i 17 Dedicated 
- a j 5 Here Spec 
Special Forces air elements both Army Aviation + 
ial Forces elements. This relates to both 
· dedicated aircrew and SP aircraft, ie MH-60 Black 
-47 Chinooks and MC-130 Heres. , Hawks/MK 
-~----~--~~---~~---«-~~---
Selection 
---------------------------
Training 
--------------------------------------· 
Personnel 
Capability 
-----·----~"'-'' Training 
Equipment 
~-------------~----'~ 
Capability 
---r··· ·-- ·--·-·- -------· ------ain9tc>ilave-i=f-element5;-!tley-neea-·tab_e _____________ -----------------·----------· 37 1 17 If we are g 
b 1 6 integrated 
'dual client 
into the FT unit. Therefore courses run are all 
'- FT/PT so that every individual is trained to the 
, same level More emphasis needs to be placed on PT 
___ L_ _____ ~~gJ~_r~_.l?_~ _[~g __ ~g_r_TlE~!i!JJ~-~i-~~EI~--------------------------------------------
37 i 17 More impo 
c I 7 instead of 
should be 
rtance/investment placed on FT Commando unit 
PT unit. Resources, training time/money/etc 
prioritised for FT Commando unit. PT unit is 
i basically a non-productive unit in the context that it cannot 
~.s!.~~--~Jlg_l_!~--unit immediatelY: __ .(. ____ -~~~-~!?J.c:lY. 
rtance placed on Special Forces -----37 ; 17 More impo 
d i 8 weapons/a quipment procurement without normal Army 
i involvemen 
I M16A2/A3 
t, ie Special Forces orientated small arms 
Not only for water operators, but for all Special 
L Force~2P_~ 
37 ! 17 More invol 
rators. 
e i 9 other units 
vement/promoifon of Spe-cial-Forces-community to-
/other Services. Give these units/Services a 
better idea 
work/liaise 
38 1 1-8- Improve th 
of our capabilities/limitations and ways to better 
with these outside units/Services. 
e profileofso-·within theADF.arldexternar--·--
onl! 0 agencies. Commanders at all levels within all Services of 
y i the ADF sh 
capabilities 
ould have a basic understanding of the roles and 
of SO units and how SO units can enhance their 
L ___ o erations 
.?..~.L1~. _C2~~~.ffity:-
/c_§!p_?bilities. __________ . _______ . ______________ , _______ . __ 
__ _1 __ g2~~-~!:!~.c:l..!3~_g!_~r~Q!l_Q_~I _ _t2_Er.c:l.~J.c!.~_PQ.c:l.Lf.c:l.~-
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Training 
---------------------------
Resources 
----~--~~~---------
Equipment 
~-------~~--
Marketing 
·---~-·-~--·~-·--~--w-" •• ~-~~ 
Communication 
------~~~-~--~~- --~----
f~E!'!~l!!!Y ________ 
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a 
18 All courses PT or FT oerweEm 
_ 2 the salll_~~--~g _ _li_~~- ~?;_ erritorial. 
18 1 Commando Regt disbanded to come under command 4 
3 Cdo. Why have two units competing with each other -
wasted etc. 
18 Dedicated support units: 
4 (1) fixed wing 
rotary 
41 18 Know who we are - Maintenance of Special Forces Gp Personnel 
a 7 identity and unit identity within the Special Forces Gp: 
We as an Special Forces gp must be confident in our identity 
in order to preserve it. We are entitled to be 'elitist' we have 
earned that discretion and any cursory glance at military 
history and successful Special Forces units clearly supports 
this right. If we are expected to provide a capability beyond 
the capacity of conventional forces then we must be 
permitted to inculcate into our culture an unconventional 
even non-conformist outlook. 
(2) In order to preserve, enhance and develop the 
uniqueness and unconventionality of SASR and the 
Commando Regts it is essential to preserve the particular 
attributes of each unit. Each element is tasked to conduct 
different missions within the SO spectrum. The opportunities 
and advantages provided by the establishment of the Special 
ForcesTraining Centre are numerous and I welcome the 
challenges this will bring. However, any attempt to achieve 
commonality in selection procedures predicated on resource 
effici criterion must be resisted. 
41 l 18 Get the job done - Maintaining an operational 'outcome' or 
b · 8 capability based focus. 
(1) Provision of an effective SO capability as part of the 
wider Army and ADF warfighting capability requires us to 
concentrate on the end-state. This will ensure we are Not 
constrained by process based methodology, one which is 
currently espoused by technocrats and their flow charts and 
models. 
(2) Our doctrine must withstand intellectual review to ensure 
its credibility, but pragmatic methods providing a 
demonstrated effective capability must take precedence over 
an approach based on jargon and theoretical systems. An 
example of this is the conduct of our individual and collective 
traini 
41 ! 18 Ensuring we are 'Comfortable in Chaos' Personnel 
c · 9 We must ensure we welcome and embrace the uncertain 
and environment that characterises 
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41 19 
d 0 
41 19 
e 1 
SO. In order to develop this ability, we must continually 
expose ourselves to this circumstance in order to develop 
our confidence and the ability to operate effectively within it. 
This requires us to accept mistakes in the conduct of our 
training and Not define success as 'zero defect'. This is a 
cultural issue that requires the Special Forces gp to confront 
the wider ADF mentality, this is of particular importance to 
commanders who must take ownership of their subordinates 
errors and be prepared to, in fact enjoy, defending their 
actions to the less flexible or enlightened. 
We cannot expect or demand timely and accurate 
i nformation or advice, nor should we. This is Not an excuse 
for unprofessional conduct, more so it highlights and 
acknowledges the demand for Special Forces commanders 
to rigorously apply the proven doctrine of mission analysis 
and SO MAP. This will enhance our mission focus and 
ultimate success when everything and everyone around us is 
Appendix 4 
s~_£2_':1_mQ!_r}gJ.QJb..~.£hao~!h~tJ~~id~!!L ___________________ ~-~------ ----------------------------- ___ _ 
Marketing our utility - but know when to say N! Operations Y Y N N N N 
The Special Forces gp must provide the logical first choice 
FE to the ADF for the conduct of ops. This requires us to 
actively seek a niche in the range of contingency planning. 
Recent history demonstrates this issue is well advanced. 
We must nowbe mature enough as an organization to 
acknowledge our limitations and Not blindly snatch at 'each 
and every' task or comply with every request for support that 
emerges. This discretion will preserve our uniqueness and 
prevent any over extension of our capacity. We can exploit 
every opportunity and be 'all things to all people' but be 
smart enough in doing so, to ensure we maintain the integrity 
of ou~.C?.~Qab!~!i-~~:. ____________________ ---------~---------------------- --------·----------··------------- ____________________________ _ 
Enjoy the moment - manage the training tempo. 
This issue is linked to the previous one but remains discrete 
from it as it refers to directed training activities - Not 
operational tasks. This comment is based on my experience 
1n SASR and relates to this unit, however I am confident it 
has application to the Special Forces Gp. We must be 
selfish to some degree and Not continually be directed to 
participate in and/or host training activities for or with ADF or 
allied/regional nation units. We are our own worst enemies 
i n this area, however we must ensure we retain the capacity 
to surge to meet operational commitments. 
Our people are our most valuable resource and they 
underpin our capabilities, in order to preserve and develop 
their skills we must balance the workload to prevent burn-
out. It is na'ive to believe that operational employment will 
come without an accompanying requirement to support and 
participate in collective training activities within the ADF, but 
we must now impose our own pre-requisites. The simple 
pleasures of regimental service must be preserved to ensure. 
a sense of pride, esprit-de-corps and humble enjoyment. 
We should never be too busy training to miss out on 
established unit activities such as Regt Birthday festivities. 
These events are funda_r:nental to maintainingJ enha_IJ£!!:!.9. 
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19 The Procurement Process. The best measure of trust is the Management 
a 2 allocation of funds. The current procurement process is 
cumbersome. If the Special Forces Gp is to exploit new 
technology and develop new, potentially clandestine, 
capabilities, it needs its own discrete funding with the 
appropriate control mechanisms built in. A guaranteed 
regular level of funding, even of relatively small amounts 
(say $1 M/yea:r) would allow the Special Forces Gp to 
achieve a 'leading edge' position within Defence. We would 
have to accept however that some of the projects would fail. 
fund d assist in the · 
42 19 The Development Process. Special Forces Gp should be at Technology 
b 3 the leading edge of technological innovation within Defence. 
We should be providing those short notice leading edge 
(para) military capabilities that are required by Government. 
We do Not really know what they are! There should be 
strategic guidance that moulds our effort. In absence of this 
we should be developing our own. Being the leading edge, 
there should be more latitude in our processes that allow for 
development paths to end in options that are other than 
successful! 
19 Focus on Equipment. We are very focussed on equipment. 
4 We should concentrate our effort on future capability and 
therefore develop organisations, structures, doctrine, tactics, 
procedures AND THEN what equipment is needed as a 
WHOLE SYSTEM. 
Exploit Technology. There is much TALK about exploiting 
technology. Soon the Special Forces Gp will have secure 
connectivity throughout. We will be in position to be led in 
the development of processes and procedures from an Army 
and ADF perspective. A system like Lotus Notes for 
example would give us the potential to streamline our 
rocesses as we know what are 
42 19 Responsibility. We should be pushing responsibility down to Leadership 
e 6 the lowest level. Individuals who own, or consider they are a 
part of, a process will work harder and try to improve it. We 
should encourage innovation, new ideas and Not be afraid of 
mistakes. 
19 Force Projection Platforms. The biggest limitation for the Operations 
7 use of Australian Special Forces is our lack of force 
projection platforms. We have a well-trained and equipped 
organisation that is essentially limited by our inability to firstly 
the force element it. 
Direction. One of the main reasons for the raising of 4 RAR Capability 
(Cdo) was to remove the domestic CT role from SASR. Both 
oranisations will need to be given the direction of what they 
will need to achieve. Specifically for 4 RAR Cdo relating to 
CT and for SASR the emphasis of training, ie Type A 
operations/war roles/unconventional warfare. The direction 
SASR will take after the hand over domestic CT is 
currently being generated internally. HQSO must provide 
SASR with a clear direction that the will take 2003. 
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43 19 Special Forces Selection. Selection is the most important 
c 9 course conducted at SASR. Detailed research and 
discussion should be conducted before any sweeping 
changes to selection or combined selection are considered. 
Commandos and SASR are looking for similar 
characteristics in their personnel. However, the mental 
toughness and stability under extreme physical and 
psychological stress which is required of SASR operators is 
only provided on the longer SASR selection process. SASR 
selection is essentially a personality test that has proven its 
value in the past and in my opinion will continue to do so in 
: the future. 
43 i2o C2. Thecommand and co-ntrol of SASR is extremely-----
d ! 0 disjointed. The Regt comes under Land Comd for 'raise, 
train and sustain'. However for operations falls under 
command of HQAST and for DFCAP specifically CT answers 
to the CDF. SASR should be controlled and tasked at the 
highest level. With so many different chains of command 
surely there is scope for things to go wrong. Particularly with 
the nature of some Special Forces operations being 
' 
' 
'sensitive' a simpler chain of command would prevent 
OPSEC breaches. 
Selection 
Operations 
43T2o s-pecfai~F=orces Avn:-fntiletuiu-reTiwouTcfhe-wis-e to-raise -- capahiiity--
e I 1 an Special Forces AAvn elm. Crews of both the S-70 and 
CH-47 and the platform chosen through AIR 87 (preferably 
Not the Tiger) need to train for missions that would most 
likely involve the use of Special Forces. Such tasking for 
Special Forces avn may incl: 
a. Low level flying by night under NVG 
b. Low level formation flying (pertinent to (CT 
COMMANDOs) and SASR ops) 
c. Ability to fly onto and off to Naval assets at night 
: d. CH-47 crews trained in RORO 
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N Y N N N N 
··-··--- ········----------------
N N Y N N N 
! e. Air to air refuelling capability 
i f. Helo gunships to prov fire spt to Special Forces ops (AIR i 
______ ( ________ 8_?l_ __ ;···--·-··--------------------------------------·--·-··-·--·--·---------····- ----------------·--·-··--- -- -···· ·--- ··--·· --- --
44 i 20 Specral Forces must have a global focus. As the planet Personnel Y Y N N N Y 
a l 2 shrinks due to increasing technology, a regional focus is too 
_j____ n~rro~_t_tbis must be expan_ded to inci!Jd~ the ~ntire _e_!_~ne!_· _ _ _____ c-::--:- -:·-:-r-:-:- __ --:-:- -:-:-
44 j 20 Special Forces must be capable of Strategic Projection. Capability N Y Y N N N 
b ! 3 Special Forces must possess a real time capability to project 
i itself strategically. This force projection capability must be 
I on the same reduced notice to move as the Special Forces 
_j __ ~ -~]ement_s. __ ~-~£~.i~-~-~E2r~2-~------~-------------------------------------------- ------------- ··:-:- ·:-:-+--::-t-:--:t+.~-1 
44 ! 20 Special Forces must be interoperable with other Services Operations Y Y N I N Y N 
c I 4 and other nation's Special Forces. lnteroperability must 
____ _J___ .92\f~r _ _R!29.~Q!!.~~~-~!:!9 __ ~g~il?.r:!:l~~~~------------------------------------------------- _________________________ ____ _ ____ ------ _____ ____ _ __ 
44 I 20 The research, development and procurement systems must Equipment N N Y N Y N 
d · 5 be overhauled to cater for the rapid advances in technology. 
, If the Army procurement system cannot be fixed then Special 
_ _L ___ E.<?!9es_ mus_t div~Q~J!~_f!!Jt!rs>!!IJ~~-Q.tirf!!JY.~------------------------- ----------------r-:-:- _____ --r:-:-
44 ! 20 Special Forces must expand itself into more Type A Operations Y Y N N N N 
~--1-~ <:>P~J:<:l!!<?!:!l5~ __ Ib!l5 __ ~e>_I,J_IQJ]_~€l9.JQ.LIJ92EI?_()rc:l!~:.____________________ ___________________________ ___ ___ _ _________ ~-
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a. A wider recruiting base 
b. Proposed restructures taking place, such as SASR 
passing on the CT role 
c. The Commando units assessing whether some of their 
more conventional roles could be passed to other infantry 
units. 
45 j 20 The following areasneed~to-bereviewedand chan-ges-~made: Leadership 
a ' 7 a. The identification and allocation of roles and task for 
SASR and Commando units 
b. Personnel are held accountable for the positions and 
responsibilities they hold at all levels 
c. Clear and timely direction and a clear aim for the future 
d. Quick/timely passage of information and/or tasks both 
internally and externally, eg Ref A received after the 
nominated response date 
e. A tendency for some to put career progression above or 
in conflict with benefit to the unit . 
f. Tendency to micro-manage activities and personnel 
g. Lack of Special Forces doctrine for the full gambit of 
, Special Forces activities, this needs to be coordinated at a 
Appendix4 
f-J~·~·· £~ntrai_QQ!nt ___ ~-----~--·---------·-- . . ·---~--~------- ··-·· -·.-r--:-:- --r-;-:-r:--:-
45 i 20 Training/Standards. At the moment SAS pers trg to maintain Training Y N N Y N N 
b · 8 20-30 skills, this needs to be reviewed and decide whether 
we are multi-skilled or highly skilled (both could apply in 
some cases). The following needs to be considered: 
a. Identify core skills and specialist skills 
b. How to maintain standards/skills for quick deployment 
c. Maintenance of capability 
d. Central control on doctrine and trg development 
e. Future Special Forces pers requirements may differ from 
the normal SAS/Commando operator. There needs to be a 
selection, trg and management process in place to facilitate 
these needs. 45T2o 'ECiucation:AftFlerrlOment-education inatiroad range-of-- ·-------··-.. --·-----··-t·Nr-N-ty ·r\f N .. -v 
c · 9 areas needs to be addressed. Some specific areas are 
listed as follows: 
! 
~5t·21 
a. Computers have been introduced but little or N training 
has occurred for the majority of personnel 
b. Special Forces doctrine and staff duties is Not covered on 
the current promotion courses leaving a void in knowledge. 
We need to identify Special Forces niche within the ADF and 
educate Special Forces pers and the ADF to our capabilities 
at the relevant organisations/personnel level 
c. Standardise staff duties/doctrine within Special Forces 
d. Security trg and procedures is ad hoc and pers Not held 
accountable 
e. Computers have Not enhanced information flow due to a 
lack of equipment in all areas or are incompatible with other 
equip/systems 
f. Computers are an aid as with technology but they do 
suffer from harsh climate or primitive conditions needing 
redundancy in e9!!.!2ment or ~cedures _______ . ______ _ 
Logistics/Acquisition. The ~urrent acguisiti~system is _ §l':Jipment 
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d 0 dated and Not responsive to Special Forces needs. The 
following need review: 
a. Flexibility of identification and purchase of items oft the 
shelf to maintain/attain capability 
b. Some items may be required in limited numbers or have a 
short life expectancy, eg required for a single task only 
c. Technology is superseded in 12-18 months, the 
procurement system needs to be aware of this and Special 
Forces needs accommodated 
d. SAS/Commando need to co-ord their procurement on 
items identified as suitable for both units if the item meets 
requirements by 80 percent then preferable to procure item 
rather than wait years for the perfect thing and risk 
obsolescence 
e. Because of the cost of hi-tech gear, a trg and 
maintenance program needs to be in place prior to issue 
f. At times it will be necessary to delete Australian content 
on some items because of specific needs, development time 
and a need to operate with other Special Forces units 
g. If ADF assets are to be used with Special Forces force 
elements, then Special Forces requirements should be 
considered and implemented at the user requirement stage, 
! eg COLLINS Class Submarine , ____ _ 
45 i 21 Personnel Management. The areas of careers, pay and 
e l 1 compensation need review and some concerns are as 
follows: 
a. Because of the number of Special Forces units, trg 
centres and HQ, etc now in existence (abnormal posting 
cycle), there is a need to identify and manage the career 
path of personnel more closely particularly in the next few 
years; the future impact of unit/posting locations needs to be 
thought through and ample time given so that the impact on 
families is minimised 
b. By the nature of Special Forces Cps/training personnel 
are exposed or suffer injuries or illness at a higher rate than 
the majority of the ADF. Because of exposure to CS gas, 
lead, asbestos, anthrax, etc, some of the dangers are not 
known at the time of exposure, so allowances need to be 
made for compensation at a future date and in a timely 
, manner. 
Person 
!---+--- . ' - . ~~-.. -.~-,---· ---- --· 
46 j 21 The retention of an operational focus in an environment Person 
a : 2 which is increasingly demanding the focus of human 
· resources on non-operation~! issues. 
nel 
nel 
46 i 21 Maintaining a technological advantage with the right but Techn 
~,_-I 3 most advanced e~-~,en~: _____________________ _ 
46 1 21 Identifying the right people for SO and then attracting, Select 
ology 
--
ion 
~-! 4 selecting, training and retaining those people. __ ~-----
46 I 21 The effective marketing of Australian Special Forces to the Marke 
----.~~~~ .... -
ting 
d j_5 Gov~rnll]ent and civil_~~!!:l.f!l_l!nitl':.._ _________________ -+---
46 j 21 The promotion and development of the credibility of Comm unication 
e l 6 Australian Special Forces within the international Special 
r-=-! Forces_ community. ----------------------- __ 
,j7 111 Ma~ketln_9:__ We __!!!~§_t__§_~_!l__<?_l!rseiY.~l:> to _the !~.§!i>l!b~-~~'=- so_ fY1ar]5~ -~----tj_l}_g ___________ 
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!c 
~ 
;:._ 
;_ 
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. 
' 
~ 47 : 22 Looking after our people. We must consider career Personnel 
d · 0 management, personal and professional development and 
,-
the needs of families (for real, Not for pretend} and this 
means putting our establishments in places where people 
want to live. 1----,'--c··c+cc----- ------------------------------- ---------- ---·--:-----::----------=-------------------:-·-------------+--:- c·-:·---:---c:------l--:-c~!-:-:-f-::·-+::-_--!~-f-::--::-1 
; 22 Communication and Admi Process must be Administration 
! 1 refined to ensure that flows well at all levels. 
48 i 22 Laser Weapon and Technology. In recent years there has Technology 
· 2 been a marked improvement in this technology, and a future 
role for this type of weapon could exist on the battlefield - we 
, should address both measure and counter-measure to this 
j _ _ ()f __ t~<?-~!!<?_IQgy.___ _ _ ___ __ ___ __ _____ _______ __ __________ _ _ _ _________________________ ----------1---- --------------------------+---+-+------l------l----+-----
. 22 Computer Literacy. Computers these days are an integral Training 
3 part of society, we need to stay at the sharp end of what 
in this ent. 
Personnel 
22 The Dawn of the Space Age is close. next century the Leadership 
d 5 permanent space station will be completed and there are 
talks about a Moon base. This might sound like science 
fiction now, but so was once the idea of travelling through 
the air or underwater. World War I proved the point that 
going over the top en masse was a waste. World War II 
proved the point that armoured formations could determine 
the outcome of a battle. Time and again we had to learn 
from our mistakes. Consequently we should look to the 
future with a futuristic mind, an open mind that is Not pre-
conceived. 
48 22 Increased Air Mobility. An air squadron should be a Capability 
e 6 dedicated part of a Special Forces unit, integrated with the 
unit to train and operate together without having to rely on 
outside assets. 
49 22 Leadership 
7 
Training 
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49 23 Improve career management. Personnel 
e 1 
50 23 Leading Edge CISEW Technologies. Mounting any Special echnology 
a 2 Forces operation, regardless of size, will be dependent upon 
our ability to gather, interpret, analyse and employ 
information. The success of this operation will be 
determined by the protection and distribution of that 
information throughout the Special Forces Gp. To do this 
effectively Special Forces need to have, and be able to gain, 
leading edge technologies. Rapid procurement of this 
tech is critical. 
--·--··-----------------------·--------------·---··-------------··---·--··--··----------- --1--------··------·,-------------·-·-·---+-:~-:-+·c--c-l-,--,-+-c·c·-+-c+-c·:·~ 
50 23 Force Projection Platforms. Raising and sustaining Capability 
b 3 supportable force projection platforms. These include 
ic and tactical air water and land 
50 23 Recruiting and Training. A re-focus and restructure of the Training 
c 4 recruiting procedures and training priorities is needed for the 
specialised Special Forces roles and tasks. It doesn't matter 
how unconventional we think we are the ingrained 
'militarisms' identify us as Army and more so as Special 
Forces. The re-focus needs to be radical if this mind shift is 
to work into the next 
50 23 issue. Something that 
d 5 must be raised in 
50 23 Marketing/PR. Special Forces needs to be proactive in Marketing 
e 6 selling itself as a useful tool over a wide range of areas. This 
must be the case towards Government. A great emphasis is 
needed here as without Government s we will do little. 
51 23 Unconventionality is a big issue that is often talked about but Operations 
a 7 never really exercised. Need to become realistic and form a 
group within the Special Forces Gp that deals entirely in 
unconventionality. Which could mean working under cover 
of a business, etc. (Disassociated completely from the 
Defence 
51 23 Grasp technology constantly. Be able to trial and purchase Equipment 
b 8 equipment off the shelf without going through the current 
51 
c 
51 
d 
long procurement system which only puts us behind the 
current technology when a decision has been made to 
purchase that particular technology trialled three years 
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1 selection criteria for both and Not trying to have a single 
\ · unified selection course for both units. 
51 ~r24 Need to~tocus on.iilteroperahilitywitil-otile-rciVilianan(f--~---
e I 1 government departments, ie assisting real time ops such as: 
! drug enforcement agencies, surveillance agencies, police 
-------------- -----· 1-:--·- -- --- ·-· ----- --Civilian N Y N N N Y 
Agencies 
_ ~- _ Efiid_sl_~~-1 9!~!~~~9..QR~,__e_tc;_ __ ____________ _ ______ ______ _______ . _ ---~----- ___ ___ ___ ___ _ _ __ _ ___ _ ______ _ 
52 i 24 More Computer Operator positions within the RegVmore Personnel Y Y N N N N 
~_J _ __?. qQmR~~UrC~:ining_. ______ _.. __________________________________________ --------------------- __________ -~ ____ _ 
52 ! 24 More positions for unconventional deployments. Operations Y Y N N N Y 
b I 3 !-::c'..:·-<-------- ----------·----···----------.. --". _____________________ _,_ .. , _____________ _, _______ ------------------1--:-:-· ---- ------ ----- - ·-
52 ! 24 Some sort of EW capability introduced. · Capability N N N N Y N 
~--"~ =-----------.. ------------------------------ --· ----·----·------·--····------- ·-··-----------·------------- c:::.----------~-- --:+:--.-+:-:-+:-~-+:.--:-{ 
52 ! 24 Exchange soldiers to more Special Forces units so that on Training Y N N l Y N N 
d i 5 deployments members are able to understand the workings 
! of each other's units. 
r--_--;------· ----------------------------------.. ------------------------------ _____________ , __________________ ----------·---·----- ---- ----·· , __ --- ----· ---
53 ! 24 To further develop the image capture and transfer Equipment N N Y Y N Y 
~ __ J ___ § Qf1f>?.Qi!i~!~-~--Lrl_f1_rl_!:!r~_f1_n. __ ~n.Y_!rg_JJ~~!:l.!.· _____ .... __ ~ .... -...................... ________ , __ .... ________________ .. _____ ----- --.. -..... ----- ----- .. - ------
53 i 24 Improve information systems (knowledge) both software and Technology Y N N Y N N 
b ! 7 hardware knowledge, to keep up with the changing 
! technologL_ ______________ ~--------------+------+-+--o+--:-+--if--1-.-1 
53 1 24 Develop/improve an EW capability. Capability N N N Y Y Y 
c I 8 
53 i 24 More use of unconventional warfare. Capability Y N N Y N Y 
.Q._j __ ~ ------------------------~~--------------------- ----- ·. ------=-------- -+-j-!--+-
53 l 25 More exchanges with other Special Forces units world wide Training Y N N Y N N-
~_j_ ___ Q_ !Q share/exp_b_~IJ_g~ s~i~~-'---------------·------ ----------------.-.. ----- _______ ...... _______________ ..... -- .. ~-:--- ---- --
54 i 25 Identification of Special Forces role in both war time and in Operations Y N N N N Y 
~---..l. .... J.. .P~fi<;~ .. k.~~I?_i_llf!: _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _ 
54 i 25 Identification of skills other than those already taught, Training N N N Y N Y 
b I 2 needed in a future conflict, egIS skills, EW and Counter EW 
----,+----- ~~ksL~~~~ns 9 .. !-J!s!~~~~Liltc. _____ ~---~----~-------------------- --~-----------------+--+--1-----l,--"1---11---J 
54 1 25 Closer ties between SASR and Commando, sharing of Training N N N Y N Y 
c ! 3 training facilities and assets, joint ex, eg SASR Pathfind prior 
54--j--25 ~u~~~-~!~!eif~!:~~~~~nci~~il~~f~-u~~i~~~fs~~;~~~tllE!r ______ oi)eratians _________ - -v- -~T N'~v -f\fN--
d I 4 Government agencies, Federal Police, Customs, etc in 
I carrying out surveillance of remote locations or carrying out 
i raids on possible drug growing areas or criminal 
~--L organis~~!2n .. ~---------------------------------- -----------'--------------------- ____________________ ----
54 i 25 Exchange exercises with UKIUS/CAN/NZ Special Forces Training Y N N Y N N 
e 1 5 forces especially those deemed as leaders in Special Forces 
1. operations and leaders in assimilating new technology in 
. their roles. 
,____--+-------- --------------------------·-------------·------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------~--- -::·-:- -· -:-:- ---- ---·r:--:-
55 ! 25 Expert in skills. Training Y N N Y N N 
a i 6 
------··· ~------· -------------------------------- ----·------------------------------ .. ------ --------- ·-- -------·--·------------·---------------·-· ------------------------ ------ ·-:--1-::- --- ---:- --,-,-
55 1 25 Up to date in technology. Technology N N N N Y N 
b I 7 -:-:-:----"'7'------------------------------+=:--'7":·:::-----~~-+---,--+--+-+---l 
55 i 25 Ability to perform numerous jobs expertly. Capability Y N N Y N N 
c ! 8 
55 ! 25 More unconventional. 
d I 9 
Leadership 
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a :,1 0 Could be improved by running an Special Forces 
, communicator course at SOS (School of Signals). At 
l present there are only a few pieces of equipment within the 
-4---- Sqn that are used to tea.ch oeera_!9rs0ar~athneESWOdSe.t--p--~er--troo--p--.- 1Pers-on_n_e __ 1 ---·- r:y·-· ·-y- .N ·r.-:-y -N:·:- __ Y56 ' 26 Introduction of an EW Tp to the Sqn ii 
b i 1 
-:··-+--···-- ·--·- ·--- --- ---··----- --------- ·---··---- --------- ···------· ' ' . ,_ .. ·- -- - -· -------------------·---·------ --· ---·--------- . -------- --------- -----------·--- ---- -- -- --· --- ----
. 56 ! 26 How to attack/detect ground radar systems (that are used to Training N N N Y Y N 
_9 ___ )___?_ c!~!~_C?!_!~.<?..QE __ rn_ov~_I!.I~Il!L _______________________________________________ -------------------------- --- ----· ------- --- ---- -----
56 1 26 Explore possibilities of becoming involved with Civilian N Y N N N Y 
d i 3 surveillance/anti drug agencies within Australia, for real time Agencies 
~6j~~~~a=~~t of selection processfor sup-port-staff:~--------~- seTectTon-~-- y N N y -N-N 
a i 4 
57 ! 26 More PT. Too often PT is-paid offfor-wor'k.""'vou~Shouldbe- Training·--------ry- N Nr-y-r-N-N-
b : 5 incorpor_~[r:!_g __ pT _!!:1!91()_~_r_ §Q!'l~.Q!!!~:_____ __ ---- ______________ _____ _ ___________________________________________________ _ 
~~ .L~; -~~~~~~;~i~~~-~;~~~~~i~~~i~~~-:i~~--~-~--i-~~:--~~----------------- ______ -~-i-:~~ -~~~~~~--- __ :_ -~- _ ~- -~-- -~-- --~-
57 26 More Computer Operator positions within the Regt and Sig Personnel N Y N N N N 
d 7 Sgn to keep up with the co_!!!Euter 2-~~~ms:_____________ -------t-:-7- __ -:-:-t-:-7- ·-:-:- --=--=-
57 26 More soldiers with relaxed dress standards to develop and Leadership Y N N N N Y 
e 8 ~~Q!~ _ _qp.!!_<?ns with!!:J_.~~Q!l_'!entiQ_1]5l!_~_§lrfare. __________ --------t-:-7- __ __ __ -:-:-
58 26 Females in Special Forces Mixed gender Y N N N N N 
a 9 _ . ____ -----·-r::·-:-+-1-,.-,-i-:-c-+-:-+~ 
58 27 Involve Special Forces in surveillance of criminal activity. Operations N N NJI N N Y 
b 0 
58 i 27 Train with all Special Forces units in world Not just local Y N N ' Y N Y 
c I 1 countries, ie Chinese, Japane!?_~-· ------------· 
58 ! 27 Involve soldiers more in UN operations. 
d : 2 
---------~--~-+-~~----Operations Y N N Y N Y 
---+------- ---·-------------------- -----------------------------~------ --------------- --------------------·-- ______ ,_ --
58 1 27 Allow soldiers to be posted to Embassies on short rotations Postings N Y N Y N Y 
e i 3 to understand other countries and ho'l,lt~!~g_s yvqr.~Jh~!~~ _ _ ---
-59T27 Do-Noilei's)i,SRsiandardsslip-or-selection criteria slip as it Selection 
a I 4 merges with Commandos into the Special Forces Gp. Allow -y Yr N N 
~- SAS to keep its identity. 
59 l 27 Deployment on more UN Operations to allow an experience Operations Y Y N Y N N 
E__j_ __ ~ ~5l§~_tQ_c!~~~IE£ in th~!:I-~.!L _________________________________ ------------------·- ---------- --------- ---·-
59 ! 27 Prescibed Service Officer commission experienced NCOs Personnel Y Y N N N N 
c I 6 into the squadrons to allow a higher level of competence at 
' command level. Most Special Forces units in the world try to 
---L~- ~e~ th~_k!lle!l in Special ~or2_es unit~--~----------------- , ___________ --i-+--+~ 
59 ! 27 Deploy unit members to overseas embassies to gain Operations N N N 't'N V~ 
d i 7 information on overseas countries and develop real skills in 
[ the culture and language. Full target reports could be 
_j___ compiled on lik~ targ~ts at the same_!!!!!e. ------ ·=--=----~--r:-:-t-::-:-t-::-t·:-:-1·-::-:-f--::--,-
59 j 27 Streamline trials and development by sending competent Equipment Y N N N Y Y 
e ! 8 unit members around to other overseas Special Forces units t 
___ L_.~r:!.c! checking_ on th~ir trial reports to ~~E3e~ procurem~nt. . ________ __.. __ ,___. -----r-:----
60 l 27 Serious inter-Service integration. Let's look at our liaison Communication Y Y N N N N 
~o--J-2~ -t:~~~~~~.:facu-5;--e9-wi1enc-o;-co"KIItfs!Jecfai-Forces _________ ·-- ca·a-aersilip _______ ·v- -N- -N·[-r\i1-N N 
_l? ____ j_ __ Q _C?b~!:'_9_~LQ!JLf.Q~~-s ___ C2_~_~g_E}~ __ wiLc_:!!~{ ________________________________________ l _______________________________________________ _ ~QJ?~- T~E3_9P!i<?!:'§!()_~-~!.E:l.~~E!!?€l~.§~!Yi9__E3_Q_f!i_~El~g(?!!!!!!if!~iQ'.l.§. ___ j~ElE~QI_l~~L ...... - '! '! -~ .. f\J .L~ }':1 
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28 Greater interoperability of NATO forces, 'let's get working 
2 with the people we will be going to war with', eg the 
Operations 
f---.;--~ Americ~ll§L Briti§!!:_ _____ =_-,-=""':-,::::o-:.:..:.w __ S=c..::O:..:.P:-'s:_,._ --------------_--,------::·----+ ____________________ _ 
28 Selling ourselves to the Politicians, making us user friendly. Marketing 
3 
28 More deployments overseas on operations. Operations 
Appendix 4 
i 4 1-="--·+----:c+·,---··-c--------:---~-:::--- ---- ------------- - '" ----~----- ·---- ··---:-----::-----,---_-·-:··-----------}.~----; ··:·-------------11-:-:-+::-:+:-·+:-:+:-:-+--::-:--i 
! 28 As Special Forces increases in size, standards of training Training 
· 5 and realistic training should stay at a higher level than the 
rest of the 
28 Only see a role for women in a UW role. Mixed gender 
6 
28 A set direction in the Forces units Capability 
7 so we are Not /'I''II'Y'In,otir'ln 
Selection 
28 Special Forces selection process - is it regressive to Selection 
" a 9 combine the two? Will it allow easier entry to accommodate 
1 ___ ..... , ...... , .... , .. 1.n, ......... ~ ......_m_ .... b ........ e ___ ,r __ s_r~q!JJ!~~-~y~J3f'B1_____ ___ ___ ___ _ ........ __ . _____ . --------------62 29 I question the limitations imposed by project Delta. Granted ing 
b 0 focus must be specialised, however some skills (ie RAPSL 
tr''"'niron shelved and SL parachuting put forward as a 'viable' 
insertion option?? 1 000-1500' over enemy territory isn't my 
idea of a stealthy insertion if parachuting is the only option). 
Should be considered as positive and useful across the 
board too. 1----·+ --:--!------ ------------------------ ----- ----------· ----- . ------ ------------------ .. - ... . --- ......................... ---- ---+-=----·: ---:::---------- ----------+-:·:·+·::·· :+·:--
- 62 29 Special Forces specialised/integral helo capability. Why use Capability 
c 1 half-trained crews on rotation when we could have continual 
support by specialist pilots. Also limitations on training with 
helos due to hours training locations = Nn-realistic practices 
that lean on perceptions of capability rather than on intimate 
. _ of actual li!Tlitations. 
62 : 29 Reduction of time for water ops course. Creates burden on 
d 2 troop to free up exercise time in order to train operators in 
basic skills. Also long water course provides a formal 
environment within which fledgling NCOs can gain basic 
knowledge on considerations for command of a water ops 
patrol, liaison with Navy, employment of all methods of 
projection, passage planning, etc - rather than assume that 
time in a water troop means the possession of this 
knowledge. As there are many gaps where opportunities 
exist to miss the use of assets or skills. 
62 ! 29 Pay levels in Special Forces group 4 RAR - SASR. Are they 
e · 3 equal? Is there incentive to cross over - N! It's like a 
Training 
Personnel 
nishment rather than career ression. ~C .. J~-~~=~~~~-CC---·---·------------+---------------~-1--+--~ 
63 : 29 More involvement with international peace keeping. 
a · 4 
to exchanges with international forces, at 
Israel. 
343 
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65 
- c 
66 
c 
66 
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Operations 
Training 
ng with other Operations 
Operations 
Leadership 
Leadership 
Leadership 
Operations 
Operations 
Operations 
Training 
Capability 
rtir'"'"t''"n for future (long term - 5 yrs on), ie swift strike Leadership 
"""1n1,.,,.,. vehicle. 
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69 32 More Prescribed Service Officer commission chances for 
e 7 Other Ranks. 
70 : 32 A lack of understanding of the Special Forces environment 
a ' 8 and culture impending on efficient and effective support to 
units. 
{1) Difficulties in communication arise due to a lack of 
understanding of the role of Special Forces units by some 
HQ pers that could be improved with closer liaison with units 
and members. It is suggested that these pers be posted to 
Special Forces units prior to filling positions on the HQ. 
{2} Misconceptions also exist within supporting units 
concerning the seemingly endless entitlements of certain 
Special Forces units. Supporting units can significantly slow 
down Special Forces response times by questioning 
requests and demands. An active PR program could 
enhance the reputation of Special Forces units and improve 
co-operability whilst maintaining operational security. 
{3} It is also Nted that some junior Special Forces members 
have an almost non-existent understanding of the logistic 
and pers support functions. It is an Army wide responsibility 
1 to educate all on the and admin streams. 
Management 
Personnel 
70 1 32 Special Forces posting cycle for non-Special Forces qualified Postings 
b ' 9 pers. Following para 70.a., experience in Special Forces 
units is obviously limited to small numbers of non-Special 
Forces pers and it would be advantageous to manage this 
experience in future postings to other Special Forces units or 
HQ rather than wasting valuable experience by posting 
members back into mainstream 
70 33 IS Training. There is an increased emphasis on the 
c ! 0 requirement for electronic communications between all 
Special Forces members/units. However, adequate 
resourcing {dollars and manpower) is Not being provided to 
train and sustain this uirement. 
70 33 The manner in which the Special Forces Gp is employed Resources 
d 1 provides intangible benefits to the Australian community and 
as such should be afforded the resources both human and 
to maintain a 
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Appendix 4 
at keep pace 71 : 33 Ensure that weapon systems are adopted th 
a 1 2 with current world technology, eg 50 cal vehi cle mounted 
___ J ....... p_q_~!:lJ!l!~.J2Urchase of M19. --··--~-----
-··--·-----------
71 I 33 Increasing time dedicated to training personn el in their 
,_Jjy~_Er.~-=-------b _L~ r~~eectiye areas of expe_r:tj_seL~.9...!!1.2Q!~Y-~~-9. 
71 I 33 Ensuring that personnel are given the apport 
c ' 4 their careers throu h promotion courses. _ 
71 I 33 Allowing selected personnel to work with oth 
d I 5 may be beneficial to their unit tasks, eg Spec 
unity to further 
er agencies that 
ial Forces pers 
_L_ ~o exchan_g~-~ith ~~~-~-~atLons ::Jr:'~.Q-~7 ______ _ 
-·---------------~-
71 I 33 Initiation of a support program to help familia scope when 
e I -~ ~e~i~.Lf9.~2~~-~P..Q.l:l~~~--~r~_~way on exte_l}~ 
72 \ 33 Command Restructure. Move from LHQ to a 
e_d opera![ons. __ 
n independent 
a 7 organisation on a level with the other environ mental 
. commands. 72Tss· ·s·iJ-ecTaT"Forces--P-ostTn9lmiJacton-strate9ic .. P --------------·-------------Ianning. 
b · 8 (1) Work place agreements (contracts for lo ng term 
, implementation) 
i (2) Continuity for ops and trg. 
j (3) Priority given to accommodate strategic plans . 
... L~- iiL.B~~!.~~prLQEi!Y.!9Ls_peci~!!.~-~-~1:!1!~ ts. ---------~~-
72 j 33 Special Forces Admin and Log. 
c ' 9 (1) Minimising a duplication of effort with oth er Aust services 
(Navy). 
(2) HQSO protecting units from admin and I 
is a time consuming distraction from corps b 
(3) lnteroperability with other foreign forces. 
(4) Minimising government red tape (peace 
administration and logistics limitations when 
time operations). 
og decisions that 
usiness. 
time 
conducting real 
i (5) HQSO ensuring every decision is resour ced (including 
__ j __ time and space). __ 
72 ! 34 Appropriate Timely Trg for Special Forces. 
d 1 0 (1) Special Forces offr development. 
(2) Special Forces OR development courses 
, (3) WAN trg. 
i -~ 4 _Recruit trg_:_. _______________________ ~----------
------
o a full range of 72 i 34 Operations. To provide a force appropriate t 
e i 1 operational possibilities (women, Nn-beret q ual pers being 
i co-ordinated by qualified SASR specialists, e quipment 
------~~---· ----~----- e!)hancement prog_r:_~~~l: ... - ..... -----------···· __ 
73 ! 34 Force Projection. Inadequate force projectio 
a · 2 currently inhibit operational capability. Dedic 
n arrangements 
ated Special 
rangements with Forces aviation assets and better working ar 
RAAF and RAN assets are desirable. Curre 
Collins Class submarines and range and pay 
nt deficiencies in 
load restrictions 
_______ ,____ gf Black. Hawk ar~ exa_I'!!P.L~~--____ _ 
--~~·~-
73 I 34 Type A Operations. For SASR in particular, 
b i 3 apparent that type A operations have an imp 
I play in achieving likely tasks. Implementing 
it has become 
ortant role to 
this capability 
__ ..;._ successfully will be a signific~t challenge to so. 
--~-~~-~~----
al to Special 
e. With a 
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i regular Commando organisation. SFTC and changing roles 
j of SASR post-CT the nature of selection is an important 
1 issue to Special Forces soldiers. Issues such as women and 
~ ! ~~ ~~-~2-~J~I3~> .. ~~<2~()~!) -~~gi~~l~f_()~£13l>J§l1L[11to_t~i!) g_~!I39Q'Y~-- -~- . --~~ . ~~~--·---·-·-- ........ ____ ·-:-·:- .... . ... C" -~--
73 : 34 CT Handover to 4 RAR. The transition of this role is likely to Management Y Y N N N Y 
d i 5 be a significant undertaking and as yet little planning 
"==- _J __ .c:lEE13~r~_!9 ... ~c:lYI3QE:lE:l~.g()l'!~.'!.cted:___ _ _ _ _ __ -------~~ ______ __ ---------·--r::-- ___________ _ 
73 i 34 SASR Post-CT. The structure, size and training focus of Leadership N N N N N Y 
e ! 6 SASR post-CT is likely to be a contentious issue. Issues 
I such as rotations, type A operations and overseas recovery 
_____ L ______ <:1!.13 .. ~13Ltc:> __ ~l3.!13~.e>!YI3.~ .. -....... --------------··----- ·---------- _ -----· ----------·-----------··-------------- ------------------------------------- ----··· ...... ______ ·-----
73f! 34 A number of other issues were raised that are worthy of Leadership Y Y N N N Y 
7 note: 
(1) C2 Arrangements. Is is appropriate for SO to remain 
under Land Comd for raise, train and sustain? 
(2) Procurement. The current system is Not giving SO the 
techNiogical edge in a timely manner. 
(3) Overseas Exercises. Should Ferdinand replace much of 
the Night series to enable more regional engagement and 
! less reciprocal training? 
: (4) Locations of Units. Where will Special Forces units be 
! b~sed )D __ the future? ----------------------------------------------·-------- ---------------~-- ___________________ __ 
74 i 34 To strive to be truly unconventional. Leadership Y Y Y Y Y Y 
a i 8 ?.fT"34 to- inc-r-ease-ow:--i<-no-w-ted'9e--ot-an-d-stailaili9-in .. t't1e ______________ .. coilimunication- v N N ·v--N~-
~-~ ~lligenc~90mn:!_t~nl!Y.·-------------------------------.. ---- ------c-------+,-,-+-:-:-+·-::-.,-1--~+:-:-l 
74 i 35 To continue to gain operational experience over a wide Operations Y N N N N N 
~---0 variety of deeloY!!Jents. . . __ ---------r--1--,-, 
74 ! 35 To continue to acquire 'state of the art' technical equipment Equipment N N N N Y N 
d I 1 to enhance our capabilities. 
----- -f---c-c- --- ------
74 35 To ensure our Operational Security Procedures are sound so Security Y N Y Y N Y 
e 2 ()!J!_QE_I3.!~-~ors __ ~r:!~-~13r:.c:l~L()!_1S -~!.~_gondl!_~.l3i sa!~------ --------------·-----~- _____ ___ ____ __ ,__ 
75 35 Officer Career Management within SO. Upon completion of Training Y N N Y N N 
a 3 the suite of selection courses for service within SO units, 
officers are posted into command and administrative 
positions. These positions are demanding in terms of 
commitment and time and do Not allow SO officers to 
conduct professional development courses within the SO 
stream other than the core or mission essential skills. Of 
concern is that professional development courses for officers 
specific to SO are almost Nn-existent. I have recently 
completed the SOOBC and found this to be beneficial and 
appropriate to my-employment within SO. I hope this course 
continues in the future for new officers coming into the SO 
stream. I believe that for the future a continuum of 
t=-::-+-·-~'erofe~sional development courses ne_13.Q.~J2.. be ~ddresss~ --------·-+--v:+:-v·- -:N·-- Y N N 
75 35 Officer Tenure within SASR. Currently officers are selected Selection 
b 4 for service in SASR as a result of their performance on the 
selection course. On completion of a basic tactics course 
and a basic para course, the officer is deemed 'beret' 
qualified but returns to his parent unit to complete his posting 
with that unit prior to being posted to SASR. On posting to 
'--~---..C..-----'---t'-'-'h~e=--~R-~eg_!ment the ()ffic~!l~-13~_<_e~cte~Jo t~~E:l.il_ comm~E!.~L __ __,____ 
347 
position. Although the command responsibility is within the 
capability of officers selected, they lack the core skills 
required of them to operate effectively as a member of their 
patrol/troop without further training. This could be addressed 
by having officers complete a cycle of courses relevant to 
their employment. I believe moves that are in place to have 
officers posted to SASR serve tenure of four years in the 
Regiment are sound. This allows the officer to complete the 
cycle of courses and the three-year cycle that currently 
exists. I believe this concept has been proposed but to date 
it has Not occurred. f-----+--c···---t·--·--·-·------------------------------------------------------------------ -------------· ----------··----
75 35 Special Forces Training Centre. The concept of a Special Manage ment 
c 5 Forces Training Centre appears at a glance to be a good 
concept. It allows the consistency in training and allows the 
Operational Support Squadrons of the respective SO units to 
concentrate on their role of operationally supporting the FEs. 
There are however, particular skills that are relevant to 
particular units, for example a commando unit's requirement 
to conduct platoon level operations compared to the 
requirements for an SAS patrol. Therefore, I see a 
requirement for each unit to maintain an element responsible 
for unit specific training. Under the Special Forces Training 
Centre, resources and funding would be controlled by Trg 
Comd. Who then resources and funds the training 
conducted within each unit, Trg Comd or Land Comd under 
! the raise, train, ~_us~?ii)_L!!flbrella? _____ _ 
75 i 35 Common Selection. The selection courses that exist across Selection 
d I 6 the Special Forces Gp today are designed to select a ! particular soldier and officer for service in a particular unit. 
! Common selection does Not allow for a specific to unit 
i selection. Currently the Commando selection course is run 
1 over a 7-day period and the SASR selection course is run 
1 over a 21 day period. Successful applicants for these 
I courses tend to display a higher degree of motivation and 
I mental toughness than those that are unsuccessful. The 
' duration of the SASR selection course places an additional 
I test on the applicant's motivation and mental toughness, 
; both during the course and the lead up training. Due to the 
1, fact that a different type of soldier is required for the different 
roles that each unit has, a separate selection process should i be adhered to. This may take form of a separate selection or 
1 a combined 'barrier testing' phase followed by a specific to 
____ J_=- ..l;!!!t selection p~~~~----------·-------------------+=---:--=-
76 1 35 After 2000, concern our training with the UW role. Capabilit 
a I 8 
y 
-----
76T36 MovSSASR- over to iiie eastern states.--·-------------- Manage ment 
c i 0 ----- -----:-=-
76 I 36 Gender diversity needs to be encouraged within Special Mixed G 
d i 1 Forces. The male domination leads to closed-mindedness. 
-1-::-----:-: 
76 l 36 We need a specialised air force unit for Special Forces. Capabilit 
e ! 2 
77!"36 cam"bmecn3eiection-cou-r5e:--E"xamTnation-otthe-resiJ-eciive-- selection 
ender 
y 
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ed selection course. com bin 
compa 
elemen 
require 
from ext 
frames 
candida 
Unilate 
Commandos operate in raid 
nies and are employed in large groups with supporting 
ts. Conversely SASR soldiers are essentially 
d to operate as small teams or indiividuals, isolated 
ensive command structures and for protracted time 
Considering this then, the requisite personal traits of 
tes for these two separate roles are different. 
ral selection will most likely result in a reduction of the 
1--···'l-::-::.-rquality 
77 36 Specia 
of selected soldiers for both units. 
I Forces Training Centre. Whilst the concept of a 
I ForcesTraining Centre is sound, in theory it poses b 4 Specia 
somei 
require 
extend 
and the 
from th 
basic c 
special 
the sco 
with a 
scope 
occuri 
reducti 
be com 
nherent concerns. The level of detailed training 
d by SASR soldiers, who are to be employed in an 
ed operational role, isolated from support elements 
refore relying upon training and initiative. This differs 
e commando who is rarely separated from his or her 
ommand structure. His or her role is that of 
ised infantry conducting offensive operations outside 
pe of the general ADF. The SASR soldier is tasked 
range of specialised roles at strategic level beyond the 
of the ADF. So while some overlap of training may 
n certain subject areas, combining courses risks a 
on in training level. This is likely to occur as courses 
e progressively directed at the Special Forces 
.!!1 as __ ~p_p_os~.9__!~~Q.~~J!i~_rg!~~~-- ----------------------·-- _ L_. ~~~tru 
_ 77 36 It is ack nowledged that cross-pollination of SASR and 
c 5 comma ndos will be of mutual benefit to both, however SASR 
to retain its independence in order to effectively train needs 
its ope 
stand a 
be com 
Centre 
rators to meet the ADF mission requirement. Current 
rds and the loss of valuable knowledge bases stand to 
promised with the creation of Special Forces Training 
--k---~-----N~--~~-~~~~- -~-~-
ur own aircraft like US Special Forces. 78 f-36
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en in Special Forces combat roles. 78!36 N worn 
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Appendix4 
Training N y N N 
--------·----·--·-···-·-····~-~---- ···- ·----- ---- ·--·-- ·--
Training N y N N 
---Capability N y y N 
-------------·--1-:c-:-1-N r:---Mixed gender y N N 
-------------------------~---·-- --- ----- ----- ------
Training y N N N 
c ! ___ 8+--
---------------------------- ----· 
78 i 36 Longer 
d i 9 
bush exercises with other units as enemy. 
rehensive reinforcement cycle where new members 79 i 37 A camp 
a I 1 to the t roops are fully trained in their basic skills and 
! insertio ns so that tp trg time is Not wasted bringing these 
_I'_~_!J_[>j_Q_~ J:>!l§]~-!~'.1.~!~---- -- -. - - ------------------------! membe 79 T37 OPS-EC 
b ! 2 should 
79_,__37 ·More c 
needs to be addressed and those violating the rules 
_be_de~:!!L~l!.h __ ~~ord[Qg!y.:. ___________________________ 
orporals or senior diggers should be sent away on 
3 exchan ge (even short term- several weeks) to other Special 
Forces units around the world. This is necessary to gain 
, ___ exposu r~ __ to ~_ew ~g~pment,_assets and techn~es. ____ 
79 i 37 Moret 
d ! 4 especi 
· Comm 
raining should revolve around offshore recovery, 
ally since this looks like one of our main roles after 
andos take over the CT role. 
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79 37 More emphasis should be placed on strategic strike 
e 5 capabilities, as this appears to be the new direction in 
modern day warfare. Also a larger emphasis place on UW 
Appendix 4 
Capability Y N N Y N Y 
harassment tasks. l-8·o··~+-3~~7-+M-a~i=nt'--".aC..C.in trainingfocus on~patrollirlg~sl<iiTS-and speciaiTst~---- Training_________ ·Nry.~ N v~ -N v 
a 6 insertion skills (as with Project DELTA recommendation), eg 
need for water op NCOs to instruct/supervise during all water 
op cses as part of the DSO qualification - PTCO cse, dive 
l---+-----+~~-~-'-!_~g9~_Q!!~~~: __________________________________________________________ ------------------------- "7':- --- --- ---·- ----- -----
80 37 Maintain overseas deployments to SE Asia and Pacific Training N N N Y N N 
b 7 Region. If Regt is over-committed, these trips could be 
reduced to a ptl/team deployment. Worthwhile deployments 
for a water op FE would be Paskal at Lumut in Malaysia and 
Thailand seals at Sattahip in Thailand. These units are 
water operations orientated, have soldiers that are 
approachable and motivated to train with Aust SASR. The 
locations are such that an important cultural and language 
~---~----~exchange is ~sibl~---------···----·------~---- -··------·-·······-·------· ---~-- ____ ··--- ·-·--· --~-:- ___ _ 
80 1 37 Maintain policy of leave or stand down period to overlap with Personnel Y N N N N N 
c : 8 school holidays as is occurring with 2 Sqn in 1998. This is a 
i good way of compensating families for time lost (evenings, 
! nights and weekends) when their husbands or fathers are 
,_ .. f-... a~~-2!:1.-~~~r_c:!~-~~------------------------------·-·-·--------
80 ! 37 Encourage senior troopers and corporals to participate in 
d ! 9 Amelio activities (advice, free time to plan.) Previous in-
: country experience is invaluable in times of operational 
______ J ______ g_~~!2YI_!l_e_!:l!: ______________________________________________________________________________________ .... ________ ...... 
80 I 38 Development of ship under way capability. Also, submarine Capability Y N N Y N Y 
e I 0 skills with the new Collins Class submarines. ~T 38 Combined Selection~-The r'..:;e::.:sp:..::e_::c:,.:ti:..v-:ce.:.:.:::ro::.:le~s-=-a=-=n-d-:-t_a_s~ks--of:-t-:-h-e-f-S-:::-e--:1-e-ction 
a J 1 two tunbitsd~ffre difftereTnht and th~rehfore tthl ed~efflectiotn process 
! mus e 1 eren . ere are 1n eren y 1 eren 
i requirements of manpower, that is, a man suitable to 
j Commandos, (larger raiding forces), may Not necessarily be 
, the same man that the SASR is looking for, (small team 
1 capable of operating removed from command/support 
, elements). Therefore, I believe, separate selections should 
--~~- be maintained. ----------------------------------~-
81 ! 38 Special Forces Training Centre (Special Forces Training Training 
b ! 2 Centre). The concept is sound but it poses some possible 
I problems. There are a number of courses that could be run 
at a Special ForcesTraining Centre. These would be 
courses that are c.ommon to all members of the Special 
Forces Gp, ie basic demolitions, PTCO, CQB, Special 
Forces Sniper and Climbing/Survival. There are, however, 
courses that are specific to SASR, ie small team insertion 
skills, LRPV, CPP, PAS and advanced demolitions. 
Therefore, some elements of Op Spt Sqn should be 
maintained within SASR to continue its role of conducting 
YNNNNY-
N Y N Y N N 
s1rssl'f~~!~~~~JB~~~;t:~ :~ta~~ts,-co~o-cat"ed with-Special·---- c-apability_____ N -y· -y- ·N- .N r-t~f 
c : 3 Forces Gp so as to provide and perform to Special Forces 
._ __ ! requ~remen~-L~~Iieve !!!Ls will enable better, closer and 
350 
more capable inter-operability for both aviation and Special 
Forces alike. 
38 that 4 RAR (Cdo) and Special Forces Training Capability 
4 Centre will provide a much needed string in the Special 
Forces Gp's bow and will prove to be of a mutual benefit to 
both Commandos and SASR, however, given that SASR and 
Commandos roles are inherently different, SASR needs to 
retain and maintain its independence so as Not to prejudice 
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82 : 38 ng. To enhance our ability to better cope with all Training 
a 5 contingencies, all personnel within the Special Forces family 
require a thorough grounding in the basics. There was a · 
tendency in the past to shorten time on courses, however 
this has been addressed with P DELTA. 
82 ! 38 The Special Forces Training Centre may be able to address Training 
b i 6 combined training, however there has to be set guide lines 
both Commando and SAS training. Basic combined 
training can be achieved with thorough preparation and set 
goals. There must be high standards set for each unit as 
they have completely different roles and tasks. We should 
Not get confused with what is really required versus what is 
~~E_~~!~~-t ______________________________________ ------------- ·-·. -.. ·---- ---- . --------- ·- ---· ----------· . 
82 38 Courses such as Patrol Tactics, Supervisor Infantry Ops Training 
c 7 (Section), Medical, Signals, Demolitions and 
MOUT/FIBUAICQB (the American model), can be conducted 
by the Special Forces Training Centre. Basic insertion skill 
courses such as Small Craft Handling (PTCO), parachuting 
and mobility can also be conducted, however specific 
ltr.ooinir,n would need to be carried out within the individual 
units. These are the basic core courses that are required for 
a new member in al Forces. 
82 38 Selection must be looked at completely differently as both 
d 8 units have different requirements. The question of whether 
training centre would be able to conduct a combined 
selection must be determined by each individual unit. There 
needs to be standards applied to these selection processes 
so there is clear delineation between SASR and 
Commandos. SASR selection is vastly different to that of 
Commandos. Completely different types of people are 
required. To overcome the short fall in training, there is a 
requirement to collate all teaching points and separate these 
for both Commando and SAS tr~inir1n 
82 38 Commando Company Training. 
9 (1) SASR has been involved in training teams to 
Commandos in the past. These courses are a very good 
start point for the future, however continuation training will 
differ from east coast to west coast and by each individual 
instructor. To ease the burden on training between both 
Commando units and SASR, 16 RWAR could be utilised as 
the training company for reinforcements for commandos. All 
the training facilities are within Western Region along with all 
the necessary training support and expert instruction. 
Commandos would be better for the hand over of 
351 
the CT role post-2000 if the training 
unit that has been conductin CT for over a decade. 
83 ' 39 Relocation of SASR. To have all the Special Forces Management 
a 0 community based to the one side of the continent is a little 
short sighted. At present the other assets locally based offer 
_ _ _! !~_)(j_~i!i!y__?_n_c:j p_~!~ll-~ al ~ _ ______ __ _ __ _ _ _____ _ .. 
83 39 Special Forces Personnel on UN Deployments. The 
b 1 opportunities for sending Special Forces personnel on UN 
deployments are becoming more prevalent. However if the 
hierarchy within the ADF wish to maintain a high standard 
then the opportunity to send Not only individuals or 
uadron but s and must take more of a focus: 
83 39 Selection of Special Forces Candidates. Currently the Selection 
c 2 selection process for both Commando and SASR are 
uniquely different and should continue their separate 
selection process. However in saying that, the Special 
Forces community should be given the opportunity to 
combine the courses to see if it is feasible, both on a budget 
and performance point of view. There are many 'pros and 
cons' for combining the selections and we won't know unless 
out of our fixed and be a little more flexible. 
83 39 Dedication of Aircraft for Special Forces. One of the key Capability 
d 3 issues concerning the ADFs Special Forces community is 
the lack of dedicated aircraft for Special Forces, however 
36/37 Sqn do a great job in their wide spectrum of 
employment. The current C-130s are Not equipped with 
GPS or FUR for Special Forces ops, to add to that, on a 
recent Vector Flash exercise, the Australian freefallers and 
mobility operators had to rely on a foreign agency to 
ete the task at hand. 
83 39 In recent years ADF has been triallling two DH Twin Capability 
e 4 Otters as a replacement for the Porters. As of last year the 
staff involved in the aircraft commented that for the type of 
aircraft it costs more to lease the aircraft than to buy it over 
e 5-year lease period. To add to that, the aircraft is 
governed by civilian restrictions so it can't support Special 
Forces type roles by the dropping of Heli Boxes. If the ADF 
were to have dedicated aircraft with the sought after 
technology it would greatly enhance the capability of the 
ADF to rescue hostages in foreign countries. To date we are 
probably the only western country without its own dedicated 
aircraft in location. 
84 39 Combined Selection Process. I believe we can only combine Selection 
a 5 the selection process to a certain degree. That could 
possibly be that all the physical tests are conducted in the 
initial phase to get the physically/mentally fit personnel 
required to then go into the Special Forces fields req. This is 
where the course can split but conducted at the same 
school, for obvious cost cutting reasons. The selection 
process for SASR and Commando has to be different due to 
the varied nature of tasks that both units conduct. It has 
been proven in the past that a Commando can operate as an 
Reserve unit but a unit such as SASR cannot. CT 
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skills n owadays, are Not considered a 'black art', SASR has 
raining police forces in the region for years, some of been t 
those 
-
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al Forces Training Centre. A central school for basic Training Y N N Y N N 
6 skills i s a good concept to eliminate duality of facilities and 
instruc tor base, but there will be a need to have training cells 
that gi ve the mission essential skills to each different Special 
Force s formation. These cells or training wings should be 
d at the individual units. 
-~------------------------~--------·----·----------------·--··-------------------------------------· ---··-----------------~---~-----··--- --- ----- ··---- --- --- ---
gms. As a Special Forces force there still seems to be Leadership N N N N N Y r-39 
locate 
Paradi 
7 a limit ed view on how we do our business. These are 
gener ated by a lack of assets and restraints placed on 
Speci al Forces by Army, ie insufficient ranges for organic 
!:! .. ~Y-~!-~~§_t_§Q_g~~--~-~Q3 i!!__f:\.:.~~:mt~~t d~[!!t _____________ ---·---------···-------·- r:---~-~ ______ ...... __ _ 
nal Focus Language Training. Language skills are Training Y N N Y N N 
'1!-~~.P.~ 
39 Regia 
8 very much a perishable skill and need more attention for its 
39 
upkee p, ie 2 month emersion training in tC).rget country, 6 
week Customs and Patrol Boat attachments, 3 months 
attach ments to a unit of similar role and tasks (KOPASSUS, 
Task Force 90 P.l. SAF, PGK) in target country. The amount 
ofmo ney and work that go into training a proficient linguist is 
Notre fleeted in continuation training or time to conduct 
g to keep these perishabel skills alive. A more serious 
t giving the linguist training time support and TIME to 
train in 
look a 
do the training, three continuous days per month with at least 
time spent in country, once a year. This sort of some 
train in g is mostly time intensive with the use of limited 
resour ces. 
Select ion. Selection y y y y N y 
9 (1) T he current selection process should be adapted to meet 
40 
the ch allenges of the future. I believe that due to the very 
differe nt roles and expectations of each unit that a separate 
selecti on needs to be run for SASR and the Commando 
units. 
(2) In line this the SASR selection should look to the future 
ddress the following: and a 
(a) T he selection of women to serve in predominantly UW 
roles. 
(b) T he selection and recruitment of specialists into a 
reserv e component (eg journalists, linguists, technicians and 
minorities, etc). ethnic 
c- M aintaining a larger reserve component with an 
operat 
(3) s election and recruitment of suitable personnel remains 
n
y_g!_.o ha'{l~J_g a c~pable~_for~~s unit. _____ --~-------1r:N·-:-r:-:-N . N y -N-~N 
Training 
the ke 
Traini 
0 (1) T 
ional role. N~ 
he training focus of each Special Forces unit needs to 
bema re defined to ensure that units are able to effectively 
maint ain mission essential skills to a higher level. The 
adage 
the Au 
of 'Jack of all trades Master of none' seems to define 
stralian approach to training Special Forces operators 
~~-Q~~~~L~~~-~~l~!_~g_e_~~~J~.1~_8.r1.~.t~~~-!~.il:~~~----- ______________________ j__ -~---in all o .l~L-~ 
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c 
40 
dup lication, the units will be able to achieve a higher level of 
and capability in their mission essential skills. Obviously skill 
so me cross-training will still be required between units. 
(3) Training courses should be approached in a more 
ben eficial way. For example, all language training of SASR 
ling uists should be done 'in country' using the University 
Ca mpus courses offered in most Asian countries, thus also 
givi ng a higher level of cultural awareness and local 
kno wledge. If this is prohibitive financially, then the courses 
run in civilian campuses in Australia would be suitable by 
pro viding a different perspective to SASR members. 
(3) SASR should start to have a greater focus on UW 
trai ning and operations in urban environments out of uniform, 
he scope for such activities in the future political as t 
env ironment in the region is increasingly relevant. The 
tinuing need for green roles troops is as important as con 
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Eq uipment and Funding. Equipment N N Y N Y N 
1 (1) To enable all Special Forces units to operate to their I 
hig hest potential they need to be equipped with the most 
suit able equipment that maintains a technology edge over 
thei r rivals. This is especially true of items such as night 
visi on and image transfer equipment. 
(2) 
the 
sys 
Weapon systems need to be capable of adapting across 
range of mission profiles and the M4 modular weapon 
tern would do this for SASR allowing both recovery and 
tingency roles to be covered with one weapon system. 
New equipment needs to be assessed quickly and 
con 
(3) 
bro ught into service, allowing us to maintain the technology 
e. Two and three year procurement cycles leave us edg 
beh ind both our allies and adversaries. 
(4) Funding needs to be maintained at a suitable level to 
ens ure challenging and relevant training can be conducted in 
bot h Australia and the region. This should be characterised 
by N notice activities planned and conducted by HQSO to 
ens ure the Special Forces group is at the capability level that 
~a5+4·o J=!Q. Le §_Q_!:~_9~!eS~-------------------------------------------adership Training. Training Y N N Y 
d 2 (1) The focus for Special Forces should be developing our 
fut ure leaders now. To do this the JNCO showing potential 
sho uld be given the opportunity to train on exchanges with 
oth er Special Forces units overseas. In the same way our 
juni or officers should be exposed to the planning and training 
terns of other units in the Special Forces community 
rseas. 
sys 
ove 
(2) 
we 
Exposure to our overseas allies at all levels will ensure 
maintain the technological and technique edge into the 
fut ure. 
(3) 
poli 
Vital to leadership of SASR in the future is the continuing 
cy of having SASR officers serve as patrol commanders 
at least one year. Without this they will Not undersand 
hardships and complexities faced by a patrol they may 
for 
the 
tas k in the future as XO and OC. 
~---.-.-.~-~-~~-~-~-----~-~--~~---~-~~-----·-~-~--'=-'·'---->~-~~---------~--~-~ ---------~~--~-=--~ ~-........l...-~-~= 
354 
Appendix 4 
85 ! 40 Planning and Staff Processees. Training Y 
e · 3 (1) To ensure that the Special Forces group remains 
effective into the future, it is vital that planning and staff 
processes are standardised across Special Forces and that 
a suitable training course is conducted for all officers and 
N N y 
SNCO. 
(2) This course should take the form of an Special Forces 
joint planning course and it should initially target all officers 
and SNCO identified for planning or staff jobs, eg Tp XO and 
SSM and ultimately all Special Forces officers and SNCO. 
(3) The course should be compulsory for any Navy or Air 
Force personnel that are involved in the planning or conduct · 
of missions supporting Special Forces units. It would give 
them a valuable insight into the capability and requirements 
of Special Forces, while teaching the correct planning 
sequence. 
! (4) The US military currently run such a cpurse that may 
L-~-·- J?.~q_vid~_~_g_Q_g_Q__st~n .. P£tQ.t!9.~-HQSQ_~-----------------
85f! 40 The future of Special Forces will rest on the clear definition 
· 4 of unit roles, effective training of suitably selected personnel 
in mission essential skills within these defined unit roles, 
maintaining the technological and technique edge over both 
allies and adversaries and ensuring that our future leaders 
and planning staff are trained to the highest standard 
: through exposure to foreign units and through relevant 
! courses in Australia. 
86 I ·4o Observation. The.i'mp·o·rt-anc.e oftacticai.ancfoperation.al __ _ 
a 5 manoeuvre is directly proportional to increased dependence 
on the technology for transmission of timely information and 
intelligence. This increased reliance on the timely provision 
of information, in order to penetrate the enemies decision 
process is forcing SAS FEs to meet shorter response times. 
Recommendation: In order to maintain a short response 
time the skills required must be routine. Routine comes from 
repetition in training and a high degree of competency in the 
fundamental skills. Therefore the Special Forces Gp should 
maintain its focus on reducing the amount of inappropriate 
training and tasking. This will increase time to maintain a 
reasonable skills competency. DELTA projects have gone 
along way to achieve this; however, this should be constantly 
monitored and updated. 
Full mission rehearsals with joint assets and full C2 should 
be increased because at present our weak link in a majority 
of missions is the assets that we rely on. Assets and related 
. units can Not match our response times, therefore negating 
_j_ ___ one of the ~ecial Fq_r:9es §_R _ _!ijyant~~l~-~: ______ _ 
86 ! 40 Observation. SASR and Commandos have different 
b 6 missions and tasks, therefore, the selection criteria need to 
reflect these differences. 
Recommendation: SASR should retain its selection course 
to ensure that we continue to get suitable officers and men 
. based on the qualities required to complete the unique 
____ _l____ IT!L~~lQ.Il~_!Jlat __ ~EEIYJ.2 __ $~_~R. __ Q_C?!!Ir_Tl_al_l~iQ..:~~~o':l_!Q_h~Y-~-~----
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'C d trammg course' that teaches and selects amman o 
personnel o n their ability to perform the related skills in a 
strenuous e nvironment. SASR and Commando situation is 
Not the sam e as 22 SAS and SBS. 22 and SBS perform 
similar missi ons, therefore, their selection criteria are similar 
and joint sel ection is appropriate. In our case the missions 
of both units are different and to impose joint selection will 
degrade the ability of SASR and Commandos to select and 
~riate personn~--~--
. Career concerns appear to have a greater Leadership Y N N · Y N N 
train the a 
~0 Observation 
7 effect on th e decisions made, than do operational interests. · 
40 
This is an e ffect which, historically proven, comes with 
'Peace Tim e' defence forces. This effect is present among 
NCOs throughout the Special Forces officers and 
community. As a direct result micro management is frequent 
and if this trend continues it would be harmful to 
ment of future leaders. With diminished 
development, innovation and flexibility will 
at all levels 
the develop 
leadership 
decrease wi thin the Special Forces community. 
Recommen dation: Commanders at all levels (in particular 
ommanders) must be given more responsibility the junior c 
and made a ccountable for their decisions and actions. 
training within the Special Forces group needs to 
d and monitored to ensure that our future 
Leadership 
be increase 
commander 
·---~--------· 
Some of th 
8 However, I 
e~~!~s-~:~~~~~~~u~~s~~=~~d~e~~ed to change:-- Leade-rs-hip ________ -N rN -N,-Y. -N- y-
believe that the Special Forces Gp should 
focus on developing leadership at all levels. 
40 
maintain its 
Maintaining a high degree of competency in the fundamental 
aving the appropriate selection and training to suit 
nit requirements. These factors have Not 
oughout history and probably will Not change in 
skills and h 
individual u 
changed thr 
the future. 
··------------(1) Combin 
9 squadrons 
e Yr 1 Sqn with Trg Sqn leaving two operational Y Y N 
1 
Y N N 
within SASR:A Contingency Sqn and Recovery 
41 
Sqn. Perce ived advantages would be: 
(a) All reinf orcements would undergo common Special 
Forces skill s training at the Special Forces school, eg 
emolitions, para and COB. Reinforcements patrolling, d 
would be p osted to units only on successful completion of 
es. these cours 
(b) SASR r einforcements would then receive one full years 
nit training within Trg Sqn. Upon posting to specialisVu 
Contingenc y Sqn, all reinforcements would be fully trained in 
ertion skills and require N. further training to reach mission/ins 
OLOC level 
(c) This sy 
future SAS 
instructor s 
stem would also cater for the expected reduced 
R manning due to our commitment to supply 
u:r~~~-r~To§~~~i~t;~~~fa~~~~~s -personnel- Training ---->y N '1\f y "f\i y Introduce a 
0 at sub-unit I evel on lessons learnt on all operational and 
contingenc y deployments. Currently a lot of knowledge and 
e~~rie.!l£~-_gained_ on t~~~-~-missiQ_IJ~J~_yery ______________ ~--- -------· .·----'-·'--.L·-·· .__ _____ _ 
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vauJau•c lessons are only being 
that mission. 
87 Currently there is a widespread lack of knowledge across all 
c levels in Special Forces on the benefits and procedures of 
using information technology. The IM systems currently 
available are Not being used to their full potential (ie Special 
Forces WAN, SASRLAN) or their inappropriate use is 
causing security concerns, all through lack of training and 
awareness. A solution could be to introduce an 
intelligence/information systems management position into 
all sub-units within Special Forces (SAS Sqn) whose 
responsibilities would be to advise, train and regulate on 
current information management systems available and in 
use within al Forces. 
87 Currently there are two individual weapon systems used Equipment 
d within Special Forces (M16 and Styer). Neither system is 
issued with a night aiming device (NAD) as .standard. In 
1998, most Special Forces soldiers will cannot accurately 
employ their individual weapon in low or N light conditions 
despite it being recognised at least 1 0 years ago that the 
likely future battle would be fought at night and indeed, most 
of our training doctrine is based on nighttime activity. We 
need to standardise a weapon system within Special Forces 
and immediately channel our efforts into addressing this 
inadequacy. My suggestion is to discard the Styer and equip 
all Special Forces personnel with the M16/M4 modular 
weapon system. Not only would we benefit from continuity in 
training, ammunition type and 40mm capability, but the 
mounting system allows for great flexibility in the choice of 
day/night sighting aids. All weapons should be issued with 
at least a NAD such as Aimpoint, Trigicom scope or tritium 
sights, etc. The current NFE procurement projects will 
obvio further enhance this 1---+----f-C .. :::-.. :.: 
87 41 A serious UW capability within Special Forces needs to Mixed Gender 
e 3 address the possibility of recruiting women and intelligence 
specialists from the civilian intelligence community. We 
need to change the way we think in relation to covertly 
acquiring intelligence as I don't believe an Special Forces 
member could ever develop enough skill in this field to be 
viable. 
88 1. Education of SASR Personnel. Since my return in Personnel 
a January from a two year posting with 1 Commando Coy I 
have observed a distinct lack of knowledge, understanding 
and belief in the raising, development and employability of 
the following Special Forces elements: 
(a) raising of 4 RAR (Cdo) 
(b) expansion of 1 Commando Regt (3 Coy) 
(c) Special Forces School 
(d) relocation of SASR 
Education of SASR members in these areas will Not only 
increase the unit knowledge and understanding of the 
development of Special Forces, it may increase the number 
of SAS members that are wi to be out of the unit 
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41 Location of Special Forces is my understanding that Management 
5 4 RAR (Cdo) is to remain in Holsworthy. This is unfortunate 
in two areas: 
(1) Being an amphibious unit, its distance from the ocean. 
While major activities will be forecast, casted and transport 
organized, a great deal of experience can be gained through 
minor activities being conducted in a suitable close training 
area such as experience in the surf (PT), swim fitness, 
swimmer scout drills and general small craft training without 
the need to include excessive transportation times into the · 
activity. This is especially beneficial to members from 
country areas. 
(2) Isolation of Special Forces units. One of the advantages 
that the SASR has in its location is that it is isolated from 
conventional units. This restricts involvement with a more 
regimented environment allowing for concentration in other 
(task related) areas. Perhaps locations such as Holsworthy 
(4 RAR) and Singleton (Special Forces School) will Not allow 
, . . for this to occur. 
88 i 41 Development of the Special Forces School. During my 
· 6 service with 1 Commando Coy I observed the raising of the 
Commando Training Wing (CTW). With only ttwo SAS 
qualified 'instructors' the CTW that was predominantly 
manned by members of the RAR and 1 Commando Regt 
personnel on full time service lacked the qualifications and 
experience required to train Special Forces soldiers in 
inherently hazardous activities such as amphibious 
operations and close quarter battle which are two of the skills 
required by all commando soldiers. To that end it will be 
important that the SASR be well represented throughout the 
raising and implementation of the Special Forces School. 
This will ensure that the better interests of SASR, skills and 
standards are maintained. It will also ensure that suitably 
qualified and experienced instructors are available to train 
the Forces soldiers of the future. 
88 ! 41 Selection and Training of SASR Personnel. Due to the 
d i 8 changes in society and the likely combined SAS and 
Commando selection course that is likely to last for an 8 to 
10 day duration, while being of adequate time to select a 
suitable commando soldier, I do Not believe that this is 
enough time to successfully select a suitable soldier for 
service within SASR and unfortunately I feel the ability to 
select suitable personnel for service within SASR will 
gradually be reduced. Until the unit training demands are 
reduced (CT role to 4 RAR) this may result in a required 
reassessment of the units manning capabilities or a 
reduction in the units training requirements. This is another 
reason for the unit to ensure that it provides appropriate 
instructors for the raising of the Special Forces school. 
Shortfalls in the current present training system resulting 
the era' are In 
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particular in the field of water operations. Members are 
being posted into the troops with minimal training which is 
likely to impact on the unit capabilities if Not addressed in the 
future. The intentions of Force Projection Troop to 
: reintroduce the assault swimmers course, all be it a 
__ j __ . shortened version is a ste~?_ in the right direction. ----:--:-+-::---
88 j 41 The Future of SASR. Given that the raising of 4 RAR (Cdo) Capabi 
e · 9 is successful and they take over the CT role in 2003? SASR 
will inevitably take on the 'grey role' in a more active way. 
The grey role should be conducted by a troop size group 
comprising of a regular component for the administration and 
planning (in conjunction with the Swan Island detachment), 
with a reserve component to be activated when required. 
Ideally the group should be located outside of the barracks, 
never in military uniform and distanced from the regiment. 
The reserve component comprising of ex-SASR personnel 
and suitable females all of varying ages and appearance 
who have slipped back into civilian life and hold a credible 
cover story. The recovery capability will have to be 
maintained which will include continued practice of insertion 
and field skills as well as a reduced CT and maritime CT 
capability. Until SASR is relieved of the domestic CT role 
the regiment will need to maintain its current activities. 
However, a grey roles component should be identified to 
commence the raising of this skill and conducted utilising the 
---~-
lity 
~~!!!~_§lD_<!_~~perience __9f other agencies. ---···-·----·------ ______  ~¥·--~-----
42 The continued selection of high quality personnel for the Selecti on 
0 Special Forces Gp, ensuring standards are Not 
-- -- £~f!!~?.r:.<?!!Ji§~_qf~r:_!~~9~~9~.!-~-~-~2~~:___ ____ --·-------------- - ------- ------- --
----·--------···--· 
42 The effective training of personnel in an Special Forces Trainin g 
· 1 training centre to meet the needs of the individual units, 
ensuring standards are Not compromised in combining 
...... J. train!!:!g_:____ ___ --------------- _______ _ 
-----
89 l 42 Ensuring HQSO is an effective organisation, ie fully Manag ement 
c . 2 integrated into HQAST for operational needs and LHQ for 
! maintaining training resources required for high risk and 
_____ j_ ___ dema__!l<!!!l9.2J~era~2nal qcm:l_!_llitmeQ_!~.:..---~------=-----:--=---·- ____ _ 
89 ! 42 Developing a Special Forces ethos across the Special Leader ship 
d j 3 Forces Gp to encompass the unconventionality and unique 
_____ L ____ nature _of Special qe._~r:_~!!2_rlS. _ _ 
-89 ! 42 Developing and improving the Joint nature of training Trainin g 
e i 4 conducted by the Special Forces Gp. SO requires close 
____ __j ___ SUQE2.'!.!!.2~ the B_&.F and RAN to ~_nsure its success. 
90 l 42 There must be more clarification on the direction that the unit Leader ship 
a 
1 5 and individuals are to take in regards to Unconventional 
Operations. I feel formal training is required in this subject 
and that Unconventional Operations are Not just a mindset, 
which can be suited or applied to all members. I know that 
there are many different facets within this subject, but to me 
they are undefined. Currently the UW course is held at 
Swan Island but would be more beneficial conducted at 
____ SASR on a mor~_reg.ular basis. _____ _ 
---~-~ 
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b 6 Regiment is lacking. Therefore, I feel the Regiment needs to 
prioritise operational experience and overseas exchanges 
against training requirement, during the three-year cycle. 
This would develop experience levels and gain exposure for 
the senior members of the unit. 
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90 42 Career management within the regiment in the past has Postings Y N N N N N 
c 7 been handled very poorly. It needs to be addressed I 
considering the start of the Special Forces school is going to 
see members from the regiment being posted to other 
Special Forces units, with 15+ years experience and possibly 
being the rank of CPL at N fault of their own and in many 
~-.. ---+·------+9_ases ~il.Yln.9 rev_~!:t~<t!t:~_.I9D~J~2~!:'!~--~!!hLr:! __ §~~B~---- ........ ------------------------ --- ----- -- __ ---
90 42 There is the need to increase the amount and level at which Training Y N N Y Y N 
d 8 the training is directed in computer and information systems. 
There is also the need within the troops to develop computer 
literacy, starting_~!_!he lo~~,st levels. -------------------1------··---+--+--lf--+-+--+----1 
90 l 42 HQSO and SASR need to clarify the direction, allocation of Equipment N N Y N Y Y 
e ! 9 money and manning for the future of oxygen parachuting 
: within the unit. There is a deficiency in the maintenance and 
! serviceability of the current oxygen equipment held in the 
~-_j _______ !:!!:lit a!_lhis J~resen_!_!ime:.____________________________ .. -------------- __ _ ,-~ ____________ _ 
90fj 43 Special Forces require dedicated aircraft to maintain inter- Capability N N Y N N Y 
!,•.: 0 operability between SASR and aircrew in order to develop 
and constantly update SOPs. It will also alleviate the i problem of the time restriction for the deployment of the 
-:-J ____ §!§l_r:!~b.Y~!I'P~-~-sho~_QQ!ice_._ ________ .. ----------------------------· _________________ -:--:-- _____ --r----
91 i 43 Group Identity. Finding an identity and an esprit de corps Leadership Y N N N N N 
a I 1 that all Special Forces units can relate to considering the 
I differing roles, the different unit backgrounds and histories 
! and with the tyranny of distance will Not be easy. The 
i creation of a joint Special Forces school, a joint selection 
i ; process and even a Special Forces Corps would, I feel, be I i positive steps towards forging a strong bond. It must, 
j however, be well managed and there must beN lowering of 
9Th~s- -~:~~!~~~:_r~~~f-~!~fs!~~~u:~~r~!!§~sR-ancftlle _______ Marketing-- ·y-v'N' N -N+N 
b : 2 Special Forces community in general 'market' themselves 
i more vigorously and cleverly. For such a 'tall poppy' like 
Special Forces, this trend needs to continue and progress for 
our survival to be assured. Acceptance, both by our military 
colleges as well as our political masters is essential, Not only 
i for our existence, but for our deployability. This, obviously, 
___ j ______ g_oesJ:l.§l_~lr:! . .b.§l.r:!_Q __ ~ith~_~trong_ identity. __________________________________ -----1--- __ 
91 1 43 Projection. By this I mean the subtle, but relentless Operations Y Y N N N Y 
c ' 3 projection of individuals, sub-units and unit Not only into our I region, but on a global scale. Obviously the greater the 
; operational exposure the better. Recent events graphically 
i illustrate that it is, perhaps, a little shortsighted to focus ! primarily on one area. Every effort must be made and every 
I opportunity taken to project ourselves, be it through the UN, 
! aid agencies/NGOs, DFAT, trade missions, industry, 
____ _!__ _____ ~t~~~~W:q:~~~,~~;;~~;fu~~~~~~~~~~~~~g:~D~~-~~~m~:~. _____________________ ~-- __ __ __ _ __  
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91 l 43 DFAC-P Role. It is my belief, and I am sure I am Not the Operation 
d ; 4 'Lone Ranger' on this, that we are an under utilised resource. 
The development of an 'extended' DFAC-P role, if correctly 
handled, would benefit all agencies concerned. We have 
valuable skills to offer and complement agencies such as 
Federal Police, State Police Services and Customs. These 
skills include recon/OP, patrolling, tracking, reporting and 
ICAT. Greater training opportunities also exist as does the 
s 
____ attachment of observers .. t'-o_t_h...,e_se_a.,.g_en_c.cc.i-'-es"_. ________ -+-=---
91 l 43 Equipment. Although some of the equipment issues I intend Equipmen 
e l 5 to raise are in the process of being addressed, I believe they 
need to be satisfactorily completed sooner rather than later · 
as they directly affect our strategic capability. Firstly is the 
avionics update (including GPS fit) of the F-111 fleet. This, 
along with a working SOP for ground based L TO without the 
aircraft having to 'see' the target, is crucial to this weapon 
systems effectiveness. Secondly, the ne~d to fit at least 
some of the Collins Class submarines for Spec Ops; at least 
t 
to the same standard as the '0' Boats and preferably 
beyond. Thirdly is the need for some form of refit to at least 
the Spec Ops C-130 aircraft. An in-flight refuelling and a 
GPS fit with a download capability would be a minimum. 
Fitting of FLIR and an ECM/ESM suite would be nice also. 
To that end the timely creation of a dedicated Special Forces 
air wing with dedicated aircraft would Not only increase 
training standards but also interoperability and significantly 
reduce deployment lead times. Lastly, and certainly Not 
least, is the issue of procurement. Special Forces units 
require greater autonomy in the trail and procurement of all 
: types of equipment. We all know how protracted the process 
I is under the normal system, ie the combat boots, cams and 
_____ L_ ___ the_)_Q_ad 2~9.~Y~!_em. -------------·-----
92 ! 43 Maintaining Quality Personnel. It is imperative that the 
a ' 6 Special Forces Gp maintain the quality of its personnel. To 
do this we must look at our system of selection, bearing in 
mind that we are still Army u nits and ultimately must be 
prepared to operate at the highest level of conflict in a 
conventional setting. I believe that cost cutting techniques, 
such as joint selection courses, and applying conventional 
training wisdom, such as validating selection as a course on 
a percentage pass rate, can only be self-defeating in the 
long run. Without a doubt the selection process demands 
scrutiny, and should be a dynamic process, as otherwise it 
risks atrophying into an ineffective sieve. It cannot be 
validated as a training course however, as it is selection Not 
training, and most importantly should Not be judged on a 
; percentage passing or quota basis as this could lower the 
1 quality of those selected. With the operational tempo on the 
: rise for the Special Forces Gp, it is critical that commanders 
! will still be able to trust their subordinates to make the 
! correct decision, especially with the strategic and political 
_l consequences ot_~pecial o_p~rations beir:!_g potentiai!Y so dire. 
Selection 
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b 7 Special Forces Gp to formation level, it is essential that 
training of core skills be rationalised to ensure that the most 
is made from the training dollar allocated to HQSO. The 
consolidation of all core skills to the Special Forces Training 
Centre is a good plan and with the amount of money being 
constricted to the group an essential one. It is a move 
however that I perceive as being fraught with peril. It is a 
unit that will take some time to become effective, and until it 
is fully accepted and operational all core skills will be better 
trained under the current regime. The future without a doubt 
is toward some skills being consolidated at the Special 
Forces Training Centre, but to rush toward it will mean that 
, the basis in core skills of some operators will be 
__ L ___ ~oi!IErQ.rnl~~.Q.~------------··---------------·--·-----------·--- -------··-----· 
92 I 43 Developing an Operational Focus. It is critical that units on Operations N Y Y N N Y 
c ! 8 short warning be able to match that with a focus that allows 
them to deploy with minimum fuss and then carry out tasks 
in a competent and disciplined fashion. To develop this 
focus there needs to be Not only the perceived chance of 
deployment but also the reality. In addition 4 RAR and 1 
Commando Regt must have the operational ethos instilled 
into them, as their current focus appears to be Not dissimilar 
to the rest of the Army. Without this focus being spread 
across all units, the perception will be simply that of the 
group still having only one viable deployable unit. For the 
. Group to be a viable formation size group all units must 
~J _____ f~l~U!:!_~-~?m~~yel_ of OJ:>erational fO<?!J§· ___ ----------------- --------------- ___ _ 
92! 43 Maintaining Technlogical and Capability Edge within Region. Equipment N Y Y N Y N 
d · 9 As other countries within the region close the gap with 
Australia in technology, it stands to reason that they will 
begin to improve in quality as well. Our assumed superiority 
in technology is already being eroded, though this will slow 
with the current economic crisis, and as other countries gain 
advanced equipment their quality will have to improve to 
operate it. In addition as we improve our ties with our 
neighbours they will naturally gain experience and training 
from operating with us that further closes the gap. It will 
take a great effort to maintain our technological edge, by 
both improving our current line of equipment as well as 
identifying other equipment swiftly that will fulfil our new roles 
and responsibilities. This will also tie in with the requirement 
to maintain the quality of our personnel, as this will be the 
critical aspect in maintaining and improving our superior 
_ _\ _ ~tanding._ _ ____ . --~-----·----------------------~------- __________ _ 
92 i 44 Develop Operational Experience within Group. It is essential Operations Y N N N N N 
e ! 0 that the Special Forces Gp take every opportunity to gain 
· operational experience that it can. Without the operational 
experience within the group, we will find it increasingly 
difficult to train quality individuals and retain highly trained 
operators in the units. Advanced training and selection 
requires experienced instructors, and an operational focus ] 
will be best fostered by the regular deployment on 
_____ L_ gp_~-~?~i~l1-~~-f...!:l9_!()_~2~f~--~':!':~_qg_~_gy~r~tbl:lrc.:r:>Y_Il!~!-~_!>_()l!r ____________________________ j ______ _ 
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capability must be validated on operations, even if it is just 
combined training with other nations. This final point is the 
critical issue that must be addressed, as it will effect all the 
-~-~~-- <?.!he!s in ~-£~~QJ?_9rtiQ!lateJ~~b!2-r:!.!"-~---~----·"·----~~-----
93 I 44 Force Projection Platforms. Presently we have a distinct 
a ! 1 lack of force projection platforms available to Special Forces. 
To maintain a truly strategic capability we need to have 
greater access to: 
(1} Chinook CH47 
(2} Collins Class submarines 
(3} Naval Assets (Kanimbla} 
(4} Naval Aviation assets 
Appendix 4 
"- 5)_ Qiyi1J~~-9E~J~ -----·········-·--····-------- _ ................................. __ . ........... .. . ___ _ 
93 ! Special Forces Training Centre. The Special Forces Training N N Y Y N N 
b 2 Training Centre has the potential to undermine an Special 
Forces unit's ability to conduct its unit specific individual 
training. Receiving the appropriate resources and 
1 establishing a good working relationship with TC-A, I believe 
9-s-+·44 ~~m~~~sde §~~:~~~n~ ib~~~i~~~e~electi'onhas thep.otential - Selection ____ -v N N ~r+N -N 
c · 3 to undermine SASRs ability to select the soldiers and officers 
that are suitable to serve in the Regt. The concept in the 
future of selecting members for SASR only after they had 
spent time in Commandos, I believe is ludicrous and will 
undermine the ability for SASR to draw from a broad 
spectrum of the three services. With the possible changing 
, roles of SASR in the future there may be a need also for 
____ L ..... §~§-~_!.<?. cq_~-~!~-~-~-~~Q~-~-~ingJ!~~~~~~l~i!:J.g_!>a~~~~-9.L~Jil~~~:____ _________________________ ____ ____ ____ __ __ r----
93 ! 44 Officer Career Management. Presently there is some Training Y N N N N N 
d ' 4 resistance (depending maybe on your CO} for officers to be 
released from their units to attempt an Special Forces 
selection course. Once an officer has passed, the problem 
can become even worse and getting released to conduct 
further courses or an early posting may become a real fight. 
Special Forces units need to be more proactive in pursuing 
: the release of officers and should Not just leave it up to the 
_j ___ Jndiyidual with little backii)_9J9 S.2EL9ll2.: _____________ ~·---------- --·----------____ ·-::--:- ______ -
93 l 44 Information Systems and Information Management. Technology N N N Y Y N 
e · 5 Presently the Special Forces Gp and the Army as a whole is 
way behind in our ability to maintain a grasp on computer 
technology. The Special Forces WAN is a great concept, but 
it is a double edged weapon which could lead to numerous 
: security and IS breaches if the appropriate training is Not 
__ I ______ Qroyided ~ith_!_~~--~ __ stem. ... ··--··-------··------- ________ --~ --+-+~--1 
94 I 44 Dedicated Special Forces air wing, including Chinook, small Capability N N Y N N N 
~L.§ fast helq__~~QE.Q.I!.an~_C-1}Q.~pec .2P_£EY?~ble:.______ _ ______ -r-- ___ --r--~ 
94 ! 44 Corps of Special Forces. Provide for career management Personnel Y Y N N N N 
b ! 7 separate to the Corps of Infantry which does Not recognise 
_j___ the ~xJra hards!]ips of ~~_kl_9J!!_~_p_~ci~! Fore~-~---__ -------:----+o~~-,-1-:-:-~+:-:-J 
94: 44 Special Forces Development and Trials Team. Allow for Personnel Y Y N N Y N 
~--l-- 8 faster ai'!~P to d~te eq~pmentE.I!rch~~e. _________ __" _____ ·-I.,-:- -+-+-:+~ 
94 : 44 Relocate SASR to eastern seaboard. Management N Y N N N N 
<! ___ L __ ~ ------------------·---··- --------·---·----------------------------- ----------·------- ·-------------- ---------------- --- --- ---- -- --- -----· 
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ne location ~- 94 l 45 All Special Forces training conducted at o 
l e l 0 separate to operational regiments, this wo 
~ r-~-~~~--~~---,~ ~~-~Ime_nt§~y!9~2__0n9entrate on ~-~.2E_~r_ati9_r}. 
o. 95 l 45 W1th the likely approach of a Joint Specia ~ a ! 1 establishment, it is important to realise tha 
uld allow for 
al focus. 
-.T--~~-~~.~-----~----
I Forces training 
t the two Special 
·:.,; Forces roles (SASR and Commando) sho 
separate in selection and in some areas o 
uld remain 
f training. It is 
' apparent that the basic SASR trooper and 
i PTE are a different animal. There are rna 
l for joining, attitude, maturity, type of roles 
1.. expected to fulfil, etc. All these qualities w 
distinguished on a selection course and e ! i candidates will probably indicate their pre 
the Commando 
ny reasons; reason 
they will be 
ill need to be 
venthough 
terence, this will 
lection, therefore , Not be easy in such an environment as se 
__ J ·--- t_b~_ql!~~ty_~!ll drqp: _______ .... __ . _____ _ 
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not fulfil the 95 i 45 Currently the C-130 Spec Ops crews can 
b i 2 requirements of the stand-by patrols or th e requirements of 
ht recently where if 1 some types of insertions. This came to lig 
it was Not for the USAF Talon, the trainin 
been conducted as planned. The only rea 
took place was because of the spare airc 
they used GPS and had the use of FLIR. 
needs dedicated crews who are on as mu 
g would Not have 
son the training 
raft and the fact 
Special Forces 
ch notice to move 
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95 45 There are Service and civilian aircraft tha 
-------------------------------------
t could be used for 
c rictions on them. 3 training/ops that at the moment have rest 
Islanders and Twin Otters could be used 
resupply, but currently there are restrictio 
These should be another option open to p 
in parachuting and 
ns on their use. 
Ianners as well as 
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Capability N N 
------------------------------------
Capability N N 
1----+----J-other civiliani.'Ilili!ar~~-'=!!J?.ment. 
-~~--- -~~-~T. 
for all members, 95 45 Computer training is absolutely essential 
d 4 Not just clerical. The new computer cell i 
great step, but with only 20 or so terminal 
n Campbell Bks is a 
sand a lot of 
people to train and Not a lot of time to do it in, training will be 
slow. 1----+---~~~'--------~-----------------
95 ! 45 Operational experience within the Army is 
e I 5 Thankfully it is getting better but there are 
very low. 
opportunities 
! around the world where Special Forces o perators could 
r::-:-L:-- dep~ or detach -~ith O~!lJ:Se~ natio~ns._ 
96 i 45 Defining the Aim. This is not the elusive a 
a : 6 changing spectre that some would have u 
-~------~---~-
nd shape-
s believe. As it 
: has been since the beginning, the aim is a lways success in 
apon' may change, i battle. The evolution of 'battle' and of 'we 
but the desired outcome (or 'end-state' to 
feel more comfortable with military geek s 
immutable. If this is the essence of our a 
and tasking will easily flow from it. The n 
have always been new theories) of 'Revo 
'Bloodless War', C3 .. 4 .. 5 .. 6 .. ? .. I Warfare' 
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7 necessary to train soldiers who are able to plan, co-ordinate, 
integrate, synchronise and execute a mission successfully. 
first glance, this may appear to be daunting but if the 
training concentrates on the essence of military operations, 
the base skills - ie navigation, communication, weapons 
skills, planning and orders, insertion methods - any 
additional/special tasks can more readily be assimilated and 
executed by the properly trained soldier. The reason that we 
have moved from the baseline in our recent past is because, 
in peace time, there is the easy lure of chasing the attractive 
and the exciting in our training schedules and disregarding 
the physically demanding or repetitive ('Hell- We can 
already do that; why waste time doing it again?). It is an 
interesting observation that as soon as it appears that there 
may be a job on, everyone wants to go to the Q-store for a 
new compass, new magazines, to go to the range, to 
rehearse drills - the very things that we an said that we had 
or were proficient in and did Not require to get or to practise. 
Recent training reviews have done much to correct this 
deviation. 1-·----·+-----+:::.:: 
96 45 Exploiting Opportunity. Given that we have well trained 
soldiers that are able to deploy at reduced notice to move, it 
is now the task to find them employment. It is here that we 
all must revisit the First Key Challenge - Defining the Aim. If 
the job that is being offered does Not fall within our focus 
then it should be passed on to the people who should be 
doing it. Prolonged peace has made us willing to take on 
tasks that may Not necessarily be ours and may offer little 
back to Special Forces. However, benefit may be gained in 
areas that, on first glance, may Not seem obvious. It is up to 
all members to be constantly vigilant to possible 
opportunities. (These opportunities may well lie outside the 
country or outside of the military but offer something none-
the-less). It is also up to all members to be on the lookout 
Appendix 4 
for tasks and trainin that are time wasters and Not relevant. 
~--f:~----:--~------------------t~~-r~~-1~-:·+-~~+:~~+~-i 96 45 Disregarding the Superfluous. In war and in peace we face Training 
d 9 the external problem of the lack of manpower and the lack of 
funds. It we were to decide, for example, that the focus of 
the unit was to be able to fight as well as carry out 
reconnaissance and surveillance tasks, we could be led to 
assume that there would be a requirement for modern and 
efficient weapons systems for our soldiers and for the 
platforms that they may serve. (in a unit on reduced notice 
to move one would think such matters would already have 
been decided and acted upon). To then be able to outfit the 
unit with a weapons upgrade it would be a matter of deciding 
what attractive items would need to take lower priority. Once 
our basic requirements are met, then we can move onto less 
needed items. This also goes for exercises, courses and 
training. If equipment or training is Not essential nor relevant 
to our aim, it needs to be cancelled. Believe me, there are 
innumerable activities that do uire our attention! 
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0 finishing statemen t but is based on observing the unit 
number of years. Again and again it has 
46 
2 
46 
training cycle for a 
been identified tha t the intensity of training puts extreme 
strain on our reso urces and personnel toward the end of 
each year. I have Not observed teeming hordes attempting 
to over-run our ra mparts but the intensity of training would 
give the lie. The main problem that this poses is, that if we 
should be activate d for conflict during this period, I see that 
we are carrying ve ry little physical or mental 'fat' and would 
be more susceptib le to making wrong decisions and to 
mental and physic 
understand what I 
al burn-out. (For anyone who does Not 
am saying - I can only suggest that you 
take a posting for 
September!). Stro 
a year or so and then return on posting in 
nger directives need to be implemented 
th regard to our use of time. Also, anyone 
an't handle the pace- get out!'; to them I 
are Not unlike the hamster in the wheel 
eping the thing turning that he can't see 
and supervised wi 
who says: 'If you c 
suggest that they 
who is so busy ke 
that it is taking him nowhere! The problem of leave (or lack 
t of this increased activity period - people 
led by the intensity of the training on 
of) is a direct resul 
become so enthral 
'OLOC', 'NTM' an 
that take on such 
d other marvellous combinations of letters 
hallowed meaning that common sense is 
pushed aside (one e again, N 'enemy at the gates'). Our men 
hout leave again and again. This is Not 
mmanders as they only snatch two and 
face two years wit 
realised by the co 
es of the Regt. With this overwork it is 
g horse that receives extra load - in fact, I 
ould be the one being looked after. On top 
three year glimps 
generally the willin 
the person that sh 
prospect of actually losing what leave is j 
aso sho-u-ld-c-on-ductsta_ff_i-nd-uction-~,·---- Trainin,_g ___ t Y- v Niv N -N 
ssential for non-Special Forces personnel 
of this, there is the 
owed!!!! 
In future years, H 
training. This is e 
and of benefit to S pecial Forces personnel given the rapid 
advancesintechn ology, force structure and strategic affairs. 
Despite attending a Joint Operations Planning Course and 
studying SO doctri ne, I require more background information 
to maximallY- contr ibute to the HQ. 
Address the wider Army perception that Special Forces is a Marketing Y N N N N N 
3 resource black hoi e. Clearly the nature of SO means that j 
ateriel and wages costs are involved, 
e multiplier effect of SO offsets this. The I 
s occurs should be quantified and should 
ent that debunks the resource issue. The 
e wider perception that Special Forces I 
ffective and very versatile asset well worth 
nditure. i 
higher training, m 
however, the fore 
extent to which thi 
present an arguni 
endstate should b 
presents a cost e 
the resQ_l:!!.9.~-~~E~ 
46 Information Opera 
4 capabilities for eft ~~t~ ~:Jo~~~~~~~e~~~o~~~~~ -~h:- capability----·--- v v NlJ_N_ N v 
same time we sho uld Not try to develop these in isolation or 
h other ADF force elements, but rather 
skills or niche roles can provide a unique 
in competition wit 
where our existing 
skill set: 
··-··--···---------·------· ·----·------- ------------ -----·----- -- --- ---~--~-~ 
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Examples: 
(1) Physical Attack on Enemy C31 Systems: infrastructure 
targeting and strike and standoff weapons (such as EMP), 
attacked on civil infrastructure such as telecommunications 
and power. This would lead to a requirement for higher 
technical expertise in these areas. 
(2) Use of Adversary C31 Systems. EA on remote systems, 
physical hacking of isolated and secure computer systems, 
tapping of PSTN networks (capabilities developed with 7 Sig, 
their employment with us or in areas where they cannot go). 
(3) PR, PA and CA. The understanding that we don't fight in 
Vietnam anymore and that often the overt use of Special 
Forces is more valuable than the actual task they are doing 
(I cite the comments by Mick Malone prior to Op POLLARD). 
The use of Special Forces strategically inCA, PA or PR may 
mean that Special Forces need to develop much more media 
savvy, and also change its MO to accommodation media. 
Stop thinking that 'putting on a show' for CGPI is a farce and 
that civil media are the enemy. 
(4) Better OPSEC. Anyone who thinks that Special Forces 
is currently good at this should come and see me. They are 
Not. This should Not be read as a need to increased effort 
for security but smarter use of security. Some in SASR think 
that everything they do is TOP SECRET, when what is really 
Appendix 4 
~. ; be in done is wasted effo'!. -------~· ·-- ~· -·---·-··-~~.~-r:-:-t-:c~":"'i-: -t-::-:-l-:-74 
98 I 46 Getting Red of the 'Cult of the Beret'. Selection Y N N N N N 
b i 5 (1) Selection process at the moment still produces social 
! cloning: he gets selected because he's like me. What we 
i tend to produce is Special Forces soldiers who are of a 
particular template that is often suited to door kicking, but 
less suited to some of the future roles that we are after. 
HUMINT, for example, requires female, non-descript (ie Not 
6'4", built like a tank and wearing the Special Forces watch 
and day pack) and of different character. What about direct 
entry to Special Forces, older recruits (ie stability and 
maturity)? 
(2) Does a few weeks of selection followed by a few years 
as a TP COMO translate as the best staff officers? I would 
argue that many unit and HQ staff are Not the best for the 
job, and indeed are paid better because of their previous 
prowess at TACTICAL skills. If Special Forces wants to 
remain the best they need to attract the best for each job, 
; Not simply assume that because someone is beret qualified 
_ __) ______ .!tJeY: rem~!D the_ b~~!_!n a __ staff jo_~_:._ __________________ ----------------··--- -----~-:-:- ________________ _ 
98 i 46 Merit based promotion (a problem across the Army Not just Personnel N N N N N N 
c ! 6 Special Forces) 
(1) Officers are Not promoted on merit until they have 
served a minimum of 15 years, a joke in a society that has 
moved away from the 'job for life' mentality. (1.5 to 4 yrs 
training, 3 to 4 years L T, 6 yrs CAPT, 3 yrs to PSC, plus 
usually 1 to 2 yrs PSC until promotion). What this means is 
that jets (and those who continually study to gain new skills) 
progress at the same rate as also rans (you really need to 
_j__ tread on xour qick Not to ma_ke MAJ !hese day~·------<--
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similar (2) Flexible posting/promotion. NSW police have a 
system where internal vacancies are offered. Fixed 
postings, but with the ability to apply for your own job 
at the end of posting. People who apply can be any 
LCPL can apply for the SGT job, and if he has the sk 
experience he gets promoted. People who are happ 
CPL range controllers can stay that way for years if t 
2to3yr 
again 
rank, ie 
ills and 
y being 
hey 
- want to. 
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98 46 Developing roles in a comprehensive security enviro nment 
d 7 including: drug enforcement, illegal immigrants, terra rism 
(beyond CT resolution), environmental damage, curr ency 
r-·- -+···:·--:-1_f~gb_t and resourc~ero~_c __ ti_on_._-----:~-
bility 98 46 The ability of commanders to identify idiots and the a 
e 8 (and conviction) to sack them. See the private secto 
are Not a sheltered workshop, nor an instrument of s 
r-we 
ocial 
policy. _ 
99 j 46 Administrative planning needs to be timely, accurate and 
·--
~J _ _i} COI!!EL~!~: _____________________________________________ _ 
--------
99 ! 47 Administrative procedures standardised across the S 
b l 0 Forces Gp by use of SOPs for Admin and the Specia 
: WAN. 
pecial 
I Forces 
Operations 
~------Personnel 
Administration 
-------·---------·--·-·-·------
Administration 
""~,-·~~!~,~~-- -- ~-~--~~---------------·--"--'----~~---~--~~-~----------
t staff Management 
-- ~------·-· ·---------------------
99 i 47 Units are Not to develop procedures in isolation, mus 
~-J _J ti:J!Q~.9~!~-~--Ij.Q.._ -------·---··. --~------------------- ..... -· --- ------
99 i 47 More emphasis must be placed on administration in order to Administration 
---,~-----------
>ps etc. _____ d .J 2 enhance train~. Timely information from o 
g-g·! 47 The importance at personal administration needs to 
~---: 3 rbl[l:lJlg_!:lted _to all le~~!§..:. _ _!!is a co~mOiJ_!esponsib~i!Y 
99f/ 47 A far greater emphasis needs to be placed on the low 
be 
.:._ __ 
er 
! 4 levels, ie TP/PL SGTs, 21Cs, etc. The soldier's 
------~=-~~_Q.rn_i_nistration is t!:teir _r~~EQ.~§ibi!!!L ______ _ 
---~---
10 ! 47 Location of Units 
Oa j 5 1. With the selling off of prime Defence land to deve lopers 
units 
a good 
and heritage groups, much of the better locations for 
within the Special Forces Gp are disappearing. For 
example, since AMS moved, Chowder Bay would be 
location for 1 Commando Regt HQ and 1 Command 
with a Water Ops Wing conducting courses on beha 
Special Forces Training Centre. Other examples inc 
Cook and Gan Gan. These bases are N longer avai 
oCoy 
If of the 
lude Pt 
lable to 
us. 
e, Not 2. The remaining bases are increasing in importanc 
because of their strategic location or other intrinsic 
importance, but que to diminishing resources and as 
available. Therefore, consolidation is required to ide 
sets 
ntify the 
remaining bases to units. 
Field is 
3. Other limitations imposed upon the group is poor 
allocation of existing bases. In the LMA, Luscombe 
presently being used by two Sig Sqns. What would 
unit do with a landing field. I understand that some t 
facility may be built there in preparation for the 2000 
Olympics, but surely the sooner the Special Forces G 
a Sig 
ra1mng 
ptake 
, over the area, the better. I would have thought that with a bit 
__ ___1 ______ ~~!~ .. !!l-~!l~Y_§P~!:l_t~-~--b.~i1_~!_!:19__i!l_t~~--~Mf1..!~_!!:1_~!.f3_~§ ethe 
-------------·----
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10 
1e 
Australian SF soldiers on a regular basis to allow us 
r-niiiAr·r"'"'l'' carry out our critical self-analysis, and develop 
ress with TECHNLOGY. 
1 0 48 Retention of Personnel 
2a 5 1 . Giving clear cut tasks and goals to achieve (based on a 
plausible mission} and have these efforts recognised and 
confirmed by higher than battalion or regimental level (ie 
COMO SF upwards visit courses or activities}. 
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Management 
Communication 
2. Equalising pay across the SF Gp for those with the same 
and ~~-~~-~-,'-------~-----------------------------------------------------------·}c=---,-----~-----------t-:-~}~-:1-:-:-+ 
10 48 Embrace Technology 
2b 6 1. Have a clear point of contact or a central agency that can 
research or give advice on equipment that is used to conduct 
SF tasks, also give each unit a contact list of people who are 
conducting or researching new/replacement items as often 
or three people are conducting the same research but 
for different application. Also many items that are Not 
suitable for SASR are suitable for Commando operations 
and vice versa. 
2. Incorporate lessons on new technology and computer 
software used to improve work performance. 
3. Purchase off the shelf items and issue them to user units 
to conduct trials and have the civilian companies compete to 
adapt the equipment to our use, thus avoiding individuals 
with a fixed perspective conducting a trial aimed at what they 
the to ach 
1 0 48 Change Work Practices Management 
2c 7 1. Due to limited resources and equipment in some areas, 
change the work schedules or work place of selected 
individuals to suitthe units and individual needs. 
2. Give a clearly defined end state to be achieved in work 
produced/fitness etc and let the individuals set their own 
work practices. This would allow the manager to grade their 
reviews accu 
10 i · 48 Raise the Profile of the Full Time Commando Bn Marketing 
2d · 8 1. Put on show and tell exercises to impress on the HQ staff 
and politicans they have created an extremely versatile and 
cost effective unit. 
2. Conduct Joint exercises to demonstrate the skills 
; ...... ~,·~·,.,uired to other ADF units. Also conduct a more 
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aggressive recruitment program to ensure the quality as well 
as 1~f:l_9!1.~D!i!}'__()j_~ppl!9~1]-~~-!~!.tnP!.O.Y~Q:___ ---~-------- -------------~'!·-----·· --------------·--- -r:-:·-1---c+-·:+--t --:--J-,-~ 
48 Training and Living Facility for the Individuals on Holsworthy 
2e 9 Barracks 
1. Improve the living accommodation for members in 
Holsworthy Barracks (or at least have all the unit in one area 
and not scattered over three barracks) and Not have other 
units intermingled in the live in lines as this detracts from the 
work quality, ie reverse weeks when the other unit is in the 
Bks during the day and the soldiers cannot sleep. 
2. Design and build ranges and facilities to 
supplement/improve day to day individual and collective 
training, ie MOE, COB and MOUT. 
3. Ensure access to field training areas for day to day 
trai 
:··-·-l·-=-·-.,.-,·-"'--- -----·-·----------··------- ·-··-·-- . --··-··--·----- --· - ---------------·· -··-·--··--·-+-------·---··:··:---------··-+-::---:·) 
49 Be Vision Led Leadership 
0 1. There exists the requirement of clear definition, 
continuous refinement and articulation of where our future is 
headed. Individuals need to understand what is expected of 
them. This vision is what we as a Group will create. It is Not 
the past or what others may be doing. This vision with its 
own implementation strategies should be adapted to or 
enlarged for its audience as it moves down the chain of 
command. Every unit, sub unit and department/element 
within the Gp has a responsibility and role in moving towards 
a situation when the vision becomes reality. Articulation of 
the clearly defined vision at all levels in a language that is 
easily understood at that level is required to Not only 
command compliance, but empower individual commitment. 
2. Visions are best evolved out of the process of merging 
personnel and shared visions. Soldiers should be 
encouraged to share in what it is they personally value. This 
ensures the concept of vision represents more than the 
collective view of superiors. Relying too heavily on someone 
else's vision reinforces a culture of dependence and 
conformity. People become committed to visions when they 
embrace their own personal visions. If they do Not have 
one, then all they can do is sign up for someone else's. 
When people with strongly committed values and a sense of 
purpose come together collaboratively, the potential for 
rful outcomes is 
1 0 49 Transition from a Traditional Military Structure Management 
3b 1 1. The Army is a traditional oranisation with a hierarchical 
structure. Within this structure there are many levels of 
authority. Everything passes through the chain of command. 
Logical argument is provided on paper. There are many 
when paperwork is Not required, but insisted upon 
(because that is the way it is done). Traditional 
organisations deprive workers of the opportunity to engage 
in continUous learning and constantly fail to allow soldiers to 
accept responsibility and authority for their job. How people 
do things is Not really important, the process is just the way 
L ______ L ______ L()~>Jf:l~~!!Y~f; __ ~a~rr•e~--~ac~rhieved. What is of rtance is the 
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3d 
outcome, the capability. On occasions we concentrate far 
oo much on the wrong area. At times there exists a 
requirement for a more level structure within departments 
and sub-units. The military would find it extremely difficult to 
change from its pyramidal structure. Within the group 
another structure could be implemented to address this. It 
could be similar to an administrative chain of command and 
an operational chain of command. There are levels in the 
administrative chain of command that are Not required in the 
operational chain of command. Maybe a strategic chain of 
command for our own economic or growth and development 
strategies is required. This would promote networking, 
which has proven to be a valuable tool within the Gp in the 
past. It allows personnel to draw skills, knowledge and 
nformation from others in a timely and effective fashion 
without the bureaucracy normally involved in travelling 
through chains of command. There are many benefits from 
a more flat or level structure. Just because things worked 
effectively in the past does not mean that there are Not 
better or more effective processes available. Networking 
also has the ability to avoid re-inventing the wheel and 
keeping pace with what others are achieving or working on 
within a subject ?lr~~t therefore, becoming more effective. 
t 
i 
49 I mprove Acknowledgement and Recognition for Soldiers and Leadersh ip 
2 
49 
3 
NCOs 
1. Rewarding effort or giving credit where it is due in 
traditional organizations can be complicated. Middle and 
upper management generally accept most if Not all of the 
credit for an organisation's achievements. Soldiers are 
generally Not acknowledged or recognized for their abilities. 
There is a tendency within the Gp to accept high levels of 
performance or ability as normal, yet remember times of 
failure. Care needs to be taken Not to develop collaborative 
ndividuals who bear no allegiance to anything other than i 
themselves and their own careers. Without those who 
continually go outside the comfort zone and risk failure we 
would Not evolve. Recognition is a powerful incentive and 
can result in behavioral change and commitment from 
soldiers. 
- --~. -··--~--~-~--=-~~=~~-~ ... ~~~--==~-'-='"·=-'-=•-=---'-"'"-"=~==~---•.-.•~·~--~=·--~~=~~~h-R_.._. __ .. ,,=~~=~=~~~-=~~&V~-·~~ ~ ... ~ ... ---~-~---~ 
A Need to Develop Our Own Resources Personn 
1. Our most important resource is our line soldier. The man 
who carries the weapon while wearing face paint. The 
soldier has other needs outside of battle skills. By 
diversifying our training we could develop more lateral 
thinking and develop soldiers who can think on their feet. 
Lateral thinking and problem solving skills are achieved by 
most because of their own attributes and the varied 
situations they are placed in by quality training. However, 
we should devise strategies to create the environment where 
soldiers learn lateral thinking and problem solving skills far 
earlier in their career. We need a focus on developing 
individual problem solving skills, a tolerance for ambiguity 
and the capacity to cope with diversity. This relates to the I 
sol~!~-~s we!!2~_th~_.2_f!!c~. esj:>eci~I.Y early in the~ careers. 
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49 Develop Efficiency 
4 1. To be effective we need to be efficient in all areas, 
ensuring something is learnt, gained or reinforced by every 
bullet fired, every minute written and every task undertaken. 
If nothing is learnt, gained or reinforced then we do Not need 
to do it. Time and resources may be better employed on 
more useful tasks that will benefit and develop our culture 
a_!lcj_~ap_~_t:l_iliJy._ . ______ _______ _ ____ _ 
1 0 49 Learn from Our Past 
3f 5 1. So many times we re-invent the wheel and do what was 
done several years before. We need to heed the advice of . 
those who have experience. Education and experience 
when combined are powerful qualities, but when separated 
have different characteristics. Many good ideas and 
warnings come from our subordinates, yet they are often 
ignored. If something was tried in the past and did Not work 
effectively, then quality research may proyide an answer. In 
this case, quality research comes from consulting widely and 
listening to people with subject experience. Databases 
should be implemented to record all PAR recommendations. 
Employ networking to gain and pass on ideas within the Gp. 
We should attempt to always go forward by whatever means 
even in the face of advers 
10 49 The first issue would be the one of locations. We are all 
4a 6 beginning to feel trapped in by the urban growth around our 
bases, be it SASR or 4 RAR (Cdo). We are supposed to 
deploy under secrecy, yet everyone can blatantly see us 
when we do. This includes other units of the ADF. I strongly 
believe that we should be in isolation from the rest of the 
ADF and civilian areas as much as 
1 0 49 The issue of pay is one which really only involves 4 RAR 
4b 7 (Cdo) and 1 Commando Regt. SASR has a special 
allowance for the risks they take and I understand this and I 
have N complaints. Realising that SASR are usually 
employed in a higher risk environment than the above units, 
I still believe that we warrant the need for a risk type of 
allowance. 
1 0 I believe strongly in the introduction of joint training between 
4c . the three units of the SF Gp. With the financial problems 
affecting the ADF we need to start amalgamating courses. 
Fewer courses and exercises obviously means less money 
spent but we gain the advantage of getting to know the other 
members of the SF Gp and how they operate. We must start 
to learn each other's capabilities and operating procedures, 
for when it comes to it will be too late. 
10 49 I think it is inevitable that 4 RAR (Cdo) and 1 Commando 
4d 9 Regt will amalgamate someday and I believe it should be 
sooner than later. 
10 50 4 RAR (Cdo) should get rid of the RAR and the Colours so 
4e ' 0 we can begin to separate ourselves from the rest of the 
Corps. If this happens we could have more time to train on 
SF related subjects. We are starting to think and perform 
like SF but we would reach the desired result if the 
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1 0 50 Personnel 
5a 1 1 . Due to the rapidly changing world climate it is more than 
probable that strategic limited engagement type warfare will 
be conducted. It is therefore more practical to have a large 
'standing Army', but a well trained and fully manned SF GP. 
It is necessary to bring all SF units up to full manning so that 
they are capable of meeting any threat that may be posed to 
Australia and her interests. The manning of a unit is directly 
linked to its effectiveness. 
~'~"' '+-''''-~'"~' 1 0 50 Equipment , Equipment 
5b 2 1. It is necessary to 'keep up with the times'. A lot of the 
equipment on issue to the AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE 
FORCES (ADF) is outdated, unsuitable, or too cumbersome 
be used effectively. I feel that the reason that this problem 
has arisen is that the 'operators' are Not necessarily the 
ones who trial the gear, and if they are, what they trial is Not 
is purchased. This must be overcome if we are to be 
1 0 : 50 Retention Personnel 
5c ! 3 1. Hand in hand with manning this issue is just as important 
as any other. We must be able to retain the members we 
currently have if we are to move forward. This could be 
achieved by offering 'rewards' to hold people in the SF Gp, 
whether this was to take the form of financial or conditions of 
service. An incentive to stay in the SF Gp may be required 
to solve the retention issue. 
1 0 , 50 Resources Resources 
5d ! 4 1. To keep SF units up to speed in all of their skills, it is 
necessary to use up to a great deal of resources. For this 
reason it is imperative that all units within the SF co-operate, 
and try to work together to share what resources are 
available. This may be achieved by scheduling 
exercises/training courses to run concurrently. This should 
have the effect of easing the strain on an already stretched 
resource base. 
Communication Communication 
1. Communication from unit to unit, operator to CO, is the 
key to our survival. If we do Not communicate with each 
other, wastage of manpower and resources will continue. 
The notion of 'protecting our turf' is an out moded idea in this 
day and age. Information sharing will only make us stronger 
as it will lead to better resource ent. 
Reduction in the number of SF units allows for: Resources 
6 1. Maximum use of current resources 
2. Ability to train necessary number of paratroopers rather 
compete with other units and against diminishing assets 
and facilities 
3. Joining or amalgamating units under one command will 
avoid duplication and free up extra vital personnel required 
elsewhere. 
4. Eliminate the unnecessary problem of trying to please the 
RAR Assoc. 
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50 Identification and occupation of appropriate and permanent 
7 locations/facilities. F,+·-·=c':··t~,_=-:=:=:..:':::.::===-=:..::.:_,,--,-:-::"·-.,... ------· .,, .. ,·,····-···--···------,---· ·-r:-·,---:-··-;--;,------··r~:-7!-·.-:-t-.--:-+-:-:+:·:t:-·:-i 
50 Stop Reinventing the Wheel. Leadership 
6c 8 1 . Continual unnecessary rewriting and updating of 
Doctrine, TMPs and SOPs, etc. 
2. Wastes valuable time and manpower that could be better 
spent on what we are here for, ie to train for operations 
rather than sitting at a desk typing. 
3. New documents are generally minutely different and N 
more i than the one 
1 0 . 50 Dedicated permanent ADF assets to train and operate with: . 
6d · 9 1. Saves time and efforts wasted on assets that fail to 
materialize at the last and or crucial moment. 
2. Allows for actual capability rather than a spoken, written 
or notional capability. Allows all to be trained properly at all 
rather than rushed training and the chance of 
accidents or incidents because of lost skills or proper training 
over looked or short cut to meet time lines on assets. 
10 51 ndependent Command. 
7a 0 1. SF capabilities cannot be fully developed or utilised as 
long as we remain under command of Land Comd. We 
cannot develop our full potential as long as we are controlled 
by an organisation that inhibits our growth, curtails our 
independence, fails to understand our ethos and which 
appears Not to have embraced SO and the need for SF. 
2. SF needs to develop political sponsorship to ensure its 
survival. 
10 51 Career Courses. 
7b 1 1. One of our major weaknesses is the lack of formal 
training for SF officers and to a lesser extent NCOs. We 
require our own SF career courses. These courses should 
Not be an added formal training burden but replace specific 
course irements. 
10 51 lnteroperability 
7c 2 1. If SF wants to promote itself as the force of choice then 
the broad range of capabilities that exist within SASR and 
Commandos should also be packaged as a single capability. 
(However I would be reluctant to promote such 
interoperability as long as 4 RAR (Cdo) remains part of the 
RAR). 
2. It goes without saying that for this interoperability to work 
there also needs to be a more unified approach to formal 
training, and research and development issues between the 
SF units. Although the SFTC will address common training 
issues, the establishment of the school is seen by some as 
rlinninii.,hiinn the overall effectiveness of SF train 
Consultation 
3 1. Consultation on significant issues needs to involve a 
broader group. At the CO/RSM level many ideas have been 
filtered. When was the last time COMO SF conducted a 
seminar involving key unit personnel including OC and 
SSM/CSMs to discuss critical issues? (Granted this 
Five in the ht 
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10 51 Mobility Personnel 
7e 4 1. Administrative procedures need to be put in place that will 
allow for greater mobility for FT and PT SF personnel within 
e SF Gp. 
2. The ability for PT personnel to serve for periods of fulltime 
service or for FT personnel to take time out will assist in the 
retention of . lifiE:!9PE:!E~_9_r:lt:JI:)I._ .... ...... _ . _ .. . 
10 51 Communication. I submit that, in my experience with SF Gp, Communication 
Sa 5 communication is at the minimum standard it should be. 
This lack of communication breeds both resentment between 
the units and rumour 
10 51 Focus. I assert that the focus seems to be misdirected at Leadership 
Bb 6 times, eg hat badges and para wings rather than the real job 
at hand. 
10 51 Technology. The acquisition and use of technology, which is Technology 
Be 7 sound enough to carry the SF Gp into the next century, eg 
Appendix 4 
use of NVG. 
··--------····- ·- ··-·-····-········ -·-------···--··-···----·--···-··········--·--------·li--·-------·-·-·--- --l·--1-···+·-·+-··+--+--:-l 
10 
Bd 
suitable personnel to Personnel 
10 
9a 
10 
9b 
10 
52 eat all individuals as individuals.'"soidiers a:re being treated 
5 as a number Not as people. Officers are losing contact with 
eir soldiers. 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Marketing 
Communication 
11 52 One Standard for the Entire N difference in PT Leadership 
Oc 6 standard between Land Cor:n~~t:~c!_!_~g __ Q_<?I!l_~~-- __ -+-=·--.-··--,--,---·---:--·-····--+:·-:-l-c:-_+·c·,-l·o·c-!·-::-:-·l-::-:-l 
11 52 More Awareness with Entitlements. Soldiers should be Administration 
Od 7 informed of their entitlements and people should Not bend 
the rules to suit themselves. 
11 52 Maintain and im 
Oe 8 retention rate hi 
service conditions to keep the Personnel 
11 
1a 
52 Information Flow. The information across the SF Family is of Communication 
9 a poor standard. This needs to be improved so that the units 
can perform their tasks correctly. [Sigs requesting returns 
from units Not arriving until the day after the task was to be 
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in 11 i 53 Public Relations Issue. That the information that is read 
1 b · 0 the print media or electronic media is correct and gives the 
j ___ ~ 9_2.rrect _'!!es~~..:-~~~------------·-·····-------·--·--------
11 i 53 PUBLICATIONS. That the units across the SF Family a re all 
1 c · 1 using the correct doctrine and Not individual unit's mad e up 
: doctrine. 
----···--··-·--· 
11 [53 PA'llss0E-:079lsPECIAL-FORCE.-PAY7fRAiNING. 
1 d i 2 SF Family needs to establish an allowance that is for al 
members. At the moment, SAFA is and was raised to 
furnish the SASR. With new SF units being raised, it is 
time to revisit the SF allowances. The ECN 079 pay ca 
needs to be looked at in the respect that if a clerk or a-
member completes the Basic Commando Course, he is 
entitled to a pay rise because in all likelihood he will No 
The 
I 
now 
se 
Store 
not 
t be 
. required or get the chance to complete the other course s 
_\_ reg~ired to gualify_for the 079 pay level. _ 
11 i 53 Manning - Posting plots are released early so that short falls 
1~j_ 3 _car:!_ be_q_Q!1:_~_9_t_~~f9!~1~~--~9 . .9.L~_po~~~g__p~~!Qg: ____ _ 
----·-----
11 i 53 SF Family. The SF Gp must forge strong family ties 
2a i 4 (between 4 RAR (Cdo), SASR and 1 Commando Regt ). 
ASR Key positions in commandos should be offered to Nn-S 
personnel (providing they are competitive and suitably 
qualified) so as to develop a feeling of unity within the 3 
units. A SGT in 4 RAR (Cdo) or SASR should be able to be 
: posted to a W02 position in 1 Commando Regt then ba ckto 
i whichever unit they have qualified in. We must avoid a 
est'. 
____ _L __ J?_~rc~p_t[Q_!J __ !b~~!l_th~ k~y_l~osi~~~-?re g_!_~_!l to JQ_e "'!__ 
11 i 53 The SF Gp should attempt to develop a better image w 
2b i 5 the ADF, by this I mean give something back, whether 
·-------
ithin 
it be 
' good quality instructors on short term courses or perma 
positions at some of the schools. We should attempt to 
nent 
, avoid the image (currently perceived) that only rejects a re 
------~--- paste~ frQJB SASR. __________________________ ~-
--
11 i 53 Focus less on the paper and more on the action. It see 
2c l 6 me that there are currently more papers and submissio 
ms to 
ns 
s at 1 being drafted than ever before yet action is rare. This i 
all levels and it is creating an uncertain environment. M 
a time a direction (eg the location of HQ 1 Commando 
will change, then change again and again and again. T 
amount of staff effort that is wasted is enormous. The s 
applies to some of the proactive projects that are going 
any 
Regt) 
he 
a me 
on; 
: you get half way through a task and the goal posts cha 
i and all ou've done thus far has been wasted. 
nge 
1·-n 53 Staying abreast of technofo-gy:··weneec"fto.be.onthe·---r~-----
2d i 7 leadin ~e of new technolo9Y:_ _________ ~----
---
11 i 53 Appreciate the person. One of the most important 
2e i 8 challenges is to have individuals recognised and accep ted 
uty regardless of the role they fulfil. Whether they are the d 
hygiene person or the lead scout of an operational patr ol, 
! providing they are doing their job to the best of their ab ility 
___ t., __ they should be acce~?,ted ~~ual. ___________ _ 
11 j 53 Development of a group ethos and identity, ie: 
~~_L_§! 1_: ___ QQI!.li!.IQ_11 ___ ~f_Qft! .. {B_Q~_9B.QAQ1 .... <:1 .. ~9. .. 1\.JQQ_{~E __ ~.!!~ ~) __ ~_!!~ 
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Appendix4 
skills {where appropr iate) training. 
2. Equitable remune ration {eg SAFA and Pay Rates). 
3. Leadership of the SFGp by HQSO; manned by the best 
; personnel from within the group {as well as some from 
____ _L ___ _Q~t§_iQ~l!l~-------------
-·----------------------------------------- ------------- --------------------
11 i 54 The acquisition and i 
~E L__Q im .!£Ve QE~~.!lC?!:!~--
11 l 54 Integration of SF Com 
3c l 1 orientated SF Task F 
11T5·4 -sellingats_F:_toTtier 
ntegration of technology to continually 
effectiveness. 
--~---~-~----~--~--~-~~------------~·-··¥·--~--~------ ~-- --~~~~---~--~~---
d and Force Elements into mission 
~J::£_~~~i<:>!_Qper~~~!Qt:12_~nd JL~DJE!9!-~--------
est of the Army at all levels {primarily 
3d l 2 achieved by professi onal conduct and high levels of · 
ccasions). Conversely ensuring that SF achievement on all o 
remains relevant to t he Strategic and Operational needs of 
the ADF. 
~- - ~=--·-
and retaining the people we need at the 11 i 54 Recruiting, selecting 
3e i 3 standard we need th 
11 i 54 Conducting realistic 
3f.._L_ 4 training_2--t BQTHJ!l~-
11 i 54 Pay and Allowances 
4a i 5 undergone a sea cha 
em. 
and effective operationally focussed 
individual and collective levels. 
-~-~------------- ------
The structure of the SF Gp has 
I commando is an incr 
nge in the past two years. The 
easingly important part of the group, 
i however he is clearly Not being remunerated to the level that 
__ j __ -~J§_~~!JJ_l:l_n_l;!__!r:~it:Jit:Jg __ 
11 j 54 PT FE Deployability. 
4b J 6 PT currently exists. 
~~-9!:!!E~~~-~~~-g-~-~~!"'{_~·-----------·----------- ___ 
Some legislation for the callout of the 
This legislation does allow for the 
! deployment of part ti 
there is considerable 
employment and as 
ability to deploy part 
me soldiers on operations. However 
risk to the individuals civilian 
such it affects 1 Commando Regt's 
time soldiers at short Ntice. 
, Representation shou ld be made to have this legislation 
ent. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
_____ __! ______ --~11'!~!:!~~-~YJ>~~!!~~-
tage. SF must continue to seek out 11 i 54 Technological Advan 
4c i 7 new technologies to maintain a technological edge in the 
' region. However the 
development in SF a 
strengthen links with 
resources available to this 
re limited and as such we must further 
the development agencies in the US, 
--~~Y~!QE_~d_f{_~Q£~ .. t.>~L!Y:.~----~-~----~---------------. ~--•--·-- ~!l~I~.!b.~re J~~---~-~JL 11 I 54 OS Education. It doe s appear that HQSO is attempting to 
4d I 8 spread the joy regard ing operational deployments. However 
luable deployments regarding future some of the most va 
development of the S 
has a stranglehold o 
commando personne 
F capability are to the US, where SASR 
n deployments. This is preventing 
I from learning and gaining experience 
the most advanced SOF in the world. ____ from what is ar9.!:1~ 
11 ! 54 Information Flow- in -----~-- ------------teroperability, visibility and efficiency 
5a i 9 
----------~-----·-·-----·---·----- ------
Technology N 
-----~--~----~------"~----
Operations N 
Marketing __________ rv 
r=-:--------Selection y 
Training N 
=·------
Pay y 
----~---------------~---
---
Operations y 
-------------------------------¥-• 
Technology N 
__ .......,...,~--~-~~-~-~~-~~-~-~~--=-~= r-y Operations 
Communication y 
11 i 551-F-o_c_u_s --economy of -- . effort and lack of duplication 
5b i 0 
g the capability to perform as a versatile 11: 55 Credibility- displayin 
5c : 1 force of choice 
1ft55 Recognitionof indivi ---~~---~-¥~.-~--~~---~---~----~~~~----~-~~.~-~---~---~--~----~~--~ dual and corporate performance 
Management 
Marketing 
~-~~~--~-----~-~--
Leadership 
-------------------------------------- f:=--
__ !Q_g_!9~dg~~------------·-------------------------------.. --------- _Technology 
5d i 2 
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What is the SF Gp Management 
1 . What are the roles and tasks of each unit within the SF 
Gp? More importantly are they realistic? 
2. Does a third PT Commando Coy add value to the SF Gp 
capability? How do we justify it? 
3. Should 4 RAR take over MGT and Domestic 
CT/Recovery? Is it just an expensive changeover? 
4. Do we need two Commando units? Take the plunge and 
create an integrated unit! 
5. Where do we get our support from? Is maintaining two 
Ops Spt Coys and a small logistic effort at 1 Commando 
viable? Can we effectively brigade these assets at a 
'megabase' on the Eastern Seaboard? 
6. Should we just take the plunge and build an SF 
megabase at Holsworthy, forgetting traditional allegiances to 
Perth and Mosman? 
55 SF Ethos and Recreation of the SF Spirit 
5 1. The SF Gp is growing and Not everyone is from SASR. 
Commandos do have something to offer - just ask most ex-
SAS personnel who have had the 'misfortune' of serving at 1 
Commando Regt. At the moment outsiders/newcomers 
could be forgiven for thinking that Commandos were poor 
cousins. 
2. Likewise there are some good spt staff out there who 
believe that they have something to offer. They go to the 
effort to fit in - they do selection courses and put in the 
hours. Consistently they miss out on deployments, 
exchanges and the like. They are soldiers too. They join the 
Army and SF Gp to do these trips and get experience. 
Remember to look after he who feeds, clothes, houses and 
bombs you up. Keep them happy and they will keep on 
bending over backward, and coming back for more. What is 
more they will tell their mates and promote the SF cause. 
3. An SASR and operator first ethos will only undermine the 
efforts of the SF Gp to establish a more credible profile 
within the 
11 55 SF Pay Pay 
6c 6 SAFA needs a massive overhaul. Essentially it is SAS 
allowance. That's fine! They do something very, very 
special, well deserving of extra-remuneration. So do 
Commandos. ECN 079 is not the same as 343 and should 
be recognised as such. I guess enough has been said on 
IS 1ssue others so I won't on it. 
11 55 All Corps SF Selection 
6d 7 1. There are a lot of good officers and soldiers in the Army 
who have something to offer to SF. Yet apart from a very 
small number of motivated individuals we fail to capture this 
audience. SF needs to target this wide population if it is to 
have any hope of manning its SED, particularly from a 
support staff perspective. 
2. This is Not a case of saying 'Hey SF is in town, come and 
see us at the theatre if u are interested'. We need to 
378 
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6e 
l-11 
7a 
---~---
11 
7b 
i 
11 
7c 
I 
55 
go to the CSSBs, the L SF, the Fd Hasp, the Armd Regt and 
the lnt Cays see their CO/OC and say: 'W 
want one, maybe 
elop them in SF a 
f skills and experie 
to help SF achiev 
nt, and logistical p 
mindset. We nee 
e don't want to 
steal your people. We two of your 
brightest and best, dev nd send them back 
with a whole new set o nces you can use'. 
3. We need their skills e its goals. They 
understand procureme rocesses, they 
knowthelanguage,the d to exploit this and 
have supporting agenc ies develop a pas itive attitude to SF. 
There is a fascination out there, we have 
s with these units use it, develop relation 
M UTU!-J:, __ g_Qi!!_~=-------- ___ 
The Viability of SF Avi ation 
an aura. Let us 
and achieve some · 
-- ----------------------------------
8 1. A dedicated SF Avn Sqn is probably N 
AIR 87 then wha 
e better off training 
F roles? Should w 
0/CH-47 to be AA 
M suite. We aren 
ot realistic. If 
Defence can't organise t hope is there for 
SF Avn? Would web aircrew to use 
existing platforms in S e modify a small 
number of existing S-7 R capable? Do they 
need a FLI R and/or EC 't that big to justify a 
dedicated SF Avn elm. 
2. What input do we t ry and have with C -130J and the 
r:::-----------
Capability 
_ ... ~~r~~C?~!~P!~~~~~~!? 
···--······--·-·--·----·-· ···-· ·-. ····-······-····-------- -------·--·-· ········-·······------------- ·········•·· 
55 Resources 
9 1. As the SF Gp is no w under command 
ously allocated res 
cretion of the form 
he cost of develop 
LCAUST, there is 
56 
greater scope for previ ources to be 
redistributed at the dis ation HQ. When 
this is combined with t ing theFT 
commando capability a nd a tightening of 
reater strain on th 
ces. When this str 
will be required to 
fiscal allocations, 
there will be an even g e units that 
consume these resour ain is great enough, 
either more resources maintain the current 
capability or one of the following may re 
ng activities across 
suit: 
a. a reduction in traini the SF Gp 
(resulting in a reduced capability}, 
b. a reduction in size of the SF Gp (or on e aspect of the 
group), or 
c. a restructure of the SF Gp (and possib ly a change of roles 
for one or more eleme 
-----
l'}tS}: __ 
Manning 
0 As the Army and the A OF as a whole red 
here is a smaller b 
Gp increases to the 
ratio of SF to its r 
be expected upon 
arge, personnel in 
uce the total 
number of personnel, t ase from which SF 
can recruit. If the SF anticipated size, 
therefore changing the ecruiting base, can 
the high standard still selection and can 
the Army staff such a I tensive 
~9~!lisatl<:>DJ_~------ -~--~.~~--~--~-----~-~-~~-
56 CIT. The effect of Cl to be twofold. 
1 1. Firstly, the ARA sol 
T can be expected 
diers are now effe 
e of their predeces 
e job (OJT) to gain 
ctively undergoing 
training for half the tim sors. This will 
mean more time on th the same level of 
proficiency. Will this 0 to the time a soldier 
must spend in their par igibility for selection 
in order t~_gain the sa 
JT time be added 
ent unit prior to el 
me ~~perie_nce lev el? 
.• 
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2. Secondly, a GRes soldier must now spend three times as I 
long to become qualified as a basic infantry soldier. Add this 
to the time it takes to train a fully qualified SF soldier and the 
total time will now be in the vicinity of 3-5 years. The 
following questions need to be asked: 
a. How long does the average GRes soldier stay in the 
Army? Is this long eNugh to train and maintain under the 
CIT system? 
B. Do most GRes soldiers have the capability to undertake a 
period of FTS in order to complete this initial suite of 
courses? 
C. The benefit of recruiting trained infantry soldiers into SF 
to alleviate the initial training time has already been 
discussed. What will the effect be on the manning levels of a 
standard infantry reserve unit who will be targeted to provide 
r--·+·-t·budding volunteers for §F selection? __ 
11 56 Location 
7d 2 1. There has been much talk about where the SF Gp and its 
various elements will be located in the future. One option 
that has emerged is that the SF Gp will be co-located at 
Holsworthy. Although this may be a good option politically 
and economically, it is Not so viable for the PT units that 
require close access to water on the short training periods 
that they undertake. The extra administration and logistics 
that would be involved in moving such a distance every time 
the water is needed will make any such training unfeasible. 
Appendix 4 
Management N y + 
I 
2. The PT Commando Cays regularly conduct amphibious J 
training, rehearsals and raids on a Tuesday night parade. 
This training often takes a parade night well into the hours of 
the following morning. This would be exemplified if the unit 
N N 
-,-,-- -~ ___ .YY~I~_Q9L!C?.9~lS.~.r:!~~!-~~~-e.!:____ __ ____________ __ __________ _ ____ _____ ___ _ __ _ __ ______ _____ _ ___ __ __ __ _ 
11 56 Emergency of Technology Technology N N N I Y Y N 
7e 3 1. There are many aspects of technology that the SF soldier 
must grasp in order to remain proficient. This includes I 
information systems (C41evel and combat control systems), 
1 
equipment, weapons and most importantly for SF, non-lethal 
weapons. In many roles within SF (including CT, personnel 
and equipment recovery and peace keeping), non-lethal 
weapons provide an excellent option for subduing personnel 
without drawing undue negative PR through collateral 
damage and dead enemy personnel. 
2. It will become harder for a soldier to remain proficient in 
all aspects of technology as this area diversifies. More time 
, will need to be spent training and maintaining these skills 
___ _j ____ ~avir]_gJ_~~~!!_meJ.c:>.r:.~..9_'!l_~~.I.e.!~ed -~~i!!.~J!~r:!L~g~------------- _______________________ ,_, __ ,__, ______ _ 
11 I 56 SED. Due to the inability to meet the current manning Personnel Y Y N N N N 
8a i 4 requirements, it is important to develop an integrated SED 
l for the Commandos. 
11 r 56 Legislation. The implementatiOn of legisT~iion-thatallows the PartTime _______ --~f ··v N- -N -Nrv· 
a~ _ _L__§_ SF G£Jg_h_arness th~ P~ __ e.!~'!!.~JJ£U?.9~!r~-~~J.Q __ !t!~ .. f~Q.:_ -=---- ______ ·-:--:- ----f-:-:- ~jN 
j5~~;~~~£~~t~;~;~~~;r~;~~·rs. p:~--~"~: ~r NJ: 
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are recognised financially and the system is fair and 
itable. 
11 ! 56 Technological Advantage. Many projects for the SF Gp Equipment 
8d ! 7 seem to be done in isolation so that only one unit benefits 
from the results. The development methodology should 
1 ... inc!~g~_~l_§t~~~I:JQIC:i_~~~ '{'o'Q~~~--~PP_!I?P!!~!~:- ............ . 
11 i 56 Promotion. It is important to market the SF Gp as offering a Personnel 
Be · 8 career for both officers and soldiers and the need to target 
the correct for the mann of the SF G 
11 1 56 Fitness - PT designed Not to wear people down. Training 
9a i 9 
11 ! 57 Equipment - look at Equipment 
9b ; 0 task at hand Not an 
11 · 57 Medical - one standard for the entire Army Not double Leadership 
1 standards for the different commands. 
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57 Welfare - more emphasis should be centred on family unity. Personnel 
2 ' 
57 Conditions of Service should be maintained for the retention Personnel 
3 of soldiers Army wide, members should be informed of all 
the entitlements he/she is entitled to. 
Orientation to Asia/Pacific 
Recruiting of both sexes Mixed Gender 
Person management skills Leadership 
Adaptation of the new Personnel 
Acceptance of change Personnel 
57 Recognition of SF Units. A soldier in the SF Gp should be Personnel 
1 a 9 proud to say he is a member of the SF and feel he is respect 
as an equal in the SF community. Individuals and units 
should Not be seen as being better because they train full 
time or because they have a more distinguished unit history. 
Be standardising the SF selection course it will reduce this 
mentality. However soldiers will always see the SAS as 
being more elite than the Commandos, which will continue 
the 'us and them' attitude. I feel the SF Gp should become a 
standardised organisation with standardised specialist skills. 
Unit would still maintain different capabilities however the 
soldier would have done the same basic SF training. Also a 
standardised emblem should be given to the SF Gp instead 
of having different unit badges. By doing this, units would 
simply be known as One, Two and Three Regiments or by 
their capability such as Reconnaissance, Strike and 
Recovery Regiments. This will hopefully reduce any 
and allow soldiers intcrnnt:lr<l 
12 58 lnteroperability. SF soldiers both Part Time (PT) and Full Training 
1 b 0 Time (FT), should be able to operate in the SF community 
depending on the individuals and units NTM requirements. 
By maintaining standardised training across the SF Gp, an 
individual could have the to nn<>r<l1IO 
.. :L~~~:~~~l~---L--------------L-L~--L-~-J_-~ 
381 
Appendix 4 
organisation depending on his aptitude and abilities. This 
will allow greater flexibility for planners at Headquarters and 
also allow a better posting cycle for soldiers. PT soldiers 
would then have the ability to conduct Full Time Service 
12158 ~=:~:!~~;r~~;;:;;;~~-~;;;~n;;: __ Trilin9 ___ NY N~N--N N 
1 c i 1 have interoperability and a standardisation of training across II 
· the SF Gp, a SFTC must be established. This training 
centre should be the heart of the SF Gp and control Not only 
doctrine but also all SF courses. By standardising courses 
and conducting them at one location it will reduce any 
discrepancies in training. Also by conducting all SF courses 
at the SFTC it would increase the overall SF Gp efficiency 
and allow better soldier interoperability between units. I feel 
this will occur over the next few years however the SASR 
should be trying to lead the way by providing experienced 
j operators as instructors. I also believe the SASR has a lot to 
i offer the Commando Regts in future SF doctrine and 
·--L~- l?_21icies. --------··-----··---------------------- ·-----------l·-::-o-1-:-:-+-:-:+-:-:+:-::-!-:-:-l 
12 ' 58 Establishment of an SF Gp Goal and Not Three Individual Leadership N Y N N N N 
1 d 2 Unit Goals. The future of the SF Gp depends on the clear 
definition of unit roles, capabilities and size of force required 
to maintain these capabilities. Once these issues have been 
decided, an overall SF Gp goal can be established so as to 
refine these capabilities. Only be clearly defining these 
issues will units be truly distinguishable which will assist in 
the esprit de corp of the SF Gp. Also as a result of this 
analysis, unit manning and size may change which may 
_____ , ______ ~~':!lt.!!l .. ~~~-gQ_~t_d_l}~_Q!_i~!~9!~_t_j_q!)_Q_f_I,J!lH§l~--------··-------···-·-· ------------------- -· -:-:-f--- --- -c·:- ~-
12 58 Integration. RTA has highlighted the need for the Australian Personnel Y Y N IN N N 
1 e 3 Army to place more emphasis on the PT Army. With the 
reduction in numbers of the FT Army, it has meant a I 
reduction in the pool of personnel who could be selected for 
the SF Gp. This therefore means that the SF Gp must also I 
rely on PT personnel to maintain unit manning. Units in the 
SF Gp could maintain a c~rtain size force of PT personnel 
who have the ability to conduct FTS or deploy on a suitable 
NTM. However, it would mean that it could take the PT 
soldier a number of years to become fully qualified due to the 
large amount of specialist skills required by personnel in SF 
units. I believe for this concept to succeed there must be a 
new rationale in the PT Army to change the focus away from 
time in rank to focus on skills competency. An example is 
instead of having SF PT soldiers spend previous time doing 
subject courses, they should focus on their individual 
specialist skills and abilities. Therefore after a few years the 
unit would have highly skilled PT soldiers and Not poorly 
skilled PT NCOs. Also by operating in the same unit as FT 
personnel they will feel part of a larger team and Not as an 
unwanted member of the SF Gp. Sooner or later there has 
to be a reason why so much money and time is spent on 
, ______ , ___ ,_;_th.c.::e...:.s--=-e ~oldie!~-~!bQ.l:l_t_p_!g_yLd~_l}_g_~--r~-~!~~J~~-~~R~!?_!!!!Y.~---------·--- --------------------· ---- __ ________ _ ____ _ 
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58 With the current constrain Management Y Y N N N N ts placed upon the military, in 
the availability of finance for 
seems ludicrous that SF is 
4 numbers of personnel and 
58 
equipment and training, it 
expanding at such a rate. 
be supported by the curre 
personnel. It seems to m 
This expansion rate surely cannot 
nt standing Army in regards to 
there is a functional HQ el 
e that within the 1 Commando Regt 
ement and QM stream that with 
quite easily have been able to 
ommando element. This utilisation 
minimal expansion would 
accommodate a regular c 
of 1 Commando Regt caul d have saved the duplication that 
g within the 4 RAR (Cdo). The 
commando unit was sound, 
is now seen to be occurrin 
initial concept of a regular 
however, the reality of bei 
beyond the current streng 
ng able to support such a unit is 
th of the ADF. Maybe the SF Gp 
onally lower and bolster the 1 should set our sights fracti 
CommarJdO Regt with a re 
The appeal of getting the 
~ular commando force. _c.~-!-::::::-----:-·-+:-~+:-:+.:-:+::-+-: 
I df th P I YNY!NN r:-:-N regu ar comman o orce on e ersonne 
5 ground is a nice to have b ut has been to the detriment of the ,. 
reserve force element. C urrently there is an imbalance of 
support personnel posted within the SF Gp. 4 RAR (Cdo) 
has RAEME pers in abun dance who have limited equipment 
to maintain whilst the rese rve unit, with its full compliment, 
makes do with possibly o 
this should be addressed. 
58 I am currently led to belie 
ne craftsman per company. I feel 
veihat-th-ere--is.areView-bei-ng___ -- Leade-rship ___ ---+,No-:-1--:y-::+-:f\d·r\f~ N 
6 conducted as to the feasi bility of the regular commando I 
battalion. If this is so, wh 
change the current select 
unit's individual requireme 
published. Why is it rushi 
y has SF perceived the need to I 
ion process to accommodate both 
1 
nts before the results have been 
ng into something that may have to 
be reversed. In the pasts ix years SASR have been driven 
to change by members ill conceived ideas which have had to 
be reversed. In the proce ss it has caused damage and 
disruption to the system o 
gains. I believe the SF G 
shouldn't ~l:l_an~_!_q_~_!_~_f; 
58 Military personnel posted 
ut of all proportion to the foreseen ~-
p should look before it leaps, it 
ake of outside influences. 
--------------------------·--·-·--·-·--- -----------------·-···-··-- ----1·---. ----· 
to SF units within the Q system Personnel Y Y N N N N 
7 should be closely vetted b y the system so as to place the 
58 
right person in the job. Th e CQMS position is Not something 
a battalion can easily grasp due that a regular person from 
mainly to the size of the a ccount he would be working with. 
battalion to the company is usually 
auld Not be prepared to administer 
deal with the associated problems 
possibly the Bn RQ level. This is a 
isolated commando company 
A member posted from a 
done on promotion. He w 
an account of this size or 
that may be only found at 
major concern for OCs in 
locations. 
----------·---------
Knee jerk reactions are s -----------··-·-·-·----------------------··-·-·-------- -------·--··-··-------·-- . --··--!·-··-·- --- -~ een as panic within the system and Equipment N N N 1 N N Y 
8 thus do Not instill confide nee in a special force unit. Any J 
reaction to a potential pro blem should be addressed by the 
qualified personnel within the system and widely 
disseminated before beco ming law, ie the preparation of 
weapon systems erior to working_!!1_~n am12hibious .. _ __ '-'---
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environment and the oiling of 
~---~---~-~~d_et __ r_i~e~_~jQ_~~~~e~E~~-~~---------~--:-~=--------------~--~,~-----r~~--~-;-,-4-~ 
58 Consolidation of the SF Gp into one unit. SASR, 1 Capability 
9 Commando Regt and 4 RAR (Cdo) currently duplicate some 
roles and tasks and are occasionally reluctant to share 
information. The ADF would benefit if they were part of the 
one unit with each element specialising inthe various skills. 
12 59 Selection and placemenTofreinforc.ements: -·=rFieco"in:-_b_,..~i~n:'e:.:.:d:::: ... +S-e-cl·e--c--t~io_n ______ -l-:-o-~+:c":·f.c-:4--l··::-:-l 
3b 0 selection course is a positive step and needs to be 
developed to comprehensively determine an applicant's 
suitability for SO. The current SF Reinforcement Analysis 
'"'""'"'''""'to address most of these issues. 
59 Officer development and management. In the past this has Personnel 
1 been lacking. Current procedures are a vast improvement. 
This can only have an extremely positive effect on the SF 
§_P· .......................................................................................... ________________________________________ +·:··-.,-·------_-··-----------------····1-:-:·+:··:·1-,--,-+-:·c--f·c-_-1--:·:--l 
12 59 Targeting specialist personnel. We should actively acquire Selection 
3d 2 pers with spec skills in areas such as technology, security, 
regional specialists, languages, weapons and explosives to 
. name a few. This includes females an~_pe:_.:.r_s~ ___ o= __ f: ___ e:_t_:oh __ ::n_:i_c,, ........ c.·..: .• >e:.:.:-J---------------------------+--:+----+---+---+---
12 59 Establishment of a Force Projection Cell. This cell would Operations 
3e 3 address and develop the current shortfall in our ability to 
deploy and co-ordinate our FEs to deal with situations 
outside Australia. 
12 59 Orientated Equipment. Ensuring all equipment is Equipment 
4a 4 specifically designed tor SF roles rather than trying to modify 
conventional communications. ~~~~=~~~----+"~---:--~---------+~~--~~-1~,~~-r.~l 12 59 Realism in Training. Ascertaining a realistic role tor SF Capability 
4b 5 GRes. If 1 Commando Regt is a GRes unit it has limitations 
of deployability simply because the Government has political 
ems d the reserve. 
12 59 Co-ord Between SF, RAN, RAAF. To ensure SF elements, Management 
4c i 6 RAN and RAAF can work together smoothly there needs to 
be more education and co-ordination between these 
12 • 59 Access to Training. Regardless of which unit within the SF Training 
4d , 7 Gp an individual comes from, he/she must have greater 
' access to standardised f--------+-----
12 • 59 Marketing. The Marketing 
4e_ : 8 Australia's SF 
12 ! 59 Selection 
Sa , 9 1. With the raising of 4 RAR (Cdo) as a regular commando 
regiment, the number of ARA SF personnel required will 
increase greatly. This places an extra burden on the SF Gp 
to select and train troops. In an army that is being reduced 
in size, an increase in the number of SF troops means that 
more are going to be selected from less. As identified in 
Reference A, 'our competitive edge is gained through our 
people'. The challenge then is going to be to attract enough 
high quality personnel to the SF Gp to maintain the high 
standards set by Australian SF to date. 
2. Exactly what is required of an SF soldier serving in 
SASR, 4 RAR (Cdo) or 1 Commando Regt in a rapidly 
world needs to be identified. Are the fundamental 
'--·· •• t .. :..:..:.:;;.:c.:..<il::...:v •.• :: 
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attributes required the same? Because of the primarily 
offensive role of commandos, is a different type of soldier 
needed for the reconnaissance and surveillance focus of 
SASR? Is 4 RAR (Cdo) going to be a stepping-stone to 
SASR? If so, what age are personnel going to be when they 
are selected for service with SASR? 
3. There is no question that SF personnel need to be of the 
highest quality. However, it is recognized that capable and 
professional soldiers are needed in all areas of the modern 
Australian Army. The other corps and branches of the army 
are going to take a dim view of 'losing' a large portion of their 
more capable soldiers to SF. The SF Gp needs to show that 
army at large receives a generous return for their 
'""'"'<>·trn•:ont of soldiers. t-·-· ---+---·-1--'-C..C 
12 60 Career Management. Personnel 
5b 0 1. Career management of soldiers in the SF Gp will be very 
important in the retention of personnel. Some issues relating 
career management are as follows: 
a. Retention of rank on posting to 4 RAR (Cdo) as an 
operator, 
b. SASR and 4 RAR (Cdo) troops being interchangeable, 
c. Subject courses specific to SF, 
d. Establishment of career streams, 
e. Dedicated SF support staff, and 
f. Deployment of 4 RAR (Cdo) personnel in conventional 
roles. 
12 60 Defining SF Capability 
5c 1 1. In an environment where resources, especially soldiers 
are becoming increasingly finite, the SF Gp needs to have a 
clear vision of what capabilities it must provide to the ADF. 
Once these capabilities are decided upon and established 
they should be promoted (inside the limits of security) within 
e army and the ADF as a whole. Commanders at all levels 
ld then be aware of what the group can offer their 
organisation and what it cannot. 
2. Justification of the SF Gp's existence requires it to be 
recognized as a highly professional and capable 
organization. This may require responses to input from 
outside sources. 
12 60 Roles Leadership 
5d 2 1. The capabilities that the SF Gp will provide to the ADF 
are multi-faceted varying from offensive in nature to 
humanitarian operations. A clear division of possible roles 
should be determined. This will allow units to concentrate on 
r tasks and develop a greater expertise in these specific 
areas. 
2. If an entity called the SF Gp is to function effectively there 
should be N 'poor cousins'. Units within the group should be 
confident that they are on an equal footing with the other SF 
units. Unit pride will grow once units are given clear roles. 
There are also implications on the selection and training of 
personnel. It would be retrograde to establish an element of 
the SF that is Forces'. 
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12 60 1 Commando Regt 
5e 3 1. If SF is to be defined in terms of capability, the role of 1 
Commando Regt in contributing to this capability needs to be 
examined. As mentioned above, the competition for 
resources throughout Army and the ADF has intensified. 
Therefore justification of expenditure is becoming essential if 
units intend to receive the same annual allocation of 
resources. Against this background the expense of 
maintaining a part time commando regiment could be seen 
as excessive, unless its role in the group can be clearly 
identified. 
2. The desirability of having equal partners in the SF Gp has 
also been discussed. It is difficult to see how this perception 
within the group and the wider army could be prevented 
unless the 1 Commando Regt contribution is demonstrable. 
3. The current policy of selected part time personnel from 1 
Commando Regt supplementing ARA overseas deployments 
is a positive step in establishing a capability. This could be 
expanded to deployments of teams or ideally sub-units on 
tasks or training activities. 
4. Another strategy for development of 1 Commando Regt 
could be to employ part time personnel in ARA SF units on 
full time service tor extended periods. This practice would 
establish the reputation of part time personnel as capable SF 
Appendix 4 
Capability Y Y N N N N 
' soldiers and enhance the skill base in 1 Commando • 
. 1
1 
I [ Regjment. 
·~f'6~ ~~~~!~~~;:~:i~~~=~;:~~~~~~i~;_i~;~~~~t .. th-:et --- Manage-ment _____ v v -r\JTN I r;.f N 
environment, and the changing doctrine of the ADF. 
Special Forces Group is to capitalise on change and cement 
; itself as a permanent and indispensable part of the ADF 
I ORBAT, I believe we need to address the personnel and 
__ _j __ o~gani~ati2_n issues disc~:~2~ed.________________ . ________ --+---11--+--+--+--i 
~; j_6~ ~f~~~~~[~~~~~IQ~h;~~~i~l~~~u:~_v_~:-~~~-~~~~=-::~~:i~~~~- ~~~~~:~-·-----·---· N N ~1~- y N 
12 i 60 SF part time members being more involved in the goals of Part Time N Y N 1 N N N 
6b I 6 SO and maintaining an element at a higher state of 
l readiness 
'12.! 60 Maintaining controTot S-F-·eTements under-~:iaso-raXherthan~- Manageme-n'f N y N N N N 
6c i 7 tor exam~le the ne'{V SFTC COfT!ing under Training_Com_m~an __ d-+::::------+-:c-:-r::-:-t-:-:-t·-=~~--:--:-i 
12 ! 60 Career management in SF Personnel Y N N l N N N 
6d i 8 
____ _L __ --------------------------------·-·--l·-::--:-=---f-:-:-t-:-:-~+:-::-t-:-~+·:-c1 
12 l 60 Viability of 1 Commando Regiment Capability N Y N N N N 
6e i 9 -1~ns1 un-it_r.oies-ancftasl<smust ·be-Ciearlycfeiined~-fliey_m_ustbe--~peraiio-ns------,,r'Y- r;;r N N N 
?.~J_..Q -~ealistic__~!:l.9.. evenly_~ai~!J£~-~thin the~f.§~ . __ _ 
12 I 61 Duplication of effort within the group must be reduced Management N Y N N N N 
7b i 1 
·12 i 6f The group-needs restructuring to reduce-waste.arldproduce- Capability-- N Y N N N N 
7c 2 the most effective and efficient use of resources. Why is 
there a need for Full Time and Part Time Commando 
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61 Reduction of intra Special Forces Group politics 
3 1-:,.::: •• ;---·:::+:o::··-·········---·---·-----·-·-............................ _,_,_,._ ................................ _, .................. .., .......... +--·--------·--------··-.. ---J----+----1---+· 
Recognition of the value and effort of non SAS units within Pay 
the SF Group in the form of restructuring and broadening 
allowances to adequately compensate members of those 
units 
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RECONFIGURING FOR THE STABLE STATE 
Appendix 5 
The list below sets out the order in which Capacities were achieved through 
organisational realignments to achieve the optimum stable state. The central idea 
that supports this realignment process is that those organisational capacities or 
competencies that are more tightly bound to the effects should determine the 
shape and structure of the organisation. Effectively the colours within the report at 
Figure 29 (although using the 'Capability to undertake' ratings) are being adjusted 
to bring high levels of capability to the left of the chart and force a reduction in 
capability for those means (and their underlying) capacities that have less utility. 
1. Communicate using foreign languages 
2. Establish and maintain cover/legend/appropriate norms 
3. Establish rapport/win trust 
4. Operate in a civilian environment 
5. Implement psychological operations 
6. Manage distribution of resources 
7. Elicit information 
8. Identify networks of contacts 
9. Analyse information 
10. Build personal profile 
11. Evade surveillance and access control measures 
12. Observe/monitor using surveillance/intercept devices 
13. Employ target acquisition and cueing devices 
14. Employ support weapons 
15. Defeat security systems 
16. Place surveillance/intercept devices 
17. Breach information systems 
18. Interfere with electronic/manual information systems 
19. Recreate events 
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20. Administer business 
21. Interfere with production and services 
22. Track financial dealings and assets exchanges 
23. Provide funds 
24. Provide shelters and basic living facilities 
25. Broadcast information 
26. Handle and preserve evidence 
27. Seal an area 
Means - Capacities Set Completion Procedure 
In this section I set out the full solution procedure for completing Means -
Capacities sets (a 'Means - Capacity set' is defined as the group of Capacities 
required to achieve a single Means. A worked example is set out on page 3 of this 
appendix. 
The table below shows the Means with their associated Capacities shortfall, how 
many are in the set and the percentage complete resulting from this. The list has 
been ordered on the Capacities shortfall column with fewest at the top. 
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assistance to dissident movements 
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Algorithm Description 
Begin with the assumption: A single Means needs all of its Capacities to be 
present and able to be performed in order to achieve the Means. 
The aim of the process is to determine the optimum order of achieving Capacities 
so that the most Means could be performed with the achievement of the fewest 
possible Capacities. An iterative process is used, involving the selection of the 
best Capacity to adopt in each iteration, or cycle. In each cycle the Capacities that 
bring the most number of Capacity sets (or Means) to 'near completion' are 
chosen. 
Worked Example 
In the table below are the two Means (Establish haven and Sponsor relocation) 
that contain the fewest Capacity shortfalls for cycle two. Also shown is the 
number and statement of Capacities necessary to complete these two Means. 
Establish haven 
Sponsor relocation 
2 Provide shelters and basic living facilities 
2 Seal an area 
2 Implement psychological operations 
2 Manage distribution of resources 
The next step compares each of the four Capacities to identify how many Means 
would be completed with each individual Capacity. In this example, Implement 
psychological operations and Manage distribution of resources are selected as 
they bring to near or full completion a larger number of Capacities sets and in 
fewer cycles than the other two Capacities. 
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Comparing the first five (see table below) Means - Capacities shortfalls for each 
of the four Capacities, we see: 
• Implement psychological operations has 2, 3, 4, 4 and 5. 
• Manage distribution of resources has 2, 7, 8, 8 and 8. 
• Provide shelters and basic living facilities has 2, 5, 7, 8 and 8. 
• Seal an area has 2 and 10. 
Implement psychological operations has the lowest set of numbers and, therefore, 
rates as the most valuable Capacity for this Cycle, in contrast Seal an area is the 
least valuable. The remaining two, .whilst similar, do not outweigh the value of 
completing the set for Sponsor relocation. 
• Create false business or inject super- i 10 
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• 
• 
Provide shelters and basic living 
facilities C--------------·---------------j---------------------------------------------------~~--------------~ 
• Empower local functionaries and 
local 
• Materiel/financial/intelligence 14 
assistance to dissident movements 
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Means in Order of Being Solved 
The table below contains the ordered sequence of Means completed using the 
process outlined earlier. It should be remembered that after each cycle the entire 
Means list is re-ordered within the decision-making logic to reflect changed 
priorities, resulting from the partial solving of Means that occur at lower levels. 
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Note: 
! 
1 Provide communications 
2 Sponsor relocation 
3 Release information to media 
4 Engage with neutral/hostile groups 
Foster and exploit relationships with key individuals 
5 Collect Humint 
6 Wide surveillance 
7 Cue precision weapons 
8 Attack by stand off 
9 Attack by close action 
Strike individuals or small groups 
10 Accompany other forces 
Seize and recover individuals or small groups 
11 Recover detainees/friendly forces/authorised 
Stand off info gathering (technical/cueing) 
12 Close reconnaissance/monitor specific target/named area 
Deceive physically/electroniCally 
Tap-hack electronic information systems 
13 Collection technical information/items 
Escort specialists 
14 Penetrate/ threaten leader physical security 
Provide close protection 
15 Deny resources/render key infrastructure 
Disrupt shipping and facilities 
Interfere with aircraft movement and facilities 
16 Create false business or inject super-competitive products 
Damage product or brand 
Threaten/damage leader personal wealth 
17 Manipulate financial holdings/stocks 
Manipulate/damage business functions 
Orchestrate 3rd party attack 
18 Enable infrastructure 
Generate/train forces 
Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO effort 
Provide vital services and/or resources 
19 Disseminate physical/electronic psychological operations material 
Appendix 5 
Empower local functionaries and support local organisations 
Materiel/financial/intelligence assistance to dissident movements (onshore also) 
20 Attack leader moral/financial integrity/authority 
Establish haven 
Gather evidence 
Penetrate/infiltrate groups/networks 
Text in bold indicates the Means and Capacities that were chosen in each cycle. 
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Cycle 1 
• 
• Seize and recover individuals or small · 13 
I 
ousme:ss or inject super- '14 
! • 
• :14 
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• Stand off info gathering 
• Deny resources/render key 11 
infrastructure ineffective 
• Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO 11 
effort 
f-···--------------------------·----------~---------t--------------.-----------------------·-----------'-------------.-----
• 
• Seize and recover individuals or small : 13 ! 
• or inject super- i 14 
• j 14 
397 
• Attack leader moraVfinancial 
• Interfere with aircraft movement and 17 
facilities 
• Deny resources/render key 
infrastructure ineffective 
• Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO : 11 
effort . 
• 
• 14 
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• 
• Interfere with aircraft movement and 17 
• Deny resources/render key 
infrastructure ineffective 
• Infiltrate/manipulate/concentrate NGO i 11 
effort . 
................................ ............................. .... j.......... .. .............................. .. 
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• Create false business or inject super-
• Disseminate physical/electronic 14 
psy~~s>!?_g!~a} ()P~!~!!()!!~ ~~ten_~--a_l __ ........... -+-········································· 
Gather evidence 
17 
17 
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Cycle2 
• Seize and recover individuals or small 
• Create false business or inject super- 10 
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~--. ·-···--········ --- --··-····-···············-··· 
Provide shelters and basic 
facilities 
f--·----····-·····-- -------·-·- _ ---------+--·--==-=:.::.:..~c..=..:.c,.,c:.:c::.c:.::::.c:.:::.:=. ________ -t-77---·--·------j 
• MaterieVfinanciaVintelligence 14 
assistance to dissident movements 
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Cycle3 
• Seize and recover individuals or small 
• Recover detainees/friend! y 
for~~~il!_l!..th.()r:i~~~Y~!~onnel ____ 
• MaterieVfinanciaVintelligence 12 
assistance to dissident movements 
• Penetrate/ threaten leader physical 12 
• Interfere with aircraft movement and 13 
facilities 
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405 
Cycle4 
Engage with 
neutral/hostile groups 
thr,roncrh intermediaries 
• Foster and exploit 
relationships with key 
individuals 
• 
• Empower local 
functionaries and support 
local 
2 
• Infiltrate/manipulate/con 5 
centrate NGO effort 
• Provide vital services 5 
Appendix 5 
and/or resources 
----··-··--------····-------------------------------··--------------------·-··--------+----------------------------------------------- --+----------------------------------------·1 
• Collection technical 6 
information/items 
406 
Build personal profile 
I 
6 
• Close 7 
reconnaissance/monitor 
specific target/named 
area of interest 
• Disseminate 7 
physical/electronic 
psychological operations 
material 
• Orchestrate 3rd party i7 
attack 
• Create false business or 8 
inject super-competitive 
• Threaten/damage leader 
wealth 
• MaterieVfinanciaVintellig ! 1 0 
ence assistance to 
dissident movements 
• Penetrate/ threaten leader : 10 
• 
• Attack leader 
moral/financial 
• Disrupt shipping and 
facilities 
• Interfere with aircraft 
movement and facilities 
• Manipulate/damage 
business functions 
• Engage with 
neutral/hostile groups 
intermediaries 
• Empower local 
functionaries and support 1 
local 
12 
12 
12 
12 
2 
• Infiltrate/manipulate/con • 5 
centrate NGO effort 
• Strike individuals or i 5 
small 
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iO! 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Seize and recover 
individuals or small 
Disseminate 
physical/electronic 
psychological operations 
material 
Orchestrate 3rd party 
attack 
Create false business or 
inject super-competitive 
Recover 
detainees/friendly 
forces/authorised 
7 
7 
8 
leader i9 
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• Materiel/financial/intellig 10 
Evade surveillance and access control 
measures 
ence assistance to 
dissident movements 
• Penetrate/ threaten leader 10 
• Attack leader 
moral/financial 
• Disrupt shipping and 
facilities 
• Interfere with aircraft 
movement and facilities 
• Manipulate/damage 
business functions 
• Collect Humint 
408 
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··-····----------·········-··-··-···········-·1 
• 
• Materiellfinancial/intellig ·10 
ence assistance to 
dissident movements 
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....... __ j~ns~or~_~!~ol_____ _ _____ _ 
-·--·-------------·-·---------------·----~---
• Penetrate/ threaten leader : 10 
• '11 
• i12 
morallfi nancial 
-~--··- ·-------------- ---------·--------{--- ----~~~~~~~-----r:--,:-----------------1 
• Disrupt shipping and i 12 
···------·-· -----···--
facilities 
• Interfere with aircraft i12 
• 
• 
• 
• 
movement and facilities 
Manipulate/damage 
business functions 
:12 
--- - - --- --- --------------- ---------------- . ----·--------------~- ------
Accompany other forces 12 
Seize and recover 
individuals or small 
Stand off info gathering 6 
Close 7 
reconnaissance/monitor 
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• Recover 
detainees/friendly 
forces/authorised 
• Penetrate/ threaten leader 10 
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____ p_hy~ic_~~~~~£~Y- __ ____ ----:--,--.,--------- _________________________ _ 
Attack leader 12 
• Disrupt shipping and 12 
facilities 
• Interfere with aircraft r 12 
movement and facilities 
• Manipulate/damage : 12 
business functions 
• Close 
reconnaissance/monitor ' 
specific target/named 
area of interest >------- ---- -------- -- ------------ --- ----------- . - -. ------ ------------------· ---- -----+----------------------------------
• Gather evidence 
• Recover ;s 
detainees/friend! y 
forces/authorised 
• MaterieVfinanciaVintellig 10 
ence assistance to 
dissident movements 
• Attack leader 
moral/financial 
• Disrupt shipping and i 12 
facilities 
------------------------ --- -- ---------------------+-,-~------ -------------
• Interfere with aircraft 12 
movement and facilities 
• Manipulate/damage 12 
business functions 
ri>;:~;~-;;t~;:-~ -------------- --------------------- ----- ~- -----------,---~--:---:·----------------- -----:·-:._--------------------------- ------j 
______ -~~~lte~~~~~_E~~~-~_\'i~g f~~!~ities 
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• Infiltrate/manipulate/con 
centrate NGO effort 
• Provide vital services 5 
and/or resources 
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• Seize and recover !5 
individuals or small 
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specific target/named 
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reconnaissance/monitor 
specific target/named area 
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physicaVelectronic 
psychological operations 
material 
movement and facilities 
Orchestrate 3rd party 3 
attack 
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